Archive for March, 2011

ROK Supreme Court rejects ownership claim for property in DPRK

Tuesday, March 22nd, 2011

According to Arirang News (3/22/2011):

The Supreme Court decided Tuesday that South Korean nationals are not eligible to claim ownership of property in North Korea.

A 56-year-old man surnamed Yoo filed a lawsuit, claiming ownership of six lots in the Yeoncheon district of Gyeonggi Province, which is in North Korea, and demanded the court change the land registration back to his name, based on a deed in his ancestor’s name from the early 1900s.

Two lower courts had previously acknowledged the deed and ruled partially in favor of the plaintiff.

But the Supreme Court annulled the decision, saying it is impossible to verify the ownership of the land, since the original land registration was destroyed in the Korean War, restored in 1980 and then discarded in 1991 because the land is north of the Demilitarized Zone.

I am no lawyer or expert in the field of property rights, but my understanding is that when reunification comes property reconciliation will be a nightmare for both Koreas.  Many South Koreans have already prepared the paperwork to reclaim lands confiscated by both the Japanese colonial government and the DPRK government and they are simply waiting to file them.  I imagine there are many North Koreans that have done the same.  No doubt there will be numerous types of claims and remedies—too voluminous to list here.

At a minimum, this case seems to establish the first of many tests for the validity of land reclamation cases: verification.  If a claim cannot be verified in evidence, it will not be honored by the court, and we also have a better idea of what kinds of evidence are not admissible.

Although possessing the right documentation will be important, I can also see all sorts of creative solutions emerging to help establish a claim even for those who lost their land titles long ago–DNA comparisons from family burial plots, to name just one example.

If anyone is aware of any good papers on this topic, please let me know.  There is probably a hefty German literature in this area, though I am not sure how comparable the legal systems are particularly when it comes to the disposition of land.

Some other recent South Korean cases:
1. A South Korean court gave North Korean defectors the right to divorce their spouses in the DPRK so they could remarry.

2. The North Korean children of a deceased, wealthy DPRK defector (who died in South Korea) are suing in a South Korean court for their share of his inheritance.

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Kim Jong-il pays respects to memory of Chung Ju-yung

Tuesday, March 22nd, 2011

Pictured Above: Chung Ju-yung Stadium in Pyongyang
(Google Earth:  39.040093°, 125.735237°)

According to the Korea Herald:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has sent a verbal message to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the death of a noted South Korean industrialist who pioneered cross-border economic projects, the North’s media said Saturday.

Chung Ju-yung, the then chairman of Hyundai Group, initiated a series of major economic projects in North Korea starting in 1998, including a sightseeing tour to scenic Mount Geumgang on the North’s east coast. He died on March 21, 2001.

In the verbal message, the North Korean leader spoke highly of the South Korean industrialist, saying that he did the right thing to promote national reconciliation, the North’s Korean Central News Agency said in a report.

“Chung Ju-yung paved the way for national reconciliation and cooperation and did really a great job for the development of the inter-Korean relations and the sacred cause of national reunification,” the KCNA quoted the leader as saying in the message.

Kim also expressed hope that everything would go well for the Chung family and Hyundai, the KCNA report said.

The report did not say when and how the North Korean leader’s message was conveyed to the Chung family in Seoul. Chung’s eldest son, Chung Mong-koo, heads the nation’s largest automaker, Hyundai Motor Co.

According to the Choson Ilbo:

North Korea has sent a wreath to Hyundai Group to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the death of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung.

The wreath that read “In memory of Chung Ju-yung” was delivered from Pyongyang’s Asia-Pacific Peace Committee to Hyundai staffers at the joint-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong.

On Friday North Korean leader Kim Jong-il spoke highly of Chung for his role in paving the way for national reconciliation and cooperation.

Chung initiated various projects with the Stalinist state including the Mt. Kumgang package tours in the North and had sent more than one-thousand cows over the demilitarized zone to North Korea.

