Archive for the ‘International Governments’ Category

North Korean iron ore continues flowing into China, reports suggest

Friday, August 12th, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Despite firm promises from Chinese officials of full sanctions enforcements, reports from Daily NK suggest that iron ore is still being exported in substantial quantities from North Korea. Sanctions allow imports of iron ore when proceeds benefit “livelihood purposes,” but this seems to be a very difficult criteria to ensure in practice:

Thousands of tons of iron ore exports from the North are pouring into China daily, despite UN Security Council sanctions issued in April that ban states from procuring minerals from the regime unless related to “livelihood purposes”, Daily NK has learned.
“The Chinese regions facing Musan County in North Korea are teeming with thirty- and forty-ton trucks loaded with iron ore,” a source in China with knowledge of North Korean affairs told Daily NK in a telephone conversation on August 11.
Sources in North Hamgyong Province corroborated this news.
The trucks, he added, are mostly transporting iron ore to a classification yard near Helong City in China. In the past, the railways near Helong running along the Tumen River border area were not frequently utilized. But recently China added express freight trains on this route, presumably to facilitate more expedient transport of North Korean iron ore to local steel mills. More broadly, the source asserted the development indicates Beijing’s future intentions to expand trade with the North.
Connecting dozens of 100-ton freight cars, the express trains transport some 2,000 tons in a single shipment, with several round trips transpiring daily. Moreover, the source noted, “Some cargo trucks transport goods from Musan Mine across the submerged bridge on Tumen River directly to steel mills in China.”
The partially underwater bridge, made by connecting slabs of rock large enough to permit vehicular transport, was constructed in the early 2000s to facilitate the Sino-North Korean iron ore trade industry. However, following the implementation of strong global sanctions earlier in the year, iron exports plummeted, rendering the bridge obsolete.
More recently, however, this crude piece of infrastructure is experiencing a resurgence, coming as quite a surprise to local Chinese residents. The source explained that goods passing through Chilsong Customs are checked thoroughly, item by item. Customs officers at the underwater bridge, on the other hand, merely record the total number of shipments passing through, making it the preferred conduit for proscribed goods.
The general rise in trade can also be noted in Dandong, the gateway to 70 percent of trade between the North and China. A source in the city told Daily NK earlier in the month that after the reopening of the aging Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge, after yet another round of repairs, the volume of shipments has been on a steady uptick.
“Roughly 1,000 trucks, each with a 20-ton loading capacity, are laden with diverse goods and pulling into Sinuiju daily. That’s more than a ten-fold increase,” she said.
Full article:
North Korean iron ore exports to China booming despite sanctions
Daily NK
Choi Song Min
2016-08-12
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Is North Korea’s food situation really getting worse? The markets don’t think so.

Friday, July 22nd, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Since early 2016, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) has been sounding the alarm bells on North Korea’s food situation. In an interview a few weeks ago with Voice of America’s Korean-language edition, FAO-official Christina Cosiet said that this years’ harvest would be the worst one in four years. One question, dealt with before by this blog, is how bad this really is. After all, the past few years seem to have been abnormally good in a long-run perspective.

But another obvious question is: why do market prices in North Korea tell the opposite story about food supply?

Prices for both rice and foreign currency (US-dollars) have remained remarkably stable for a situation where people should be expecting a worse-than-usual harvest. It is important to bear in mind that prices are largely seasonal and tend to increase in September and October. But unless prices somehow skyrocket in a couple of months, things do not look that bad.

There seem to be two possibilities here: either official production and food supply through the public distribution system simply does not matter that much, because shortages are easily offset by private production and/or imports. Or, the FAO projections simply do not capture North Korean food production as a whole.

For an overview of food prices in the last few years, consider the following graph (click here for larger version):

graph1

Graph 1: Prices for rice and foreign currency, in North Korean won. Prices are expressed in averages of local prices in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan. Data source: DailyNK market prices.

As this graph shows, both the exchange rate and rice prices have remained relatively stabile over the past few years. Thus far, this summer has been no exception. The following graph shows exchange rates and rice prices from the spring of 2015 till July 2016 (click here for larger version):

graph2

Graph 2: Prices for rice and foreign currency, April 2015–July 2016, in North Korean won. Prices are expressed in averages of local prices in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan. Data source: DailyNK market prices

This does not look like the behavior of a nervous market where supply is declining at a drastic rate. Of course, a number of caveats are in order: again, prices are likely to rise through September and October, as they have in the past. Moreover, markets may react to any harvest declines at a later point in time, as they become more apparent.

