International Governments « North Korean Economy Watch

Archive for the ‘International Governments’ Category

US to Announce More Sanctions on NK Entities

Wednesday, September 26th, 2007

Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
9/26/2007

(UPDATE: On Oct. 23, [2008] the State Department blacklisted two North Korean companies, Korea Mining Development Corp. and Korea Taesong Trading Co., for violating U.S. bans on the sale of equipment used in building missiles or other weapons of mass destruction to Iran and Syria. Citation: “North Korean Plane Was Grounded at U.S. Request “, Wall Street Journal, Jay Solomon, 11/1/2008 )

The U.S. State Department is expected to announce additional sanctions on North Korean entities connected to missile proliferation, Yonhap News reported Wednesday.

Some of the entities are believed to be linked to the Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), which was designated in June 2005 in an executive order for supporting weapons of mass destruction proliferation, it said.

The measure would come at an awkward moment as envoys from six nations _ South and North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan _ gather in Beijing from Wednesday for a fresh round of negotiations aimed at disabling and eventually dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and programs.

The U.S. Treasury had frozen some $25 million in North Korea-related money held in a Macau bank in late 2005, a punitive measure imposed as the six countries were signing an agreement toward denuclearization. That led to more than a year’s suspension in negotiations with the North.

The new round of six-party talks is already on shaky ground with suspicions that Pyongyang may have transferred nuclear-related material to Syria, prompting the unexplained Israeli air incursion into Syria earlier this month.

Tom Casey, a State Department spokesman, said Tuesday the new sanctions are related to missile technology transfers and downplayed possible negative repercussions on this week’s talks.

“The company that was sanctioned has been sanctioned previously for the same thing. So the net effect of this is really pretty minimal,” he said. “I don’t see…any reason why this should impact on the six-party talks.”

North Korea accused the United States of defending Israel’s recent airstrike against Syria, calling the strike a grave crime that undermines regional peace and stability.

The North’s main Rodong Sinmun newspaper said, “Israeli warplanes’ intrusion into the territorial airspace of Syria and bomb-dropping are an outright violation of Syria’s sovereignty and a grave crime that destroys regional peace and security,” according to Yonhap.

The North’s comments came days after high-level talks between North Korea and Syria. The two countries, which deny the allegation of a secret nuclear connection, did not provide details of Pyongyang talks.

Andrew Semmel, acting U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation policy, said earlier this month that North Koreans were in Syria, and that Syria might have had contacts with “secret suppliers” to obtain nuclear equipment.

Semmel did not identify the suppliers. However, he said he could not exclude the possibility that a nuclear black-market network, run by the disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, might have been involved.

Semmel’s comments raised speculation that an alleged Sept. 6 Israeli incursion into Syrian airspace was a strike targeting a nuclear installation. U.S. officials have said Israeli warplanes struck a target. One U.S. military officer said the strike was aimed at weapons being shipped to Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.

Posted in Arms shipment, Illicit activities, International trade, Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (aka Kapmun Tosong, KOMID), Mining/Minerals, USA | 1 Comment »

Oppressive regime’s ID cards pave path to liberty

Monday, September 24th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Jeon Jin-bae
9/22/2007

North Korean resident identification cards have become a hot item on the black market in China for ethnic Koreans who want to live in Europe.

Mr. Kim, an ethnic Korean man from China, moved to Paris last year and obtained a resident permit from the French government a few months ago allowing him to stay in the country for 10 years. He asked not to be identified by his full name, because he obtained his permit illegally.

His resident permit states that he is a North Korean refugee and identifies him as a North Korean citizen, not a Chinese national. Kim said he purchased a North Korean resident’s ID card and pretended to be a refugee from China when he sought asylum in France.

Kim said he is not alone. “At least 100 people have sought refugee status in the last year using the same means,” he said.

According to other ethnic Koreans in China, North Korean IDs were traded in cities near the China-North Korea border, such as Yanbian and Dandong. The prices range between 1,000 yuan and 1,500 yuan ($134 to $199), they said.

“As far as I know, there are many North Koreans who want to sell their IDs,” said an ethnic Korean who lives in China.

North Koreans who manage to escape to China are anxious to sell their IDs, because they are afraid of being captured, identified as North Korean and then send back to their homeland.

According to sources, ethnic Koreans who want to live in Europe prearrange their trips through middlemen who transport them through China’s Shenzhen Province to Hong Kong.