The Daily NK also offers some cultural background

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DPRK expanding submarine force

Tuesday, March 22nd, 2011

pipagot-2.jpg

Pictured Above: Pipagot Naval Base  (Google Earth: 38°35’40.17″N, 124°58’38.49″E)

UPDATE (3/28/2011): According to Strategy Page:

North Korea has apparently been building an improved version of its Song (Shark) class mini-sub. The 250 ton Sang is actually a coastal sub modified for special operations. The original design is a 34 meter (105 feet) long boat with a snorkel and a top submerged speed of 17 kilometers an hour (or 13 kilometers an hour when at periscope depth using the snorkel to run the diesel engines). Top surface speed is 13 kilometers an hour. Max diving depth is 150 meters (465 feet) and the boat is designed to rest on the ocean bottom (useful when trying to avoid enemy search). There is a crew of 15, plus either six scuba swimmer commandos, or a dozen men who can go ashore in an inflatable boat. Some Songs have two or four torpedo tubes. Max endurance is about eight days. The new model is 39 meters (121 feet) long and is believed to have a max submerged speed of 27 kilometers an hour. Over 40 Songs have been built so far, and one was captured by South Korea when it ran aground in 1996. At least half a dozen are of the new model.

North Korea has a fleet of over 80 mini-subs, plus about 24 older Russian type conventional boats (based on late-World War II German designs, as adapted for Russian service as the Whiskey and Romeo class). China helped North Korea set up its own submarine building operation, which included building some of the large Romeo class subs. North Korea got the idea for minisubs from Russia, which has had them for decades. North Korea has developed several mini-sub designs, most of them available to anyone with the cash to pay.

The most popular mini-sub is the M100D, a 76 ton, 19 meter (58 foot) long boat that has a crew of four and can carry eight divers and their equipment. The North Koreans got the idea for the M100D when they bought the plans for a 25 ton Yugoslav mini-sub in the 1980s. Only four were built, apparently as experiments to develop a larger North Korean design. There are to be over 30 M100Ds, and they can be fitted with two torpedoes that are carried externally, but fired from inside the sub.

North Korea is believed to have fitted some of the Songs and M100Ds with acoustic tiles, to make them more difficult to detect by sonar. This technology was popular with the Russians, and that’s where the North Koreans were believed to have got the technology.

The most novel design is a submersible speedboat. This 13 meter (40 foot) boat looks like a speedboat, displaces ten tons and can carry up to eight people. It only submerges to a depth of about 3.2 meters (ten feet). Using a snorkel apparatus (a pipe type device to bring in air and expel diesel engine fumes), the boat can move underwater. In 1998, a South Korean destroyer sank one of these. A follow-on class displaced only five tons, and could carry six people (including one or two to run the boat). At least eight of these were believed built.

The use of a North Korea midget sub to sink a South Korean corvette in March, 2010, forced the United States, and South Korea, to seriously confront the problems involved in finding these small subs in coastal waters. This is a difficult task, because the target is small, silent (moving using battery power) and in a complex underwater landscape, that makes sonar less effective.

There are some potential solutions. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the U.S. recognized that these coastal operations would become more common. So, in the 1990s, the U.S. developed the Advanced Deployable System (ADS) for detecting non-nuclear submarines in coastal waters. The ADS is portable, and can quickly be flown to where it is needed. ADS is believed to be in South Korea. ADS basically adapts the popular Cold War SOSUS system (many powerful listening devices surrounding the major oceans, and analyzing the noises to locate submarines) developed by the United States.

ADS consists of battery powered passive (they just listen) sensors that are battery powered and deployed by ship along the sea bottom in coastal waters. A fiber optic cable goes from the sensors (which look like a thick cable) back to shore, where a trailer containing computers and other electronics, and the ADS operators, runs the system. ADS has done well in tests, but it has never faced the North Korean mini-subs.

ORIGINAL POST (3/22/2011): According to the Choson Ilbo:

North Korea is building up its submarine force, deploying new Shark-class K-300 submarines with better performance, a longer body and higher underwater speed than the old model which infiltrated South Korean waters in 1996.

A South Korean government official said Sunday, “We’ve confirmed U.S. satellite images and other intelligence that the North has been building and deploying new Shark-class submarines for a few years now.

They’re about 5 m longer than the old 34 m-long model and capable of traveling submerged more than 10 km/h faster.”

The North has about 70 submarines and submersibles. The Shark class, which accounts for about 40 of them, is its main submarine force.

Below are additional stories about the DPRK’s submarine fleet and navy:

Still Waters Run Deep

DPRK’s midget subs torpedo equipped

DPRK naval bases near Baengnyong Island

KPN submarine bases in the East Sea

North Korea supplied submarines to Iran

Bermudez on the North Korean Navy

NKeconWatch Military resources page

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Kaesong production value returns to pre-Cheonan levels

Tuesday, March 22nd, 2011

According to Yonhap:

The monthly production from the South Korea-invested industrial park in North Korea exceeded US$30 million for the first time since tension escalated over the North’s torpedoing of a South Korean navy ship a year ago, the government said Sunday.