Even so, it seems inconceivable that market prices would remain so stable if North Korea was experiencing a steep dive in food production. After all, farmers would be able to see signs fairly early on, and their information would presumably spread through the market as a whole. In short, it is logically unthinkable that markets simply would not react to an unusually poor harvest.

This all begs the question of how much market prices tend to correlate with the FAO:s harvest figures overall. The short answer appears to be: not much. The graph below (click here for larger version) shows the average prices for rice and foreign exchange per year on the North Korean market since 2011, and harvest figures drawn from reports by the FAO and the World Food Program (WFP). (See the end of this post for a more detailed explanation of the underlying calculations.)*

graph3

Graph 3: Yearly average market prices for rice and US-dollar (in North Korean won), and FAO food production figures. Data source: DailyNK market prices

As this graph shows, there is generally fairly little correlation between market prices and harvests as calculated by the FAO. Harvests climbed between 2009 and 2015, while market prices climbed and and flattened out from 2012, around the time of Kim Jong-il’s death. Exchange rates and rice prices unsurprisingly move in tandem, but appear little impacted by production figures as reported by the FAO.

It is possible that prices react in a delayed manner to harvests, and that the price stabilization on the market is a result of increased harvests over time. But the consistent trend over several years, with prices going up as harvest figures do, is an unlikely one. Again, it is also difficult to imagine market prices not reacting relatively quickly to noticeable decreases in food production.

So what does all this mean?

It is difficult to draw any certain conclusions. But at the very least, these numbers suggest that the FAO food production projections are not telling the full story about overall food supply in North Korea. Moreover, market signals are telling us that food supply right now is far from as bad as the FAO’s latest claims of lowered production would have it. Rather, prices seem normal and even slightly more stabile than in some previous years with better harvests. In short, the narrative that this year’s harvest is exceptionally poor seems an unlikely one.

 

*A note on graph 3:

 For market prices per year, I calculated an average price from all observations in a given year. The DailyNK price data is reported for three cities separately: Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan. I have used an average of these three cities for each data observation as the base for calculating yearly averages. This is a somewhat tricky way of measuring, as the amount of data observations, as well as their timing, sometimes varies from year to year. The steep decline in 2009–2010 is primarily caused by the currency denomination, and should not be taken for a real increase in supply.

The FAO food production figures are not reported by calendar year, but published in the fall and projected for the following year. Since these figures best indicate available supply for the year after they are reported, I have assigned them to the year following the reporting year. That is, the figure for 2014 comes from the WFP-estimate for 2013/2014, and so on and so forth.

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Bank of Korea estimate of North Korean economy in 2015 published

Friday, July 22nd, 2016

UPDATE 1 (2016-12-15): Yonhap reports on some statistics released by Statistics Korea. They largely mirror Bank of Korea data, so I have put the report here:

North Korea’s per capita income was unchanged at 1.39 million won (US$1,179.10) last year, about one twenty-secondth of South Korea’s, government data showed Thursday.

According to data by Statistics Korea, North Korea’s nominal gross national income (GNI) came to 34.5 trillion won in 2015, with its moribund economy contracting 1.1 percent last year.

In comparison, South Korea’s GNI stood at 1,565.8 trillion won last year, roughly 45 times larger than North Korea’s.

North Korea’s population stood at 24.47 million last year, while South Korea had a population of 51.01 million, the data showed.

Mobile phone subscriptions in North Korea were 12.88 per 100 people, while those in South Korea were 118.46 per 100 people, according to the data.

South Korea’s total trade volume was valued at $963.3 billion last year, compared with North Korea’s $6.3 billion.

South Korea’s overall energy output capacity reached 97.64 million kilowatts, 13 times larger than the North’s 7.42 million kilowatts.

In 2015, Seoul’s total rice production reached 4.32 million tons versus 2.01 million tons for Pyongyang.

The two Koreas also showed significant gaps in social infrastructure.

South Korea’s road network totaled 107,527 kilometers compared with the North’s 26,183 kilometers.

The statistics office has been publishing general information on the North since 1995 as a way of providing insight into the economic and social conditions of the reclusive country.

ORIGINAL POST (2016-7-22): I have added the report to my DPRK Economic Statistics Page. You can download the PDF here.

The Bank of Korea claims the DPRK economy shrank in 2015 by 1.1%

This number has numerous drawbacks which I have discussed before.

According to the Yonhap:

North Korea’s economy is estimated to have contracted 1.1 percent last year amid negative growth in most industries, South Korea’s central bank announced Friday.

The Bank of Korea (BOK) has issued an annual report on the estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of one of the world’s most secretive nations.