From there they fly to Thailand and meet with South Korean middlemen who provide fake South Korean passports.

Using these documents, the ethnic Koreans will often fly to Switzerland and then move to the country of their destination, often France or Italy, via overland routes.

Reaching Europe is seen as being more than half way to success, sources said, because the process of seeking refugee status is relatively simple.

In France, immigrants only have to submit an application along with a North Korean ID card to qualify. The French government then provides a temporary three-month residence permit, which is extended until a final decision is made.

Four months after applying for refugee status an interview will take place. A French official who speaks Korean will question the applicant, but most ethnic Koreans are well prepared to pass this simple screening, the sources said.

Europe is a popular destination because it only costs 10,000 euros for a Korean-Chinese to buy refugee status and various organizations often provide them with extra protection and assistance.

Posted in Black markets, China, Civil society, Emigration | 2 Comments »

Expert says N.K. becoming more open, better at dealing with national disasters

Monday, September 24th, 2007

Yonhap
9/24/2007

North Korea is becoming more transparent and effective in dealing with disasters, spurred by both internal and external factors, an Asia-Pacific regional specialist said in his latest paper.

Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, a securities studies professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii, noted five trends in the North Korean government’s responses over the past decade to nationwide shocks, including floods, typhoons, drought and avian influenza outbreaks.

Increasing transparency is one of the trends, with Pyongyang more quickly admitting to disasters that have struck the nation, he said in a paper (download here) released last week through the Korea Economic Institute in Washington.

It took North Korea several years to admit the impact of natural disasters in the mid-1990s that led to massive starvation and chronic food shortages. But in August 2000, when it was hit by Typhoon Prapiroon, North Korea released the news three weeks after it occurred, and in the two following years, when other typhoons struck, North Korea reported it within three to six days, Mansourov said.

Pyongyang immediately acknowledged flooding in August 2007, he said.

“Observers agree that the timeliness, details, and amount of coverage of flood damage and rehabilitation work in August 2007 is unprecedented.”

North Korea is also showing institutional knowledge and a capacity for disaster management, with new organizations growing out of a decade of learning and experience, such as various provincial centers, the professor said.

The North Korean Red Cross Society has been exceptional, he said, working with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and has made itself the leading agency in disaster preparedness and response.

Inter-agency coordination has also increased, with deputy prime minister-level working groups working closely together in each disaster since the flood of 2001, as there are preventive programs through which basic relief supplies are stored in town and villages.

For example, the 10-year strategy against avian influenza, worked out by the emergency commission in 2005, would have been unthinkable a decade ago, Mansourov wrote.

Another notable trend is the increasing cooperation between the North Korean government and international humanitarian community, gradually allowing joint needs assessments and monitoring, he noted.

Mansourov argued that external factors helped bring about the changes.

“International factors did make a difference in what happened in (North Korea), especially through the introduction of innovative ideas and dissemination of best humanitarian practices,” in addition to foreign aid, he said.

The scholar also argued that while the country’s top leader, Kim Jong-il, does control any institutional changes, there is also adaptation driven by needs.

“There has been some degree of autonomous institutional learning and adaptation; it is incremental in nature and caused by both positive and negative feedback from the environment regarding institutional performance in crisis situations,” he said.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Arduous March, Avain Flu, Disease prevention, Epidemics, Foreign aid statistics, Health care, International Aid, International/Korean Red Cross, Korea Economic Institute, Statistics, UN, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UN World Food Program, UNDP, UNICEF, UNWHO | Comments Closed

What Are N. Koreans Up to?

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Korea Times
Marcus Noland, Stephan Haggard
9/21/2007

Last summer North Korea conducted provocative missile and nuclear tests. Yet only four months later, Pyongyang signed on to a roadmap that included a return of international inspectors, a full declaration of contested nuclear activities, closing down existing facilities and ultimately disabling them.

American negotiator Christopher Hill predicted this last step could take place as early as the end of the year.

What are the North Koreans up to?

The cynical, some would say realistic, view in the United States _ advanced by departed Bush administration hawks such as John Bolton _ is that Kim Jong-il is raising false hopes.

The appearance of cooperation has several tactical advantages. Sanctions and ongoing uncertainty have had substantial economic costs. The February agreement was preceded by secret meetings in Berlin to resolve the Banco Delta Asia issue.

In return, the North Koreans closed their nuclear facilities, but they have not firmly committed to the difficult aspects of the agreement _ providing a full accounting of their programs, disabling their programs, and giving up actual stores of fissile material and weapons.

