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N. Korea Has 3 Stimulant Drug Factories

Monday, March 19th, 2007

Korea Times
3/19/2007

Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) has reported that it suspects there are at least three secret factories producing illicit stimulant drugs in North Korea, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported Saturday.

The Japanese daily said that Hiroto Yoshimura, deputy commissioner general of the NPA, mentioned the suspicion of the facilities during his speech as a Japanese representative at the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs’ closed-door meeting in Vienna on Wednesday.

The commission is under the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

Two of the three factories are located in areas where pharmaceutical factories were situated when the Korean Peninsula was under Japanese colonial control, Yomiuri reported quoting sources.

It is highly possible that North Korea has been using the factories to produce the drugs, according to the report.

It is the first time that the NPA has mentioned at an international conference the locations of stimulant drug factories in North Korea.

Over smuggling of North Korea’s stimulant drugs, the NPA reexamined seven cases uncovered from 1997 to May last year, in which about 1,500 kilograms of stimulant drugs were seized.

As a result, the NPA determined in July that Pyongyang was involved in an organized way on the grounds:

_ Spy boats of North Korea’s secret agency have been used as a means of transportation.

_ North Koreans arrested for smuggling made confessions hinting they had been acting under the instructions of the North Korean government.

According to the authorities, the drugs seized are divided into three types, based on analyses made of the contents. Due to differences in impurities and crystalline elements, the police are increasingly under the belief the drugs were produced at different locations.

Further, the authorities analyzed confessions of suspects arrested for smuggling stimulant drugs, data from intelligence satellites and the moves of covert operations boats and cargo vessels that transported the drugs.

The police strongly believe buildings in Wonsan in North Korea’s east and Chongjin in the northeast are drug factories.

Both places are where the Japanese pharmaceutical factories were located before World War II.

Also, it has been confirmed that stimulant drugs were sent from a port at Nampo near Pyongyang and there is a building suspected to be a drug factory near the port.

In addition, the NPA has obtained information there is another factory along the Yalu River near the border with China.

In November, the NPA reported at an international conference in Bangkok on controlling drugs in the Asia-Pacific area of North Korea’s state involvement in stimulant drug smuggling.

Posted in Drug smuggling, Illicit activities, Japan, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime | Comments Closed

N. Korea, Japan begin preparatory contact for normalization talks

Tuesday, March 6th, 2007

Yonhap
3/6/2007

North Korean and Japanese officials met Tuesday in Hanoi to set the agenda for their two-day discussions scheduled to start here Wednesday to settle pending bilateral issues preventing them from normalizing diplomatic relations.

The Japanese representative to the talks, Koichi Haraguchi, met with his North Korean counterpart, Song Il-ho, Tuesday morning for the preparatory discussions.

The normalization talks are part of last month’s six-nation agreement aimed at dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Under the accord, North Korea has 60 days to shut down its plutonium-producing Yongbyon facility in return for 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for electricity production. Japan has said it won’t contribute to the aid unless there is progress on the issue of its citizens abducted by the North.

North Korea admitted to kidnapping 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s and allowed five to return in 2002. Japan says 17 people were kidnapped and must be accounted for.

In addition to the abduction issue, the North Korean and Japanese diplomats are expected to focus on the ways for Japan to atone for its 1910-45 occupation of the Korean Peninsula.

Prior to the opening of the talks, meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made clear in a parliamentary address in Tokyo that Japan will not compromise with North Korea over its abduction of Japanese citizens.

“Solving the nuclear problem was the main theme of the six-nation agreement, but the abduction issue is not one where any concession is possible,” Abe said. “Our stance is that unless they change their attitude, we won’t change.”

Posted in International Aid, International trade, Japan | Comments Closed

UNDP pulling out of DPRK for now…

Monday, March 5th, 2007

Kim Jong Il’s Word
A U.N. agency yanks its cash and people from North Korea.
Wall Street Journal (Hat Tip One Free Korea)
3/5/2007

North Korean officials arrived in New York over the weekend for discussions on normalizing relations with the U.S. as part of the nuclear disarmament accord struck last month. Chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill is scheduled to meet today and tomorrow with his counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan.