It said the communist country’s GDP shrank 1.1 percent in 2015 from a year earlier, the first negative growth since 2010.

The bank cited a drop in crop and mining output by 0.8 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively.

The manufacturing sector suffered a 3.4 percent decline. The electricity, gas and tap water business also tumbled 12.7 percent due to a fall in hydroelectric power production attributable to a drought, according to the BOK.

But the construction field posted a 4.8 percent rise, and the service sector grew 0.8 percent.

The North’s mining and manufacturing industries accounted for 32.7 percent of its GDP, down 1.7 percentage points from 2014.

The BOK put the North’s gross national income (GNI) at 34.5 trillion won ($30.3 billion), 45 times less than that of South Korea. The North has around 25 million residents, half of the South’s population.

The data also showed that the North’s trade volume totaled $6.25 billion, down 17.9 percent on-year.

Exports slipped 14.8 percent to $2.7 billion, and imports shed 20 percent to $3.56 billion.

The North is under heavy U.N.-led economic sanctions for its nuclear and missile activities.

Since no accurate economic data from North Korea are available, the BOK said the statistics are based on estimates using methodologies applied to gauge South Korea’s own economy. Thus, it’s not desirable to directly compare the data with those of other foreign nations, added the bank.

Here is coverage in the Wall Street Journal:

North Korea’s economy likely shrank last year for the first time in five years, South Korea’s central bank said, potentially increasing the ruling challenge for leader Kim Jong Un, who has promised to boost prosperity while confronting the U.S. and other nations with nuclear weapons.

The Bank of Korea said Friday that it estimated North Korean gross domestic product fell 1.1% in 2015, the first decline since 2010 and the largest fall since a 1.2% contraction in 2007.

North Korea doesn’t release official statistics or allow outsiders to make assessments of its economy from within the country. As a result, the BOK’s estimate of North Korean GDP is often cited as the best guess. It bases its calculations on information from Seoul’s spy agency and other authorities that study North Korea.

The biggest recent economic setback for North Korea has come from a sharp fall in the price of coal, its main export product, and a slowdown in China, its sole major trading partner. The South Korean central bank said the North’s external trade was valued at $6.25 billion in 2015—down 18% from a year earlier.

New international sanctions on North Korea following its nuclear bomb test in January this year and long-range rocket launch in February may increase the economic pressure on Pyongyang. For the first time, United Nations sanctions target North Korea’s commodities trade, while the U.S. has sought to cut off Pyongyang’s links to the international financial system.

North Korea insists it will continue to pursue twin policy priorities of nuclear weapons development for its defense while seeking to boost its economy. In his first speech in 2012, Mr. Kim said North Koreans should “not have to tighten their belts again” and has regularly visited economic projects such as factories and farms.

However, output in nearly all North Korean industries contracted last year, including agriculture, fishing, mining and energy, the South Korean central bank said in its report.

Construction was a rare bright spot, growing an estimated 5%, as Mr. Kim has pursued the redevelopment of areas of central Pyongyang, including major new housing projects. The Bank of Korea also estimated a 0.8% increase in service-sector output, reflecting the emergence of unofficial market trading and underground financial services.

The North’s per capita income was around $1,224 in 2015, the bank said, compared with South Korea’s $27,200.

Here is coverage in Reuters:

North Korea’s economy contracted in 2015 at the sharpest pace in eight years, an estimate from the Bank of Korea showed on Friday, as low global commodity prices landed a blow to exports, a key driver for the impoverished country’s economy.

The gross domestic product in North Korea last year fell a real 1.1 percent, South Korea’s central bank said, which was the first fall since 2010 and compares with a 1.0 percent gain in 2014. It also marked the fastest decline since a 1.2 percent drop in 2007.

Isolated North Korea does not publish economic data.

All sectors except construction and services declined, a likely burden for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un already under pressure from international sanctions against multiple provocations including a nuclear test in January.

“The key reason for the GDP contraction looks to be trade as global commodity prices fell while China demand also declined,” said a Bank of Korea official, who declined to be named as he was unauthorized to speak to media.

“North Korea’s main commodity exports are coal and iron ore, which likely all declined last year.”

Neighboring China is North Korea’s chief trading partner.

The Bank of Korea data showed exports in North Korea fell 14.8 percent last year in annual terms as mineral product shipments slumped 14.7 percent. This was far worse than a 1.7 percent decline seen in 2014.

Imports dropped a faster 20.0 percent last year, compared with a 7.8 percent increase in 2014.

The central bank official said trade is expected to worsen this year as it becomes difficult for North Korea to boost shipments with other countries with international sanctions likely to grow heavier following Pyongyang’s continued missile launches and nuclear threats.