Cooperation also drives wedges between the U.S., South Korea and China. If North Korea appears to be making concessions, it is easier for South Korea and China to continue diplomatic and financial support.

Next month, President Roh Moo-hyun will travel to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-il. Expect him to come bearing gifts to cement his legacy as a peacemaker.

Other politicians in the presidential race have also offered extraordinarily ambitious and generous programs of support for the North as well.

Recent studies we have done on North Korea’s changing external economic relations are consistent with some of this cynical picture, but also suggest a sliver of hope for more substantial change.

To understand why, requires a brief tour of the miserable history of North Korea over the last two decades. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean economy went into a steep decline ending in full-blown famine.

By our estimates, as many as one million people _ five percent of the entire population _ perished in the mid-1990s. Out of the human ashes of this tragedy, however, the North Korean economy began to undergo a profound transformation.

As households and work units scrambled for food, they engaged in barter, trade and new economic activities.

The desperation of the famine also saw an upturn in illicit activities, from missile sales to drugs and the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. But trade and investment also started to flow across the Chinese border.

Chinese companies, small-scale traders and North Korean firms pursued business opportunities, from large-scale mining operations to the import of South Korean videos.

The regime was always hesitant about the emergence of the market. In July 2002, the government initiated economic policy changes that decriminalized some private activities. But reforms have taken a zig-zag path, always subject to reversal.

Sanctions and closer scrutiny have limited the country’s arms sales and illicit activities.
With these sources of revenue increasingly foreclosed, North Korea has two alternatives _ open the economy and increase normal commercial activities or cooperate primarily to obtain aid. In terms of internal change, these two options may actually push North Korea in opposite directions.

Consider the aid tack. Given the regime’s concerns about internal stability, aid could provide a lifeline, allowing the regime to sustain a modicum of current consumption while forgoing deeper reforms. Under this option, North Korea trades away its nuclear program for assistance precisely to maintain the political and economic status quo.

Alternatively, North Korea could use the resolution of diplomatic tensions to deepen the economic reform process.

The military has been engaged in commercial activities and could potentially benefit from such a course. But real reform will reshuffle power and influence within North Korea in ways that are unpredictable and risky.

So what can we expect from Pyongyang? The nuclear program is the regime’s one major asset and we should not expect them to bargain it away easily.

Rather we should expect prolonged and difficult negotiations as they try to extract tribute for their “Dear Leader.”

In the end, we may eliminate North Korea’s capacity for making additional nuclear weapons, but this will not necessarily be accompanied by economic or political reforms.

An important lesson learned elsewhere in the developing world is that aid is not a substitute for reform.

Ambitious schemes for infrastructure and other investment in North Korea will only generate large economic pay-offs if they are accompanied by genuine opening and a more aggressive embrace of the market.

The key issue, therefore, is how tightly South Korea will link its offer of aid to progress in the resolution of the nuclear issue. Properly conditioned, South Korean aid could be a powerful carrot in the nuclear negotiations, whether it ultimately encourages internal reforms or not.

But if the South Korean offers at the summit are large, unconditional and open-ended, they could permit the regime in Pyongyang to stall the nuclear negotiations while actually discouraging deeper reform.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Arduous March, Black markets, China, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International Aid, Mining/Minerals, Political economy, South Korea, USA | Comments Closed

Kim Jong-il Plays Democratic Politics

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Korea Times
David Kang
9/21/2007

There has been widespread speculation as to why, after repeated calls for a summit by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Jong-il decided to meet at this time.

Some have argued that Kim is only meeting because of improved U.S.-North Korean relations. Others feel that Kim hopes to gain further aid and trade from South Korea.

Although we do not know the exact reasons, one possibility is that Kim sees two major elections looming on the horizon: the South Korean and U.S. presidential elections.

A summit provides Kim the opportunity to influence these elections. Were Kim to wait until there were new presidents in both countries, his influence on the new presidents’ goals and strategies would be minimized.

As to South Korea, it is quite likely that Kim Jong-il hopes be an influence by presenting a moderate and reasonable image of himself.

Indeed, if Kim can speak the right rhetoric and portray himself as flexible, make a few token concessions to increased economic or social exchanges with South Korea, and repeats rhetoric about “uri minjok ggiri (we, Koreans, by ourselves),” there is a good chance that many South Koreans will feel reassured and sentiment favoring engagement may solidify.