May we suggest that, before he sits down, Mr. Hill take a look at the brief statement issued quietly Thursday by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). There is no better guide to Kim Jong Il’s negotiating style, nor to the North Korean dictator’s habit of breaking his word. Nuclear negotiators, beware.

The agency announced, in an item on its Web site, that it is suspending all operations in North Korea because the “necessary conditions set out by the Executive Board on 25 January 2007 have not been met.” The UNDP’s 20 or so projects will be shut down, we’re told, and its eight international staffers will be pulled out of the country. The U.N. isn’t known for its tough love, and no one we’ve talked to can recall another example of the UNDP suspending operations in a country that refused to comply with the regulations.

The “necessary conditions” were imposed at the last board meeting in response to an outcry over the UNDP’s lack of oversight over its programs in North Korea. U.N. documents, produced reluctantly after prodding by the U.S. mission to the U.N., showed numerous irregularities dating back into the late 1990s. Tens of millions of dollars for programs that were supposed to help the poor appear instead to have been handed over to Kim’s dictatorship.

As the March 1 deadline for compliance approached, North Korea decided to throw a tantrum to see if it could get excused from its obligations. It deemed the conditions politically motivated–especially the one that limits aid to programs that directly help the people and bans assistance that could aid the government–and demanded a renegotiation.

Never mind that North Korea sits on the Executive Board and had agreed to abide by the terms thrashed out in January. To its credit, the UNDP refused to be bullied into extending the deadline and is holding Pyongyang to its commitments. The suspension applies to all existing projects; the board had already suspended new projects until an audit could be completed and better oversight provided.

The U.N. has another deadline fast approaching in North Korea. At the end of January, Secretary General Ban Ki Moon ordered a full investigation of all U.N. programs in North Korea, to be completed within three months. Those include Unicef, the World Food Program and the U.N. Population Fund. As the end-of-April deadline for that audit comes closer, it will be instructive to watch Pyongyang’s degree of cooperation.

Meanwhile, the talks on North Korea’s nuclear program are moving ahead, with the U.S., South Korea and Japan all holding bilateral meetings with Pyongyang this month toward the goal of normalizing relations. At the top of Japan’s agenda is the whereabouts of its citizens who were kidnapped by North Korean agents in the late 1970s and 1980s and forced to train North Korean spies. Negotiations with Pyongyang have so far yielded the return of only five abductees along with preposterous explanations for how the rest have supposedly died.

The preference in some diplomatic circles, including the U.S. State Department and perhaps now in the White House, is to dismiss the U.N. corruption in North Korea as well as the abductee and other human-rights violations as side-issues to the more vital objective of getting Kim to give up his nuclear program.

We’d argue that international focus on these issues is an essential part of keeping up the pressure on Kim’s regime. But even if you buy the argument that these are ancillary issues, there’s still an important lesson here: If Kim won’t abide by the pledges he made regarding UNDP aid to his country, how can he be expected to keep his promises on nuclear disarmament?

Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton lays out the troubling case of changing American intelligence judgments toward North Korea in The Wall Street Journal today (article available here). His point about the need for an intrusive inspection and verification regime is especially important. Under the six-party agreement announced on February 13, North Korea has 60 days to account for all of its nuclear programs. If it doesn’t, or if Kim attempts to renegotiate the terms at the last minute, we’d like to think the U.S. would show at least as much fortitude as the United Nations, and tell Kim to take a hike.