Construction rose 4.8 percent last year, accelerating from a 1.4 percent gain in 2014, the same data showed.

Meanwhile, a 0.8 percent gain in services last year reflects North Korea’s economic shift towards capitalism as the black market there has become more pervasive. Financial services have also grown, which likely contributed to the gain, the BOK official added.

The Bank of Korea has released GDP data on North Korea every year since 1991 based on information received from related sources, including the Ministry of Unification.

Here are comments from The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES):

North Korean GDP Dropped Estimated 1.1% in 2015

The Bank of Korea (BOK), South Korea’s central bank, released data on July 22, 2016 indicating that the North Korean economy shrunk by 1.1% in 2015. If this estimate is correct, this would mean that the North Korean economy contracted for the first time since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012. At the same time, these estimates also indicate that the gap in per capita GDP between North and South Korea widened from 21.3 times in 2014 to 22.2 times in 2015.

The last time North Korea’s annual growth rate was below zero in BOK statistics was five years ago. Back in 2009, it was estimated to be -0.9%, edging up to -0.5% in 2010. However, the last four years have been a time of continued expansion according to the BOK with North Korea’s economy estimated to have grown 0.8% in 2011, 1.3% in 2012, 1.1% in 2013 and 1.0% in 2014. The estimated growth rate for 2015 was the lowest since the -1.2% of 2007.

The BOK’s data indicates that while growth sped up in North Korea’s construction sector in 2015, the performance of the agriculture, fisheries, mining, manufacturing, and public service (electricity, gas and water) sectors was poor.

In the mining sector, declining magnesite and iron ore production resulted in a 2.6% loss of output, while in manufacturing, both light and heavy industrial saw production decline and consequently the sector contracted by an estimated 3.4%.

Output in the public service sector fell by a dramatic 12.7%. The BOK highlighted a drought in 2015 as being a key contributory factor in this regard: reducing hydroelectricity output, as well as exerting a negative influence on steel and machine tool production. At the same time, gains in agricultural and fisheries sector, which had been estimated to be 1.2% in 2014, was partially reversed in 2015, with the sector believed to have contracted by -0.8%. Although output in the livestock and fisheries sector expanded rapidly, this was offset by declines in cereals production including rice and corn due to drought.

Conversely, the construction sector expanded by 4.8% as both output in building and public works-related construction rose. The service sector, principally public services, the wholesale and retail service sector, and communications, grew by an estimated 0.8%.

North Korea’s nominal Gross National Income (GNI) was estimated to be 34.5 trillion South Korean won (KRW), i.e. 2.2% of South Korea’s nominal GNI. Per capita GNI rose to 1.393 million KRW, an increase on the 2014 figure of 1.388 million, but still only 4.5% of South Korea’s per capita GNI.

The gap between North and South Korean per capita GNI rose from 21.3 times in 2014 to 22.2 times 2015. At the same time, combined North Korean commodity imports and exports declined by 17.9% to $6.25 billion (excluding North-South trade) compared to the previous year ($7.61 billion).

The year 2015 saw a decline in the price of minerals, including iron ore, internationally. Reduced demand for North Korean anthracite in China had an impact, with North Korean exports declining to $2.7 billion, a 14.8% decline year-on-year. Textile exports increased by 5.3%, but mineral product exports fell by 14.7%. Income (totaling $3.56 billion), chiefly from mineral products and textiles, thus shrunk by a dramatic 20%.

The difference in the scale of North Korean and South Korean trade volumes rose to 154.1 times in 2015 (an increase from 144.3 times in 2014). At the same time, according to South Korean Ministry of Unification statistics, inter-Korean trade rose by 15.7% year-on-year to $2.71 billion.

Here are comments by Marcus Noland.

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Buy your own North Korean coal, through Alibaba

Thursday, June 30th, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Are you looking for the perfect birthday present or anniversary gift for your loved one? Look no further. It seems you can buy your own North Korean coal through the Chinese shopping website Alibaba.

One company, Dandong Zhícheng Metallic Material, states: “We are professional company of trading the North Korea Briquettes, choose us, trust us.” Buyers can choose to have their coal transported either through the Dalian or Dandong ports, and the company markets both coal briquettes and other types of coal products. The website contains information about the country and their products in both Chinese and Korean, but the text is blurry and appears in a small font, making it difficult to read. I am currently unable to find the original page where these descriptions appear, but below are a few screenshots:

Screen Shot 2016-06-30 at 22.05.17Screen Shot 2016-06-30 at 22.05.31Screen Shot 2016-06-30 at 22.05.52 Screen Shot 2016-06-30 at 22.06.14Screen Shot 2016-06-30 at 22.06.05

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Update 2016-07-03:

Voice of America (Korean version) cites this blog post here, and Yonhap in turn cites VoA here, without citing this blog.