This would be a good chance of binding the next South Korean administration into continuing its engagement with the North, regardless of who actually wins the presidency.

As for the United States, Kim has less ability to influence the election, simply because Americans pay far less attention to North Korea than they do to other foreign policy issues, such as the continuing troubles in the Middle East.

However, if Kim can present a moderate face, and also help forge a solid consensus in South Korea about the best way to solve the North Korean problem, Kim may be hoping to bind any new U.S. president to a path of reconciliation, as well.

Indeed, many observers think that Kim has already won, simply by agreeing to a summit meeting with Roh. Especially with Roh so clearly hoping to cement his place in history with this summit, they fear that there is little that Kim can do that would harm his image in South Korea.

However, if Kim hopes to be an influence on the presidential election in the south, this presents a genuine opportunity to further expose Kim to pressures and influences of the outside world, which is a move in the right direction.

For decades, the North Korean leadership had only concerned itself with internal regime politics, and even ignored the voices and needs of its own citizens.

If Kim realizes that his image among the South Korean public will have a direct effect on his own rule, this may affect his actions and policies.

In this way, Kim is taking more of a gamble by agreeing to a summit than is generally recognized.

If South Korean sentiment turns against Kim after the summit, this will restrict the new South Korean president’s foreign policy options, and it will also make it harder for Kim to delay, obstruct and avoid dealing with nuclear and other issues.

As such, Roh has more leverage than generally believed, if he is adroit in his negotiations.
If Roh goes into the summit determined to come away with some agreement with the North, he will have no bargaining power whatsoever, and Kim will win. But if Kim is seen by the South Koreans as the one obstructing progress, it will make North Korea’s situation more difficult in the future.

Thus, Roh absolutely must go into the summit prepared to return empty-handed. Only when Roh is prepared to walk away, will he have any leverage on Kim.

Roh must be willing to confront Kim on serious issues, such as the nuclear issue, and press Kim to make a public statement that he supports denuclearization. Ironically, Roh’s reputation may even improve if he can show that he met Kim with a flexible and reasonable set of issues and options.

Roh must also pay attention to not only the public opinion of South Koreans but also the U.S, and in particular the policymakers inside Washington.

Roh needs to realize that managing expectations and framing the summit in a positive way is critical for him to be seen in Washington as enhancing, and not obstructing, the nuclear negotiations.

There is little chance that Washington will allow Roh to set the agenda for denuclearization, as revealed in the embarrassing episode at the recent APEC meeting.

If Roh wanders too far from Washington’s stance, he will not have Washington comply, but rather he will merely be left alone.

Thus, it is critical that Roh and Cheong Wa Dae pay as much attention to how the summit is viewed in Washington as how it is viewed in South Korea.

I am in favor of this summit, only because it further exposes Kim to South Korean public sentiment, and increases the leverage the outside world has on this reclusive regime.

I hope that Roh does not squander his opportunity to further draw out the North Korean leadership and expose them to the outside world.

Posted in Political economy, South Korea, USA | Comments Closed

Seoul seeks nearly W1.3 tln for joint projects with N. Korea next year

Thursday, September 20th, 2007

Yonhap
9/20/2007

[excerpt]

The South Korean government plans to ask the National Assembly to significantly increase its budget for inter-Korean cooperation projects and aid programs for North Korea, the Ministry of Planning and Budget said Thursday.

Seoul hopes to increase the fund for its cross-border projects to 750 billion won (US$812 million) next year from 500 billion won this year, according to the ministry.

The amount of money allocated for its humanitarian projects will also increase 14 percent to some 530 billion won, the government said.

“The increased budget for humanitarian programs will go to providing half a million tons of rice and 400,000 tons of fertilizer,” each up 100,000 tons from what Seoul provided this year, a government official said while asking not to be identified.

The requests for budget increase are still subject to approval by the parliament, but observers believe the amount of Seoul’s economic aid or assistance will be significantly increased next year following the upcoming summit of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang from Oct. 2 through Oct. 4.

The government was widely expected to promise large assistance and economic cooperation at the summit, only the second of its kind since the two Koreas were divided at the end of 1950-53 Korean War.

Meanwhile, the government also said it would request a total of 895 billion won for its official development assistance next year, up 23.3 percent from some 725 billion won in 2007, as part of efforts to boost its grants and soft loans for developing and under-developed nations to 0.12 percent of its gross national income from 0.08 percent.

