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Ten million live in food insecurity in North Korea, UN says. But what does that really mean?

Tuesday, May 16th, 2017

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A new report published by World Food Program and other UN institutions (Food Insecurity Information Network), detailing food insecurity in the world in 2016 as a whole, says the following about the situation in North Korea:

4.4 million (or 17 percent of the North Korean population as a whole) is in “crisis, emergency and [or?] famine”.
5.6 million (or 22 percent of the population) lives in a “stressed” situation when it comes to food.
This brings the entirety of the population living in food insecurity to ten million.

North Korea is the only country in all of East Asia with food insecurity, the report says.

It is unclear where the data comes from. According to the report, it could either have come from government sources in North Korean or from the World Food Program, but the report itself does not specify this.

A few things are worth noting. First and most importantly, particularly at a time when news reports abound about the rising middle classes and the new consumption habits of the wealthy, it is crucial to remember that a significant proportion of the North Korean population still live lives far away from the relative luxury of Pyongyang.

Second, though there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that a significant part of the North Korean population lives in severe hardship, harvests do not appear to be declining. On the contrary. According to the WFP’s 2017 needs assessment for North Korea,

“[w]hile official Government harvest data for 2016 has not yet been released, FAO estimates that rice production in 2016 increased by 23 per cent compared to the previous year when there was drought, but remains below the previous three-year average.”

Third, the World Food Program’s methodology for estimating these figures is rather unclear and problematic. For example, in the above-mentioned assessment of North Korean needs and priorities for 2017, released earlier this year, the WFP classifies all those depending on the Public Distribution System (PDS) as “suffering from food insecurity and undernutrition, as well as a lack of access to basic services.”

Presumably, this is derived from the fact that PDS distribution (of grains and staple foods, which is basically all it distributes) fluctuates through the year and is fairly unpredictable. But with the growing prevalence of the markets, it is unclear whether even those who the WFP claim “depend” on the PDS, really get the main portion of their food from the system. Over the past few years, public distribution of food has become an increasingly marginal (though certainly not unimportant) part of the food supply, and assuming that 18 million North Koreans experience food insecurity simply because they are beneficiaries of the public distribution system seems questionable at best. Obviously, the only way to understand food security overall would be to look at sources of food overall, not just one channel of supply.

Fourth, one overall problem with data on food security in North Korea remains the involvement of the North Korean government in the data collection. That is not to say that the North Korean government pushes the food production estimates upward to make itself look more successful. On the contrary, at times it probably exaggerates food needs in order to receive more outside assistance. Rather, the political nature of food, markets and the economic system makes it difficult to get trustworthy assessments of the food situation in the country. Only in one paragraph in its short version of North Korea’s needs estimates for 2017 does the World Food Program even allude to the markets:

In addition to the PDS, households are increasingly reliant on markets for their foods, except cereals. Farmers’ markets are distribution channels for a wide range of foods and basic necessities. In addition to swaps and bartering, markets involve large numbers of small transactions, often led by women.
Markets enable households to sell produce from their kitchen gardens; vegetables, maize and potatoes, as well as some small livestock.

Given the extent to which marketization has prevailed in North Korean society for over close to three decades, language like this seems to conflict with an overwhelming body of information about the centrality of the markets in the system today.

And, of course, there is the elephant in the room: North Korea’s economic system itself. As Amartya Sen famously pointed out, famine and food insecurity does not first and foremost stem from a lack of food overall, but from skewed entitlements. In other words, resources exist, but the problem is who gets them. In North Korea, the regime continues to refuse overarching and fundamental reforms of the economic system. As Fyodor Tertitskiy convincingly argued in a recent piece in NK News, the systemic changes in the North Korean economy of the past few years is most likely the work of bureaucrats within the state hierarchy, rather than a push by Kim Jong-un. In short, there are a lot of things the regime could change about the economy, to improve access to food and diminish food insecurity, but which it does not do.