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DPRK food rations at 60% of UN recommendation

Thursday, June 16th, 2016

According to Yonhap:

North Korea has been providing just 360 grams of daily food rations to each of its citizens in the second quarter of this year, far below the United Nations’ recommendation, a media report said Thursday.

Citing the report by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the U.S.-based media Voice of America (VOA) said the daily ration is 12 percent less than last year during the same period which was 410 grams, and 10 grams less than the previous quarter’s 370 grams.

This is far less than the U.N.’s recommendation of 600 grams as well as the North Korean government’s target of 573 grams.

According to the FAO’s recent report on the North’s food supply and demand for the grain in 2015-2016, the country’s grain production in 2015 was 5.42 million tons, a 9 percent decrease from the previous year.

The report said North Korea’s rice harvest dropped 26 percent to 1.95 million tons last year from a year earlier, while its corn harvest contracted 3 percent to 2.3 million tons during the same period.

FAO said that North Korea’s food shortage this year will be 694,000 tons which has to be filled either by external assistance or by imports from other countries.

This is the isolated country’s worst food shortage since 2011. If North Korea manages to import some 300,000 tons of food this year, it will still face a shortage of 394,000 tons, VOA said.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s food rations remain at 60 pct of U.N. recommendation: report
Yonhap
2016-6-16

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North Korea’s trade volume down 18 percent in 2015

Tuesday, June 14th, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

According to KOTRA (reported by Yonhap):

North Korea’s trade volume sank 18 percent last year from a year earlier, ending five years of straight growth, due largely to a drop in the prices of its key trading items such as coal and overall shipments, a South Korean trade agency said Wednesday.

The North’s overall trade volume came to US$6.25 billion in 2015, compared with $7.61 billion the previous year, according to the state-run Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).

The reclusive country’s outbound shipments fell 15 percent on-year to reach $2.7 billion, while imports also dropped 30 percent to $3.55 billion over the cited period, the data compiled by the agency showed.

Consequently, the communist state’s trade deficit reached $850 million last year, narrowing 33 percent from the previous year.

The North’s trade volume has been on a rising path since 2009 reaching an all-time high of $7.61 billion in 2014.

But a drop in prices of key trade items such as coal, coupled with a slowdown in China — its strongest ally — led to a decline in overall trade volume, KOTRA said.

Bilateral trade volume between North Korea and China came to $5.71 billion last year, down 16.8 percent from a year earlier,

The figure accounted for 91.3 percent of the North’s overall trade in 2015, slightly higher than the previous year’s 90.1 percent.

Two things are worth noting: first, it’s about trade volumes in dollar terms, not the amount of goods per se. Second, this would seem to add to what I’ve pointed out earlier on this blog – decreases in trade with China following the sanctions may simply be part of a pattern that began earlier, before the sanctions were put in place. In 2015, trade with China accounted for 90.1 percent of North Korea’s total trade.

Full article by Yonhap here:
N.Korea’s trade volume drops 18 pct in 2015
Yonhap News
2016-06-15

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China claims to ban more dual-use products from DPRK

Tuesday, June 14th, 2016

According to Reuters:

China’s Ministry of Commerce released a list of goods banned for export to North Korea on Tuesday, saying the items could be used to build weapons of mass destruction.

The list of dual-use goods, or products that have both civilian and military use, comes after the United Nations nuclear watchdog said North Korea appeared to have reopened a plant to produce plutonium from spent fuel of a reactor central to its banned atomic weapons drive.

The ministry said in a statement on its website that the list was meant to comply with the requirements of a round of U.N. sanctions imposed in March in response to a North Korean nuclear test in January.

The new list adds to a much longer Chinese list of banned goods released in 2013 after the North carried out its third nuclear test that year.

Analysts said at the time the 2013 list was a positive sign that China was working to implement U.N. sanctions targeting the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

The new list names dozens of banned items including magnetic materials, high-strength metals, chemical fibres, and laser-welding equipment. It also lists about a dozen chemicals that could be used in producing “chemical warfare agents”.

The banned goods could be used in nuclear, biological or chemical weapons development, the ministry said.

But China has declined in the past to give a full list of items banned for export to North Korea, which U.N. monitors have said makes it difficult to assess how strictly China is implementing sanctions.