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, South Korea | Comments Closed

A Year in Waiting for Steel Plates

Wednesday, September 19th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Chan Ku
Institute for Far Eastern Studies
9/19/2007

(UPDATE: On Oct. 23, [2008] the State Department blacklisted two North Korean companies, Korea Mining Development Corp. and Korea Taesong Trading Co., for violating U.S. bans on the sale of equipment used in building missiles or other weapons of mass destruction to Iran and Syria. Citation: “North Korean Plane Was Grounded at U.S. Request “, Wall Street Journal, Jay Solomon, 11/1/2008 )

Kimchaek boasts one of the largest steel factories and fishing ports in North Korea especially that of Daesung General Company’s east coast headquarters.

However, at once-famous seaport everything including ship, freezer, packing factory was obsolete and rust. Most of the Soviet-built machines in factories were at least 20 to 30 years old. And there were neither enough spare parts to fix machinery nor job orders, so the factories had stood still for a long time.

I consulted with local North Korean officials in Kimchaek and reached an agreement: ship repair dock will be built in Kimchaek, steel products necessary for building floating dock would be Daesung General Company’s responsibility, and other issues concerning building land factory and management of joint-stock company would be decided in Pyongyang.

Also we finished negotiation over fish export and Pollack fishing by trawler. Thus basic problems were solved.

I came back to Pyongyang on September 30. And another businessperson, Mr. Kim Sung Chan of Pamco Trading, told me his will to invest fifty percent of the capital.

All of sudden, Daesung General Company notified us that among our previous agreements, only the site of repair dock was decided and asked us to wait, promising final decision would delivered in one month.

To start first phase of building factories, it was most critical to have steel products ordered from state. We believed the promise from the North (to take responsibility of providing iron plates) and returned to America. However, after two month had passed, there was no news from Pyongyang. Curious, I called back and was told to visit North Korea as soon as possible.

On December 9, 1989 I arrived at Sun An International Airport. In Pyongyang, vice president of Daesung General Company (president was absent, traveling abroad) said “we asked the state for iron plates, but production plan was omitted in 1990 fiscal year so one more year of waiting is inevitable, or send us steel plates.”

In other words, our business plan was totally embarrassed and we had to make a new one. Again, I conferred with Mr. Kim and found out a solution, which was to buy a used floating dock from an American port. There was a fifty-year old used floating dock in Miami, Florida that we were able to buy. If repaired, it seemed available for another twenty years.

Finally, two obstacles had our plan failed. Firstly, it was supposed take at least three month and five hundred thousands US dollars (twice the price of dock) to convey the floating dock by sea. Secondly, (and more fundamental problem) the US government would not permit to sell the dock to North Korea. We were not even possible to transport the dock to Hong Kong and then to North Korea.

Because acquisition of required steel plate for floating dock was failed ultimately, the daring business had gone nowhere. Wasted much money and more than a year of time, I was so depressed at that time[.]

Posted in Agriculture, Daesung Trading Company, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Sea shipping, Steel, USA | Comments Closed

North Korea Is Taken off U.S. Drug-Trafficking Countries List

Wednesday, September 19th, 2007

Bloomberg (h/t One Free Korea)
Bomi Lim
9/19/2007

North Korea was dropped from the U.S. list of countries producing illicit drugs, a sign of further relief of tensions between the two countries.

“North Korea is not affecting the United States as much as the requirements on the list,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christy McCampbell said on Sept. 17 in Washington, according to a transcript of her speech on the State Department Web site.

Ties are improving between the U.S. and North Korea after a February agreement on ending the government in Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. As North Korea moves to scale back the program, the U.S. has promised to review ways of improving ties with the communist country, including removing it from a list of states that sponsor terrorism.

North Korea agreed to a year-end deadline to disclose and disable its nuclear facilities after it shut down and sealed its sole operating reactor at Yongbyon in July.

North Korea was first mentioned in the annual presidential report on “major illegal drug transit and drug-producing countries” in 2003, when President George W. Bush said the U.S. would fight the country’s suspected drug trafficking.

Posted in Drug smuggling, Illicit activities, USA | 1 Comment »

Summit Negotiations for Co-Development of Kaema Plateau

Tuesday, September 18th, 2007

Daily NK
Jeong Jae Sung
9/18/2007

North Korea has requested for negotiations to begin at the Inter-Korean Summit Talks on the co-development of the Kaema Plateau, also known as “the roof of Korea.” The request was taken into consideration by the Ministry of Unification.