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Japan, South Korea, Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), UNDP, USA | Comments Closed

The Political Economy of Sanctions Against North Korea

Sunday, March 4th, 2007

Ruediger Frank
Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No.3, 2006 pp. 536

PDF Here: DPRK sanctions.pdf

Abstract:
This article explores sanctions as a policy tool to coerce North Korea’s behavior, such as by discontinuing its nuclear weapons program. It discusses the characteristics of sanctions as well as the practical experience with these restrictions on North Korea. It becomes clear that the concrete goals of coercion through sanctions and the relative power of the sending country to a large extent determine the outcome. Nevertheless, the general limitations of sanctions also apply, including the detrimental effects of unilateral and prolonged restrictions. It appears that the imposition of sanctions against the DPRK is unlikely to succeed. As an alternative way of changing the operating environment for North Korea, assistance deserves consideration. Despite many weaknesses, this instrument is relatively low in cost and risk, and can be applied continuously and flexibly.

Highlights below the fold:
(more…)

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Black markets, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, International trade, Japan, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Political economy, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), USA | 1 Comment »

Japan’s N Koreans oppose ‘bias’

Saturday, March 3rd, 2007

BBC
3/3/2007

Thousands of North Koreans living in Japan have demonstrated against what they say is discrimination following Pyongyang’s nuclear test last year.
The protesters rallied in a Tokyo park complaining that their community had been bullied by the police.

Hundreds of police kept them apart from a counter-protest by nationalists.

There are more than 500,000 ethnic Koreans in Japan and bilateral ties have soured since Pyongyang carried out its missile and nuclear tests.

Ban rejected

The Korean residents group, Chongryon, said about 7,000 people attended the protest in Hibiya Park, although local media put the figure at about 3,000.

Some demonstrators carried pro-Pyongyang placards or carried posters of the North’s leader Kim Jong-Il.

They demanded an end to bullying of Korean schoolchildren and the resumption of ferry services to the North that Tokyo shut after the nuclear test in October.

Chongryon official Nam Sung-U told the crowd: “We Koreans in Japan have gone through such suffering during colonial rule and even after liberation. We have united to survive.”

Many of the Koreans in Japan are descended from people brought in as forced labour during the Japanese colonial era early last century.

The governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, tried to get the protest banned but the courts rejected his request.

Nationalist counter-demonstrators took up positions along the Koreans’ protest route to chant slogans.

One major thorn in ties has been abductees – four years ago North Korea admitted its agents had kidnapped 13 Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s.

Posted in Chongryun, Japan | Comments Closed

The Ordinary Abductions

Thursday, February 22nd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2/22/2007

North Korean spy agencies love kidnappings. Of course, their colleagues worldwide also would not mind abducting a person or two, but in most cases there are some urgent reasons for taking such drastic measures _ the victims are prominent opposition leaders, or wanted criminals who cannot be extradited through normal channels, or people who are unlucky to know something way too important. North Korean abductions are different: They are often surprisingly random and target people of no significance. The very randomness of most of their abductions once was often cited by sceptics who tried to refute these accusations as “Seoul-inspired falsities.’’ Indeed, why should the secret services of a Stalinist state spend so much time and money only to kidnap a Japanese noodle chef, or a tennis-loving teenager? Nonetheless, in 2002 Kim Jong-il himself confirmed that these seemingly meaningless abductions of ordinary Japanese citizens did take place.

Of course, North Koreans spies did not limit themselves to Japanese only. Quite a number of South Korean citizens have disappeared into the Northern maw as well: it is known that at least 486 South Koreans have been forcibly taken to the North and have never returned.

A vast majority of them are fishermen who were imprudent to come too close to the North Korean coast, but this figure also includes a number of known victims of covert operations. Currently they number 17, but there are few doubts that the actual number is much higher. If the abduction is planned and conducted well, its victim simply disappears and is eventually presumed dead.

A good example is the case of the five South Korean high school students who disappeared from the island beaches in 1977 and 1978. They all were believed dead for two decades, but in the late 1990s it was discovered that the youngsters were working in North Korea as instructors, teaching the basics of South Korean lifestyle to would-be undercover Northern operatives.

