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A Black Hole

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008

Today The Economist published a report on the political momentum of the North Korean human rights movement. Although this web site does not keep up with the politics of the movement, the article points out how globalization is seemingly improving human rights in the DPRK…

A Black Hole
The Economist
1/30/2008

When you learn that Chinese firms are teaching notions of corporate social responsibility to factories in North Korea, there are two possible reactions besides incredulity. One is despair. Scandals from China involving tainted products, abused workers or environmental degradation are legion: what could its companies possibly have to teach their backward, isolated and viciously repressive neighbour?The other is to celebrate the glorious rising tide of globalisation, which washes up little bits of good news on even its most remote and neglected shores.
…
Human rights, then, no longer seem so central to the West [politically]. So it is moderately encouraging to hear that Chinese garment-makers, subcontracting to North Korea to escape mounting costs at home, insist that their partners stop imposing seven-day working weeks. Just as China’s Western partners 15 years ago trapped them in misdemeanours by finding that sewing needles had broken on supposed rest days, so the Chinese are catching the North Koreans with the same tactics.

This might seem like a radical thought, but imagine how much better companies from OECD countries would be doing this. According to US Census data, the US has only imported $1.7 m from the DPRK since 1992 (including the famine). Since isolation from western markets has been the DPRK’s policy essentially since its founding, why try to maintain it? Lets start investing and trading. Agree or disagree in the comments. I’d like to know your thoughts.

Posted in China, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Manufacturing, Trade Statistics | 1 Comment »

2008 Olympics visit Pyongyang

Monday, December 17th, 2007

Olympic torch ‘going to N Korea’
BBC
12/16/2007

North Korea will host a leg of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games torch relay, state media has reported.

The flame, which is due to pass through 22 cities in the four months before the Games, is expected to reach North Korean capital Pyongyang on 28 April.

Chinese and North Korean officials made the agreement in Pyongyang, said the official Korean Central News Agency.

A day earlier the torch is scheduled to pass through the South Korean capital of Seoul on its way north, say reports.

The torch, which will be lit at Olympia in Greece on 25 March, is due to cover five continents before the event begins on 8 August.

The planned 137,000-km (85,000-mile) relay route will include a trip to the top of Mount Everest.

The two Koreas have agreed to send a joint team of officials to the Beijing Olympics by train, as part of reconciliation efforts after their 1950-1953 civil war.

Coca-cola And Samsung Billboards to Appear in Pyongyang
Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
12/17/2007

Coca-cola and Samsung billboards, viewed by the North Korean regime as symbols of “American capitalism” and “Imperialistic culture,” will soon be visible in downtown Pyongyang just on April 28, 2008.

The China-based Huanqiu Times reported that the Beijing Organizing Committee of the 2008 Olympic Games (BOCOG), the Chosun (North Korea) Olympic Committee, and the Pyongyang People’s Committee signed an agreement to cooperate during the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay.

Samsung, Coca-cola, and Lenovo (a Chinese IT company), three of the main companies sponsoring the Beijing Olympics, will be allowed to advertise their products by cars when the Olympic Torch Relay passes through Pyongyang on April 28.

The three companies will be able to distribute pamphlets to North Korean citizens, but the extent of the content of these pamphlets will limited to the history of the respective companies’ sponsorship of the Olympic Games. Outdoor billboards will not be permitted along the relay path.

Additionally, with the exception of Shanghai-Volkswagen (the official car company of the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay), car companies will not be allowed to reveal their logos during the event.

The upcoming Torch Relay marks the first time in Olympic history that the Torch will pass through Pyongyang. Fifty-seven members of the Chosun Olympic Committee, six representatives from the three sponsorship companies, one member of the International Olympic Committee, and four Chinese diplomats will act as torchbearers in the event.

The relay will begin at the Tower of Juche Idea. Sights along the route will include the May Day Stadium, Kim Il Sung University, the Chosun-China Friendship Tower, the April 25 House of Culture, the National Liberation War Memorial Hall, Pot’ong Gate, the People’s Palace of Culture, the Pyongyang Gymnasium, Kim Il Sung Plaza, the Chollima Statue, the Arch of Triumph, and the Kim Il Sung Gymnasium. The total distance will be 20 kilometers.