The Kaesong industrial complex produced $31.05 million worth of products in January, up 6.7 percent from $29.09 million in December, the Unification Ministry said.

It was the first time that the monthly production from the Kaesong complex topped $30 million since the attack took place in March last year. The complex produced $30.79 million worth of products that month.

Seoul suspended all cross-border trade after a multinational investigation found North Korea responsible for the March sinking of the warship Cheonan. Relations between the divided countries hit the worst point in more than a decade when the North shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong in November.

Despite the high tension, the annual production at the complex increased 26 percent to $323.32 million last year compared to a year earlier.

The rise appears to be due to the steady increase of North Koreans working in the complex.

A total of 46,194 North Koreans, up from 42,397 in January last year, now work in the communist state’s border town of Kaesong, providing labor for South Korean firms that produce goods such as clothes, utensils and watches.

The factory park was a result of the first inter-Korean summit that took place in Pyongyang in 2000. More than 120 South Korean firms operate in Kaesong, providing capital and know-how in exchange for cheap labor.

Previous posts about the Cheonan incident are here.

Previous posts about the Kaesong Industrial Zone are here.

Read the full story here:
Production at Kaesong complex returns to $30 million mark
Yonhap
3/20/2011

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DPRK attempts to block ROK GPS signals

Sunday, March 20th, 2011

UPDATE 3 (4/1/2011): The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is considering measures against North Korea after the reclusive state was accused of jamming satellite navigation signals.  According to Flight Global:

The organisation is intending to co-operate with South Korea over the matter, says the Korean ministry of foreign affairs.

It follows a meeting between Korean foreign minister Kim Sung-Hwan and ICAO secretary general Raymond Benjamin yesterday.

The ministry says that ICAO has accepted its position of “pointing out the illegality” of Global Positioning System signal jamming by North Korea in early March, and that a “recurrence of such [an] incident must not occur”.

It also says that ICAO has agreed to “co-operate with Korea in taking necessary measures” should there be another incident, because North Korea’s action “threatens civil aviation safety, of not only Korea but also other countries”.

ICAO was not immediately available to comment on the foreign ministry’s statement.

UPDATE 2 (3/20/2011): According to Strategy Page:

Since the 18th, North Korea has been directing a GPS jamming signal across the border, and towards the southern capital, Seoul. The jamming signal can be detected up to a hundred kilometers south of the DMZ. The North Korea GPS jammers are based on known Russian models that North Korea bought and copied. The usual response for GPS jamming is to bomb the jammers, which are easy to find (jamming is nothing more than broadcasting a more powerful version of the frequency you want to interfere with). But such a response could lead to more fighting, so the south is still considering what to do. The jamming is a nuisance more than a threat, and most military equipment is equipped with electronics and other enhancements to defeat it. This is the third time in a year that the north has attacked the south. The first was the torpedoing of a South Korean warship a year ago, then the shelling of a South Korean island off the west coast last November. Now this jamming, and DDOS attacks on government websites.

UPDATE 1 (3/15/2011): According to Yonhap, the DPRK has rejected a letter of complaint from the South over GPS jamming:

North Korea on Tuesday rejected a letter from South Korea demanding that the communist nation stop sending jamming signals across the border, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said.

South Korea’s communications watchdog, Korea Communications Commission (KCC), asked the ministry earlier in the day to send the North a letter in which it complained of the trouble caused by disruptions to Global Positioning System (GPS) signals in the South.

South Korean officials have blamed North Korea for jamming the signals early this month in what they believe was an attempt to interrupt ongoing military drills between South Korean and U.S. forces. GPS-based mobile phones and certain military equipment in the South’s northwestern areas experienced minor errors due to the disruption, according to officials.

“Following KCC’s request, we tried to deliver to the North a letter of complaint written in the name of KCC Chairman Choi See-joong through the liaison office at Panmunjom,” the ministry said, referring to the inter-Korean truce village. “But the North’s liaison officer refused to receive it.”

In the letter, the KCC said it demanded that the North “instantly stop jamming activities and provide measures against similar incidents in the future.”

The commission also wrote that the jamming of GPS signals is “causing an inconvenience to our people and threatening their safety,” adding that such actions are “unacceptable” under International Telecommunications Union regulations. Both South and North Korea are members of the Union.

North Korea was accused of jamming GPS signals across the border last year, but this is the first time the South has tried to lodge an official complaint on the matter.