Eventually, one of those former students was even allowed to briefly meet his family at the Kumgang resort. Kim Yong-nam disappeared from a beach in North Cholla Province in 1978. Later he was identified as the husband of an abducted Japanese woman, so North Korean authorities grudgingly admitted that Kim Yong-nam was indeed in the North, and staged a meeting with his family. Unsurprisingly, during this meeting and press conference, he insisted that he was not kidnapped but saved from the sea by North Korean sailors. Far more surprisingly, he sort of admitted that his job was related to spying.

It is remarkable that the kidnappings of the South Korean teenagers roughly coincided with similar abductions in Japan. In both cases the abductors obviously targeted randomly selected teenagers who were unlucky enough to be on a lonely beach. Another commonality was that the abductees were later used to train espionage agents. Perhaps, teenagers were seen as ideal would-be instructors for the spies _ still susceptible to indoctrination but with enough knowledge of local realities to be useful.

In April, 1979, a young South Korean walked into the North Korean Embassy in Oslo, Norway. His name was Ko Sang-mun, and he was a schoolteacher back home. Why and how he came to arrive at that embassy is not clear. As was usually the case, the North Korean side insisted that Ko Sang-mu defected, while the South Koreans alleged that the young teacher was the a victim of a taxi driver’s mistake: He took the taxi to a “Korean embassy’’ and the driver delivered him to the embassy of the wrong Korea.

It is impossible to say now whether this highly publicised case was abduction, defection, or something in-between. However, in 1994 it became known that Ko Sang-mun was in a labour camp. A small propaganda war ensued. Ko was made to appear in a North Korean broadcast assuring everybody that he was free, happily married, and full of righteous hatred for the US imperialists and their Seoul puppets (most of his speech consisted of customary anti-American rhetoric). We do not know where he went after delivering this speech _ to an apartment in Pyongyang or to a dugout in a prison camp. Meanwhile, Ko’s widow in the South committed suicide, unable to cope with the stress of the situation.

There were also more “normal’’ instances of abductions. The North Koreans kidnapped people who possessed important intelligence. In 1971 Yu Sang-mun, a South Korean diplomat stationed in West Germany was kidnapped in West Berlin, together with his family _ wife and two children. Perhaps, the few other South Korean officials who went missing in Europe in the 1970s were also abducted by North Korean agents, but presently only Yu’s case is certain.

In the 1990s most abductions of this sort took place in China, and their victims were political activists, missionaries, and real or suspected South Korean spies. All these abductions occurred in the Chinese North-East, near the borders of North Korea.

The abduction of North Korean dissenters, or suspected would-be defectors, from Soviet territory has been quite routine for decades. Sometimes these abductions sparked a crisis in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but in most cases the Soviets simply turned a blind eye to such acts.

Posted in China, Education, Emigration, Japan, South Korea | Comments Closed

Seoul Wants 6 Nations to Shoulder Burden for Energy Aid to NK

Sunday, February 11th, 2007

Korea Times
Park Song-wu
2/11/2007

South Korea is thinking of chairing a working group for energy aid to North Korea as the United States is trying to differentiate this round of the six-party talks from a 1994 process, a Seoul official said on Sunday.

But Seoul has a firm position that all parties should jointly pay the “tax” for peace, he said.

“Denuclearization will benefit all parties, so the burdens should be shared jointly,” he said. “But we are thinking of taking the lead in the working group for energy aid, considering the circumstances of the other parties.”

He did not elaborate. But Tokyo is not expected to raise its hand to chair the working group, considering the Japanese anger over the North’s abduction of its nationals in the past.

Russia prefers forgiving the North’s debts instead of providing it with energy.

China, host of the multilateral dialogue, is already playing the most important role of chairing the six-party meeting.

What the United States apparently has in mind, and consented to by all parties, is the necessity to differentiate the result of these on-going negotiations from the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Since it was signed by Robert Gallucci and Kang Sok-ju in Geneva on October 21, 1994, Washington provided 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to Pyongyang over the following seven years.

