Archive for January, 2007

Buddhism in North Korea

Monday, January 15th, 2007

Korea times
Andrei Lankov
1/15/2007

Some time in the late 1940s, a young Russian journalist made a tour of the Mt. Kumgang, accompanied by a local official. The numerous Buddhist temples scattered in the valleys attracted his attention, but the official assured the Soviet visitor: “Do not worry, we will take care of them. We will close most of them, and will find a good use for others _ like, say, resorts for the working masses.”

It is difficult to say what the journalist felt back then, but when he recalled this episode in the early 1980s in his memories, his disdain was palpable. But this is indeed what happened to many _ indeed, most _ Buddhist temples in North Korea.

For decades, the North Korean state was almost unique in its hostility to all forms of religion. Indeed, few if any Communist states ever came close to proclaiming and enforcing a complete ban on all kinds of religious activity _ aside from North Korea, such a ban existed only in Albania, another ultra-Stalinist state (Pol Pot introduced the same policy in his infamous “Democratic Kampuchea,” but he did not stay in power long enough).

In the late 1980s, a very limited amount of religious activity came to be tolerated, but for some 25 years, between 1960 and 1985, North Korea had neither temples nor officially recognized religious groups.

However, if all religions are bad for the North Korean authorities, not all of them are equally bad. Some of them are worse, while others were ranked as marginally more tolerable.

For the North Korean regime in its early years, it was the Christianity that was clearly seen as an embodiment of evil.

This attitude was prompted by the fact that Christianity was a recent introduction, with too, too strong connections to foreign powers, above all, to the United States. It was both “reactionary” (as every religion) and anti-national.

The most acceptable religion probably was Chondogyo, or the Teaching of the Celestial Way. Nowadays, this eclectic cult has somewhat waned and does not play a major role in either Korea, but for a century, from the 1860s to the 1940s, it was a important force in the spiritual life of the country.

Its leaders and activists were prominent in two major outbreaks of the nationalist movement _ the Tonghak Uprising of the 1890s and the March First Movement of 1919, and this tradition made the North Korean authorities somewhat more tolerant towards it.

Buddhism fell somewhere between. It could not boast the nationalist credentials of Chondogyo _ on the contrary, in the colonial era many Buddhists collaborated with the Japanese (as a matter of fact, some colonial administrators saw Buddhism as the “religion of empire” and actively promoted it). At the same time, it did not have Christianity’s close associations with “imperialist” powers.

The land reform of 1946, proclaimed by the North Korean authorities (but actually designed by the Soviet military) inflicted the first major strike on Buddhism, and all land holdings of religious institutions were confiscated. This left the monks without any means of existence and drove many of them from the monasteries.

To keep the Buddhists under control, the Korean Buddhist Union was created in late 1945 as an umbrella organization. It did not so much represent the believers as make them accountable to the emerging state bureaucracy. This was a standard device: Similar bodies were created for other religions as well.

While all Christian churches ceased to function immediately after the Korean War, services were held in some Buddhist temples until the early 1960s. It is even possible, even if not particularly likely, that some services continued through the dark age of North Korean religious history, the period between 1960 and 1980.

Of course, the former Buddhist monks were subjected to strict surveillance and numerous restrictions were placed on their social advancement. However, it seems that they fared better than former Christian activists and priests.

The Buddhist Union was quietly disbanded in 1965 _ at least, for years nothing was heard about this body for nearly a decade, and in all probability it fell out of existence for some time. However, from around 1975 the representatives of the North Korean Buddhist Association were again seen at international gatherings where they scorned the U.S. imperialist warmongers and their South Korean puppets, all the while explaining how happy the masses in their country were to be led by the “Great Leader.”

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a large-scale restoration of old Buddhist temples, and these days there are 63 officially recognized temples in North Korea. Some of them are allegedly used for religious services, but it is not clear when the services are real and when they are nothing but carefully staged performances for the sake of foreign visitors. It is known that nowadays there are some 300 monks in the North, all receiving their wages from the state and taking care of the temples.

Thus, by the standards of North Korean religious policy, the treatment of Buddhism was not particularly harsh. However, it seems that Buddhism is not positioned to experience a dramatic revival in future. It appears that the North will eventually go Christian, and this Christianity is likely to be of a radical, nearly fundamentalist, variety. At least this is what can be guessed from the study of the events of the recent decade.

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Military influence broadens in Kim Jong-il’s North

Sunday, January 14th, 2007

Joon Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja
1/4/2007

Since its founder Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, North Korea’s political landscape has been transformed dramatically, and military officials have solidified their standing in the power elite of the communist country.

They have elbowed aside civilian politicians and bureaucrats, a new analysis shows, and the data confirm that the North’s “Military first” political slogan is much more than rhetoric.

In 1994, North Korea published a list of 273 people making up a committee to plan the founder’s funeral. That list also contained the seating order for those dignitaries at the funeral ― an accurate reflection of the pecking order in the North’s hierarchy at the time.

A JoongAng Ilbo special reporting team, its Unification Research Institute and Cyram, a research firm specializing in social network analyses, compared that 1994 rank order with data drawn from profiles of 324 North Korean figures provided by the Unification Ministry and the National Intelligence Service. The researchers ranked the top 50 North Korean figures after Kim Jong-il, the current leader and son of the late president, and compared that new list to the data from 12 years ago. The 2006 rankings took account of the officials’ titles and their roles, how often they have accompanied Mr. Kim on his frequent “site inspection” tours, seating charts and ranks announced by Pyongyang last year for several political events and evaluations by specialists in North Korean affairs.

“Kim Yong-nam is the official head of state in North Korea, but he acts as a subordinate to Kim Jong-il at public events,” said Chon Hyun-joon, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification. “In order to find out who actually is capable of controlling people, money and policies in North Korea, we have to use a special approach.”

On the new list, Mr. Kim, whose official title is chairman of the National Defense Commission, sits atop the hierarchy. Jo Myong-rok, the first vice chairman of the defense commission, was ranked second and Kim Yong-nam, head of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, was ranked third. The Supreme People’s Assembly is the North’s legislative body, but it normally delegates most of its power to the Presidium, a core group of elected members.

Jon Byong-ho, a Workers’ Party secretary, and Kim Il-chol, minister of the People’s Armed Forces, are ranked fourth and fifth. The Workers’ Party has been the only party in the North since 1948, except for a few parties that exist on paper as counterparts for foreign social democrats, for example. The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces is responsible for the management and operational control of the North’s military. It is directly controlled by the National Defense Commission, which Kim Jong-il heads.

Kim Yong-chun, the Army chief of staff, was ranked seventh on the new list, followed by Pak Pong-ju, the premier.

Comparing the new rankings with the 1994 list, only two people ― Kim Jong-il and Kim Yong-nam ― kept their top-10 posts in 2006. Among the top 51, only 16 still remain in power.

The comparison showed a clear shift in the job titles represented in the elite. During the Kim Il Sung era, members of the politburo and Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, the cabinet, the military, the Supreme People’s Assembly and some other organizations were all represented in the power elite. With the party at the center, the officials were balanced, presumably in an effort to avoid concentrations of political power and possible threats to Kim Il Sung’s leadership.

But North Korea under his son is dominated by the “Dear Leader,” as North Koreans refer to him, and the National Defense Commission members.

Military officials surged to the top over the 12 years. On the 2006 list, the top 50 North Koreans after Kim Jong-il include 12 military men, up from five in 1994. Ri Yong-mu, the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, was ranked ninth in 2006, climbing from 55th on the 1994 list. Mr. Kim’s three favorite generals, Hyon Chol-hae, Pak Jae-gyong and Ri Myong-su, were added to the new top-50 list. They have appeared frequently at Mr. Kim’s side on his inspection tours throughout the past year. In addition to the 12 flag officers, five other men in the top 50 are also involved in military matters.

In 1994, 25 Workers’ Party members were ranked among the top 50 leaders; that number increased to 27 in 2006. People in charge of party organization and propaganda were prominent on the list. North Korea appeared to have put lesser value on bureaucrats and economists as the Kim Jong-il regime has progressed. Eighteen bureaucrats and economic officials were on the 1994 roster, but the number dropped to six in the new list. In 1998, the North revised its Constitution, dropping vice presidents and the prime minister’s staff. That change could be one of the reasons for the relative scarcity of administrative officials on the new list.

Some analysts had a different interpretation: The lack of bureaucratic power officials in the list, they suggested, reflected Kim Jong-il’s priority of defending his regime rather than rebuilding the nation’s shattered economy.

North Korea watchers also said Mr. Kim runs the communist country by directly controlling the military, the party and the cabinet by stacking those institutions with people personally loyal to him. “Since 1998, Mr. Kim has issued orders under the title of the National Defense Commission, but Pyongyang-watchers were unable to confirm that he was actually presiding at the commission meetings,” said Chon Hyun-joon of the Korea Institute for National Unification. “The North’s power is concentrated in Mr. Kim alone, and there is a limit on how much authority he can exercise directly. In recent times, Mr. Kim appears to have handed over some of his powers to his closest confidants.”

The research also showed that a complex network of blood, school and career ties weaves the top 50 leaders together. Of the 50, at least 30 are members of that network; no information was available on the family, schools and careers of 11 of the other 20; at least some are probably bound up in that web.

“During the Kim Il Sung era, the official ranking showed the strength of each individual’s power,” said Hyon Song-il, a former North Korean diplomat who is now a researcher at the National Security and Unification Policy Research Institute. “In the era of Kim Jong-il, becoming his confidant means power.”

The North’s top 50 people include six of Mr. Kim’s family members. School ties among Kim Il Sung University graduates were also visible; 22 are alumni of the North’s prestigious school.

The 35 vacancies on the list between 1994 and 2006 were all filled by Kim Jong-il loyalists. Among the absentees, 16 either died of natural causes or were executed. Oh Jin-wu, known as Kim Il Sung’s right arm, and Ri Jong-ok, the North’s vice president, died naturally; So Kwan-hi, the party’s agriculture secretary, was reportedly executed in 1997, along with other officials, to appease anger over the famine of the late 1990s.

Hwang Jang-yop, who was ranked 26th on the 1994 list, defected to South Korea. Kim Chol-su, the 22nd most influential person in the North in 1994, was later identified as Song Du-yul, a scholar who is now a German citizen, by intelligence authorities and prosecutors in Seoul.

There is little room for women in the North’s elite, both in 1994 and 2006. In 1994, two women were among the top 50 officials, but the number fell to one in 2006. Kim Kyong-hee, the light industry department head of the Workers’ Party, is Mr. Kim’s younger sister.

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North conducts emergency drill of top security

Sunday, January 14th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Lee Young-jong
1/14/2007

Several security organs directly in charge of the safety of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-il, conducted an emergency drill in Pyongyang on Friday, intelligence sources from South Korea and the United States said.

Military troops and tanks from the Pyongyang Defense Command were deployed rapidly while increased military communications were noted that day.

In addition, the Escort Bureau, in charge of protecting Mr. Kim, also had a busy day, the sources said.

The incident sparked a flurry of activity by the South’s intelligence community, as the increased military activity in the North’s capital did not fit the usual pattern of winter drills conducted by the North’s military.

The fact that security organs closely guarding the North’s leader’s safety were involved in the activities sparked momentary suspicion among some sources that a military coup might have occurred in the North.

By the end of the day, however, intelligence officials here concluded that the drill was to prepare for any unforeseen changes inside the power structure of Kim Jong-il’s inner circle.

A source familiar with the circumstances said, “We have confirmed that the activities pertained not to a real situation but were part of a drill to respond to a possible scenario.”

The source added that the situation did not require an emergency meeting by authorities in the South. Nevertheless, intelligence officials said that drills of this kind rarely happen in the North.

“This shows that the North sees the need to conduct emergency training as part of a broader effort to contain possible risks,” he said.

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N. Korea escalates ‘cult of Kim’ to counter West’s influence

Saturday, January 13th, 2007

Christian Science Monitor
Robert Marquand
1/3/2007

North Koreans are taught to worship Kim Jong Il as a god. In a manner unique among nations, the North exerts extraordinary control through deification – a cult ideology of complete subservience – that goes beyond the “Stalinist” label often used to describe the newly nuclear North.

While outsiders can see film clips of huge festivals honoring Mr. Kim, the extraordinary degree of cult worship is not well known, nor that programs promoting the ideology of Kim are growing, according to refugees, diplomats, and others who have visited the Hermit Kingdom.

In fact, in a time of famine and poverty, government spending on Kim-family deification – now nearly 40 percent of the visible budget – is the only category in the North’s budget to increase, according to a new white paper by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy in Seoul. It is rising even as defense, welfare, and bureaucracy spending have decreased. The increase pays for ideology schools, some 30,000 Kim monuments, gymnastic festivals, films and books, billboards and murals, 40,000 “research institutes,” historical sites, rock carvings, circus theaters, training programs, and other worship events.

In 1990, ideology was 19 percent of North Korea’s budget; by 2004 it doubled to at least 38.5 percent of state spending, according to the white paper. This extra financing may come from recent budget offsets caused by the shutting down of older state funding categories, says Alexander Mansourov of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu.

It has long been axiomatic that the main danger to the Kim regime is internal unrest. That is, Koreans will discover the freedoms, glitter, and diversity of the modern outside world, and stop believing the story of idolatry they are awash in. “It isn’t quite realized [in the West] how much a threat the penetration of ideas means. They [Kim’s regime] see it as a social problem that could bring down the state,” says Brian Myers, a North Korean expert at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea.

Since the poverty and famine of the late 1990s, everything from CDs and videos, South Korean radio, and cellphone signals from China, new styles and products, and new commercial habits have seeped in, mostly across the Chinese border, in a way that might be called “soft globalization.” Such flows feed a new underground system of private business, information, bribery, and trade that exists outside the strict party-state discipline and rules.

Yet rather than accept such penetration as an inexorable threat, Kim is putting up a serious fight to slow and counter it – by increasing his program of cult-worship.

Kim Worship 2.0

Like a computer software firm updating program versions, the North is steadily updating its ideology to make it relevant. This practice of mass control by in-your-face ideology has been laughed off in much of the world, including China. But North Korea is increasing its ideological cult worship. The scope of the current project outdoes even the cult of personality during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, according to a 2005 doctoral dissertation by Lee Jong Heon at Chung-Ang University in Seoul. Mr. Lee visited North Korea several times for his research.

After the Oct. 9 nuclear test, for example, banners sprang up over North Korea stating “We are a country with a nuclear deterrent.” Kim’s test feeds a national pride that is part of the propaganda drilled into Koreans from birth: that Kim alone can fend off the US and Japanese enemies. A US diplomat in Asia says such pride may prohibit Kim from giving up his nuclear program in the current “six party talks” – and those talks stalled again in late December in Beijing.

“The cult of personality campaign is more extensive today than in 1985,” says former South Korean foreign minister Han Sung Joo, who visited Pyongyang this past October, and in 1985. “Unlike the Stalin and Mao personality cults, there is a deification and a religious emotional element in the North. The twinned photos of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are everywhere. Every speech says Kim Il Sung is still alive. I think if I stayed another two weeks, I might even see Kim Il Sung. The country worships someone who is deceased, as if he is alive.”

Kim Jong Il has upgraded his deification strategies to strengthen the family cult system. Western reports often detail Korea’s unique “juche ideology” – a theology of Kim worship, repeated hourly and daily, reminding Koreans they are insolubly bound to the Kim family and must erase foreign influence from their minds.

Yet juche is a subcategory of a far more encompassing umbrella of deification known as woo sang hwa, or idol worship. In North Korea, woo sang hwa contains all the aspects of cult worship. Kim broke away from orthodox communism, for example, in a program called “our style socialism.” While Marxism-Leninism demands fealty to “nation,” “party,” and “serving the people” – Kim’s “our style [Korean] socialism” does no such thing. It makes “family loyalty,” with Kim at the head, the supreme good – a major deflection from communism.

During the late 1990s famine, a “Red Banner” campaign for unconditional loyalty and harder toil began. Then came “Kangsong Taeguk” in the late 1990s – a project to push economic and military ideology. This project culminated in the 1998 Taepodong-1 rocket launches, which thrilled North Koreans, frightened Japan, and started a whole new military mindset in Tokyo.

The North uses “ideology rather than physical control,” Lee says, whenever possible. The current variation of the program is called “military first.” It is intended to bolster North Korea’s nuclear efforts. Military First started as a campaign to support juche, and as a slogan designed to remind Koreans that the nation is at war. It came packaged with a rallying cry called “dare to die,” say refugees and Kim experts. (There’s a dare-to-die pop song, and a dare-to-die movie. Recent internal memos brought by defectors indicate “dare to die” is urged on local officials due to a feeling in Pyongyang that young people aren’t showing enough zeal to make such a dare.)

A new military focus

Yet Military First may now be a tool for evolving a significant structural change – a new ruling elite in day-to-day affairs. For years, the North Korean state was ruled by the workers’ party. Under Kim Il Sung the party was the driving force in Korea – the main route to achievement and pay. Everyone wanted to join. (Party members in China and Vietnam are 5 percent of the population; a 1998 Korean Central report put Korea’s membership at 5 million, or 22 percent, though it may be lower.)

“The outcome of the Military First policy replaces the workers as a main force,” says Haiksoon Paik, a North Korean specialist at the Sejong Institute outside Seoul. “North Korea’s party has not been functioning as well as it is supposed to … several positions in the Politburo have not been reappointed. Kim is not depending on the party, but a smaller more streamlined military apparatus. This is due to his politics as a result of the nuclear crisis brought by the Americans.”

“Military First is not aimed at building up the military, which is already quite built up and strong,” says Lee, whose dissertation is titled, “A Political Economic Analysis of the North Korean Regime.” “It is about replacing the old party – First Rice – structure of senior Kim. If the party is unwieldy, the military will control the people on behalf of the leader.”

Tellingly, on New Year’s Day, Kim Jong Il visited the shrine where his father was interred. He has gone there only four times since he came to power in 1995. Each visit has taken place in a year following major accomplishments. According to South Korean media, for the first time, Kim visited the shrine without party or government officials. This time, only key military officials were in attendance. On Tuesday, North Korean papers heralded the visit, and the Oct. 9 nuclear tests as “an auspicious event in the national history.”

Kim-worship in the North is a vivid – and inescapable – spectacle to behold, say visitors. Thousands of giant “towers of eternality” to Kim scatter the landscape. Special “Kimjongilia” crimson begonias are tended in family gardens. Kim’s media calls him variously the “Guardian Deity of the Planet,” and “Lodestar of the 21st Century.” In 2002, Korean mass dances known as Arirang, featured 100,000 flag wavers (and was described in state media as the “greatest event of humankind.”) Many loyal Koreans bow twice daily to Kim pictures that sit alone on the most prominent wall of their homes.

Perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of the Korean cult project is its recent veering toward race and ethnic solidarity, say Kim watchers. His main appeal to his people today, a push that rarely gets attention outside the North, is to the racial superiority of a people whose isolation and stubborn xenophobia supposedly makes their bloodlines purer. Mr. Myers notes that festivals of 100,000 flag wavers is not a Stalinist exercise, but a celebration of “ethnic homogeneity.” Since the 1990s Kim has more fervently claimed lineage to the first ancient rulers of Korea, a move intended to place him in a position of historical, if not divine, destiny as leader of the peninsula.

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N. Korea demands Japan lift ban on ferry link

Saturday, January 13th, 2007

Kyodo
1/14/2007

Song Il Ho, the North Korean envoy in charge of normalizing relations with Japan, demanded in a recent meeting with a senior Japanese lawmaker that Japan lift a ban on a North Korean ferry service to a Japanese port on humanitarian grounds, informed sources said Sunday.

In a meeting with Taku Yamasaki of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party who visited Pyongyang last week, Song said, “There are people who can no longer travel to and from Japan even if they want to,” according to the sources.

“Humanitarian problems must be removed immediately,” Song was quoted as saying. Japan has banned entry by the North Korean passenger-cargo ferry Mangyongbong-92 as part of its sanctions against the North following its missile launches into the Sea of Japan in July.

Song also said Japan’s trade sanctions against the North after its first nuclear test in October is hurting sales of clams and matsutake mushrooms, according to the sources.

“We are faced with difficulty selling clams and mushrooms,” Song was quoted as saying. He also said Japan’s economic sanctions “have not been effective.”

The sources said Yamasaki was served cuisine featuring matsutake and Song told him, “I feel pity for the Japanese who can no longer eat delicious clams and matsutake” and implicitly requested that Japan lift the trade embargo against North Korea.

Returning to Japan from a five-day visit to Pyongyang until Saturday, senior LDP lawmaker Yamasaki also said on a TV Asahi program Sunday that North Korea denied it abducted Kyoko Matsumoto, a woman the Japanese government added last year to a list of Japanese nationals abducted by the North.

Yamasaki quoted Song as saying, “Several years ago, the Japanese government made an inquiry. After investigations, we found that no such person existed.”

Matsumoto, who disappeared from Tottori Prefecture in 1977 at age 29, was added to the list of abductees as the 17th victim in November. The abduction of Japanese nationals has been one of the major sticking points in the normalization of ties between Japan and North Korea.

Yamasaki visited Pyongyang despite the Japanese government’s urging not to do so when it is imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. The visit was also seen by some as paving the way for former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to make his third trip to the country.

On that point, Yamasaki said, “I personally think it would be nice if the trip is realized but nothing definite was made this time.”

Yamasaki said China is raising hopes that the United States and North Korea will meet later this month to discuss U.S. financial sanctions against the North.

Yamasaki said he met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei on Tuesday and Wu made a remark to that effect.

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Gaeseong site opened for lease

Friday, January 12th, 2007

Korea Herald
Lee Joo-hee
1/12/2007

The newest building in the inter-Korean industrial park in Gaeseong will be up for lease from early next month, Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung said yesterday.
The apartment-style factory, with a space of some 8,000 pyeong (25,000 square meters), will be large enough for as many as 40 small manufacturers.

Units in the building, constructed by the Korea Industrial Complex Corporation, will be leased to smaller-sized businesses making garments, accessories and other such goods, the Office of Gaeseong Industrial Complex Project at the ministry said.

The building will be completed this June, it said.

This is the first open lease of a building in the industrial park since North Korea’s missile launches last July.

“We have agreed that there was no reason to delay the lease any longer, considering it would provide momentum to the economy and offer opportunities for small- and medium-sized businesses,” Lee said in a weekly press briefing.

The Gaeseong park is favored by companies seeking low rental and labor costs.

But the sale of the remainder of the main complex is still suspended due to a deadlocked security situation following the North’s nuclear test last October.

Output at the industrial park surpassed $10 million for the first time in December last year, Lee said.

Touching on the reported spread of scarlet fever in the North, the minister said the government will not provide medical aid.

“As scarlet fever is not a fatal infectious disease we deem that North Korea will be able to solve the problem on its own. There will be no aid regarding this matter.”

Scarlet fever broke out in northern Ryanggang Province in October last year.

Good Neighbors International, a South Korean civic organization, shipped 36 types of medicines, including penicillin and antibiotics worth some $5 million, to the region.

Last month, the Join Together Society, a humanitarian aid group in Seoul, shipped a total of 400,000 doses of penicillin to the North.

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N. Korea sets up law office for foreigners’ investment

Friday, January 12th, 2007

Yonhap
1/12/2007

North Korea has established a consultation office to provide legal services for foreign investors, according to the North’s official media Friday.

The office, called Pyongyang Law Office, is to give advice with regards to the foreign investment law, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the Mount Geumgang tourism law and the North’s legal system, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

The services will be provided for not only foreign investors, but also overseas Koreans, institutions, business entities and residents in the communist country, KCNA added.

“Before they decide to make an investment in the DPRK, foreign investors will be able to use the legal services, so it will be very useful in terms of investment safety,” said Heo Young-ho, chief of the office.

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Pyongyang Law Office Opens

Thursday, January 11th, 2007

KCNA
1/11/2007

The Pyongyang Law Office, an independent corporate body, has started its operation to provide services for the solution of legal matters arising in various sectors. Ho Yong Ho, chief of the office, told KCNA that his office provides legal services upon application and assignment by foreign-invested businesses (equity or contractual joint ventures and wholly-foreign owned enterprises) and Koreans in overseas as well as by the institutions, establishments, organizations and citizens at home.

As for the categories of services, he said:

It introduces the laws and regulations of the DPRK on foreign-related matters, Kaesong Industrial Zone, Kumgangsan Tourist Zone and others.

It also holds legal consultations concerning the selection of the investment project, establishment and operation of foreign businesses, dissolution and bankruptcy of businesses, concerning documents of legal nature including feasibility study reports and memorandum of association, concerning trade, transport, finance, insurance, intellectual property, real property and concerning civil law relations between corporate bodies, corporate body and individual and so on.

Legal services are offered on the principle of fairness, promptness and legality and on the basis of the facts, laws and contracts, while the service performer is held accountable before the party concerned and the law for the service offered.

Application for the legal service may be made in person or written form, or by means of communications device. Foreign investors are well advised to consult the office prior to their investment in the DPRK, which will prove a wise choice for the guarantee of their investment security.

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Just got back from Iran!

Thursday, January 11th, 2007

After spending New Year’s in the Islamic Republic of Iran, I am getting back on top of my life.  Blogging will continue shortly.

In short, I had an amazing time and I recommend it to everyone.  My travel agent, Ace Vacations, did a fantastic job securing the visas, as well as planning and executing the travel agenda.  

A more detailed description of my trip will come soon.

On an unrelated note, I also just visited Turkmenistan. My country count is now at 44.

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Kaesong Site to House 40 More Manufacturers

Thursday, January 11th, 2007

Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
1/11/2007

Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung said Thursday that some 40 small factories, mostly clothing manufacturers, will move into the joint industrial complex in North Korea this year.

But he said it would take more time for the ministry to fully resume the halted expansion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

Last September, the South Korean government decided to hold off expanding the inter-Korean business venture because of heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula after the North’s launching of ballistic missiles in July. After the Stalinist state’s first-ever nuclear test on Oct. 9, tensions increased further.

“We’ve decided not to postpone helping small South Korean manufacturers, which have been struggling with adverse domestic business conditions, especially high wages,” Lee said during a press briefing at the ministry.

The manufacturing companies will move into a new five-story building constructed by the state-run Korea Industrial Complex Corp. involved in a pilot project for the industrial complex.

Construction of the building will be completed by June. It is not related to the postponed sale of the second section of the industrial complex, the minister said.

The number of North Koreans working for the 18 South Korean firms at the industrial complex surpassed 10,000 last year.

When fully expanded by 2012, the complex is expected to house about 2,000 South Korean manufacturers employing about half a million North Koreans, according to the Ministry of Unification.

The minister, however, said more progress in the stalled six-party talks is necessary for the government to resume expansion of the project.

He said he will continue discussing the matter with the Korea Land Corp., a state-run land developer, which has been involved in the Kaesong project, and Hyundai Asan, the business arm of Hyundai Group that handles the Mt. Kumgang tourism project.

Lee said the government would not provide medical aid to the Stalinist state to help stem the spread of scarlet fever, an infectious disease.

“Scarlet fever is not a fatal infectious disease. Given the significance of the disease, we believe that North Korea itself will be able to solve the problem,” Lee said.

The ministry considered providing medical aid to the North after scarlet fever broke out in the northern part of North Korea last October.

Earlier, South Korean humanitarian aid groups shipped 36 types of medicine including penicillin and other antibiotics to Pyongyang.

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