South Korea has already sought international action against the sabotage, with the foreign ministry sending a letter of inquiry to a United Nations agency in charge of information and communication technologies, a presidential official said earlier this month.

ORIGINAL POST (3/8/2011): According to the AFP (via Singapore’s Straits Times):

Seoul confirmed on Monday that North Korea has been trying since Friday to jam communications signals across the border, where the US and South Korea are holding a major joint military exercise.

Signals are being emitted from near the North’s border city of Kaesong to disrupt navigational devices using GPS (the Global Positioning System) north-west of Seoul, the Korea Communications Commission said.

They caused minor inconvenience on Friday and Saturday, it said, while weaker signals are ongoing. ‘Intermittent (GPS) disruptions are still continuing, although signals are weak,’ the commission said in a statement, adding that it was working with government agencies and security authorities to counter the jamming.

The South’s defence ministry confirmed the intermittent failure of GPS receivers last week, but refused to give details for security reasons. It was not clear whether the disruption caused problems to the war games.

The North’s military operates dozens of bases equipped for an electronic war to disrupt South Korean military communications, the South’s Yonhap news agency said. The communist country has imported GPS jamming devices from Russia, while South Korea uses French equipment to disrupt or monitor the North’s military communications systems, it said.

How do these kinds of attacks work and how effective are they? According to Wired:

North Korea is reportedly jamming Global Positioning System (GPS) signals in South Korea, possibly in an attempt to interfere with the U.S.-South Korean annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle drills, which kicked off on February 28.

GPS jammers work by sending a signal that interferes with the communication between a satellite and GPS receiver. It’s a relatively simple operation, with relatively short-range effects. Thus far, cell phones used by civilians and troops and some military equipment have been put on the fritz by the disruption attempts.

But the juiciest target for the North’s jamming efforts would be the U.S. and South Korean arsenals of GPS-directed bombs.

If it works just right, the GPS jammer can cut off a satellite-guided bomb’s ability to guide itself to target. The bomb simply continues hurtling towards the ground in the direction it was when it lost contact with a satellite.

However, these weapons have other means of guiding themselves in the event of jamming. Take the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a guidance kit that’s strapped to older, “dumb” bombs to make them more accurate. In addition to GPS, the JDAM kit comes equipped with an Inertial Navigation System (INS), which measures a bomb’s acceleration and uses the information to plot its way to a target. In the event a JDAM’s GPS signal is successfully jammed, it can rely on its INS to guide it, although accuracy is reduced from 5 to 30 meters.

That’s not the only backup for U.S. bombs. “Increasingly you see that there are multi-mode smart munitions that have both GPS and laser guided so that if one is not working, the other can,” says John Pike, a defense and aerospace expert and president of Globalsecurity.org.

Though he’s not familiar with the specific systems used by the North Korea, Pike says other incidents make him think the U.S. might not have much to worry about in this case.

“The jammings that I have been aware of in other instances I would place into the category of ’seriously annoying.’”

North Korea is believed to have both a GPS jamming system imported from Russia and a modified version its been shopping around the Middle East, according to South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo. Russia reportedly sold a GPS jamming system to Iraq on the eve of the second Gulf War. And in case you missed that one, jamming wasn’t much of an issue for U.S. bombs.

But jamming might not be the only info war trick North Korea’s been up to lately.

Last week, at least 29 websites were affected by a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which targeted a number of South Korean government, U.S. military and private sector sites. At the moment, the origin of the web traffic flood remains unknown, but North Korea is widely suspected because of its prior history. In June 2009, South Korea intelligence attributed a series of DDoS attacks which targeted a similar portfolio of sites to North Korea.

Which organizations in the DPRK carry put these kinds of operations? The Choson Ilbo highlights the well known Mirim College for Electronic Warfare Research

Pictured above on Google Earth: Suspected initial location of the Mirim War College in Pyongyang (39.013904°, 125.877156°) (via Michael Madden).  Reports now indicate it has been moved to the other side of Pyongyang in Hyonjesan-guyok.

 

According to the Choson Ilbo:

Pyongyang began developing electronic warfare capabilities in 1986 when it founded Mirim University, the present-day Automation University, to train specialists.

A defector who graduated from the university recalled that 25 Russian professors were invited from the Frunze Military Academy in the former Soviet Union to give lectures, and some 100 to 110 hackers were trained there every year.

Mirim is a five-year college. The Amrokgang College of Military Engineering, the National Defense University, the Air Force Academy and the Naval Academy are also reportedly training electronic warfare specialists.