This makes language like this, also from the WFP’s 2017 needs assessment, so problematic (my emphasis):

There are many complex, intertwined reasons for the high rates of undernutrition in DPRK, including challenges in producing sufficient food. The majority of the country is mountainous, only 17 per cent of land is good for cultivation.
Agriculture also remains dependent on traditional farming methods. Food production is hampered by a lack of agricultural inputs, such as quality seeds, proper fertilizer and equipment. In addition, changing weather patterns have left DPRK vulnerable to droughts and floods, which have affected agricultural production.

Mountains and bad weather are not factors unique to North Korea. Geography is not destiny, and there is no shortage in the world of countries that have overcome difficulties in their natural environment through good policy. One has to understand the difficult spot that the WFP and other UN institutions work in, given North Korea’s politically sensitive and tense context. But one can only hope that the WFP is clearer about pointing out systemic deficiencies in the North Korean economy when they talk to officials behind closed doors, than they are in public statements.

All this said, North Korea is an extremely difficult environment to navigate for international aid organizations. The women and men on the ground certainly do their best to accomplish good things, and make accurate measurements in a challenging environment. But it is important to keep these and other methodological issues in mind before drawing any major conclusions about North Korea’s food situation.

Posted in Agriculture, Economic reform, International Aid, Political economy, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Overview of Rason SEZ legislation

Wednesday, April 5th, 2017

Yeobin Yoon and Philipp Kopp at the Hanns Seidel Foundation have put together a brief analysis of different laws that govern the Rason Economic and Trade Zone.

It shows an interesting evolution in the SEZ’s regulations as North Korean policymakers try to make the zone more hospitable to foreign investment.

You can download the PDF of the short report here.

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Summer trailings along the Sino-North Korean border, in search of sanctions: photo essay

Tuesday, December 20th, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This November, just like every time that new sanctions are levelled on North Korea, the first question tends to be: what will China do? Unsurprisingly, the same question followed after UN resolution 2270 in March this year, when the international community adopted the strongest sanctions against North Korea to date, most crucially targeting its minerals exports. This time, some believed, would be different. China was finally fed up and would take measures to hit North Korea’s economy, and official; statements and some bureaucratic action reinforced this impression. Now, some hope that the “cap” measure on imports of North Korean coal will remove the loophole created by the “humanitarian exemption” in the previous sanctions.

By now, after the THAAD, other geopolitical developments and the sheer passing of time, the question of China’s degree of sanctions enforcement has almost faded into the background. As the Washington Post’s Anna Fifield showed in a dispatch from Dandong a few weeks ago, sanctions are at most one factor among many that impact trade between China and North Korea.

This summer, I visited Dandong, Yanji and Hunchun, three Chinese cities along the border. I got a very similar impression: sure, some people involved in border trade told me, things had gotten a little more complicated, though not much. But sanctions were rarely mentioned as the reason for any added difficulties or downturns in trade. At the time, China’s enforcement of sanctions was very much a topic of debate, and most analysts were skeptical of any squeezing going on, while some claimed trade had virtually ceased. At my visit, on the contrary, I saw fairly vigorous trading activity, and few people I spoke to thought any changes had occurred since sanctions were enacted. Posting these impressions and pictures has been a project in the pipeline for a while, so while much has happened since this summer regarding China-DPRK relations and trade, I hope that the reader will find it interesting to see how things looked at a time when some concluded that China was finally squeezing North Korea in a way that hurt. To be clear: all impressions and pictures below are from late June of 2016.

Trailing the China-DPRK border, in search of sanctions

Dandong

Entrance to the Dandong customs inspections area. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Earlier this year, the UN Security Council adopted the strongest sanctions that North Korea has faced to date. As with previous rounds of sanctions, one of the major questions is China’s degree of enforcement. Going back a few months, some suggested that major shifts had taken place, and that trade between North Korea and China had declined radically.