In light of North Korea’s request, the Ministry has recently conducted a survey of North Korean defectors from South Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jagang, where the Kaema Plateau is located, regarding the significant geographical features, the status of current development at the plateau, and the intentions of the North Korean government.

Kim Hyung Seh (pseudonym), a North Korean defector from Yangkang, stated that “I was told by interested parties at the Ministry of Unification that right after the Summit Talks North Korea will deliberate the Kaema Plateau development issue and that they needed my cooperation for a sound investigation.”

According to Kim, the questions asked focused on the North Korean government’s purpose in developing the Kaema Plateau, the potential value of this site as a tourist resort, and wether or not there is enough possibility for tourism given the ever increasing number of visitors from Mongolia.

He asserted that “the Kaema Plateau is a huge forest which has no value as a tourist attraction at the moment. All the particular tourist attractions in North Korea retain villas owned by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, but there are none at Kaema Plateau, which speaks for itself.”

Kim also added that the affiliates of the Ministry of Unification did not know where the Kaema Plateau was.

“It is difficult for North Korea to develop the area around Kaema Plateau, which is why they followed the shoreline to develop their railways. In order to make this project possible, the basic transportation infrastructure such as airline facilities, roads and railroads must be established first” advised Kim.

The Ministry of Unification has denied every having conducted these surveys. Regarding the interviews with defectors, one affiliate of the Ministery said “We have not held such meetings,” and another said that “We have met [with the defectors], but we never asked about the Kaema Plateau issue.”

Kim Joong Tae, the Director of the Ministry of Unification’s Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Team, who interviewed Kim, told the DailyNK that “North Korea has never suggested the development of Kaema Plateau. The Ministry merely asked North Korean Defectors about tourism development at Mt. Baekdu.”

The Kaema Plateau is situated across the Middle and Southern region of Yangkang Province, South of Northwest Hamgkyung and East of Jagang. The total area is 14,300 km2 and the height is 1,340m. It is the highest and widest plateau in the entire peninsula, also known as “the roof of Korea.”

Kaema Plateau has abundant forest resources which provide avariety of material lumber. There is also a rich supply of mineral resources, including steel, magnesite, gold, apatite, and copper.

The only source of transportation infrastructure is the military airfields in Pungseo and Jangjin.

It is probable that North Korea’s reason for suggesting the development of Kaema Plateau is to make it tourist site, showcasing various amusment parks and ski resorts. As it is now, this area is completely restricted to civilian traffic. If transportation in the high region is developed, this could be applied for military purposes.

Lee Jin Young (pseudonym), a defector currently residing in South Korea’s Yangcheon district, explained that “the Kaema Plateau is so treacherous that it is only used as a military training field for Special Forces. This was the one area that allied forces could not get control of, even during the Korean War.”

She also added that, “rather than developing Kaema Plateau as a tourist attraction, they should develop the Baekmoo Plateau which includes Mt. Baekdu. The suggestion to develop the Kaema Plateau can only be seen as their intention to construct a better transportation infrastructure.”

Therefore, even if South Korea were to agree to the co-development of Kaema Plateau, there will be huge difficulties regarding the expansion of the social infrastructure and compromising with the military. In particular, the construction of Korean roads, railroads and airfields in the region is sure to cost a lot of money.

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Forestry, Lumber, Mining/Minerals, Political economy, Railways, South Korea, Tourism | Comments Closed

N. Korea, Myanmar sign agreement on diplomatic cooperation

Friday, September 14th, 2007

Yonhap
9/14/2007

North Korea and Myanmar on Friday signed an agreement on cooperation between their foreign ministries, the North’s official news agency reported without providing details.

“An agreement on cooperation between the foreign ministries of the DPRK and Myanmar was inked here on Friday,” the North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said in a dispatch from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.

The DPRK stands for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the North’s official name.

The agreement is viewed as the first concrete step toward normalizing the countries’ relations since they agreed to re-establish diplomatic ties in April.

Myanmar severed its ties with the communist North in 1983 following a failed assassination attempt by North Korean agents on then South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan, who was visiting the south Asian nation.

Twenty-one people, including South Korean Cabinet ministers and presidential aides, were killed in the 1983 bombing.

Friday’s agreement was signed by the North’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong-il and his Myanmarese counterpart U Kyaw Thu, according to the KCNA report.

Posted in Myanmar, Political economy | 1 Comment »

North Korean Economy Watch