Jang Se-yul of North Korean People’s Liberation Front, an organization of former North Korean military officers and servicemen, recalled that when he fled the North in 2007, “I heard that the North Korean military has about 30,000 electronic warfare specialists, including some 1,200 personnel under two electronic warfare brigades.”

“Each Army corps operates an automation unit, or an electronic warfare unit.” Jang used to be an officer of a North Korean electronic warfare command.

Material published by the North Korean Army in 2005 quotes leader Kim Jong-il as saying, “Modern war is electronic warfare. Victory or defeat of a modern war depends on how to carry out electronic warfare.”

In a 2006 report, the South Korean military warned North Korean hackers could paralyze the command post of the U.S. Pacific Command and damage computer systems on the U.S. mainland.

Experts believe that the North’s 600 or so special hackers are as good as their CIA counterparts. They attempted in August 2008 to hack the computer of a colonel in South Korean Field Army headquarters. In 1999, the U.S. Defense Department said the most frequent visitor to its website was traced to North Korea.

Due to economic difficulties since the 1990s, the North Korean regime had a hard time boosting its conventional military capabilities and instead focused on strengthening so-called asymmetric capabilities that would allow it to achieve relatively large effects with small expenses. That includes not only nuclear and biochemical weapons and missiles but also special forces and hackers.

FAS has more on the Mirim-based school here.

A couple of years ago, the Daily NK mentioned another possible contender: Moranbong University

Pictured above on Google Earth: Korean Workers’ Party Building 3 complex in Pyongyang (39.057894°, 125.758494°)

According to the Daily NK:

Moranbong University, which is directly managed by the Operations Department of the Workers’ Party, is said to be leading technical developments in cyber war against foreign countries.

A North Korean source said in a telephone interview with Daily NK on the 10th, “I heard that the U.S. and South Korea were attacked. If it were confirmed that North Korea was responsible, it would have been by the graduates of Moranbong University.”

According to the source, since the mid-1990s, the Workers’ Party has been watching the worldwide trend whereby the IT field started dominating, and founded Moranbong University in 1997 in order to train experts in data-processing, code-breaking, hacking and other high-tech skills. The results of new student selections, curricula and training are reported only to the Director of the Operations Department, Oh Keuk Ryul.

The foundation of the University was spurred by the North Korean invasion of the South in Kangreung, Kangwon Province in 1996. 26 North Korean special agents tried to infiltrate South Korea after passing under the Northern Limit Line in a special, mini-submarine, but they were all killed or committed suicide after the operation failed. After that, there was a debate within the South Korean Liaison Office under the Operations Department of the Party about the sending of spies to the South and collecting intelligence through contact with resident spies in South Korean society. After listening to such suggestions, Kim Jong Il approved the establishment of the university.

It is a five-year university which selects 30 freshmen every year. The university makes every freshman a military first lieutenant. In sophomore year, students take courses in martial arts, shooting and other special skills, and then they take courses in assembly languages, wiretapping, code-breaking, and hacking.

Graduates are dispatched to the headquarters of the Operations Department of the Party or local South Korea Liaison Offices, where they are put in charge of collecting intelligence from intelligence organizations and the military of South Korea, the U.S., Japan, China and other neighboring countries, or demolishing programs.

Since 2003, more than 200 graduates from the University have started working for the Operations Department or as professors of Moranbong University. Some of them have been dispatched to China in order to train in international techniques or to earn foreign currency as Chosun Computer Center (KCC) workers.

According to the source, Moranbong Univeristy is better than Mirim University, the former main educational institution for North Korean hackers, in terms of equipment, technology and curricula. It is located in Jung-district, just across from the No. 3 Government Building, in which the United Front Department, the Liaison Department and the Operation Department are stationed. The real purpose of the university is not officially revealed even to general agents of the Operations Department, because it is treated as top secret.

The source concluded, “Wiretapping has its limits because of a lack of equipment, but they have world-class hacking technology.”

The Daily NK,  Choson Ilbo, and Strategy Page later posted additional information on these organizations.

South Korea is said to be seeking additional sanctions on the DPRK for these activities.  According to Yonhap:

But they said the North should not go unpunished for the sabotage, with a senior presidential official hinting at the possibility of seeking sanctions against the communist nation.

A charter of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) bans a country from doing damage to electric waves of other nations. Both South and North Korea are members of the ITU.

