Archive for the ‘China’ Category

North Korea looks to recycle toxic waste

Monday, June 30th, 2008

UPDATE 3 (2013-3-15): Michael Rank offers more information on the DPRK – Taiwan nuclear waste deal:

North Korean-Taiwan nuclear waste deal thwarted over export permit
By Michael Rank

A Taiwanese report says one reason the North Korean nuclear waste deal fell through was that Taipower didn’t obtain an export permit for the waste from the Taiwanese Atomic Energy Council (AEC).

It also says that Taipower claims no final deal was ever signed, so there is no question of the agreement being violated. It quotes Taipower official Huang Tien-huang as saying the North Koreans blocked them from viewing the processing site at Phyongsan (Pyeongsan, 평산, 平山), while the AEC also had procedural problems with the North Koreans, leading it to refuse an export permit.

North Korea has hired a (presumably Taiwanese) lawyer, Tsai Hui-ling, to plead its case, and is claiming NT$300 million (US$10 million) compensation. Tsai can be seen on this English-language video clip.

A PRC report quoting Taiwanese reports says the first stage of the deal worth US$75.66 million envisaged shipping 60,000 barrels of nuclear waste, and a further 14,000 barrels in the second stage, with a total value of $150 million and that the North Koreans were after the deal as a source of foreign exchange at the height of the famine. There have been ten rounds of negotiations to try to resolve the dispute, the report says, adding that Taiwan decided in 1999 that it would process the waste domestically.

As I reported in 2008, North Korea signed a deal with a Chinese company to recycle industrial waste that is so polluted that other countries have refused to handle it.

A slightly fuller Chinese report than the one I cited earlier names the Chinese company involved as Dalian-based Huatai Recycling Resources Co Ltd and says it has close links with the North Korean National Defence Commission, foreign ministry, environment ministry and foreign trade ministry.

It also says the North Koreans have four large recycling sites at Sinuiju and Nampo, two for lead batteries and two for electronic goods, and that they are able to recycle a wide array of equipment, from plastics to refrigerators as well as computers, phones and scanners, including goods that are banned for recycling in China.

It is not clear if the Chinese-North Korean deal was actually implemented.

UPDATE 2 (2013-3-2): The DPRK intends to sue Taiwan for breach of contract in its failure to begin the Taiwan – DPRK waste management project. According to the China Post (Taiwan):

North Korea is poised to sue Taiwan Power Co. (台電) for damages of NT$300 million, over an alleged breach of a contract signed more than 16 years ago, according to lawyers working on Pyongyang’s behalf.
Litigation will begin March 4, North Korea’s legal counsel said.

In 1996, Taipower allegedly committed to a contract with North Korea in which nuclear waste from Taiwan would be shipped and stored in the isolated communist nation, according to reports.

However, the plans were halted due to North Korea’s then-inadequate waste storage facilities and the sudden eruption of international uproar over the scheme, with Taiwan paying US$8.72 million to preserve a five-year option period in 1998, according to the lawyers, who added that North Korea continued to invest in its waste storage facilities under the assumption that the deal would be completed.

After over 10 rounds of negotiation over the past 15 years, North Korea is now accusing Taipower of complacency and negligence, citing a lack of communication and effort to fulfill the agreed-upon obligations.

In light of North Korea’s unexpected litigation, Taipower has said that such a dated case needs a comprehensive internal review before a response can be formulated.

The lawsuit marks a surprising development in the ongoing row over the proposed plan to construct a fourth nuclear power plant in Taiwan, as the ruling and opposition parties wrestle over the terms of the proposed referendum, which would decide the fate of the plant.

UPDATE 1 (2009-1-8): A Taiwanese official is under investigation for activities related to the Taiwan – DPRK waste management deal. According to the AFP (via Singapore’s Straits Times):

The Apple Daily reported on Thursday that prosecutors had begun investigating claims that Chen might have pocketed 300 million Taiwan dollars of financial aid in 2004 and 2005 in exchange for North Korea handling the island’s nuclear wastes.

The daily, which did not name its sources, alleged the cash would be given to a high-ranking North Korean official through a contact who promised to help Taipei set up a ‘direct communication channel’ with Mr Kim Jong-Il’s regime.

However, Taiwan did not establish any form of contact with North Korea nor send its nuclear waste to the communist state after the foreign ministry paid the money, the report said.

Self-ruled Taiwan is formally recognised by only 23 countries and does not have diplomatic ties with North Korea.

Read the full story here:
Funds were for N.Korea
AFP via Straits Times
1/8/2009

ORIGINAL POST (2008-6-30): According to Michael Rank in the Telegraph:

North Korea is planning to recycle waste that is so polluted other countries refuse to handle it.

Through a Chinese-language website (link here) the country is seeking supplies of plastic and electronic waste which “can be processed in [a North Korean port] but which other countries and territories are restricted from dealing in”, reflecting the country’s dire economic plight and its scant regard for international norms.

Isolated and desperately poor, North Korea is a beginner so far as toxic waste is concerned, although in 1996 it signed a deal with Taiwan to dispose of its nuclear waste from atomic power plants.

South Korea reacted furiously to the deal and Taiwan was eventually forced to back down and cancel the agreement.

North Korea also offered to recycle the North Sea Brent Spar oil storage platform, which Royal Dutch Shell had proposed dumping in the deep Atlantic in 1995.

This caused an environmental furore, with Greenpeace claiming that the structure was full of oil and burying it at sea would result in serious pollution.

An enterprising young North Korean official in London unexpectedly offered to come to the rescue, suggesting that his country could dispose of the structure, saving Shell and the British government from further embarrassment.

The offer was turned down as Shell didn’t want to be seen turning to a regime as dubious as North Korea, but Greenpeace’s own reputation took a serious knock when it was forced to admit that it had enormously over-estimated the amount of oil remaining in Brent Spar’s storage tanks.

North Korea’s waste recycling plans are part of a much bigger, £5 million ($10 million) project to enlarge a port on its west coast and develop it into an export base including a duty-free zone.

“There are no limits, any business taking advantage of [North] Korea’s low labour costs for intensive processing is welcome,” the website states.

Although the port is not named, it is almost certainly Nampo, which is close to the capital and is the largest harbour on North Korea’s west coast. The development covers 30,000 square metres (320,000 square feet) and is “expandable”.

The port currently accepts vessels of up to 10,000 tonnes but the plan is to increase this to 50,000 tonnes.

The project is pitched at Chinese companies, and interested parties are asked to contact a firm in the Chinese city of Dandong on the North Korean border.

A deal with China would help to counterbalance a recent agreement with state-owned Russian Railways to build a £50 million ($100million) container terminal on North Korea’s east coast as part of a £1.5 billion ($3 billion) plan to create a rail corridor linking South Korea with Europe via North Korea and Russia.

Russian Railways wants to turn the port of Rajin into a hub capable of handling 320,000 containers a year for shipment from South Korea to Europe.

Russia and China have fought bitterly over rights to refurbish Rajin. A few years ago China appeared to have won out when a 50-year deal was announced with the Chinese border city of Hunchun, but this came to nought and Russia was the ultimate winner in the battle to revitalise the north-eastern port and ultimately link it with Europe.

The original source, a Chinese language website, is here.

To read the full story click here:
North Korea in bid to recycle toxic waste
Telegraph
Michael Rank
6/30/2008

Share

Chinese invest in DPRK mining

Sunday, June 29th, 2008

Michael Rank, a China/North Korea specialist based in London reports:

A Chinese company has opened a joint venture iron mine in North Korea with registered capital of €36 million ($57 million), a Chinese website specialising in North Korea reports (link here).

The Chinese partner is S Group, whose main aim includes developing magnesite mines in North Korea, but for some reason it switched from magnesite to iron mining.

The mine in Ongjin-gun (gun=county), Hwanghaenam-do (South Hwanghae, do=province), south of Pyongyang, has been in operation since the second half of last year, and the company running it is the Xihai/Seohae (West Sea) Joint Enterprise, the website says, but gives no further details.

The Chinese report erroneously places Ongjin-gun in Hwanghaebuk-do (North Hwanghae) but it is confirmed as being in Hwanghaenam-do by  조선지도첩 (Joseon Jidocheop, Atlas of Korea, Pyongyang, 1997), p. 45. I have not been able to find any other reference to a Chinese mining company called S Group.

Chinese steel company Tonggang (Tonghua Steel), based in the northeastern province of Jilin, was reported by a Chinese newspaper in January 2006 to be spending four billion yuan ($506 million) to develop the Musan iron mine in Hamgyeongbuk-do (North Hamgyong province), said to be North Korea’s largest iron deposit – and the biggest in Asia, according to some estimates.

Magnesite (magnesium carbonate) is used in protecting the linings of steel furnaces, in the production of synthetic rubber and in making fertilisers.

Share

China softens food export ban on DPRK

Monday, June 9th, 2008

Good Friends reports (via Yonhap) that China recently increased its yearly grain export quota to North Korea from 50,000 to 150,000 tons to help ease the DPRK’s food shortage.  China initially restricted food exports because of its rising domestic food prices.

North Korea’s corn imports from China rose 1,523 percent to 27,600 tons in February this year alone from the same period last year, according to statistics released recently by the Chinese authorities.

Read the full story here:
China softens food export ban to help alleviate N.K. food shortage: aid group
Yonhap
6/9/2008

Share

Update: Jang Song Taek’s anti-corruption campaign

Tuesday, May 20th, 2008

UPDATE: 
The Daily NK brings us up-to-date on the DPRK’s  anti-corruption drive.  The Daily NK analysis, however, gives the impression that Kim Jong Il is clamping down on the military, which again raises speculation that this policy is driven by concerns greater than financial leakage:

A source from Shinuiju reported in a telephone interview with Daily NK on May 14th that, “Director Jang Sung Taek has been staying at the Yalu River Hotel in Shinuiju since March, and has been directing inspections at Shinuiju Customs covering imports and exports made by rail, foreign currency-making activity organizations, and trade companies belonging to the army.”

“This inspection is decidedly different in scale and scope from previous inspections which are usually carried out every spring at Shinuiju Customs and various trading companies. The inspection usually targets simple private corruption as well as all fields related to business with China,” said the source.

The inspection group reportedly consists of some 100 agents dispatched from the Ministry of Administration, the Central Prosecutor’s Office, the National Security Agency, the People’s Safety Agency, and the Imports & Exports Guidance Bureau of the State External Economic Affairs Commission. Some 50 other agents were sent as reinforcements in late April.

The inspection group withdrew all trade certificates with exception of those certificates belonging to the families of anti-Japanese guerilla fighters, and those certificates issued by the Ministry of Finance or the Shinuiju Municipal Administrative Committee.  Therefore, presently at Shinuiju Customs, all import items without trade certificates issued by the above mentioned three groups have to be sent back to China.

The whole article is worth reading here.  If any readers have a thoughtful take on these events, please share them.

ORIGINAL POST:
North Korean Economy Watch has thoroughly covered news of the DPRK’s anti-corruption drive (here, here, here, here, and here).  We have speculated as to whether this campaign is motivated by primarily fiscal concerns or whether it is a broader realignment of state, party, and military portfolios necessary for a policy/personnel change within North Korea’s socialist system.

Hideko Takayama at Bloomberg highlights the fiscal aspect of the anti-corruption campaign and is the first to announce the Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law is leading it:

Jang, 62, was sent to Beijing and the Chinese city of Dandong near the border with North Korea in February to root out corruption at North Korean corporations operating in China, the businessmen and officials said.

Jang, who was dismissed from Kim Jong Il’s power circle in 2004, was rehabilitated in December 2005 and appointed to be Director of Administration of the Workers’ party last October, an official at Chosensoren, a North Korean organization in Japan which acts as a de facto embassy, said, requesting anonymity.

The leader’s brother-in-law is also responsible for the State Security Department, the People’s Security Ministry and the Central Prosecutor’s Office, according to the Chosensoren official. In addition, Jang runs a campaign against what the government calls anti-socialist activities.

Jang’s mission was to find and punish people who were diverting profits that were supposed to be repatriated to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.

“Jang is familiar with how the business is done outside the country and knows all about money and corrupt ways of making money,” Lee Young Hwa, professor of developing economies at Osaka’s Kansai University, said. “His assignment is like sending a thief to catch a thief.”

Read the full stories here:
Kim’s Brother-in-Law Heads North Korea Anti-Corruption Campaign
Bloomberg
Hideko Takayama
5/2/2008

Shinuiju Inspectors Investigate Corruption
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho, Park In Ho
5/16/2008

Share

DPRK offers US$100,000 aid to China

Sunday, May 18th, 2008

From the Associated press (via the Herald Tribune)

North Korea is offering China US$100,000 (€64,500) to help earthquake survivors.

The North’s Korean Central News Agency said Saturday the country made the offer to China’s government, which is scrambling to cope with the aftermath of Monday’s magnitude 7.9 quake. It did not elaborate.

Read the full article here:
North Korea offers US$100,000 in aid for Chinese earthquake survivors
Associated press (via the Herald Tribune)
5/17/2008

Share

Chinese businesses want DPRK labor

Tuesday, May 13th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-5-13-1

Small and mid-sized Chinese companies are now looking toward North Korea. The Chinese press reported on May 5 that the industrial union of Dungta, a small city of just over 500,000 located south of Sunyang in Liaoning Province, recently spent seven days looking into opportunities in the North on the invitation of the Choson Bongwha Company.

The purpose of this recent invitation appears to be that North Korea is looking to improve small and mid-sized industrial activity by allowing foreign entities to set up shop. The North was seeking investment for an oil paint factory, a textile factory, and a rolling mill. The Chairija factory in China’s Dungta City is planning to invest three million euros (aprox. 470 million won) to set up a paint manufacturing facility in the DPRK.

The reason Chinese businesses are looking toward North Korea is that even in China wages have been growing sharply, and as labor laws are amended it has become more difficult to hire employees, driving up production costs and lowering the competitiveness of exports. Cheap and easy labor in North Korea is turning the eyes of many Chinese companies.

The importance of this latest visit by the Chinese industrial representatives was reinforced by the invitation by the Choson Bongwha Company, which specializes in commission-based textile production. This appears to be related to the North Korean authorities’ plan of boosting the standard of living throughout the country by hosting Chinese heavy industries. Recently in the North, companies have joined in partnerships with Chinese businesses to manufacture lighting and cigarettes, showing that Chinese businesses are also interested in enhancing their presence in North Korea’s domestic market.

Just as South Korea’s small and medium-sized businesses have turned to China in order to stay competitive, now Chinese companies are eyeing North Korea’s cheap labor force in order to maintain their edge.

Share

Food shortage coping strategies

Saturday, May 10th, 2008

With the likelihood that food is coming into short supply in North Korea, the authorities and individuals alike have implemented strategies to minimize the adverse effects.

I am keeping a running list of official and civil responses here as they appear in the media.

1. The DPRK supposedly ended rations for mid-level cadres (party and state employees), though food can still be purchased in markets. Unless the government is hoarding its grain supplies, this probably has the effect of improving food distribution (transferring food stocks outside Pyongyang), though not to the satisfaction of those who were used to receiving it for “free.”

2. The DPRK asked China for food aid. (Requested 150,000: tons of corn. Received: 50,000 tons on their first ask)

3. Propaganda extolling people not to waste food has been distributed to workers.

4. The DPRK has started cracking down on liquor production/sale.

5. Lets grow potatoes!

6. Distributing food stocks to military families from military warehouses.  This will hopefully take some of the pressure off the price of grains in the markets.

7. Solicit food aid from the US.

8. Officials begin to demand more bribes!

9.  The KPA halts military exercises to assist in farming.

10.  Propaganda campaign to educate the population about alternative foods (Good Friends via OneFreeKorea)

11. China increases food export quota

Share

When food and politics collide

Sunday, April 13th, 2008

News of the DPRK’s food shortages began to surface several weeks ago when Good Friends reported:

North Korea’s chronic food shortage has worsened to affect even some of the country’s elite citizens in the capital, a South Korean aid group said Thursday.

The communist nation has not given rice rations to medium- and lower-level officials living in Pyongyang this month after cutting the rations by 60 percent in February, the Good Friends aid agency said in its regular newsletter.

Pyongyang citizens are considered the most well-off in the isolated, impoverished country, where the government controls most means of production and operates a centralized ration system. Only those deemed most loyal to Kim Jong Il’s regime are allowed to live in the capital.

The food situation is more serious in rural areas, with residents in many regions in the country’s South Hwanghae province living without food rations since November, the aid group said. (AP)

Why was this the case?

Floods last August ruined part of the main yearly harvest, creating a 25 percent shortfall in the food supply and putting 6 million people in need, according to the U.N. World Food Program.

Over the winter, drought damaged the wheat and barley crop, according to a recent report in the official North Korean media. That crop normally tides people over during the summer “lean season” until the fall harvest.

North Korea’s ability to buy food, meanwhile, has plunged, as the cost of rice and wheat on the global market has jumped to record highs, up 50 percent in the past six months.

China also appears to have tightened its food squeeze on North Korea for domestic reasons. In order to meet local demand and control inflation, Beijing slapped a 22 percent tariff on grain exports to the North. (Washington Post)

So North Korea’s domestic agricultural production has fallen and so have commercial food imports (international inflation, OECD government subsidies for bio-fuels, and increasing fuel prices have combined to raise the prices of commodities such as rice and pork up to 70% in the course of a year). 

Compounding this problem, however, agricultural aid from North Korea’s two most reliable benefactors (China and South Korea) has dried up.

[China] has quietly slashed food aid to North Korea, according to figures compiled by the World Food Program. Deliveries plummeted from 440,000 metric tons in 2005 to 207,000 tons in 2006. Last year there was a slight increase in aid, but it remained far below the levels of the past decade. (Washington Post)

And strained relations with the new Lee government in South Korea have not helped:

The South typically sends about 500,000 tonnes of rice and 300,000 tonnes of fertiliser a year. None has been sent this year and without the fertiliser, North Korea is almost certain to see a fall of several tens of tonnes in its harvest (Reuters)

So what will be the mitigating factors that prevent another humanitarian emergency?

“The reason for the mass starvation that occurred in late 90s is that North Korea faced natural disasters without expanding the market’s capability to substitute for the broken planned economy capability, and so the damage to North Korean citizens was inevitably large.”

“The market in North Korea has expanded in the last 10 years. The supply and demand structure of daily necessities, including food items, has been formed.”

“Because the market capacity has expanded, the possibility of a mass-scale starvation occurring is no longer high. In actuality, the change in food prices is being monitored at the market.”

-Dong Yong Seung, the Samsung Economic Research Institute’s Economic Security Team Chief, speaking at the 19th Expert Forum sponsored by the Peace Foundation (Daily NK)

Mr. Dong’s analysis addresses the improved efficiency of DRPK’s market supply chains but does not address the effects of an adverse supply shock. 

The UN seems ready to help, although it has not been asked:

Institutionally, mechanisms are in place in North Korea to ring the international alarm bell before hunger turns into mass starvation. The World Food Program monitors nutrition in 50 counties, and the Kim government has become expert in asking for help.

“The North Koreans know that they are facing a difficult situation and have made it increasingly clear in the past few weeks that they will need outside assistance to meet their growing needs,” the U.N. official said, asking not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

North Korea, which even with a good harvest still falls about 1 million tonnes, or around 20 percent, short of what it needs to feed its people, relies heavily on aid from China, South Korea and U.N. aid agencies to fill the gap.

The UN official said it was clear from a variety of sources that the food security situation was worsening in North Korea and that it needed to be addressed.

Last month Kwon Tae-jin, an expert on the North’s agriculture sector at the South’s Korea Rural Economic Institute told Reuters that if South Korea and other nations did not send food aid, the North would be faced with a food crisis worse than the one in the 90s.

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation said in late March it sees the North having a shortfall of about 1.66 million tonnes in cereals for the year ending in October 2008.

The North will start to feel the shortage the hardest in the coming months when its meagre stocks of food, already depleted by flooding that hit the country last year, dry up and before the start of its potato harvest in June and July. (Washington Post)

The UNWFP, however, will be under pressure from its donors to monitor food aid and make sure it is not diverted to non-emergency uses.  Under these conditions, it is not likely that they will be asked to provide much aid until a catastrophy is already underway.  So with the UN out of the picture, who is best positioned to prevent the reemergence of a humanitarian crisis in North Korea today? China.  

Despite China’s own food probelms, however, it is always likely to capitulate, at least in part, to North Korea’s emergency requests.  China does not want to deal with another North Korean famine, particularly during the Olympic season, and they certainly do not want to deal with any political instability that could result. 

Yonhap reports that the DPRK has asked the Chinese for 150,000 tons of corn this year.  Chinas says they will give 50,000 tons–and that is just initially. (Yonhap)

UPDATE 4/14/2008: I still have not seen any reports in the media of Noth Korea seeking suport from Russia.

UPDATE 6/9/2008: China increases grain export quota to North Korea to 150,000 tons

(more…)

Share

China/North Korea financial integration

Saturday, April 12th, 2008

Last week we discussed the growing presence of North Korean companies in Russia.  This week, the Daily NK reports on China’s first steps at financial integration with North Korea:

China has introduced a new settlement system which allows North Korean business to open bank accounts in China and settle business transactions in Yuan, the Nikkei reported on Sunday.

With the adoption of the system, North Korean people and companies can open Yuan bank accounts within China after some formalities and use the accounts for trade settlement with their Chinese business partners. Accordingly, North Korea is now able to buy foreign currencies such as dollars and euros with its Yuan income from trade. In addition, North Korea can legally bring in foreign currencies or send them to third countries.

North Korean companies used to have difficulties of making a trade settlement with China in cash or by barter since the U.S. enacted financial sanctions on North Korea and China imposed economic sanctions regarding remittance and bank accounts after North Korea’s nuclear tests. However, China too suffered from the sanctions as the amount of Yuan smuggled into North Korea has skyrocketed proportional to the increasing volume of trade between North Korea and China.

The new settlement system will help reinvigorate the trade between two countries. However, the system can cause concerns at the Six Party Talks as it lowers the bargaining power needed to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear programs, the Nikkei said.

Meanwhile, the People’s Government of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture announced last February that Jilin Province would allow North Korean people and companies operating in China to open Yuan bank accounts for trade purpose starting with February 20, 2008.

You can read the full article here:
China Lifts Sanctions on North Korea
Daily NK
Park Eun Jae
4/9/2008

Share

Haggard-Noland on North Korea’s economic integration

Tuesday, April 8th, 2008

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland published a piece focusing on North Korea’s economic integration.  Download it here: petersoninstitute.pdf

Although not the focus of the piece, here is an excerpt:

A first corollary of the injunction to avoid top-down approaches is that any collective development assistance must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance will have only marginal effects and may even have negative consequences if not coupled with policy changes. It is not simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in the North.

A second corollary of the injunction against top-down approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows (including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic rehabilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North Korea is to evolve toward a self-sustaining market-oriented economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Participation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint gain rather than as political tribute.

(and)

North Korea is in need of depoliticized technical assistance for a whole panoply of issues running from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaningful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commercial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as they emerge; establish and implement international trade and investment policies; and so on.

Read the full paper here:
A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension
Staphen Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Policy Brief
April 2008

Share