Archive for December, 2006

Banco Delta Asia Says It Bought `Large Share’ of N. Korea Gold

Monday, December 11th, 2006

Bloomberg (Hat Tip DPRK Studies)
12/11/2006
Stuart Biggs

Banco Delta Asia S.A.R.L., the Macau, China-based bank accused by the U.S. of money laundering for North Korea, said it bought gold from the communist state in a filing to the U.S. Treasury.

North Korea has made the unfreezing of about $24 million in assets held at Banco Delta Asia a pre-condition to returning to six-nation talks over its nuclear weapons program that broke off in September 2005. The U.S. alleged that the bank helped North Korean officials accept “surreptitious” multi-million dollar transactions, some linked to drug trafficking.

Banco Delta Asia, in an Oct. 18 letter to the U.S. Treasury Department by law firm Heller Ehrman LLP, said the bank “purchased a large share of the gold bullion produced by North Korea” prior to the allegations and no longer does so.

“Money could have been laundered, but there is no specific evidence that the bank was aware that it was being used for this purpose, nor that it facilitated any criminal activities,” the letter said. The bank “paid insufficient attention to maintaining its own books.”

Banco Delta Asia also said North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank, described by the U.S. as the Pyongyang government’s main financial agent for sales of arms and ballistic missiles, remained a customer for three months after Tanchon was blacklisted by the U.S. in June 2005 “due to shortcomings in the information technology systems.”

The bank said it put in place new managers after the U.S. action and closed North Korean-related accounts, hired an outside firm to set up procedures against money laundering and asked the Treasury to reconsider its ruling.

“The Bank has not done any business with North Korean or North Korean-related entities for over a year and pledged not to do any in the future,” the letter said.

The six-party negotiations may resume on Dec. 18 or 19, Yonhap News Agency reported, citing unidentified South Korean government sources.

Share

North Korea’s Women’s soccer team makes the finals in 2006 Asian Games

Sunday, December 10th, 2006

Yonhap
12/10/2006

N. Korea reaches the gold medal match after sinking China 3-1 in semifinals

North Korea showed it was far and above the favorite to win gold in women’s football by coming from behind to beat China 3-1 in the semifinal match of the Asian Games on Sunday.

The North Koreans, who are currently seventh in FIFA’s global ranking, clearly outperformed eighth-ranked China throughout the match, with missed opportunities and bad luck preventing the game from being settled in regulation time.

The defending Asiad champions got off to a rocky start when they surrendered a goal in the 10th minute of play when Wang Dandan put China up on the scoreboard 1-0.

North Korean goalie Jon Myong-hui failed to secure a cross from Weng Xinzhi that fell in front of Wang who tapped it into the net.

The goal, however, galvanized the North Koreans into action, with its players dominating the other side in both ball possession and shots and after several threatening moves, the North equalized with a deflected ball by the Chinese goalkeeper that Kil Son-hui returned to the net in the 21st minute.

The two sides went into halftime tied 1-1 and were unable to break the deadlock in the second half despite better chances for the North.

In overtime, the North’s domination of the pitch paid off with a left-footed shot by Ri Kum-suk in the 94th minute of play and another by Ri Un-gyong 5 minutes later. Ri is rated one of the top-20 players in the world.

The North Koreans could have made it 4-1 when the Chinese goalie intentionally grabbed Kil to prevent the North Korean from passing her. This resulted in the expulsion of the goalkeeper and a Chinese team struggling for the rest of the lopsided match.

Following the match, North Korean coach Kim Kwang-min said the match was a sort of payback for his side’s defeat in July at the Asian Football Confederation Women’s Asian Cup held in Australia.

“This time our players were in good mental health and spirit,” he said, expressing satisfaction with the outcome of the match.

The North Koreans will take on Japan in the finals scheduled for Wednesday, with Japan unlikely to pose a serious threat to the defending Asian champions. The Japanese side has never won the Asian gold in women’s football, having won bronze in both Bangkok and Busan in 1998 and 2002.

Share

UNDP Tumen River Program

Saturday, December 9th, 2006

Official Web Page:

Northeast Asia can be considered the last major economic frontier on the Asian continent.  The region has enormous economic potential, but this potential can only be realised through dynamic cooperation and sharing of resources.