China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner and sole major ally. Chinese analysts have regularly expressed concern that North Korea could collapse in chaos if Beijing’s policies become too harsh.

Reclusive North Korea rattled nerves this year by carrying out a fourth nuclear test in January and a satellite launch in February.

Thanks to Werner (a reader), here is the list of newly prohibited items (in Chinese).

I am keeping up with China – DPRK trade in 2016 here.

Read the full story here:
China says to ban export of more dual-use goods to North Korea
Reuters
2016-6-14

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China’s enforcement of sanctions on North Korea: a bit of perspective

Thursday, June 2nd, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

To what extent is China enforcing the latest round of UNSC sanctions on North Korea? This question is as important and interesting as it is nebulously complicated and difficult to answer. For the fact is, like Curtis points out here, that lower coal imports by China from North Korea does not necessarily give evidence to sanctions enforcement. Some of the figures reported in the news concern the value of the imports, which fluctuates with world market prices.

Moreover, as the old saying goes, correlation does not imply causality. In other words, the mere fact that trade in coal and other goods is decreasing does not necessarily mean that it is going down because of sanctions alone. It is worth to remember that Chinese imports of North Korean coal has decreased in the past too, before the latest sanctions round, due to decreased domestic demand and other factors. A whole host of variables other than sanctions may well be at play too.

Looking back at some previous trade data gives some context to the latest reports of decreasing trade. Even though volumes may be down, to fully understand how this impacts the North Korean economy, dollar value terms may be more relevant.

To recap:

  • According to recent data, Chinese imports of North Korean coal have decreased by 20.5 year-on-year for April 2016 (in tonne numbers).
  • According to Yonhap figures, cited here, this translates into a drop from $116.6 a year ago, to $72.27 now. This represents a 37 percent drop.
  • In the pre-sanctions quarter of the year, North Korean exports to China increased by 12 percent.

To put this in perspective, consider the following changes in the past:

  • Between January and November 2014, North Korean exports to China dropped by 12.3 percent in dollar terms.
  • Between 2013 and 2015, the value of coal exports to China dropped by 24.6 percent.
  • Between January and February 2014, total trade between North Korea and China dropped by 46 percent.

The point of citing these numbers is not to show that sanctions are not being implemented by China. Rather, such flows tend to fluctuate quite heavily for other reasons as well, and it is too early to conclude that sanctions are the only reason behind the contraction. As a New York Times story from late March this year showed, Chinese border agents tend to be fairly lax in controlling goods crossing the border – NYT cited a figure of about five percent of all goods being inspected. In sum, it is too early to draw any major conclusions about Chinese sanctions enforcement, and only future data will be able to give a more conclusive picture.

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US Treasury “311s” North Korea

Thursday, June 2nd, 2016

Here is the statement from the Treasury Department:

Treasury Takes Actions To Further Restrict North Korea’s Access to The U.S. Financial System

6/1/2016

Action Responds to the Threat that North Korea Poses to the Global Financial System; the United States Calls on International Partners to Similarly Takes Steps toward Severing Banking Relationships with the Dangerous Regime

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a Notice of Finding that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is a jurisdiction of “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Treasury, through its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also released a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) recommending a special measure to further isolate North Korea from the international financial system by prohibiting covered U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts with North Korean financial institutions, and prohibiting the use of U.S. correspondent accounts to process transactions for North Korean financial institutions.

Section 311 gives the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to identify a foreign jurisdiction to be a primary money laundering concern. Once identified, the Secretary can require U.S. financial institutions to take appropriate countermeasures. The special measure proposed in today’s NPRM would impose the most significant measure available to the Secretary under Section 311.

“The United States, the UN Security Council, and our partners worldwide remain clear-eyed about the significant threat that North Korea poses to the global financial system. The regime is notoriously deceitful in its financial transactions in order to continue its illicit weapons programs and other destabilizing activities,” said Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “Today’s action is a further step toward severing banking relationships with North Korea and we expect all governments and financial authorities to do likewise pursuant to the new UN Security Council Resolution. It is essential that we all take action to prevent the regime from abusing financial institutions around the world – through their own accounts or other means.”

Reasons for This 311 Determination

Treasury is taking this action consistent with the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, enacted on February 18, 2016, which requires Treasury to determine within 180 days whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern, and if so, to propose one or more special measures. In addition, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, which in part requires UN Member States to sever correspondent banking relationships with North Korean financial institutions within 90 days of the adoption of the resolution.