The Pyongyang leg of the relay will begin after the South Korean leg is complete. The Torch will cross the DMZ by airplane and will be run through downtown Pyongyang from 2p.m. to 8 p.m. on the 28th of April.

Posted in Advertising, China, Sports | Comments Closed

NK Forced to Revert to Agricultural Market System?

Tuesday, December 11th, 2007

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
12/11/2007

Several sources in China have relayed that it is rumored North Korean authorities are planning to take extreme measures to prevent the sale of industrial products at the jangmadang (markets) next year.

One Chinese merchant, whom DailyNK met in Dandong, China on the 6th, said, “Rumors are circulating that a measure preventing all kinds of Industrial products from being sold in the jangmadang will be implemented next year, making Chinese merchants involved in trade between North Korea and China nervous.”

He informed that “In place of industrial products, only farm produce from the fields of homeowners will be allowed to sell in the jangmadang. Marine products that up to now have been selling in the jangmadang will only be made available at appointed marine shops, meat products at food shops, and industrial products at state operated stores.”

The Chinese source also maintained that, “There are quite a few overseas Chinese who, not knowing what will happen, have bought loads of industrial products with the idea that this might be their last chance, and they have brought them into the North.”

The North Korean authorities began unfolding a series of market regulations immediately following the Inter-Korea Summit in October. These included such policies as limiting the types of items for sale and imposing a minimum age limit on female merchants. However, limiting the sale of industrial products themselves, after having abolished permanent markets, can be seen as a means of returning to “agricultural markets,” where farmers traded only vegetables and a surplus of produce.

According to other Chinese merchants with whom DailyNK met in Dandong on the 3rd, “Under the name of the North Pyongan Party Committee in Shinuiju, a three-day meeting was held between the Secretaries of the Party and of the Army and enterprise managers, from November 20th to the 22nd.”

They informed that “The meeting was held to discuss whether to prohibit jangmadang operations and put people who have been trading in the market to work at enterprises or factories, since regular provisions will resume starting next year.”

The recent efforts to regulate the markets have been analyzed as means to revert the standard of societal regulation to that of the pre-90s by restoring the provision system and normalizing factory operations. However, such an extreme measure is likely to give rise to serious civilian opposition, so there are doubts as to whether or not it can be realized.

The North Korean civilians, before the mid-90s, relied on a complete provision system supplied by the State, which included the provision of goods such as soap, clothes and other necessities. However, after the food shortage, the national provision system completely collapsed. As a result, civilians began acquiring most necessities, goods and food items through the jangmadang.

However, agricultural markets, where miscellaneous cereals, vegetables and other agricultural items raised in home gardens were traded, existed around the time when North Korea’s provision system was in normal operation.

Following the execution of the “July 1st Economic Management Improvement Measure” of 2002, the North Korean government established general markets which brought simple agricultural markets out in the open in February 2003. Since then, individuals leasing stands from the city mercantile department have been able to sell all kinds of industrial products as well.

One source in Chongjin stated in a phone conversation on the 6th regarding the recent rumors, “If the sources are Chinese merchants, than the rumor is not likely groundless. A majority of citizens sustain their livelihoods through the jangmadang.”

He agreed that “It is highly feasible that measures to toughen the regulation of industrial products in the market will be executed.”

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Black markets, China, Civil society, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Private property, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Balancing Between 2 Communist Powers

Sunday, December 9th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
12/9/2007

By 1963, the inhabitants of the huge Soviet Embassy compound in downtown Pyongyang felt themselves under siege. All their communications with Koreans were supervised, and most North Koreans who had expressed some sympathy with Moscow had disappeared without a trace. Soviet aid nearly stopped, and most Soviet advisors left the North. On quite a few occasions, the official media of North Korea and Soviet Russia exchanged broadsides of sharply worded critical statements.