But the North’s promise to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors in return for two light-water reactors was not obeyed, causing the Bush administration to criticize the deal as a diplomatic failure of his predecessor, Bill Clinton. After that, U.S. diplomats even avoided meeting their North Korean counterparts bilaterally.

The U.S. policy, however, has recently reached a turning point.

“The Bush administration may have been driven to greater negotiating flexibility by a need to achieve a foreign policy victory to compensate for declining public support for the Iraq war and the loss of the Republican leadership of Congress,” Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow for the Heritage Foundation said in a recent article.

But one thing that has not changed is the U.S. hope of not repeating the “mistake” it made with the Geneva agreement.

From 1994 to 2002, Pyongyang received 3.56 million tons of heavy oil, equivalent to $500 million, from the now-defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the United States shouldered the largest share of $347 million.

To shake off that bad memory, Washington wants to use the term “shut down” instead of “freezing” and even wants to avoid providing fuel oil to the North, reportedly citing the possibility that it can be used for military purposes.

So the talks have dragged on. And, to make things worse, the North Koreans are demanding a lot.

Japan’s Kyodo news agency reported that North Korea had demanded 2 million tons of heavy oil or 2 million kilowatts of electricity in exchange for taking the initial steps towards denuclearization.

Christopher Hill, the top U.S. envoy, expressed hope on Sunday that such technical issues could be discussed at working group meetings. On the same day, the Seoul official hinted that South Korea will chair the working group.

Posted in China, Electricity, Energy, Foreign aid statistics, International Aid, Japan, Nuclear, Oil, Russia, South Korea, USA | Comments Closed

Food aid key to N Korea talks

Thursday, February 8th, 2007

BBC
2/7/2007

As six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme resume in Beijing, the BBC’s Penny Spiller considers whether food shortages in the secretive communist state may have an impact on progress.

Negotiators for the US, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia are meeting in Beijing amid signs of a willingness to compromise.

While the last round of talks in December ended in deadlock, bilateral meetings since then have brought unusually positive responses from both North Korea and the US.

Such upbeat noises were unexpected, coming four months after North Korea shocked the world by testing a nuclear bomb.

The test brought international condemnation and UN sanctions, as well as a significant drop in crucial food aid.

South Korea suspended a shipment of 500,000 tonnes of food supplies, while China’s food exports last year were sharply down.

The World Food Programme has struggled to raise even 20% of the funds it requires to feed 1.9 million people it has identified as in immediate need of help.

Aid agencies warned at the time of a humanitarian disaster within months, as the North cannot produce enough food itself to supply its population. It also lost an estimated 100,000 tonnes-worth of crops because of floods in July.

‘Queues for rations’

Kathi Zellweger, of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Pyongyang, said the present food situation in the country was unclear.

No figures are yet available for last year’s harvest, and it was difficult to assess what impact the lack of food aid was having on supplies, she said.

However, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation estimated the country was short of one million tonnes of food – a fifth of the annual requirement to feed its 23 million people.

South Korea-based Father Jerry Hammond said there were signs of shortages – not only in food but also in fuel – when he visited the North with the Catholic charity Caritas in December.

He described seeing long queues for rations, and ordinary people selling goods in the street for money to buy the basics.

“You do expect to see more shortages during the winter time,” the US-born priest, who has visited North Korea dozens of times in the past decade, said.

“But I did see a noticeable difference this time.”

High malnutrition rates

Paul Risley, of the World Food Programme, said people in North Korea may still be cushioned by the November harvest and the pinch will be felt in the coming months.

“We have great concerns,” he said, pointing out that North Korea was now in its second year of food shortages.

He says “stabilising food security” in the country will be very relevant to the talks in Beijing.

“It is certainly the hope of all who are observing the situation in [North Korea] that imports of food can be resumed and returned to prior levels,” he said.

“Malnutrition rates are still the highest in Asia, and we certainly don’t want to see those rates rise any further.”