By the actual border, this summer, things looked very different. In contrast to the image of a desolated trading environment, I encountered bustling traffic during a visit earlier in the summer. During one morning in late June, around 85 trucks crossed the border from North Korea into China in only about one and a half hours. Virtually all trucks were registered to northern Pyongan province, the home province of Sinuiju. In addition, 19 cars and buses, one long freight train and one passenger train crossed the bridge during the same time. After this first stint of traffic, the flow reversed and a steady flow of trucks began pouring into North Korea from China. Only during the 15 minutes when I observed the traffic going from China, into North Korea, 35 trucks and 13 buses and cars crossed the bridge.

The traffic flowed in sequences, one direction at a time. And this was only the morning traffic. The flow may have continued throughout the day, as the traffic moved in intervals. Walking back to the customs area from the bridge crossing in the early afternoon, what was previously a calm intersection by Chinese inner-city standards had turned busy: trucks lined the entire street leading up to the customs office and some flowed over into the adjacent street, waiting to drive into the inspection area. All in all, more than 80 trucks lined the roads waiting to cross into North Korea. Most carried Chinese license plates.

Trucks lined up on both sides of the street at one of the main intersections in central Dandong, waiting to go into the customs inspection area to cross into North Korea. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Trucks, trucks and more trucks. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Trucks lined up for customs inspection along the streets of Dandong before crossing into North Korea. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Trucks lining up for customs inspection before crossing into North Korea from Dandong. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The never-ending line of trucks. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Truck driving into the Dandong customs area. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Another picture of the never-ending line of trucks. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

North Korean trucks crossing into Dandong from Sinuiju. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

It is commonly estimated that around 200 trucks go between China and North Korea on a regular day. In sheer numbers, virtually nothing seemed to have changed regarding the traffic since the latest round of sanctions. Only the trucks observed in plain sight during this morning amount to a little under 200, and this merely during the first few hours of the day. At least 10–20, probably far more, were already in the customs inspection area waiting to cross. In short, things looked very regular and busy.

Trucks waiting to cross from North Korea into Dandong. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Some of the trucks going into Dandong from Sinuiju looked empty. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Of course, one must be careful not to draw too drastic conclusions from one day of observations. Things may have changed throughout the summer and surely during the fall, and channels such as ship transports are not visible from the border bridge area. Moreover, according to reports from inside North Korea, the authorities have expressed concerns about potentially shrinking trade volumes as a result of sanctions, and some traders now smuggle goods that are covered by the sanctions rather than transporting them openly, as they have in the past, according to Daily NK. In short, sanctions did appear to be having some degree of impact, even during the past summer.

Most North Korean trucks crossing into Dandong were registered to North Pyongan province ( 평안북도도, here abbreviated to 평북), the province bordering Dandong. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Another truck registered to North Pyongan province. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

However, the truck traffic across the Chinese border through Dandong suggested that the picture was mixed. At the very least, observations from the border area showed that even though trade in certain goods may have gotten more difficult, North Korea was by no means economically cut off from China, and still is not. Prices for food and foreign currency on North Korean markets, too, remained relatively stable through the summer from when sanctions were put in place, indicating that the economy as a whole is not feeling any drastic impact of the sanctions.

Factory materials going into North Korea from China. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Most trucks transporting factory materials into North Korea appeared to be Chinese-registered. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Another Chinese truck transporting factory materials into North Korea. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

If the North Korean economic elite was worried about the sanctions, it certainly did not show at one hotel in central Dandong. Sinuiju in North Korea is only a few minutes drive over the Yalu River, on the bridge connecting the two countries. The hotel was packed with North Korean guests, many of whom have presumably come over for purchasing and meetings with Chinese business partners. They came and went in a steady stream, wearing luxury brand clothing, watches and carrying expensive bags and wallets.

They paid everything in cash, and at least one person per travel party spoke Chinese. One man held a car key with a logo from KIA, the South Korean car manufacturer. One woman sported a Hello Kitty handbag. As some got ready to depart, bags piled up in the lobby, seemingly filled with goods from shopping sprees around town. Some of it seemed to be meant for re-sale in North Korea. Many stores around the flood banks cater specifically to a North Korean clientele, and sell items like kitchenware that are not easily accessible across the river.

Many stores in Dandong cater specifically to North Korean consumers. The sign at the left bottom of the picture reads “조선백화점,” translating into “Korea department store.” Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Travelling to Dandong, it was particularly apparent why the Chinese government would be reluctant to clamp down too hard on border traffic, even if it would want to do so. Political reasons aside, trade between North Korea and China matters for cities such as Dandong. One can see it in the flesh: the streets are packed with companies dealing in imports and exports to and from North Korea. One company trades steel; another sells construction equipment such as tractors. Several sell cars and buses, and others deal in refrigerators, dishwashers, washers and dryers. One, called “Pyongyang Tongshin (평양통신),” judging by its name, offers cell phone services for traders travelling into North Korea. Should trade between the two countries drastically dive, the local economy would take a hit.

Advertisements for North Korean cell phone service Koryolink in Dandong. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

“Pyongyang Communications.” Sign in Dandong. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

One could turn these observations on their head: if so many trucks were lining up and only moving slowly into the customs area, could that not mean that inspections had gotten tighter? Was the line of trucks actually a sign that Chinese authorities did what they have promised to do?

Perhaps. But not according to people around the border crossing and customs area. I asked several individuals involved in the cross-border trade about the long lines and waiting times for border crossings. No one seemed to believe that the traffic commotion and lines were anything out of the ordinary. Both Chinese and North Koreans involved in import-export business said traffic had not changed at all during the past year or so. Overall trade had declined a bit, one person said. The trucks carried a little less than they did before, but only marginally. Coal was not traded as frequently as it was before the sanctions were put in place.

This sign lists services for one Dandong firm that offers, among other things, UPS transport services and solar-powered appliances, which have become popular in North Korea in recent years. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

But the timing of the early 2016 round of sanctions made such statements difficult to assess. China had in fact been decreasing its coal imports from North Korea at different points in time several years before the latest round of sanctions. Between 2013 and 2015, for example, the value of Chinese coal imports from North Korea shrank by almost 25 percent. Only between January and February 2014, the value of trade between the countries dropped by 46 percent. The statistics are often clouded by the fact that global market prices for commodities such as coal fluctuate heavily. There may also be a variety of seasonal factors at play. In sum, isolating sanctions as a variable is notoriously difficult, and often, numbers do not tell the full story. As of June this year, North Korean coal could still be ordered through the Chinese online shopping mall Alibaba.

Moreover, even if Chinese authorities wanted to check all goods cross with minute rigidity, one can question whether it would even be practically feasible. The customs area is not particularly large and did not appear to be overflowing with staff. Checking around 200 trucks per day for their exact goods, and determining whether its revenues could be used to fund North Korea’s weapons program – the condition stated by the latest sanctions – seems like a gargantuan task in practice.

Hunchun

Tourists and a truck waiting by the Hunchun-Rason border crossing (Quanhae). Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The Dandong-Sinuiju is the main point of trade between China and North Korea, but not the only one. An one-hour drive from the Chinese city of Hunchun, trucks and people come and go to and from the North Korean northeast. At the border crossing, most seem to be going to the special economic zone in Rajin in North Korea. On one gloomy Thursday in late June, around 40 Chinese trucks waited to cross. One Chinese-Korean waiting for the gates to open to the customs area told the present author that business is going very well these days. He runs a hotel in Rajin, catering mostly to Chinese tourists and business people. He has seen no dip in customers over the past year – rather, more people are coming than before. This single testimony may not be fully indicative of trade as a whole, but it does suggest that Chinese tourism remains an important and fairly viable source of revenue for North Korean businesses in Rason.

The Quanhae border crossing from afar. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Trucks lining up to go into North Korea. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

More trucks at Quanhae. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Trucks at the border crossing. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Chinese tourists lining up to have their passports checked before heading into Rason. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This was certainly the way things looked at the border crossing. Chinese tourists came and went in great numbers, many carrying North Korean shopping bags. Trucks, too, continuously crossed the border throughout the afternoon. All in all, 80–100 trucks drove into North Korea during this afternoon. One was adorned with a logo from the Dutch shipping company Maersk. A few trucks came out of North Korea as well, many seeming to carry seafood destined for cities such as Hunchun and Yanji.

A truck adorning a logo from the Dutch shipping company Maersk having just crossed into North Korea from Hunchun. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

In addition, a large number of buses and minivans carrying tourists and traders went in from China. Many minivans carried driving permits for Rajin clearly visible through their front windows. Given the amount of truck traffic only during the afternoon, it seems a reasonable estimate that perhaps twice the amount of traffic went through during the day as a whole. One person with good knowledge of the border area estimated that around 200 trucks go through at this crossing on a regular day, though this figure is obviously neither exact nor certain.

Customs office on the North Korean side of the border crossing. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Chinese tourists waiting to head into North Korea. Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The two bridges connecting Rason to China (particularly the newly constructed one in the back). Photo: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

These observations did not fully prove that China was not enforcing sanctions on North Korea during the summer of 2016. However, they did show that trade and traffic between the countries was still very much alive. Some goods may have be traded less, but neither sanctions nor souring relations between North Korea and China seemed to have reduced trade as much as some observers have claimed. The North Korean economy may be impacted by sanctions, but it is not and rarely has been fully isolated from the rest of the world.

Posted in China, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

US-China Commission releases annual report

Friday, November 18th, 2016

The 2016 report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has been published.

You can read it here.

Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Closed

IFES brief on geological surveys in North Korea

Thursday, October 6th, 2016

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

On 25th September, North Korean leader and chairman of the State Affairs Commission, Kim Jong Un, issued instructions that survey equipment should be modernized and its production domesticated using the most up-to-date science and technology, in order to decisively improve geological survey work.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the North Korean government’s official newswire agency, reported on 26th September that Kim gave these instructions in a letter he sent to the Nationwide Geological Survey Department Workers Conference held at the People’s Palace of Culture on the previous day. He also stated that “Geological surveys are the core front in constructing an economically strong nation.”

In the letter, Kim emphasized the need “to create a scientific developmental strategy for the Geological Survey Department in line with the demands of constructing an economically strong nation, and this should be executed in a step-by-step fashion. Also, under the state’s unified leadership, order and discipline must be established with respect to the development of underground resources.” He went on to say, “the role and responsibility of resource protection institutions must be raised, while the state’s energy must be put into the physical-scientific protection activities of Geological Survey departments. . . . I look forward to related officials and workers bringing about a decisive improvement in geological survey work, and contribute actively to the construction of an economically strong socialist state.”

At the same time, while on a visit to the Taedong River Syringe Factory, Kim Jong Un instructed that the factory be transformed into a modernized facility.

On 23rd September, KCNA reported on Kim Jong Un’s recent on-the-spot guidance saying: “Located in the suburbs of Pyongyang, the Taedong River Syringe Factory is a large base for the production of medical equipment, having the capacity to produce a variety of syringes.”

Reminiscing, Kim also said that the factory, built in December 2000, “rose during the Arduous March, the Kanghaeng-gun Period, under direct instigation of and energetic leadership of the General [Kim Jong Il]. This was a period the enemy viciously sought to isolate us, and natural disasters meant that everyone was forced to tighten their belts.”

While at the factory, Kim Jong Un instructed that: “not only should the factory normalize a high level of production, but also completely guarantee a high level of product quality, and undertake an energetic struggle to diversify the types of syringe produced. . . . If syringe production is to be systematically raised, and different kinds of syringe and syringe needle for a range of uses are to be produced properly, there is a need to modernize the factory in line with the demands of the knowledge economy era.”

Moreover, Kim emphasized the importance of constructing a combined production system, as well as automation, and sterilization, saying: “it is the intention of the party that the Taedong Syringe Factory will become a model and standard for our country’s medical equipment production facilities by modernizing.”

In 2007, when South Korean medical aid was offered to the North in relation to North-South medical projects, the North Korean side expressed the hope that needed supplies would be given as aid, saying: “syringes, needles and cotton balls are most needed.” They even proposed that the South Korean government aid in the construction of a syringe factory, saying “a syringe is only used once.” It is a noteworthy change that North Korea has now begun producing syringes for itself.