In short, in 1963-65 few people doubted that North Korea, together with Albania and, to a lesser extent, North Vietnam, chose to side with Beijing in its quarrel with Moscow. There were good reasons for this: Moscow was too liberal in its domestic policies, too disdainful of Kim Il-sung’s personality cult, too ready to compromise with the arch-villain of U.S. imperialism. And it was prone to an arrogant attitude in its dealings with the small East Asian country, too.

But then things changed, dramatically and irreversibly. The anti-Soviet pro-Maoist block, clearly in the making in the early 1960s, felt apart in 1966-67. The reason was the Cultural Revolution, the ten years of madness, which engulfed China. Some people believe that there was a system in this madness. Perhaps. But I personally find this system extremely difficult to discover.

It was not the only “cultural revolution,” of course. The Vietnam War demonstrated that China, despite its bellicose rhetoric, was unable to provide enough aid. The Russians provided Hanoi with missiles and tanks while the Chinese largely limited themselves to shipping the “little red books” full of Mao’s quotations.

But it was the “cultural revolution” that played the major role in the alienation between Korea and China. Kim Il-sung was perplexed by the new developments in his sponsor country. Everything looked like madness, and in September 1966 the Cuban Ambassador noticed that North Korean top officials began to make jokes about China and Mao the Great Helmsman himself (they suggested that a bit of Korean ginseng would help the Chinese leader who was obviously becoming senile).

Around the same time, in late 1966, the internal propaganda of North Korea began to criticize “dogmatism” and “superpower chauvinism,” clearly associated with China. For years, the major culprit in the internal propaganda was the “modern revisionism” (read: the Soviet Union). In December 1966, at a secret meeting with the Soviet leader Brezhnev, Kim Il-sung described the “cultural revolution” as a “massive idiocy.” Well, he was probably correct, even if his own policies were not exactly an embodiment of wise statesmanship.

At that stage, China still could play down the differences and probably keep North Korea on its side. But it seems that Beijing was not in control of the situation, or was not able to make reasonable decisions, so in early 1967 the Chinese press began to attack Kim Il-sung. Throughout 1967, the Red Guards newspapers frequently called Kim Il-sung a “revisionist,” the worst term of abuse in their (quite limited) vocabulary. He was accused of “blocking the revolutionary will of masses” and not starting a cultural revolution in his realm.

In early 1967, the Red Guards’ media reported an alleged attempted coup in Pyongyang. As far as we know, the story was a complete fake, but it prompted the North Korean press to react. In January 1967, Nodong Sinmun rebuffed the statements.

The propaganda war escalated. It was meaningless from the Chinese point of view: in its feud with the USSR China needed as many allies as possible. But it seems that the considerations of real politick were rejected by the zealots who required a complete adherence to the then current Chinese political line. Kim Il-sung and his entourage were not famous for their readiness to follow foreigners’ advice, so the situation went from bad to worse.

Bernd Schaefer penned a wonderful monograph based on the now de-classified East German archives, and noted some rather extreme episodes in the late 1960s. In the summer of 1968 the Chinese installed loudspeakers on the border and used them to blast North Korea with Chinese propaganda, largely with tales about the unparalleled wisdom of Mao. The Koreans retaliated in kind, by installing their own loudspeakers and bombarding their opponents with stories of Kim Il-sung’s greatness and superhuman wisdom.

The Chinese accused Kim Il-sung himself of enjoying a luxurious life, very different from the lifestyle of his subjects. This was correct, even if the same thing could be said about Mao. However, these personal accusations made Kim even less willing to accommodate the Chinese.

On one occasion, a group of Chinese soldiers crossed the border, obviously in hope of provoking a clash, but the North Koreans did not react and Chinese soon withdrew. There were also reports that bodies of ethnic Korean officials who were slaughtered in China by the Red Guards were put on a train and sent to the North. Personally, I am somewhat skeptical, but this story was indeed reported in the contemporary diplomatic messages cited by Bernd Schaefer and thus might be true.