Recognising Northeast Asia’s considerable potential and geopolitical significance, UNDP in 1991 agreed to support the initiative of the countries in the region to establish an institutional mechanism for regional dialogue and further cooperation.   For the past twelve years, the Tumen River Area Development Programme has facilitated economic cooperation among the five member countries: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Mongolia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Russian Federation.  The member countries are equally represented in the Consultative Commission for the Development of the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, which meets annually at Vice Ministerial level.

The main objectives of the Tumen Programme are to:

  • attain greater growth and sustainable development for the peoples and countries in Northeast Asia, and the Tumen Region in particular;
  • identify common interests and opportunities for cooperation and sustainable development;
  • increase mutual benefit and mutual understanding;
  • strengthen economic, environmental and technical cooperation; and
    work to ensure that the Tumen Region is attractive for international investment, trade and business.

The first phase of the Tumen Programme involved extensive planning and background studies.  An interim phase focused on investment promotion and development initiatives designed to build momentum for the region as a growth triangle.  The second phase built on the institutional framework for regional cooperation created by the multilateral agreements concluded in 1995.  The third – and current – phase continues to address factors fundamental to regional economic cooperation and is designed to ensure the sustainability of this regional cooperation framework.

Why the Focus on the Tumen Region?
The Tumen Region has great potential as a major entrepot for international trade because of the strategic location of the Tumen transport corridor, the strong complementarities of the Tumen River Area, vast natural and human resources, and the area’s accessibility to the resources and markets of Northeast Asia.

Northeast China and Mongolia are landlocked and therefore have a strong interest in access to ports in DPRK and the Russian Far East.  Overseas shippers also have a stake in the Tumen transport corridor, for it offers a much shorter route to affluent and new markets, and facilitates transit trade to a number of destinations.

The local governments in the Tumen Region have been steadfast supporters of the Tumen Programme since its inception.  It appears that central governments in Northeast Asia are now re-emphasising the value of the Tumen Region, particularly its strategic transport corridor.  Northeast Asian governments are rapidly improving the Tumen Region’s infrastructure network and transport services.  They are also working to create legal and institutional mechanisms conducive to cross-border trade and transport.  The Tumen Programme is actively facilitating the creation of an enabling environment through “soft” infrastructure and human capacity building.

Why is Regional Cooperation so Important?
Regional cooperation is a vital part of the development process and a building block for effective participation in world trade and capital markets.  For the Tumen Region, which partly consists of small and remote areas of large countries, economic cooperation is an effective way to avoid marginalisation.  Cross-border cooperation also helps resolve environmental issues and facilitates the adoption of international environmental standards.  Most importantly, enhanced economic cooperation in Northeast Asia helps improve political relations and stability, in turn vital elements for investment and economic growth.

It is worth recalling how remote and closed the Tumen Region was just a dozen years ago, to appreciate the full significance of its role as a frontier for economic cooperation in Northeast Asia.  Much has been achieved during the Tumen Programme’s existence, particularly in terms of opening borders and increasing interaction in a region that was, until recently, tense and largely closed.  A new trade and transport corridor has been created, which will – in time – evolve into an economic corridor with a significant impact on poverty reduction and improved living standards in the region.

The Future of the Tumen Programme
The prevailing political and economic climate in the region has altered dramatically since the start of the Tumen Programme in 1991.  The Soviet Union has dissolved, China and ROK have established diplomatic relations and a major trading partnership, and there has been a degree of rapprochement between DPRK and ROK.  The transition to stronger economic systems in the countries that relied on the Soviet Comecon trading system has reinforced the logic of economic cooperation in the Tumen Region.  The increased participation of DPRK, Mongolia and the Russian Far East, combined with the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, will help the Northeast Asian economy grow.

Dynamic cooperation has found increasing expression in Northeast Asia, and relations in the region continue to improve, helped by stronger economic links.  Despite major improvements in the geopolitical circumstances of the region, however, much remains to be done.  The Tumen Programme is the only initiative that brings the member countries together on a sub-regional basis, and its existing institutional structure and multilateral agreements should be utilised to maximum effect to help Northeast Asia achieve peace and prosperity.

 

Share

Golf in the DPRK

Friday, December 8th, 2006

Daily NK
12/8/2006
Yang Jung A

While golf equipment was amongst the list of banned luxury goods the U.S. government announced recently, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on the 6th that golf is a symbol of luxurious pleasure that only the elite in North Korea can experience.

Citing from a Pyongyang report by an Agence France-Presse correspondent, RFA revealed “The main golf course in North Korea is “Pyongyang Golf Course” with about 100 members, which in reality are all officials of Chosun Workers’ Party” and “Annual membership paid by the member amounts to $10,000.”

The correspondent said “This is a figure the average North Korean citizen could not even dream as an expense” and “The golf course in North Korea is a symbol of luxurious pleasure only experienced by authority officials or the elite.”

In the vicinity of Lake Taesung in Yongkang-gun, Nampo 38km from Pyongyang is “Pyongyang Golf Course,” equipped with a complete 18 hole course and ample enough to host an international golf tournament. The course was established in ’87 in celebration of Kim Il Song’s 75th birthday, sponsored by the Jochongnyeon, the pro-North Korean residents’ league in Japan.

Although it is said that a golf course exists within the grounds of Kim Il Sung’s Mountain Myohang villa and Ryongsung resort, the only golf course open to the public is ‘Pyongyang Golf Course.’ Mountain Myohang golf course is located in a valley 1.5km from Hyangsan Hotel, whereas Ryongsung golf course is situated 20 min by car from Pyongyang.

There are also mini courses, such as Yangkakdo golf course and Pyongyang golf practice range, Nampo Wawoodo golf course (9 holes). With investments by South Korean business, more golf courses are being constructed in areas such as Mt. Geumgang.

However, these golf courses are mainly accommodated to foreigners and excluding the elitist class, common people in possession of foreign currency such as Korean born Japanese or foreigners with blood-relatives are also using the courses.

Golf is one of Kim Jong Il’s favorite pastimes. In a book written by Fujimoto Kenji, once Kim Jong Il’s personal cook, Fujimoto wrote of his times at a golf course with Kim Jong Il at his villa.

At the golf course Fujimoto visited with Kim Jong Il, Kim asked Fujimoto ‘Compared to all the other places in the world, what do you think about the golf courses in North Korea?’ That day, when Kim Jong Il visited the golf course was October 6th and categorized a public holiday as a ‘The day Kim Jong Il visited.’

One time, North Korean mass media announced that at Kim Jong Il’s first time round of golf in `94, he scored an “eagle” followed by five “hold in ones,” recording a total score of 34. This only incited laughter from the international community.

If he had made 34 hit shots in a round of 18 holes, based on a game of par 72, this would mean he is 38 under. Even if a golf angel happened to come from the heavens, this would be impossible. While deifying Kim Jong Il and having no knowledge of golfing rules, media officials only made the situation into a laughing comedy.

In response, the New York Times sarcastically commented, that if the reports by North Korean media was true, Kim Jong Il should be selected as the “World’s number one golfer” as even professional golf competitors find it difficult to claim a hole a one in a lifetime.

Share

DPRK restricts some state employees from selling in markets

Friday, December 8th, 2006

Daily NK
12/8/2006

The North Korean authorities started to prohibit national companies employees’ sales activities while being absent from their workplaces.

According to a telephone interview with the Daily NK on Wednesday, an inside source said “From December 1, those who receive daily ration of 700g are strictly banned from participating in sales activities in private markets,” and “office employees are ordered to come back to their original company.”

The policy is aimed at those who receive 700g of daily ration, including laborers, office workers and public officials.

However, few of them actually are actually receiving rationing; even though their names are put on local party committee’s ration list, only senior party officials, security officers and workers of a few main national companies. In other words, North Korean workers are being forced to show up at work and prevented from sales activities although they will not receive salary.

Given the situation that most of factory workers depend on sales, smuggling, private farming and brokerage, the measure by the North Korean authorities would definitely threat livelihood of many people.

“Subject to 700g ration” is a common term to designate adult male citizen who are older than 17 and liable to be stationed in a workplace.

And family members dependent on the adults are subject to receive 300g of rationing; housewives, children, the elderly and handicapped citizens are classified as not eligible to work and, therefore, receiving 300g ration.

Recipients of 300g of ration were allowed to sell in private markets

Since the economic slowdown, actual amount of rationing is reduced from 700g to 534g. Other sources told the Daily NK that only recipients of 300g of ration were allowed to sell in private markets.

Thus, since mid-November ‘Central Party anti-socialist activity inspection team’ has been deployed to north Hamkyong province’s border region and local party organs and market management offices have started to regulate sales activities.

From now on, every vendor must provide documents to prove that they are not eligible to work and subject to receive 300g of ration to local governments’ labor departments and market management offices.

In the mid 90s during the March of Tribulation, rationing system collapsed and factories stopped operating. And since then, laborers have sought living on their own.

A 39-year old former defector from Hoiryeong, north Hamkyong province expected “single mothers responsible for their families’ living” would be hit most severely by the policy. The defector added “the women who lost their husbands are categorized as 700g ration recipients but do not receive any salary from their companies,” and “if they are prohibited from business, more women would cross the border from next year.”

Mr. Park, an NGO activist helping North Korean refugees in northeast China, said ‘the policy will only end up in an empty phrase’ as resumption of nation-wide rationing did so a year ago.

“I think Kim Jong Il miscomprehends the situation,” Park said with uneasy voice. “He might be under an illusion that recommencement of rationing system is working well and, therefore, it is time to make a national mobilization of labor forces to industrial production.”

Share

S. Korean publisher donates textbook printing press to N. Korea

Friday, December 8th, 2006

Yonhap
12/8/2006

A South Korean textbook publisher has donated a second-hand rotary press to North Korea to help the communist state publish school textbooks, Seoul-based UNESCO Korea said Friday.

“North Korea has requested that UNESCO assist with textbook printing presses and paper since 2000, and (South Korea’s) Daehan Printing and Publishing Co. expressed its intention to make the donation,” a UNESCO Korea official said.

The press was used in printing textbooks for South Korea’s elementary and secondary school students until 2000, the official said.

The donation is the second project UNESCO Korea has sought to help North Korean students. In 2002, UNESCO and Daehan Pulp Co. provided the North with 200 tons of paper for middle-school English textbooks there.

Share

Pyongyang not feeling pinch of UN sanctions

Friday, December 8th, 2006

Kyodo News is claiming that recently enacted UN restrictions on trade in luxury goods to the DPRK are having little effect on shops in Pyongyang (with the exception of Japanese cigarettes).  I suspect there are several reasons for this:

1.  Sanctions never completely cut off the supply of goods.  Where there is a willing buyer, there will almost always be a willing seller (particularly if the buyers is a well-connected party finctionary).  Quantity falls a little, price rises a lot.  A few more people get into the smuggling business.

2.  Most goods are imported from China.  China is not as tough on its “little brother” as the Japanese and US. 

3.  This will raise the value of North Koreans that have legitimate foreign connections (I dont want to name names but you know who you are! 🙂

4.  There are several places in Pyongyang worth checking out to learn more aobut the impact of sanctions in Pyongyang.  The DHL office in the Foreign ministry building, the shops on changwang street, and the Ragwan department store near the ice skating rink.  Ragwan was set up to sell to Koreans who returned from Japan and have yen to spare.

Story below:

Kyodo News (Hat tip DPRK Studies)
12/8/2006

Impact of sanctions not yet felt in Pyongyang stores

While countries have begun drawing up lists of luxury items they will deny North Korea as part of sanctions in response to the country’s nuclear test, the impact of the measure has yet to be felt in the handful of stores that sell imported goods in Pyongyang.
During a recent visit, shelves at a store inside the Koryo Hotel in central Pyongyang were stocked with French perfume, Russian vodka and Japanese “sake” rice wine, and restaurants in the North Korean capital still offered foreign beer.

Nor were changes visible in exchange rates for Japanese yen, the euro and Chinese yuan, which remained at around the level of previous months in several hotels that cater to non-Korean visitors and tourists.

“I would have thought that there would be a run on foreign goods by expatriates here, but so far there has been no major change,” a diplomat living in Pyongyang said. “The stores visited by the foreign community here still have, for example, chocolate and wine.”

After North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1718, which condemns the nuclear experiment and denies the nation military hardware, nuclear technology and luxury items.

The idea behind the ban on luxury goods is to pressure North Korea’s elite, not the ordinary public, in a country that faces chronic food shortage.

While the U.N. Security Council resolution detailed the military and nuclear items the U.N. member countries will deny North Korea, it left the decision on luxury goods up to each country.

Japan’s list of 24 items, for example, includes high-quality beef, fatty tuna, caviar, fur products and jewelry. Many other countries have yet to complete their lists.

Another Pyongyang resident, meanwhile, said he has noticed one change — a dramatic rise in the price of Japanese cigarettes.

There has been a three-fold increase in the price over the past few months, said the international aid worker.

While cigarettes are among the luxury items Japan denies North Korea under the U.N. resolution, there could be another reason for the price hike — a Japanese ban on port calls by the ferry Mangyongbong-92 which has been in place since North Korea test-fired missiles in July.

The ferry, the only passenger link between the two countries, has also been used to ship Japanese goods into North Korea.

“The impact of the denial of luxury goods would not be very visible” in the streets of Pyongyang as they target the country’s elite, said Noriyuki Suzuki, a senior analyst at Radiopress, which monitors North Korean media in Tokyo.

But the impact of Japanese sanctions that include a halt in all imports from North Korea “would probably result in a gradual decrease in not just luxury items but all Japanese goods in the country,” he said.

Share

After Test, Life in Pyongyang Goes On

Thursday, December 7th, 2006

Donga
12/7/2006

As the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution against North Korea, some of the projects pursued in partnership with Pyongyang needed to be postponed. So I explained the background to a North Korean director-level official in charge of relevant work, but he knew nothing about the UNSC sanctions.”

He suggested that the U.S.` financial sanctions against the North were already having an impact on the upper class. “I recently met a businessman selling medical devices to North Korea, who told me that the sales of blood pressure testers widely used by the North Korean upper class recently dropped dramatically. I believe this is because foreign currency inflows into North Korea are on the decline due to the financial sanctions against it,” he explained.

He also mentioned subtle changes taking place in relations between North Korea and China that have become growingly complex these days.

“The North is recently beefing up security measures against Chinese merchants operating in Pyongyang. The development project of the Musan iron mine in North Hamgyong Province of North Korea, which China has pushed for enthusiastically as part of its endeavor to secure natural resources, is put off for now. It is reported that after the North Korean nuclear test, the Chinese authorities ordered a postponement of the project for the time being.” As China needs raw material in the long term, however, he projected, “Though there currently are some conflict factors between China and North Korea, China will have to support the North as it does not want the country to collapse.”

With regard to what North Korean society as a whole is like after the nuclear test, he stated, “There are absolutely no signs of political changes. The North Korean regime`s control over the society is rock-solid, not being swayed at all.” He also indicated, however, “More recently, the North Korean authorities are strengthening their control over foreigners there.”

As to why the North Korean regime forces humanitarian international groups leave the country and tries not to receive food aid from outside, he cited two reasons: First, as international groups have operated in the North for a long period of time, North Korean residents started to show “real goodwill” to them. This leads to social uncertainties there. Second, as a country emphasizing “self-reliance,” North Korea finds it hurting its ego to receive foreign aid every year.

He worried that a food shortage is expected when the season of spring poverty unfolds in earnest in April. He stressed, “Given this year`s harvest was not good, if foreign aid decreases, North Korea is highly likely to face the worst-ever food shortage, arbeit not a famine, since the mid-1990s (dubbed the “Painful March under Trials”). Help from the international community is desperately needed.”

Regarding his life as a diplomat in Pyongyang, he said that even though he needed to get permission from the North Korean authorities to go to provincial areas, he could move freely within downtown Pyongyang. As the structure of everyone monitoring each other has been internalized in North Korea, he added, when one tries to shoot an “inappropriate” scene from the perspective of North Korea, someone appears out of nowhere to stop him.

He plans to return to Pyongyang sooner or later.

Share

Local Agriculture Officials Prosecuted

Wednesday, December 6th, 2006

Daily NK
Shin Joo Hyun
12/6/2006

An unidentified official document of the North Korean government, which was released recently, showed that senior local agriculture officials were reprimanded for low productivity rates and fake production reports in early November.

After thorough inspection by the Korean Workers’ Party central committee, the officials were accused of reporting false figures of agricultural production and embezzlement of products. Those who got caught would be expelled from the party and prosecuted, according to the document.

Authenticity of the document will be verified by the prosecution of the local agriculture officials and appointment of succeeding heads of local agriculture policy. If the document turns out to be genuine, it means that this year’s food production in North Korea will be gravely low and there must be someone to take responsibility.

In 1997, at the peak of the March of Tribulation, the Central Party Secretary for Agriculture Seo Kwan Hee was publicly executed for ‘spy activities.’ The incident is supposed to be Kim Jong Il’s pretext for famine and failed agricultural policy, with Seo being a scapegoat.

At the public execution site, the Pyongyang Regional Court’s justice sentenced Seo to death for ‘working as an American spy for more than 30 years and deliberately failing the Party’s agricultural policy, such as implementing inappropriate seeds and so on.’

It was also pointed out that the recent prosecution of senior agriculture officials reflected North Korean bureaucrats’ widespread corruption.

In North Korea, fraud and bribery are common from the central party to local party committees. Thus, it is possible that the central party inspection squad might have methodically already investigated personal corruption cases of the officials.

Defining embezzlement of agricultural products as felony represents the North Korean authority’s fear of possible famine. However, it is suspected that while most of the officials are corrupted, only agriculture bureaucrats are punished in order to throw the blame of the forthcoming food shortage on them; the expulsion of provincial agriculture officials of Hwanghae, Pyongan, and Hamkyong provinces from the KWP and their prosecution is intended to create scapegoats for Kim Jong Il in case of another horrible famine.

Share

N. Korea-China Ties Shaky: Expert

Wednesday, December 6th, 2006

Donga
12/6/2006

“The relationship between North Korea and China can be compared to a river that seems calm on the surface but has a great number of uncertainties surging underwater.”

Kurt Campbell, the senior vice president at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a think- tank in the U.S., had an interview with this newspaper on December 04. Senior vice president Campbell, renowned as an authority in international securities especially regarding China, said, “The official stance of China is to protect North Korea, but the nation is upset internally at the attitude of North Korea that belittles China and the global society. Without a noticeable change in the attitude of North Korea, China might take steps to reappraise its policies toward North Korea it has maintained over the years.”

―You analyzed in a seminar last month that North Korea will come into possession of nuclear capability targeting China.

“North Korea is feeling threats from many sides. What I meant was that while the major military is aimed at the U.S. across the truce line and Japan, North Korea should be aspiring underneath the surface to have suppressive force against China out of concerns regarding their relationship with China.”

At this point, senior vice president Campbell diagnosed that “North Korea seems determined to become a nuclear nation and will not give up on it” and went on to give his view that “even in case North Korea returns to the six-party round table, it will not show fundamental improvements.”

―How do you view the South Korea-U.S relationship in the present and in the future?

“The relationship between South Korea and the U.S is quite stable at the lower level. The greatest risk to the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. presently is not in the relationship itself but in the domestic politics of South Korea. Uncertainties are being aggravated by questions over where President Roh will take the problems (of the Korean Peninsula).”

―You said the South Korea-U.S relationship is stable at a low level.

“The nuclear testing by North Korea helped compose the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. The replacement of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will also help. He was not a factor conducive to the South Korea-U.S. relationship. I think he looked at South Korea not as a profitable strategic partner but as a pain in the ass. In this aspect it was incidental and ironic that the aim of Secretary Rumsfeld and President Roh, regarding matters such as the transfer of right to control strategies in war, converged at the same point. Of course their motivations diverged greatly. On the other hand the future U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to be a person who shares the opinion that having a closer relationship with South Korea is important.”

―How would you grade the response by related nations toward North Korean nuclear testing?

“I hope to see South Korea, the U.S., and China sending North Korea a concurring message. But what I’m concerned about is whether the government of South Korea did not send a message that “even though the nuclear testing was depressing, it was not unforgivable, and a certain level of business can go on.”

Share