Father Hammond thinks Pyongyang may be persuaded to consider compromises in Beijing, but is unlikely to do so as a result of any pressure from the people of North Korea.

“People are very cut off from the outside world, and there is constant propaganda about national survival. Even if they go hungry, it will be considered patriotic,” he said.

There have been signs of possible compromise from both sides in the run up to the talks.

Washington has reportedly hinted at flexibility over its offer of aid and security guarantees, as well as showing a willingness to sit down and discuss North Korea’s demands to lift financial sanctions.

Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly recently told visiting US officials it would take the first steps to disband its nuclear programme in return for 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil and other benefits.

And South Korea is keen to resume its shipments of rice and fertiliser aid – if Pyongyang agrees to freeze its nuclear programme, the Choson Ilbo newspaper has reported.

As the nuclear talks resume, all sides will be looking to translate such pressures into progress.

Posted in Agriculture, Agriculture statistics, Arduous March, China, Foreign aid statistics, International Aid, International trade, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, UN, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

China makes little investment in N. Korea since October nuclear test

Friday, February 2nd, 2007

Yonhap
2/2/2007

China has made little investment in North Korea since the North conducted its first nuclear device test in October last year, but their two-way trade volume rose 21.6 percent year-on-year over the past few months, informed sources said Friday.

“Over the three months since the October test, China made no investment in the North except in some low-budget mining development. But North Korea’s dependence on China in terms of trade increased sharply,” a senior government official said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the information.

Another source said from October to November in 2006, the trade volume between North Korea and Japan declined 75 percent year-on-year to US$7.9 million, illustrating the full range of the impact from United Nations sanctions over the North’s surprise nuclear test, they said.

Japan has shown the strongest response to the North’s nuclear test and long-range missile launches last year, banning North Korean goods and citizens from entering the country as well as barring its ships from Japanese ports.

In all of 2006, the trade volume between North Korea and China rose 7.5 percent year-on-year to $1.69 billion, while two-way trade between North Korea and Japan decreased 34 percent to $119 million in the first 11 months of last year, the source said.

“North Korea can make financial dealings only via Russia and a few other countries because it has a lot of trouble in doing financial transactions and wooing investments since the United States imposed financial sanctions on the North in September 2005,” he said.

The U.S. cut off Macau-based Banco Delta Asia’s access to the U.S. financial system, alleging that North Korea used the bank to counterfeit U.S. dollars and engage in other financial wrongdoing.

North Korea boycotted the six-party talks on its nuclear disarmament until December, saying that the U.S. should discuss ways to lift the sanctions on the sidelines of the six-nation talks involving the two Koreas, the U.S. China, Japan and Russia.

Posted in China, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Japan, Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

North Korea’s golden path to security

Thursday, January 18th, 2007

Asia Times
Bertil Lintner
1/18/2007

While the West and Japan have targeted North Korea’s overseas bank accounts to curtail its weapons program, Pyongyang has recently turned to more ingenious ways of maintaining its international businesses through substantial exports of gold, silver and other valuable metals.

Pyongyang has apparently found a willing conduit to global buyers through its many business connections in Thailand, which has recently emerged as the isolated state’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea. According to official Thai Customs Department statistics, North Korea shipped 500 kilograms of gold worth 398 million baht (US$11 million) to Thailand last April.

The following month, another 800kg of gold worth 635 million baht landed in Thailand courtesy of North Korea. Also, in June, 10 tons of silver worth 148 million baht was sent from North Korea to Thailand, followed by 12 tons worth 166 million baht last October.

In sum, North Korea exported 1.35 billion baht – or nearly $40 million – worth of precious metals to Thailand last year.

That is a substantial figure for North Korea, a country with an estimated gross domestic product of about $22 billion and whose total exports amounted to just over $1 billion, according to official statistics. Thailand is bound by the international sanctions imposed last October against North Korea by the United Nations in response to Pyongyang’s exploding an atomic bomb.