The foreign ministry already sent a letter of inquiry to a United Nations agency in charge of information and communication technologies, the presidential official said on condition of anonymity.

Read the full stories here:
N. Korea launches electronic attacks on S. Korea
AFP (Straits Times)
3/7/2011

North Korea Jams GPS in War Game Retaliation
Wired
Adam Rawnsley
3/7/2011

N.Korea Trains Up Hacker Squad
Choson Ilbo
3/9/2011

Mecca for North Korean Hackers
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
7/13/2009

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Narco-capitalism grips North Korea

Friday, March 18th, 2011

Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

In early March, the United States State Department made a statement that attracted surprisingly little attention worldwide, estimating that government-sponsored narcotic production in North Korea seemed to have decreased considerably. At the same time, the statement made clear that the private production of drugs was on the rise.

This fits with what the present author has heard recently – often from sources inside North Korea; it seems that North Korea’s drug industry is changing, and this change might have important consequences for the outside world.

The story of North Korea’s involvement with the international narcotics trade began 35 years ago. In 1976, Norwegian police intercepted a large shipment of hashish in the luggage of North Korean diplomats. The same year, another group of North Korean officials was found in possession of the same drug by Egyptian customs; they had 400 kilograms of hashish in their luggage.

In both cases, diplomatic passports saved them from any formal investigation. Next year, North Korean diplomats were caught trying to smuggle drugs into Venezuela and India. In India, quite friendly to North Korea in those days, the 15 kgs of hashish was transported by the ambassador’s secretary. After that, such seizures became regular occurrences, usually once every year or two, and usually involving North Korean diplomats.

North Korea’s narcotics program has always appeared strange to outside observers – “strange” even if judged by the standards of Pyongyang, whose leaders do not care much about legal niceties and international reputation, and perceive international politics as a cut-throat, zero-sum game. On balance, state-sponsored drug production has done much more harm than good to Pyongyang.

Available estimates agree that the North Korean government didn’t earn much from pedaling illicit drugs. It is even possible that these risky operations were largely waged to sustain North Korean missions overseas – from the mid-1970s such missions were required to pay for their own expenses.

At the same time, the existence of this program inflicted serious damage on Pyongyang’s international standing, which was at rock-bottom anyway. Despite all denials of official involvement, the program could not really be hidden because seizures of narcotics carried by North Korean diplomats and officials happened far too often and sometimes in countries that were relatively sympathetic to the North.

So, if analysts at the State Department are to be believed, North Korea seems to have come to its senses and stopped or, more likely, significantly reduced its narcotics production. Indeed, this program seems to belong to the strange and slightly bizarre world of the foreign policy of North Korea in the 1970s. After all, those were the times when North Korean agents were busy kidnapping Japanese teenagers to become living tools for the training of agents (and when US$200 million was spent propagating the juche(self-reliance) ideology in the Third World).

However, this doesn’t mean the world should heave a collective sigh of relief and write off North Korea as a potential source of dangerous narcotics. If anything, the situation has become worse over the past five to six years. But this time, the North Korean regime seems to have little or no responsibility for the new boom in drug production.

The change in the North Korean drug industry essentially mirrors the wider changes that in the past two decades have occurred in the North Korean economy and society at large. The state-run Stalinist economy essentially collapsed whilst private business took over – usually unrecognized by the state, technically illegal in most cases, completely absent from official statistics, but powerful nonetheless. This happened in all industries, and drugs production was not an exception.

The author interacts with North Koreans quite frequently and most of my contacts are people from the northernmost part of the country, from areas adjacent to the Chinese border. They are unanimous: around 2005 to 2006, these areas experienced a sudden and dramatic upsurge in drug usage, hitherto almost unknown to the common public.

It’s true that some opium productive capacity existed in the northeastern parts of Korea since the early 1900s. This is also the region where secret state-run plantations were rumored to be located in the 1980s or early 1990s. However, in the North Korea of the Kim Il-sung era, surveillance was tight and exceptionally efficient, so drug problems were for all practical purposes non-existent within the country. The drugs were produced for export and medical purposes only.

Things began to change around 2005; by that time North Korea had undergone what is usually described as “grassroots capitalism” or “marketization from below”. The old state-run economy had come to a complete standstill, so most North Koreans started to make a living through all sorts of private economic activities – from cultivating private fields and working at private workshops to smuggling.

Official corruption became endemic, so officials became more than willing to turn a blind eye to all sorts of illegal activities as long as they received their cut. Arguably, North Korea nowadays might be described as the most corrupt country of East Asia: every interaction with authorities requires payment, and if the payment is sufficient, almost everything is possible.