North Korea is proposed for action under Section 311 because (1) North Korea uses state-controlled financial institutions and front companies to conduct international financial transactions that support the proliferation and development of WMD and ballistic missiles; (2) North Korea is subject to little or no bank supervision anti-money laundering or combating the financing of terrorism (“AML/CFT”) controls; (3) North Korea has no diplomatic relationship, and thus no mutual legal assistance treaty, with the United States and does not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement and regulatory officials in obtaining information about transactions originating in or routed through or to North Korea; and (4) North Korea relies on the illicit and corrupt activity of high-level officials to support its government.

Impact of the 311 Notice of Finding and the NPRM Special Measure

While current U.S. law already generally prohibits U.S. financial institutions from engaging in both direct and indirect transactions with North Korean financial institutions, this NPRM, if finalized, would require U.S. financial institutions to implement additional due diligence measures in order to prevent North Korean banking institutions from gaining improper indirect access to U.S. correspondent accounts. While North Korea’s financial institutions do not maintain correspondent accounts with U.S. financial institutions, North Korean financial institutions frequently conduct transactions on behalf of the North Korean government and state-controlled corporations. The NPRM, if finalized, would prohibit the use of third-country banks’ U.S. correspondent accounts to process transactions for North Korean financial institutions.

Italics added for emphasis.

The “Notice of Finding” is here, and is also worth reading.

According to the Wall Street Journal:

Treasury Department officials said they are moving to ban non-U.S. banks and entities from processing dollar transactions on behalf of North Korea, an arrangement known as a U-turn, in a move to block its international trade.

China is by far Pyongyang’s largest trading partner, and Chinese firms could be caught in the crosshairs, according to current and former U.S. officials.

Zhu Haiquan, the spokesman for China’s embassy in Washington, repeated Beijing’s warnings against what it considers “unilateral sanctions taken by any country.”

He added that “we should avoid any move that may further aggravate tensions” on the Korean peninsula, and said “the unilateral sanctions must not affect and harm the legitimate rights and interests of China.”

U.S. officials were pleased that China agreed in March to support the new U.N. sanctions, which could significantly impair North Korea’s ability to generate hard currency and ship its exports.

Still, U.S. officials have voiced skepticism that Beijing would significantly punish Pyongyang, a longtime ally. China has rebuked North Korea in the past for its nuclear and missile tests, only to increase investment and trade with the country.

The issue is likely to be among the topics discussed when Messrs. Kerry and Lew meet top Chinese officials in Beijing for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a series of annual bilateral meetings.

According to the New York Times:

As a practical matter, that would largely affect Chinese banks, which facilitate North Korea’s financial transactions with Beijing, its largest trading partner. It could also affect some institutions in the nominally autonomous Chinese regions of Macau and Hong Kong, as well as in Singapore, where Pyongyang has often gone to hide the true nature of its banking activities, and to pay for missiles, nuclear fuel and the huge infrastructure it has built around those programs.

It is hard to assess how much the action will hurt North Korea. Such sanctions against financial institutions doing business with Iran proved effective because Tehran had billions of dollars in monthly oil and other energy exports that could be choked off; North Korea has none. Oftentimes Pyongyang deals in cash. Until a few years ago it was one of the largest counterfeiters of $100 bills. But that once-lucrative fraud was largely cut off by the redesign of the $100 bill.

Banks in the United States are already prohibited from doing business with financial institutions in North Korea. But the recommended rules would require them to perform additional due diligence to ensure they are not inadvertently transacting with North Korean financial institutions or the Pyongyang government through shell companies or other fictitious entities.

Notice of the new rules has been published by the Federal Register. Feel free to comment if you like.

Josh also writes a walk-through of how this works.

Here is information from Choson Exchange.

Troy Stangarone writes about the sanctions for KEI.

The UK also strengthened financial sanctions against the DPRK.

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2016 Pyongyang Spring Trade Fair

Wednesday, June 1st, 2016

UPDATE 5 (2016-6-1): The photographer Aram Pan (DPRK360) shot an incredible video of the trade fair. You can really learn a lot about the DPRK from watching it. There were lots of little surprises for me.

Also check out his Facebook photos of the Trade Fair here.

UPDATE 4 (2016-5-26): KCTV covered the trade fair.

UPDATE 3 (2016-5-23): KCTV Covered the trade fair.

UPDATE 2 (2016-3-17): According to the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES):

North Korea to Host International Trade Fairs despite UN Sanctions

Despite the newly imposed sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC), North Korea does not appear to be deterred from hosting large-scale international events, as Pyongyang plans to host its annual Pyongyang International Trade Fair (PITF) twice this year, in May and September.

North Korea’s official web portal ‘Naenara’ reported that the spring PITF will be held at the Three-Revolution Exhibition House in the Sosong District in Pyongyang from May 16th to the 19th and the autumn PTIF will be held at the same venue from September 5th to the 8th.

‘Naenara’ claimed that the country “has been hosting hundreds of trade shows both in the country and abroad for over 50 years since April 17, 1958 and such events will enable the DPRK to accelerate its friendship and cooperation with other states and boost its international trade.”

According to the website, these trade fairs will exhibit items such as machine tools, mining equipment and their manufacturing technology for minerals—items in a sector now heavily targeted by the new sanctions imposed by the UNSC.

According to the report, the trade fairs will also include displays of construction machinery and building materials, energy and environment protection materials, communication and information technology, agricultural equipment and technology, foodstuffs and production technology, print and packing machinery, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, light-industry products, consumer goods, and even vehicles.

Advertising is of course permitted at the trade fairs, with installation and removal displays and promotional materials requiring pre-approval by the host Korean International Exhibition Corporation. Transportation of the items for exhibition is to be dealt with by the Pyongyang Agent Department of the Italian company OTIM (Organizzazione Transporti Internazionali Marittimi). OTIM, a freight forwarding company established in the late 1940s, has been authorized and in charge of transporting goods between North Korea and Europe.

‘Naenara’ announced that the fairs will accept emailed or faxed applications until 40 days prior to the opening and has requested companies to send along their list of participants.

Apart from domestic enterprises, companies from around 16 countries or more — including Australia, China, Cuba, Cambodia, Germany, Italy, Indonesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Vietnam — have reportedly participated in these trade fairs in the past.

Given North Korea’s isolation from the international system and closed-nature of its economy, the international trade fairs have been important events for its economy. However, while North Korea seems determined to host its annual spring and autumn events despite the international sanctions and pressure, just how many companies from other countries will participate is an open question.

UPDATE 1 (2016-3-1): The 2016-Q1 issue of Foreign Trade is out, and it contains some additional information on the 2016 Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair.

Foreign-Trade-2016-Q1-Pyongyang-Trade-Fair

ORIGINAL POST (2016-2-11): Everyone may be talking about nukes, rockets, sanctions, and the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but the North Koreans have begun planning the 2016 Pyongyang Spring Trade Fair. Below you can see images of the first flyers to emerge:

Ex-Easy-Trade-Fair-2016-a

Ex-Easy-Trade-Fair-2016-b

Promotion of the trade fair appears to be in the hands of a Chinese internet firm named Ex-Easy.

Thanks to a reader (Andy) for translating some of the flyer:

“Pyongyang International Business Products Exhibition” is organised by an affiliated company under DPRK’s Ministry of Trade. This international exhibition is DPRK’s largest and most trade-conducive of its kind. It is organised yearly since 1998, and is held twice yearly – in spring and autumn – from 2005. The exhibition will be held in Pyongyang’s Three Revolution Exhibition hall, with a capacity of 6500 square meters. The DPRK has been gradually liberalising its economy in recent years and increasing its trade with neighbouring countries. At the same time, it has raised its domestic living standards, and they are attracted to Chinese products and (manufacturing) techniques.

Products exhibited:
1. Daily necessities, office supplies, household appliances, manufacturing / packing equipment, sewing equipment, clothes, stitched (embroidered?) products, …
2. Food, flavourings, food additive facilities/techniques, high temperature processed products and equipment, fruits, vegetable processing equipment, techniques, nucleic acid manufacturing facilities/techniques/products, bean processing and techniques, fish/seafood processing/techniques, health product processing/techniques
3. Sealing machinery, vacuum packaging, engraving machinery, food packaging machinery
4. Injection moulding machinery, moulds.
5. Misc hardware and DIY materials: bathroom/kitchen, construction/DIY, locks, safety equipment/accessories, small scale electronics, construction decorations, interior decoration – doors/windows/ceiling/walls/paint/chemicals/ceramics/masonry materials, building tech, environmentally frendly materials, furniture, inspection and certification
6. All sorts of large machinery – mining and related equipment, farming equipment, electronics, light industries, food processing and related equipment, chemical products, medical equipment, medicine manufacturing facilities.

Last exhibitions featured exhibitors from DPRK, China, Germany, UK, Australia, Italy, Poland, Cuba…. 400 over companies from 16 countries/regions. A total of 6372 square meter of exhibition space over two floors, taking up all usable space. Cars and engineering machinery took up about 1000 square meters of space outdoors. Exhibited products included cars, tooling machine, chemical, machines, communication equipment, electrical equipment, transportation machinery, plastics machinery, engineering equipment.

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