According to official Thai statistics, the gold and first consignment of silver were shipped to Thailand before the UN sanctions were imposed. But there is nothing illegal in North Korea exporting precious metals, unless, of course, the income from the sale can be tied directly to the country’s controversial weapons programs, which anyway would be extremely hard to prove.

Untapped riches
North Korea’s gold and silver mines remain largely untapped. According to Tse Pui-kwan, a Chinese-American chemist who joined the US Bureau of Mines in 1990, North Korea has significant deposits of copper, gold, graphite, iron, lead, magnesite, tungsten and zinc. When the Cold War ended and North Korea lost large amounts of foreign aid from both the Soviet Union and China, its mining industry fell into disrepair and extraction activities sharply declined.

But with new foreign cooperation, production has resumed, which the recent exports to Thailand clearly demonstrate. North Korea’s main gold mine is in Unsan county in North Pyongan province, about 150 kilometers north of Pyongyang. It was originally opened by a US firm in 1896, when Korea was still an independent and unified kingdom, and was later taken over by a Japanese company when the peninsula became a colony ruled by Tokyo in 1910.

Nearly a century later, consultants from Clough Engineering of Australia in 2001 inspected the same mine under the sponsorship of the United Nations Office for Project Services. They estimated that Unsan held 1,000 tons of gold reserves, which if true would make it one of the world’s major gold mines. Silver is also mined in the same area, while iron ore and magnesite are found in North and South Hamgyong provinces in the northeast.

North Korea’s extraction techniques are sometimes controversial. According to witnesses interviewed by the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea for its 2003 report “The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps”, there is a gold-mining labor camp near Danchun in South Hamgyong province, where thousands of prisoners are being held and forced to work under abysmal conditions.

In that same report, several witnesses claimed that “some of the mine shafts dated back to the early days of the Japanese occupation of Korea in the early 1900s. Accessing the veins of minable gold required descending and, later, ascending a wooden staircase 500 meters in length, using gas lanterns for light. Deaths from mining accidents were a daily occurrence, including multiple deaths from the partial collapse of mine shafts.”

The first attempt to modernize North Korea’s gold-mining industry was made by an Italian financier and former Foreign Ministry official, Carlo Baeli, who traveled to the country in the early 1990s and claims to be the first Westerner to do business with Pyongyang since the Korean War. He later wrote a book called Kim Jong-il and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, which was published in Pyongyang in 1990, obviously with official permission as it was printed by the state-owned Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Apart from painting a flattering portrait of the North Korean leader, the book describes Baeli’s first trip to Pyongyang in 1990, of which he wrote, “We were interested in investing in the mining industry, mainly in the extraction of gold and granite.” Baeli later signed a contract for a loan of $118 million to purchase mining equipment, and the goal was to resurrect no fewer than six gold mines across North Korea. The money was to be provided by international banks such as Midland Bank and the Naples International Bank. He also arranged for the mining equipment to be shipped from Italy.

But heavy flooding in the mid-1990s damaged both the equipment and the mines and, according to a 2006 report in Forbes magazine, Baeli today works as an adviser to the Pyongyang government at a tire-recycling plant. The car and truck tires are imported from Japan, get ground into granulate in North Korea, and are sold to China for road resurfacing, car mats and shoe soles. A lucrative business, perhaps, but not quite the golden dream Baeli had when he first arrived in Pyongyang nearly 17 years ago.

Another unusual partner in North Korea’s gold trade may have been the late Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos. In August 2001, the right-wing South Korean newspaper Munhwa Ilbo published a story claiming that Marcos in September 1970 had deposited 940 tons of gold bars at a Swiss bank in the name of the late North Korean dictator, Kim Il-sung. The report came from a former Marcos aide, and Munhwa Ilbo carried a copy of the bank-account certificate on its front page. The alleged gold bars were part of what a Japanese army general had looted from Asia during World War II, Munhwa Ilbo claimed.