Relations reached their nadir in late 1968. However, Kim Il-sung understood that his best policy would be a balancing act between the two Communist great powers, and he was ready to find a path to rapprochement. Fortunately for him, China was gradually coming to some semblance of normality, so from around 1970 it was once again possible to resume the balancing act policy. But that is another story.

Posted in China, Political economy, Russia, Vietnam | Comments Closed

China casting wary eye on North Korea

Tuesday, December 4th, 2007

Asia Times
Ting-I Tsai
12/5/2007

The likelihood that North Korea’s nuclear disarmament will be completed just a year after Pyongyang announced that it had tested a nuclear bomb has been widely welcomed around the world, with the exception, perhaps, of China.

There are increasing concerns among Chinese academics that Pyongyang’s actions are hurting Chinese interests. Last October’s nuclear test not only unmasked the contradictions of a relationship frequently described as being “as close as lips and teeth”. It may have led to a further downturn in bilateral ties.

As the host nation of the Six Party Talks and once North Korea’s closest ally, China has reacted to the prospects for disarmament in a decidedly cool manner, with its North Korea experts debating how Pyongyang will harm China’s interests.

“There is no doubt that Pyongyang will create conflicts between China and the United States once it improves its relationship with Washington,” said Zhang Liangui, professor of international strategic research at the Central Party School in Beijing. He predicted that it was only a matter of time before Pyongyang took revenge on Beijing for China’s vote to impose sanctions on North Korea at the United Nations last October.

Zhang Yushan, researcher at the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, however, doubts that North Korea could develop a close relationship with the US in the upcoming months.

After a year of dialog, North Korea agreed in October to shut its main nuclear reactor and provide detailed descriptions of all its nuclear programs by the end of the year. Furthermore, it has pledged not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or knowledge to other countries. Pyongyang fulfilled one of those promises in July by shutting down the reactor in Yongbyon. It has yet to make any substantial moves toward providing a description of its nuclear programs.

Chinese academics who question whether North Korea’s pledges to completely abandon its nuclear program are sincere also worry about Washington’s lack of determination to shape a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula after having received Pyongyang’s assurance that it would not transfer nuclear materials, technology or knowledge to other countries.

“China has always seen North Korea’s nuclear weapon issue as the Americans’ problem and has never adopted any strategic plan for itself in the Six Party Talks, which have led to where we are now,” said Jin Linbo, a research professor at the Beijing-based China Institute of International Studies. Jin argued that Beijing might have gained nothing but a security threat from its neighbor by hosting the talks.

What has particularly frustrated Beijing has been North Korea’s selfish neglect of China’s interests. The Central Party School’s Zhang noted that the latest developments have led some Chinese academics who originally had sympathies for North Korea to change their attitudes.

“Some of them have started to argue that North Korea is outrageous,” Zhang said.

Scoot Snyder, senior associate at the Washington based Asia Foundation, noted that North Korea’s traditional strategy is to play larger parties against each other; having found their country over-reliant on China for critical inputs, North Korean leaders would certainly like to stimulate a competition between China and the United States and South Korea to see who can most effectively win influence in Pyongyang. He pointed out in particular that DPRK negotiator Kim Kye-gwan’s public criticism of the United States for relying too much on China to carry out its Korea policy, US negotiator Christopher Hill’s sudden visit to Pyongyang without passing through Beijing, and the “three- or four-party” phrase in the inter-Korean summit declaration had all caused speculation and concern in Beijing.

In a study titled, “How North Korea threatens China’s interests“, conducted by Gregory Moore, assistant professor of political science at the St. Petersburg, Florida-based Eckerd College, the start of the decline in PRC–DPRK amity coincided quite closely with the rise of Kim Jong-Il in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. It was sealed with the passing of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, and contact between Beijing and Pyongyang broke down almost completely between 1994 and 1999.

Kim Jung-il, Moore suggested in his study, revealed his willingness to affront China in 1990-91 by conducting a dialog with China’s rival Taiwan and making a deal in which Pyongyang would have been paid to accept Taiwan’s nuclear waste. He played the same “Taipei card” again in 1996 when Beijing offered one-tenth of the grain that Pyongyang had asked for. In 1997, North Korea again opened discussions with Taiwan on direct flights between the island’s capital of Taipei and Pyongyang after another quarrel with China. At the time, Chinese agricultural experts publicly encouraged Pyongyang to adopt Chinese-style reforms, which led Pyongyang to call Deng Xiaoping a traitor to socialism. That jibe prompted Beijing to mull cutting off food aid to North Korea.

Other factors have also caused the relationship to sour. North Korea’s admission to US diplomat James Kelly in October 2002 that it was indeed pursuing a uranium enrichment program, its plan to establish the free trade zone and gambling city of Sinuiju, its counterfeiting of US$100 bills and Chinese currency, and China’s cutting off of an oil pipeline and deploying troops to the border in 2003 have all caused friction. In addition, rumors have surfaced that Pyongyang’s Chinese-built Taen Friendship Glass Factory resulted from Kim Jung-il’s flirtation with the “Taipei card”.

According to a Pyongyang-based foreign diplomat, bilateral relations “are mainly close in commercial and economic matters, especially with neighboring Liaoning province” in China. Bilateral trade in the first three quarters of 2007 reached US$1.44 billion, representing 16.6 growth year-on-year. The Chinese are reportedly operating three major coal mining sites in North Korea, although related government agencies in Pyongyang have denied this.

It remains to be seen how Pyongyang will handle its relationship with China. But both governments have made efforts to demonstrate their friendship.

On November 26, Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador to the DPRK, delivered a speech to students at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang, sharing the success of the Chinese Communist Party’s 17th congress, the significant accomplishments of its 29-year-long period of liberalization and reform, and China’s appreciation of its historical friendship with North Korea. The speech, which the embassy described as “a new page in the bilateral friendship”, came shortly after the visit of Liu Yunshan, member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Pyongyang on October 29. In July, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi made North Korea the first nation he visited after taking office.

In return, Pyongyang authorities issued a series of stamps featuring the 2008 Beijing Olympics in mid-November, and Kim Jung-il paid a visit to China’s embassy on the occasion of the Chinese lantern-festival holiday Yuan Xiao Jie.

In the eyes of South Korea, which has aggressively sought to improve its ties with the North, ties between China and North Korea remain unquestionably close.

Haksoon Paik, senior fellow at the Seoul-based Sejong Institute, argued that the US-PRC relationship is the key factor shaping East Asian international politics, and North Korea has simply “tried to just find some breathing space in between”.

Having dealt with North Koreans for more than a half-century, Chinese academics are now preparing for North Korea’s eventual tilt away from Beijing because of the landscape change in East Asian politics.

“For the upcoming decade, the relationships among the six-party-talk members will put the US, Japan and North Korea on one side, and China, South Korea and Russia on the other,” predicted a Chinese expert on North Korea, who spoke under the condition of anonymity.

Posted in China, International Aid, International trade, Political economy | Comments Closed

Two Koreas Join Forces to Develop Linux

Friday, November 30th, 2007

Electonic Times News (South Korea)
Hat tip DPRK Studies
Gil-soo Jang
11/30/2007

South and North Korea team up to develop a version of ‘Hana Linux (tentatively named)’ and set standards.

Reunification IT Forum (South), Chosun People’s Science Technology Association (North) and Chinese Information Society co-hosted ICMIP 2007 in Yenji, China on November 27 to 28.

At the conference, IT experts from two Koreas agreed on the need for cooperation in the Linux sector and developing ‘Hana Linux.’ Besides, the two parties will pursue other projects such as Open Office, an internationally certified (CC) office suite, and developing Korean language for excellent open software.

Such a proposal was initially made by president of Hee-tak Moon of Korea Open Source Software Association (KOSSA) to the North counterpart. A detailed plan will follow at the Speical Duties Committee (SDC) which will be formed soon by two Koreas and China.

President Ho-ik Seok of Reunification IT Forum, Secretary General Kyung Chon of Chosun People’s Science Technology Association, and President Ryong-woon Hyung of Chinese Information Society agreed to five points at issue and to create expert working groups and the SDC soon.

The three parties also consented to nurture software professionals and, as part of that effort, to base Yenben and Dandung of China, and Pyongyang, Kaesong and Hoichun of Korea as training centers. Moreover, they will consider sharing information by establishing an IT exhibition hall, library and history archive.

To further the agreement and issues, IT experts decided to hold an international conference in Pyongyang in the first half of next year to bring IT professionals together.

They were in agreement that there are differences in IT terminology between South, North Koreans and Korean Chinese and agreed to make efforts to standardize the terms.

Posted in China, Communications, Computing/IT, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Joint Ventures | Comments Closed

Musan Mine into Chinese Hands?

Monday, November 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
11/26/2007

An insider North Korean source said in a phone conversation on the 22nd, “With long-term suspension of exports for the break in China’s investment in North Korea’s iron ore production, the lives of citizens and the Musan Mine laborers have become extremely difficult. There have been talks that this might be the 2nd March of Tribulation (Mass starvation period in the 1990s).”

The South Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry released a report, the “North Korean Underground Resource Joint Development Strategy” on the 21th saying that China has cleared with a clean stroke North Korean minerals, Musan Mines being a representative example.

The report introduced the contract which gave 50-years-mining rights to the Musan Mine in North Hamkyung, which is North Korea’s best iron ore, for 70 hundred million Yuan (approximately DSD950 million) to China, which can take 10 million tons of iron ores from Musan every year for 50 years.

However, investment in Musan Mine, which was considered the China’s representative investment in North Korean underground resources, was ruptured due to the fact that opinions surrounding on the retrieval ways of shares and investment funds could not be narrowed down. Accordingly, Musan Mine laborers going through difficulty with the operation of the mine have fallen into a severe hardship in living.

The South Korean intelligence authorities confirmed the veracity of the breakdown in investment negotiation early June of this year.

North Hamkyung Province’s Musan Mine is a strip mine containing 30 hundred million tons of coal reserves, 13 hundred million tons of coals capable of digging and several hundred tons of steel concentrate, has offered these materials to the Kim Chaek and Sungjin Steel Mills, but with the unreliable operation of these mills, mining came to a halt in early 2000.

In 2005, the North Korean government closed an investment contract with the Chinese Tonghua Steel Group Consortium and China’s investment in Musan Mine began the fall of that year. As the exports of iron ore started, the North Korean authorities resumed the provision system to mine laborers and their families.

With the influx of many goods including food, gasoline, and construction materials as a reward for exporting iron ore to China, the lives of citizens in Musan have stabilized in these last two years.

However, the volume of production was known to have rapidly decreased with the cease in iron goods export to China and the rupture in joint investment with China.

The source said, “With the cease in iron ore exports to China, provision to the miners have ceased, which has incurred significant damage. We are in the ‘March of Tribulation’ again. When we are barely able to get by, something else occurs.”

The source introduced the current situation of withdrawal for Musan Mine laborers, “With only 500 thousand won (approximately USD 152), a person can get out of mining. It takes 100,000 won at the mina labor department and another 100,000 won to receive a diagnosis at mine hospitals and about 300,000 won to receive approval from the Safety Agency and the county labor department leaders as bribes. The despair of people are so heavy that people hope to come out of mining, even with the granting of provisions.”

Posted in China, Coal, International trade, Mining/Minerals | Comments Closed

Chinese Community in NK

Sunday, November 18th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
11/18/2007

Until recently it would have been just a minor exaggeration to say that Korea is a country without national minorities. The only exception to this rule are the ethnic Chinese who began to move to Korea in the late 19th century. Nowadays, South Korea is home to some 20,000 ethnic Chinese who are considered citizens of Taiwan.

North Korea also has its ethnic Chinese community, whose members, needless to say, hold passports of the People’s Republic of China. The ethnic Chinese of the North are descendants of people who moved there in the 19th century. In the late 1940s, most of them went back, but a few chose to stay, creating a small but unusual community, one of the few minorities in a society which sees its own homogeneity as a source of pride.

From the very beginning of their history, the North Korean huaqiao (as foreign nationals of China are known) found themselves in an unusual and controversial situation. Their presence was not really welcomed: in the 1950s and early 1960s the North Korean authorities went to great length to “cleanse” the land of all non-Korean elements, including citizens of supposedly friendly countries. Hence, the Chinese were strongly encouraged to go back to China.

However, the Chinese themselves were not very enthusiastic about this move: most of them had spent their entire lives in Korea. It was also important that China in the 1960s and 1970s was in an even worse state than North Korea. It had lower living standards, and hardly fared much better in terms of political freedom: Kim Il-sung’s dictatorship might have been bizarre, but it was more predictable and perhaps less brutal than the moody rule of Chairman Mao. People still went to China, to be sure, but they were not in a hurry.

According to a 2001 Chinese publication which cited North Korean sources, in 1958 in the North there were 3,778 Chinese households comprising 14,351 members.[1] In the 1960s numbers dropped on account of the ban on private economic activity, the forced collectivization of agriculture, and the nationalist policies of Pyongyang. These factors conspired to drive the ethnic Chinese away. Thus, by 1980 numbers had fallen to a mere 6,000, of whom half reportedly resided in Pyongyang with most of the balance living near the North Korean border with China.

The situation of the North Korean huaqiao was difficult to describe in one word: they were both discriminated against and privileged. As foreigners, they could not become members of the Korean Workers Party, and this alone made them ineligible for many possible careers (well, no department in the administration or bureaucracy would take them on anyway). However, children of small vendors and vegetable farmers hardly felt too bad when they realized that they would never become district party secretaries or army colonels, their aspirations were milder.

At the same time, the huaqiao were exempt from the many obligations of the average North Korean. For example, they were allowed to have radio sets with free tuning, on the condition that they would not tune in to anything but the official broadcast if some locals were present nearby. They did not attend the boring and time-consuming indoctrination sessions. And one also might surmise that they also enjoyed a much less likelihood of being arrested for some minor improper ties.

Like the ethnic Chinese in South Korea, the North Korean huaqiao have their own schools. According to the same publication, cited by Kim Min-se, in the late 1990s in North Korea there were four Chinese middle schools where students, young citizens of the People’s Republic, studied according to the Chinese curriculum. There were primary schools as well.

However, of all the privileges the most important one was their right to trade. From around 1980, the Korean huaqiao were allowed to go to China or invite their relatives to North Korea. This meant that they were the only group (at least, outside the narrow inner circle of the top families) whose members could go overseas more or less at will. In the 1980s China was beginning its remarkable economic overhaul, and the possibility of using a price differential between two closed markets is the dream of any astute merchant. In few years, most huaqiao made trade their main or only source of income.

They moved back and forth, selling seafood, frog oil, mushrooms and other exotic products, which play an unusually important role in North Korean foreign trade, to China. From China, they brought in garments, cloth, cheap electronics and household items. In the mid-1990s, during the famine, food became a major import item as well. Everything was sold at huge profits, and from around 1990 every huaqiao was seen as a rich person, almost by definition.

However, the numbers of North Korean huaqiao are said to be dwindling nonetheless. The lure of successful China is too great, so they often prefer to leave. They stay in touch with their connections in the North and maintain their business networks, but now they reside in the more comfortable and secure environment of modern China. Their desire to give their children a better education also plays a major role in the repatriation process, another similarity with the shrinking Chinese community in the South.

However, there is another move afoot as well: some Chinese are moving to North Korea to start businesses there, and they might just lay the foundations for a new huaqiao community. But that will be another story, of course.

Posted in China, Civil society, Education | Comments Closed

North Korea, China Will Start $10 Billion Fund, Yonhap Reports

Tuesday, November 13th, 2007

Bloomberg
Bomi Lim
11/13/2007

North Korea’s Daepung Investment Group will set up a $10 billion fund with China Development Bank to help Chinese firms operating in North Korea, Yonhap News reported, citing the company’s vice president.

The fund will be used to help Chinese companies build roads, railways and ports in North Korea, Daepung Vice President Bae Kyeong Hwan was quoted as saying. Bae didn’t say how much each country will contribute the fund.

Daepung also plans to set up a bank to attract investment from overseas, the report said.

China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner and an important provider of food and fuel. North Korea is isolated from most of the rest of the world and has received virtually no foreign investment.

Posted in Automobiles, Banking, China, Economic reform, Finance, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Korea Taepung International Investment Group (Daepung Investment Group), Railways, Sea shipping, Transportation | Comments Closed

Civilians along the North Korea-Chinese Border Prefer Small-Size TVs?

Tuesday, November 13th, 2007

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
11/13/2007

Recent demand for small-sized TVs has been rapidly increasing in North Korea’s border regions, resulting in a huge price increases.

According to an inside North Korean source, the price of 12-inch (dubbed “chok” in North Korea) and 14-inch TVs, compared with prices this time last year, increased by 50 thousand to 100 thousand won (approx. USD15-30). Despite the increase, these small TVs are selling out, resulting in a supply shortage in stores located throughout the border regions.

Most 12-inch black and white TVs are Chinese-made. These TVs, which could have been purchased for a mere 150,000 won (approx. USD46) up until the end of last year, have recently sold for as much as 250,000 won.

The reason for the increase in the border region is that the state has strengthened inspections in these areas of those who watch Chinese TVs. The recent preference for small-size TVs comes from the fact that they are relatively easy to conceal.

A majority of border region civilians from North Pyongan to North Hamkyung Province can receive Chinese TV signals, thanks to the close distance. Among the channels able to be viewed is once broadcasted via Yanbian TV and South Korea’s China TV (www.openchina21.com). In accordance with a 2004 agreement between these two companies to promote broadcasting and cultural exchange, diverse South Korean dramas and movies as well as advertisements of South Korean products can be viewed.

The North Korean government collected remote controls to prevent the viewing of Chinese TV along the border region and implemented measures such as sealing the channels. Throughout the China-North Korea border region, inspections conducted by the No. 27 Bureau (under the Central Communications Office) are still very much underway.

The source said, “No. 27 Bureau agents come knocking at the door and turn on the TV at once to verify which channels have been viewed. Further, they inspect the state of sealed channels; if the seal has been damaged, the TV is confiscated.” When inspections take place, 30~50 sets are taken at a time, and in order to retrieve them, several thousand won in bribes is needed.”

However, in cases where these methods have failed to prevent the viewing of Chinese TV, technicians have entered homes and intercepted the circuits inside the TV, re-sealing the attached apparatus with high-strength adhesives. By doing so, the channels are forcibly fixed on Chosun Central TV broadcasting.

When the government carried out such invasive measures, the civilians put up a strong resistance, “Are they planning to just break TVs?” However, the government enforced the regulation of internal equipment, even when faced with civil rebellion.

The source said, “The apparatus inside televisions have been fixed so that people cannot watch Chinese TV channels, and inspections have been occurring randomly, so people have been watching and hiding small-size TVs in their homes.” This activity is reflected in the price increase.

One defector who has experience in selling used TVs in Rajin in North Hamkyung Province said, “Small-size TVs by which people could watch South Korean broadcasting were originally in high demand in South Pyongan, Kangwondo and South Hwanghae.” He said, “Since they cannot pass through customs, they are usually smuggled into and sold on the black market.”

The People’s Safety Agency handed down a decree stating that, “Those who pose a threat to the state and social system will be severely punished. Get rid of all kinds of places offering karaoke, movies, film subscriptions, PCs, and games.” It further emphasized the National Security Agency’s tightening of cell phone regulations along the border region.

Since last year, severe regulation of illegal films (foreign and South Korean DVDs and VCDs) has continually been enforced. Since this year, the North Korean government has gotten headaches from regulating the houses of civilians.

The North Korean government claims that the purpose of the regulations is “Destroying enemy maneuvers and directly impugn acts that pose a threat to society and the system.” North Korea’s opening and reform still seems far off.

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