This social and economic situation has made the large-scale private production of drugs possible. The new North Korean drug scene is dominated by “Ice” (crystal meth), a synthetic substance produced in numerous small workshops. It is frequently mentioned by defectors, while references to other drugs are quite rare.

Most of my North Korean interlocutors, some former Korean People’s Army officers, believe that methamphetamines were initially produced officially, but not so much as a drug in the strict sense, rather as a stimulant for elite military units. This seems to be plausible – after all, it was used as such during World War II by both the Axis and the Allies.

However, after around 2005 private production of Ice began and soon became large-scale. There are rumors about occasional state involvement with illicit production of drugs for export, but even if those rumors are true, the state-sponsored labs clearly produce only a small fraction of the total. Most of the labs are private nowadays.

Raw materials are often imported from China, and China has also become a major market for North Korean drug manufacturers. Since law-enforcement in North Korea is so lax (at least when no political issues are involved), it is easier and safer to run a drug workshop there, on the southern banks of the Tumen River.

The Ice-producing labs are difficult to hide since the production is smelly. Usually, such labs operate at some distance from living quarters, somewhere in the mountains or at a non-operational factory. (Admittedly, such factories are not in short supply in post-crisis North Korea).

In many cases, there are joint operations of Chinese and North Korean criminal groups: the Chinese provide the necessary supplies while the North Koreans use their territory as a safe haven to process drugs that are later shipped to China.

However, some narcotics remain in North Korea, where drug usage has increased dramatically. My interviewees say that at least in the cities of the borderlands a significant proportion of younger people have had some experience with Ice. A schoolteacher from a borderland city of Musan recently told me that in 2008-09 most of the students in their final years of high school tried Ice.

But the problem is not limited to the borderlands. A few months ago, a colleague of mine whilst visiting a prestigious college in Pyongyang spotted a poster that warned Pyongyang students about the dangers of drug use. Merely a few years ago, such a poster would be both unthinkable and unnecessary.

It seems this development has begun to worry the Chinese. In the past few years, Chinese media occasionally write about crackdowns on drug dealers in China’s northeast, often explicitly mentioning their Korean connection. Last summer, Chinese media reported that a fleet of high-speed boats, operated by the Chinese police, had begun to patrol the rivers on the border with North Korea. The task of this squad is specifically to fight drug smuggling.

The “new” North Korean drug problem is relatively local and small in scale, although it might have sufficiently grave consequences for North Korea itself, as well as for some adjacent areas of China and Russia. It also might be seen as an indication of a new type of problem that North Korea might create.

In the past, most troubles related to North Korea were caused by the North Korean government that demonstrated an inclination to flout international laws and conventions (sometimes this inclination was strengthened by remarkable adventurism). Nowadays, problems are increasingly caused by the inability of this government to control what is happening in the country – at least outside of Pyongyang and some major cities. In the long run, the lawlessness of uncontrolled private profiteers might prove more dangerous than the Machiavellian adventurism of dictators.

Read the full story here:
Narco-capitalism grips North Korea
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
3/18/2011

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The heads of the Central Bank and State Price Commission appointed

Wednesday, March 16th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 11-03-15
3/15/2011

Recently, Paek Ryong Chon was appointed as the new President of the Central Bank of the DPRK. Paek is known as the third son of late Paek Nam Sun, the former Foreign Minister of the DPRK.

According to the DPRK’s official news agency KCNA, a national meeting of commercial officials was held at the People’s Palace of Culture in Pyongyang on March 7, 2011. The list of attendees at this event included Paek Ryong Chon as the President of the Central Bank.

The senior Paek served as the Foreign Minister of the DPRK from 1998 to 2007 before he passed away in January 2007. His third son, Paek Ryong Chon, 49, made his public political appearances at the North-South Premier Talks and the Joint Committee for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation meetings in Seoul on December 2007 as a department director of the Secretariat of the Cabinet.

Previously, he visited South Korea as a part of the North Korean delegation in 2002 at the first working-level talks of inter-Korean economic cooperation and again in June 2006 for the Inter-Korean Joint Event held in Kwangju.

The Central Bank was established in 1946 and is responsible for issuing bank notes, currency control and regulating other banks. The Central Bank also operates as a savings and insurance institution that provides services for the general population of North Korea through regional branch offices.

Paek’s new appointment is believed to be largely in consideration for the late foreign minister, Paek Nam Sun.