That report was never independently confirmed, but it nevertheless reflects the mystique and speculation that still surround North Korea’s gold industry – and how little the outside world actually knows about it.

Financial pressures
When the US took action against Banco Delta Asia in Macau in September 2005, labeling it a “primary money-laundering concern” for North Korean funds, very little evidence to substantiate the charges was ever produced. North Korea lost $24 million when the accounts it held with the bank in the name of a front company, Zokwang Trading, were frozen. Zokwang, which had been operating in Macau for decades, also closed its office and relocated to Zhuhai province across the border in China proper.

The action against Banco Delta Asia, a privately owned bank that the Macau government later had to prop up to prevent it from collapsing, was the second move against North Korea’s assets abroad. In a much less publicized action, North Korea’s only bank located in a foreign country – the Golden Star Bank in Vienna – was forced to suspend its operations in June 2004. The Golden Star was 100% owned by the Korea Daesong Bank, a state enterprise headquartered in Pyongyang, and was allowed to set up a branch in the Austrian capital in 1982.

For more than two decades, Austrian police kept a close eye on the bank, but there was no law that forbade the North Koreans from operating a bank in the country. Nevertheless, Austria’s police intelligence department stated in a 1997 report: “This bank [Golden Star] has been mentioned repeatedly in connection with everything from money-laundering and distribution of fake currency notes to involvement in the illegal trade in radioactive material.”

Eventually the international pressure to close the bank became too strong. Sources in Vienna believe the US played an important behind-the-scenes role in finally shuttering Golden Star’s modest office on 12 Kaiserstrasse in the Austrian capital. Until then, Vienna had been North Korea’s center for financial transactions in Europe and the Middle East. Visitors to North Korea have noted that euro coins in circulation in the country – the US dollar is not welcome in Pyongyang – invariably came from Austria. (Euro notes are the same in all European Union countries, but coins designate individual member countries.)

Last October, in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear tests, Japan froze a dollar-denominated account that North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank held with an unnamed Japanese bank. The account had a balance of $1,000 and had not been active for nearly a decade, so the move was mainly symbolic: to demonstrate to North Korea that it cannot use banks in Japan for any deposits, big or small.

So it is hardly surprising that North Korea is looking for new ways to manage and maintain its international business interests and for new partners when it is increasingly locked out of most foreign countries. That is where Thailand apparently comes into the picture.

In 2004, trade between Thailand and North Korea for the first time overtook trade between Japan and North Korea. Previously, a string of North Korean-controlled front companies, managed by the Chosen Soren, or the Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, had supplied North Korea with computers, electronic goods and other vital items.

In 2003, North Korea’s total trade volume to Japan was just over $265 million and fell even lower in 2004. At the same time, trade between Thailand and North Korea rose to more than $331 million in 2004. Two-way trade between Thailand and North Korea totaled $328 million in 2005, with Thai exports to North Korea amounting to $207 million and North Korean imports to Thailand totaling $121 million.

During January-November 2006 – the latest statistics available from the Thai Customs Department – trade totaled about $345 million, with Thai exports accounting for $200 million and North Korean imports $145 million. Thai imports of gold and silver have pushed those trade figures higher.

North Korea’s trade with Thailand grew mainly under the previous government of Thaksin Shinawatra, who at one point proposed signing a free-trade agreement between the two countries. In August 2005, Thaksin was formally invited by Kim Jong-il to visit Pyongyang. The visit never materialized, and since Thaksin was ousted last year in a military coup, the future of Thai-North Korean relations is very much in doubt.

But gold and silver are highly fungible and North Korea apparently has lots of the commodities. It appears Kim Jong-il has for now found at least one golden path around the international sanctions imposed against his regime’s nuclear tests.

Posted in Chongryun, Copper, Daesong Group, Domestic publication, Gold, Graphite, International trade, Iron Ore, Mining/Minerals, Statistics, Tanchon Commercial Bank, Thailand, Trade Statistics, Zokwang Trading Company | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch