The price of rice apppears to be stabilizing in North Korea as the end of the autumn harvest brings corn to market. However, this year’s corn crop is known to have been below average, suggesting that the current improvement might not last.
According to a source from Shinuiju in North Pyongan Province, “The price has been falling steadily of late, and is currently 5,500won per kilo.” Corn is currently 2,000won/kg, the same source added. Meanwhile, a source in Hyesan reported that the price of a kilo of rice in the jangmadang there is currently 6000won.
The news means that prices have declined by between 200 and 600won since October 23rd in the two cities surveyed. This is the first rice price decline of more than 500won anywhere in North Korea since the start of the year. Indeed, the trend was inexorably upward for much of 2012; rising from 3,500won in January to 7,000won by October.
The Shinuiju source went on to explain the reason for the change, saying, “Corn, which is a substitute for rice, has entered the market, easing prices and improving people’s food supply. This has meant that rice prices stabilized. With all this talk of reform and opening measures there has been a lot of anxiety and prices everywhere were up around 7,000won at one point. This caused a lot of resentment, but some of that has been relieved now.”
The clearest sign that the current price decline is down to the arrival of domestic corn is that the Chinese Yuan to North Korean Won exchange rate has not moved even as the price of rice has fallen. As the Shinuiju source noted, “This current situation is not really sustainable, so the money changers have not moved at all. They are not going to release more Yuan into the market.”
Read the full story here:
Corn Crashes Rice Price Party at Last Daily NK
Lee Sang Yong
2012-10-31
News of a cabinet reshuffle being slowly and indirectly revealed by the North Korean state media is generating interest in analytical circles.
On the 17th, Chosun Central News Agency, in the process of unveiling the newly completed Tongil Street Fitness Center, revealed that the Minister of Sport has been removed, with Ri Jong Moo being cited instead of former incumbent Park Myung Cheol.
This is the third such change revealed in recent days. On October 4th, former Minister of Agriculture Ri Kyung Sik was revealed to have been replaced by Hwang Min, while on the 15th it was Kim Jae Seong’s turn to replace former Minister for the Electronics Industry Han Gwang Bok.
All three of the incumbents had been in-post for a number of years, adding intrigue to the news. 71-year old Park was made Minister of Sport in 1998, while 66-year old Han had been covering the electronics industry brief since 2009. 64-year old Ri, meanwhile, was made Minister of Agriculture in 2003, relieved of his duties in 2009 and then returned to post in 2011.
Read the full story here:
Cabinet Reshuffle as 3 Ministers Replaced Daily NK
Park Seong Guk
2012-10-18
Today the Daily NK offers a scenario as to why the DPRK has not implemented more generous agricultural production incentives:
A Hyesan-based source explained today, “Cooperative farm cadres are saying that none of the experimental farms will be given 30% of their production this year because it has become difficult to meet the target. They are saying that the harvest is not good and they need to feed the military as a matter of priority, so first they’ll guarantee the military rice then give the rest to the farmers.”
A Shinuiju source corroborated the story, saying that the authorities “haven’t said they are going to take all the production from the farms, but nobody actually thinks they are going to get very much. People who trusted the official words are feeling quite stupid, and nobody is working very hard.”
Back in July, each province designated a number of ‘model farms’ that were to be used to test the policy. These farms were supposed to receive their initial inputs of fertilizer and machinery from the state, and then be given 30% of their production in return.
“They are saying that the state does not have enough rice right now and that there is no choice but to give it to the military, so please try to understand,” the source said. “Farm workers, many of whom had been buoyed by talk of food distribution, are really disappointed, especially since prices are sky high in the market these days.”
Anyone who has taken a game theory class will note the presence of credible commitment problems and backwards induction.
If a game consist of two players (the state, farmers) operating in an environment where credible commitment is not attainable, one could argue that an outcome where the state promises to increase agricultural incomes yet farmers work less is the predictable result. Here is why: If at the beginning of the game the state says “we will raise your incomes if you produce more” and farmers respond by producing more, in the absence of credible commitment, at the end of the game the state can simply take all the increased production and pay no more. There is nothing to force the state to actually keep its word once the increased output has already been produced (assuming policy makers with short time horizons). Of course by utilizing backwards induction farmers realize this and do not increase production despite the promise of higher incomes. In the limit case, the DPRK announces economic policy adjustments, nobody believes them, and nobody moves to increase labor supply in the official sector of the peoples’ economy.
If the DPRK wants to offer effective policy adjustments that lead to real increases in output it must not only promise greater material incentives to workers and managers but it must do so in a believable way. Unfortunately there are no simple mechanisms to credibly bind the hands of the North Korean policy makers within the DPRK. In the absence of suitable constraints on state power (broadly defined), this means that reputation capital is even more important for achieving desired policy goals. This is why the decision to back-peddle on the 6.28 agricultural policies, if this is indeed what happened, is perhaps the most damaging move of all in terms of improving economic performance. Taking the North Korean government at its word (reputation capital), the farmers who increased effort in the fields (expecting a 30% ownership of their output in return) have instead given the state a free lunch. They will not be so inclined to increase output the next time the government comes knocking on their door offering dreams of a chicken in every pot.
If the DPRK government hopes to induce workers to increase labor supply through official channels, relying on nothing more than reputation, it is going to have to pay for failing to live up to its economic commitments in the past. In other words, it is going to have to slowly build up its reputation capital again by increasing the incomes of workers through a policy that is not likely to pay off for several years. It is only after workers again feel confident that the state will not back-peddle on the promise to let them retain 30% of their output that they will increase labor supply and output.
Read the full story here:
6.28 Agriculture Policy on the Back Foot Daily NK
Lee Sang Yong
2012-10-12
Pictured above (Google Earth) is Changsong Town in North Pyongan Province.
There has been a lot of talk about economic reform in the DPRK in recent weeks (see here). One of the aspects of these reforms has been greater local/regional control over economic policies and outcomes.
On August 9, the Daily NKreported that Changsong is “again being put forward as a model for the spontaneous economic development of regional cities and counties as the regime works to foster a different mindset prior to impending economic changes”. According to the article:
On the 8th, Rodong Shinmun published an editorial entitled, ‘Let Our Country Be Prosperous in the Spirit of the Changsung Joint Session’ in an edition that also featured seven other related articles. The articles served as a timely reminder of the joint session of central cadres, their provincial counterparts and economic sector officials held on August 7th and 8th in Changsung County.
[…]
Utilizing the history lesson, Rodong Shinmun emphasized, “The fundamental essence of the Changsung Joint Session was increasing the role of the county in developing regional industry and agricultural accounting, and enhanced the people’s lives by the strength of our household itself.”
It went on, “In every city and district, we must resolve to decisively raise the productivity of our land to solve issues of food insecurity, and must thoroughly implement the Party’s agricultural revolution.”
On days prior, Rodong Shinmun, KCNA and other state-run media outlets also reported in various forms the idea that ‘all the counties in the country are going to follow the example of Changsung County.’ For example, on the 7th it introduced a new food processing plant in Changsung County itself.
Analyzing these moves, Kwon Tae Jin, a researcher with the Korea Rural Economic Institute told Daily NK, “When it comes to the agricultural sector, the county is at the center of everything. This is a way of passing the center’s role to the regions at a time when the center (the Ministry of Agriculture) cannot play its role properly.”
“The purpose of emphasizing the responsibility of the Cabinet and the counties at the same time is to readjust the system,” Kwon added, while the head of North Korea Strategy Center, Kim Kwang In added, “Since the center cannot do what it needs to, they want the regions to deal with survival.”
The move is also intended to raise the likelihood of the 6.28 Policy succeeding. In Kim’s words, “The regime is pushing regional self-reliance prior to the announcement of the new policy.”
Interestingly, this narrative paints the 6.28 policy as an effort to decentralize economic production because Pyongyang can no longer afford the old policies, yet for propaganda purposes, it is being portrayed as the continuation of a movement personally launched by Kim Il-sung 50 years ago!
Changsong has indeed seen a lot of recent construction. According to KCNA (2012-8-4):
County, Model in Local Economic Development
Pyongyang, August 4 (KCNA) — Changsong County, North Phyongan Province of the DPRK, has become a model in the development of local economy in the new century. Great changes have taken place in all aspects of production and construction in a matter of little over one year.
Local industrial factories have been placed on a modern and scientific basis to lay a firm foundation for reenergizing production and improving the standard of people’s living. The county seat has taken on a new appearance to suit the specific features of a county.
President Kim Il Sung provided field guidance of devotion to the county, once known as remote mountainous county, more than a hundred times in his lifetime with a noble intention to turn it into a model to be followed by all other counties.
There began a new history of mountains of treasures in the county under his care. As a result, the Changsong joint meeting of local party and economic officials was held in the county in August 1962.
Leader Kim Jong Il made sure that the spirit of the joint meeting was fully displayed generation after generation. He gave an instruction to the county to raise a new torch for effecting a dramatic turn in the local industry in November 2010.
The dear respected Marshal Kim Jong Un has led a drive to face-lift the county as required by the building of a thriving nation so that the year 2012, the 50th anniversary of the joint meeting, may shine as a proud year and a year of new changes in the development of local industry.
All local industrial establishments in the county have undergone dramatic changes as required by the new century in a matter of little over one year.
All production processes at the foodstuff factory ranging from feeding of raw materials to packing and forwarding have been automated and its overall processes sterilized to ensure high quality and hygienic safety of products.
Its textile mill has installed new type machines. Technological updating has made brisk headway at all industrial establishments in the county including paper, furniture and chemical and daily necessities factories.
There has sprung up a new food processing factory. All its processes computerized, the factory mass-produces processed meat and vegetables, varieties of soft drink, and confectionary.
A garment factory with big capacity has been built to meet the county’s need for school uniforms and solve the issue of clothing by itself.
The appearance of the county has changed beyond recognition.
The county erected a mosaic depicting the portraits of the smiling peerlessly great persons. The Changsong revolutionary museum and the county hall of culture have been successfully renovated as centers for the education in the revolutionary history and people’s cultural and emotional life.
The Changsong Restaurant and a noodle restaurant built with Korean style roofs in the center of the county seat add to the beautiful landscape of the township.
There sprang up the Undok Health Complex with all welfare and service facilities, a children’s hall, kindergarten and nursery.
The library, county people’s hospital, sanatorium, commercial and catering network, public buildings and dwelling houses have also been renovated as required by the new century.
A great success has been made in the land management.
The eye-opening changes in the county promise a socialist land of bliss where all varieties of consumer goods are mass-produced at the local industrial factories and the people enjoy happiness in their modern houses.
On 2012-8-7, the KCTV evening news broadcast images of some of the new construction:
And on August 8, KCNA reported that Choe Yong-rim visited the town:
Senior DPRK Party and State Officials Visit Changsong County
Pyongyang, August 8 (KCNA) — Senior party and state officials including Choe Yong Rim and officials of party, ministries, national institutions and local party, power and economic bodies visited various places of Changsong County, North Phyongan Province on Wednesday on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Changsong joint conference of local party and economic officials.
Changsong County is associated with the leadership feats of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il who opened up a wide road of developing local economy and improving the people’s living standard by increasing the role of county as a regional base.
The participants laid bunches of flowers before the newly erected mosaic depicting portraits of smiling Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and made bows to them.
At the Changsong Revolutionary Museum, they looked round historic relics showing the efforts made by the President and Kim Jong Il who ushered in a new history of mountains of treasures, while giving field guidance to the county.
They also went to local industrial factories in Changsong including Foodstuff Factory, Foodstuff Processing Factory, Furniture Factory, Paper Mill, Jute Bag Factory and Okpho Stockbreeding Farm.
They enjoyed a performance given by the art group of the county at its cultural hall.
Pictured above (Daily NK): The 2012 Won / US$1 exchange rate up to 2012-7-13.
According to data provided by the Daily NK, the won/dollar exchange rate fell (the won appreciated relative to the dollar) nearly 28.4% from 5,100W/US$1 in December 2011 (a high following Kim Jong-il’s death) to approximately 3,650W/US$1 in February 2012. Since February, however, the won has showed a steady depreciation and the exchange rate has risen 48% to 5,400W/US$1 as of July 13.
So as I sit here eating breakfast I am wondering what caused these swings in the exchange rate?
Firstly, what was behind the dramatic fall in the exchange rate (and food prices) in January and Febraury? A simple answer may be a decrease in uncertainty and risk. Following Kim Jong-il’s death, the DPRK did not repeat the mistakes made after the passing of Kim Il-sung. For the most part markets remained open and “regular” activities of the state were highlighted in the domestic media and reported to contacts overseas. It is also possible that Chinese intervention, particularly in the form of food assistance and trade facilitation, could have played a role.
Secondly, does this mean that the increase in the exchange rate and food prices is a result of growing uncertainty? I am not convinced. It is beyond the scope of a blog post to tease this kind of information out, but here are some other things to think about: Economic uncertainty (pending policy changes, inflationary public finance), balance of trade (fall in net exports/rise in net imports, aid), capital flows (investment, aid, remittances), weather (drought/floods), “lean times” leading up to the fall harvest.
Some of these things matter more than others but it is important to keep in mind that the North Korean won is worth about as much today as it was when Kim Jong-il died. Since the won/US$ exchange rate is highly correlated with the price of rice (a fact that can be visually confirmed on the Daily NK web page) this means that food prices are also pretty high at the moment.
Rice Prices and Exchange Rate on the Rise
2012-8-16
Since Kim Jong Un’s ascent to power, the rice prices and exchange rates are on the rise. Despite Kim Jong Un’s proclaimed priority in elevating the quality of life for the North Korean people, uncertainty are prevalent in the country as Kim Jong Un has yet to meet the expectations of the people for economic revitalization or reform.
Compared to last year, the prices of rice last September that ranged 2,400 to 2,500 KPW per 1 kg, has jumped to 4,500 KPW in December right after the death of Kim Jong Il and exchange rates that averaged 2,800 to 3,000 KPW against one USD soared to 5,000 KPW. Although the prices have stabilized since then, the prices are climbing once again, as the price of rice in February at 3,100 KPW has gone up to 3,600 KPW/kg and exchange rate of 3,700 KPW per dollar jumped to 4,800 KPW in June.
In some places, the price of rice is reported to be above the 5,000 KPW range. According to Daily NK, an internet news outlet, the prices of rice in major cities like Pyongyang, Haesan, and Sinuiju has steadily increased for the last four months.
The price of rice in Pyongyang was 2,600 KPW/kg in April but it has slowly climbed to 3,000 KPW in June 5 to 4,900 KPW in end of June and is 5,300 KPW as of July 13. In Sinuiju and Haesan, the rice prices in April were around 2,600 to 2,700 KPW but soared to 4,300 to 5,000 KPW in July 13.
Exchange rates are also unstable as exchange rate to one US dollar that averaged 3,700 KPW in March soared to 4,200 KPW in April 25, 4,400 KPW in July 14 to 5,400 KPW by July 13.
Seasonal factors are also adding to the price fluctuations. May to August is normally a difficult time for North Korea with frequent famine. Combined with extreme drought conditions in June, accelerating inflation, and people’s rising apprehension about the economy, some rice wholesalers are not withholding the sales of rice.
The rising rice prices and exchange rate is expected to continue for the time being. Flood damages and other natural disasters and the trauma from the failure of last currency revaluation in November 2009 are factors adding to the price escalation.
The visit itself did not strike me as very interesting (the animal farm has been around since at least 2002), but the mention of the “Ungok Area” did.
I have many North Korean maps which I have already transferred to Google Earth: A 1997 North Korean atlas (thanks Michael), a 1978 North Korean atlas (thanks Steve), North Korean atlas software (thanks PSCORE), and a North Korean atlas published by the Chongryon in Japan (thanks Steve). None of these sources mention the “Ungok Area”.
The only source I have that does mention the Ungok Area is from South Korea and was published in 2005. I used that source to map out the Ungok Area on Google Earth:
The Ungok Area (above in Green) composes nearly all of southern Anju and a small western portion of Sunchon City (Sinhung-ri). It is bordered on the west by Mundok County, on the south west by Sukchon County, on the south east by Sunchon County, and on the North by Kaechon and Anju Cities.
I am, however, unsure as to whether the Ungok Area has its own administrative apparatus or whether it is under the administration of Anju (and Sunchon?). Ungok does seem to be of particular interest to some group of North Korean policy makers. Judging from satellite imagery it appears to receive a disproportionate quantity of resources aimed at rezoning farm land, reconstructing meat and vegetable farms, as well as building new homes. Looking at the area one is reminded of idealized versions of North Korean village life depicted in official publications. Even the other parts of Anju do not look as “neat and tidy” as the Ungok Area.
If any readers have access to better information than me (my Korean is not very good), I would appreciate knowing more. On a side note, these questions could also apply to Mundok County’s “Chongnam Area” which appears to have been granted many different administrative designations over the years.
On a final note, I plan on publishing all of this geographic data soon. I just need to sort out some politics and programming issues.
A couple of weeks ago, the South Korean Central Bank, the Bank of Korea, published its estimate of the size and composition of the North Korean economy in 2011. You can read the finings (PDF) here. I have posted this and many other estimates of the North Korean economy on my “DPRK economic statistics page“.
Gross domestic product in the communist nation increased 0.8 percent in 2011 after a 0.5 percent decline in 2010, according to an estimate published by the Bank of Korea in Seoul. The nation’s economy has contracted during four of the last six years, the bank’s data show.
“The manufacturing sector declined, but the agricultural industry enjoyed better weather and more use of fertilizer,” the Bank of Korea said in an e-mailed statement.
North Korea is projected to keep growing under the new leader as its economic ties with China and Russia develop.
“Mineral exports to China and dollars brought in by North Korean workers sent to China and Russia would have driven the country’s GDP growth,” said Koh Yu Hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul. “North Korea is expected to be economically stronger under Kim Jong Un as it continues to increase transactions with its allies.”
…
Kim Jong Un has waged a nationwide campaign to “bring about a turn in agriculture” and increase crop yields, according to a June 7 report carried by the official Korean Central News Agency. North Korea’s agriculture and fisheries sector expanded 5.3 percent in 2011 while manufacturing fell 3 percent, according to the BOK report.
North Korea’s nominal GDP totaled 32 trillion won ($28 billion) in 2011, compared with South Korea’s 1,237 trillion won, the BOK said. North Korea’s per capita income was 1.33 million won while South Korea’s was 25 million won, according to its estimates.
After adjusting for inflation, North Korea’s economy remained smaller at the end of 2011 than it had been in 2008, according to the Bank of Korea.
The North Korean economy is undergoing changes. In fact, last year there was actually some growth, with GDP increasing .8 percent, versus a .5 percent decline in 2010. The North Korea GDP (about $28 billion, compared to $1,100 billion for South Korea). Thus even with a larger population, the average South Korean has 20 times more income as their northern counterparts. Moreover, income distribution is quite different in the north, where about two-thirds of the population is very poor and very hungry. The other third contains the well-fed ruling elite (whose lavish country estates can be seen via commercial satellite photos) and their supporters (secret police, military officers, bureaucrats) plus the semi-legal merchant class that has been allowed to develop over the last six years to avoid total economic collapse.
The economic decline in 2010, was the result of agricultural (floods) and industrial (massive power shortages) failure. But China came to the rescue by offering to set up mining operations in North Korea and buy billions of dollars-worth of minerals each year. China rebuilt railroads to handle the increased traffic from the remote North Korean mines. In addition, China offered legal jobs for North Koreans in China. The only catch was that the North Korean government took most of the pay. Similar deals have long been used with Russia but China offered far more jobs under more comfortable conditions. Competition for these jobs is fierce in North Korea and the government selects those deemed least likely to run away.
Last year North Korea bought more fertilizer for farmers and the weather was pretty good. That, plus the growing income from Chinese run mines and North Korean workers in China made up for the continuing declines in manufacturing. A good year on the farm is a big deal in North Korea, where farming and fishing are 23 percent of the economy (compared to under three percent in the south). But this year all of Korea is suffering from a record-breaking drought. This is hurting the north a lot more than the south. Although the monsoon (jangma) rains recenly arrived, a month late, the damage was already done in the north. Three months of very hot and very dry weather has seriously damaged crops. The rains will save some of them but at least a fifth of this year’s crops will be lost.
They should be studying Xiaogang Village! But instead they are studying Huaxi Village. Why? According to the Joong Ang Ilbo:
For the past six months, seven working-level North Korean officials have been staying at the Longxi International Hotel, located in a 72-story skyscraper in Huaxi Village, in China’s Jiangsu Province, a local government official told the JoongAng Ilbo in a telephone interview.
They’re allegedly trying to learn the secrets of Huaxi Village, known as China’s richest village but one that is still dedicated to socialism.
…
Huaxi Village is one of the richest places in China and a symbol of a model mixing socialism and capitalism. All the residents are shareholders of the local conglomerate and earn dividends at the end of every year according to its profitability.
“Roughly 20 North Koreans recently toured Huaxi Village,” a local resident told the JoongAng Ilbo. “The seven working-level North Korean officials have been staying in the village for six months learning how to manage a modern-style hotel.” Intriguingly, all seven are women.
The 328-meter (1,076-foot)-high Longxi International Hotel was completed last October and cost 3 billion yuan ($471 million). The five-star hotel has 800 rooms, including suites that go for 99,999 yuan per night.
“Officials from North Korea’s Foreign Ministry and the North Korean Embassy in Beijing also visited the village,” the resident said. “I’m not quite sure whether the women workers are from the ruling Workers’ Party, but they are mostly in their 20s.
“They have a great interest in learning about the dramatic growth of the village,” he continued. “They reportedly receive some kind of wages [from North Korea].”
Starting in 1978, the village’s residents actively participated in the reforms led by Deng Xiaoping. Wu Ren Bao, 84-year-old local secretary of the village, said in an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo in October 2011, “We accepted whatever was needed to make people rich and develop the village.”
Read the full story here:
Title
Joong Ang Ilbo
Chang Se-jeong, Jeong Yong-soo
2012-7-20
The Daily NK reports that food is now at record prices (5,oooW/kg) despite the food market operating under ‘normal’ operations. According to the article:
The price of rice has hit 5,000 North Korean Won/kg in the market in Hyesan, Yangkang Province. This is the first time that the psychologically significant price point has been reached under ‘normal’ market operations in the region.
A source from the city told Daily NK today, “The price was just 4,500 won as recently as the 5th, but this morning it reached 5,000 won. The prices of all other items are also on the rise, and as corn and rice prices rise in the midst of an already difficult food situation, many households are buying less food.”
Rice prices in other regions are rising too, other sources have informed Daily NK. Rice was selling for 4,500 won in Musan, North Hamkyung Province on the 5th, and had already exceeded 5,000 won in Muncheon, Kangwon Province on that same day.
Rice prices in North Korea tend to reflect the upward (or downward) trend in the exchange rate of the day, indicating the strong causal relationship between them. So it is no surprise that whereas the Chinese Yuan exchange rate was 800 to 1 on July 5th, it had risen to 810-820 won/Yuan by July 9th, and today reached 860 won/Yuan (July 10th).
Increasing exchange rates and rice prices will inevitably exert upward pressure on all prices, aggravating inflation. Naturally, people are complaining, “How are we meant to survive when rice is so expensive?” the source commented.
Prices rises are of course not the problem–they are a symptom of the problem: the DPRK has a poorly developed agricultural production and and distribution infrastructure. Although the North Korean people have shown great ingenuity at developing local coping mechanism do deal with adverse agriculture supply shocks (such as hoarding, making liquor, preserving food, cultivating private plots, and using cell phones to solve problems), they still lack access to crop insurance, futures markets, infrastructure, security of land and earnings, inflation, etc.
Read the full story here:
Rice Arrives Back at 5,000 Won Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
2012-7-10
Despite the fact that North Korea is currently in a period of mass mobilization for the agricultural planting season, North Hamkyung Province Party authorities are also pursuing a number of construction projects in and around Chongjin.
One of the plans calls for the construction of apartments for 10,000 Chongjin families after the fashion of the Mansudae area of Pyongyang, but local Party cadres and ordinary civilians see it mostly as an attempt by Provincial Party Chief Secretary Oh Su Yong to publicly display his loyalty to the regime of Kim Jong Eun.
A source from the city explained the story to Daily NK on the 24th, saying, “Most students and laborers have been mobilized for the farming support battle, yet in the middle of that the provincial Party is ordering the construction of apartments with more than 15 floors for 10,000 households in the Pohang district of Chongjin.”
“They are simultaneously doing large scale repairs in Pohang Square, constructing a coastal road and Youth Park, doing work on Chongjin Port and on a waste water purifying facility for Sunam Stream,” he added.
The construction has been entrusted to the city’s major construction enterprises, including 5.16 Construction Company, Ranam Combined Coal Mining and 6.2 Port Construction Industry. However, these do not have the financial capacity to purchase all the materials and equipment required, meaning that responsibility for providing sufficient gravel, sand and other basic items is being passed in part onto the local population.
“Households are being assigned the task of providing certain amounts of sand and gravel to certain construction sites,” the source explained. “People’s unit heads are going house to house every night pushing people to do their bit.”
“This whole thing is the result of the Party chief secretary wanting to show off his loyalty,” the source concluded.
Read the full story here:
Chongjin Facing Impossible Battle
DNK
Choi Song Min
2012-5-25