Meanwhile, Ryang Ui Gyong was appointed as the Chairman of the State Price Commission, which was formerly known as the State Price Bureau.

The KCNA made a referral to Ryang Ui Gyong as the Chairman of the State Price Commission in a recent report on a national meeting of commercial officials.

Not much is known about Ryang. He is speculated to have built his career in the State Price Bureau as a technocrat.

The State Price Commission is responsible for the price control of agricultural and industrial prices and wage systems, calculating the living costs for the people. The recent upgrade from a bureau to a commission is analyzed by many experts as North Korea’s move toward stronger price control policy to stabilize prices.

The Commission is also in charge of regulating import and export prices twice a year. This is evaluated as an attempt to prevent imports from being imported at a higher price and exports from being exported at a lower price than the international market average.

In the past, the State Planning Commission and the State Science and Technology Commission were the two main commissions in North Korea. However, since June 2010, the number of commissions has risen to five, a result of the reorganization of the Ministry of Education to Education Commission, the Joint Venture and Investment Guidance Bureau to the Committee of Investment and Joint Ventures, and the State Price Bureau to the State Price Commission.

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Korea General Corporation for External Construction

Wednesday, March 16th, 2011

UPDATE: Lots of great information in the comments.

ORIGINAL POST: According to Naenara (Link won’t work from South Korea):

The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO) is a professional enterprise for overseas construction.

GENCO has gained a good reputation from many countries around the world as a credible constructor with a long history of 50 years since its inauguration in January 1961.

It has scores of affiliated building enterprises involving a number of designers, building operators and skilled workers as well as foreign languages and other experts.

GENCO has built lots of dwellings and public establishments in Kuwait, and recently completed the 64-storied Al-Fardan Tower, an ordered project, in a short span of time in Qatar.

GENCO is looking forward to contracts for construction projects such as dwelling houses, public buildings, metros, tunnels, bridges, airports, harbours and stadiums in different countries in diverse forms such as the whole construction work and dispatch of skilled workers.

I had assumed that all overseas constructions projects were under the auspices of the Mansudae Overseas Development Group (MODG), but it appears that there is a rival firm picking up construction contracts.  This would not be surprising since the DPRK often duplicates functions so that the leadership is not reliant on a singe source of information and revenue–plus a little competition between agencies offers the employees an incentive to increase profits which they can remit back to Pyongyang.  It could also be the case that th GENCO and MODG have split the market.  MODG sticks to monuments and GENCO sticks to more traditional construction projects.

Pictured below is a Google Earth image of the Al Fardan Towers in Doha, Qatar (25.320952°, 51.529404°):

I am not sure to what extent GENCO was involved in the project. They claim to have built one of the towers, but I find it hard to believe that they built the whole thing lock, stock, and barrel since it would be impossible to develop the necessary skills in the DPRK. Additionally, there are no comparable buildings in the DPRK.  In all liklihood, GENCO is a company that simply provides construction workers who are low cost and travel from job to job remitting their hard currency earnings back to the DPRK.

Here are some, though not all, previous posts about other construction projects by MODG or GENCO.  Although I have not published it, I have an extensive list of these projects on Google Earth.

If a reader is aware of GENCO’s construction projects in Kuwait, please let me know.

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Another one bites the dust

Wednesday, March 16th, 2011

UPDATE (3/17/2011): According to the Choson Ilbo:

A South Korean security official said, “Kim Jong-il had full confidence in Ju, as you can see from Ju’s recent meeting with his Chinese counterpart Meng Jianzhu in Pyongyang. It remains to be seen whether he’s also been dismissed from the NDC and the Politburo.”

The sacking could be either a sign of a generational shift related to the succession of power to Kim’s son and heir Jong-un or the result of an internal power struggle, a North Korean source speculated.

Another source said Ju may have taken the fall for recent isolated instances of public unrest.

ORIGINAL POST (3/16/2011): According to KCNA:

Ju Sang Song, minister of People′s Security of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, was dismissed from his post due to illness.

The NDC of the DPRK released a decision on it on Wednesday.

Michael Madden has a biography of General Ju here.

Joseph Bermudez recently wrote an article for 38 North on the DPRK’s intelligence and security reorganization.

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69 North Koreans in US military

Tuesday, March 15th, 2011

According to the Rumsfeld Papers there were 69  North Koreans serving active duty in the US armed services in April 2003.

Source here (PDF).

Much more discussion in the comments.

(h/t to a colleague)

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