Article source:
‘Geological Surveys’ Are Core Front in Constructing Economically Strong Nation
IFES NK Briefs, Institute for Far Eastern Studies
2016-10-06

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Book review recommendation: Philip Park’s Rebuilding North Korea’s Economy

Tuesday, September 20th, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

It is unfortunate that books published in South Korea are often difficult for reader’s in the United States and Europe to get a hold of without waiting out the very long waiting times for online purchases or library orders. Readers of this blog may well be familiar with Kyungnam University professor Philip H. Park’s work on the institutional side of the North Korean economy. One of professor Park’s books on the North Korean economy was recently translated into English and published under the name of Rebuilding North Korea’s Economy. Sadly I have not yet personally been able to read the book for reasons stated at the beginning of this post, but a review in Daily NK summarizes some of the core arguments:

“Rebuilding North Korea’s Economy” is a detailed history of the evolution of North Korea’s economic institutions. It is a newly published English translation of the original Korean work. The author is a professor of political science and diplomacy at Kyungnam University. The book details how a series of crises stimulated a procession of changes in North Korea’s economic strategy. Each new strategy reacted to and attempted to amend the problems created by its predecessor. However, each policy also sowed the seeds for future crisis by creating new inefficiencies.

The Argument

Phillip Park’s central contribution is to correct a common misconception about marketization and the decentralization of North Korea’s economy. Park argues that North Korea did not begin its process of marketization with the July 1st Measures in 2002 – as is commonly believed. Instead, he presents evidence that North Korea actually started spinning the gears of this process much earlier, most significantly with the adoption of the Ryonhapkiopso System (Complex Industrial System) in 1986. In theory, this economic approach allowed limited market mechanisms and practical planning to replace more ideological economic initiatives. The system’s implementation was largely a response to stagnated growth and the impending collapse of one of North Korea’s key sponsor states, the Soviet Union. Aside from inefficiency, North Korea’s principal economic problem has always been striking a balance between sectors while also pursuing self-sufficiency. The Complex Industrial System aimed to address that problem.

The author uses North Korean economic journals as his primary sources. He admits that separating the useful information from the propaganda was a laborious task. So, while the information does need to be taken with a grain of salt, we can still learn a lot about the state of North Korea’s economy by observing how academic discussions and policy recommendations have evolved over time. The book does a good job contrasting policy dialogues with the results of subsequent implementations (or lack thereof). The book’s sources help dispel the myth that North Korea’s political economy is purely monolithic. Indeed, through the book, we witness key players – academics and officials alike – arguing over milestone policies.

One note of caution: Park dives headfirst into the North Korean understanding of economics. Yes, this means a heavy dose of Marxist concepts and five-syllable jargon. But those with a rudimentary understanding of socialist politics know that seemingly obscure theoretical points are sometimes used to justify sweeping changes. In particular, changes to North Korea’s economic institutions are often motivated by theoretical assumptions about how to best transition to a fully communist state. This is actually one of the book’s major charms. After we digest the dense vocabulary, we are presented with a reasonable framework for understanding the decision making of one of the world’s most opaque and incomprehensible dynasties. That in itself is a laudable achievement.

Let’s address a few downsides. Considering that the original Korean work was published a few years ago, it would have been nice to get an expanded forward with some new observations on Kim Jong Un’s performance as an economic manager. Also, abbreviations and technical jargon are used thoroughly in the book. A glossary of terms would have been a handy reference.

Although Park’s main argument may seem technical at first glance, the repercussions of this work are vast. The most immediate and profound impact is that it forces us to reconsider the history, nature, and trajectory of North Korea’s economic transformation. Marketization is typically described as a bottom-up process of slowly expanding black market activity. But Park gives us a reason to think that the picture is slightly more nuanced. It gives us a view into the thinking of North Korean economic planners. Readers are prompted to think more deeply about how institutions shape incentives in North Korea, and how these institutions have changed over time.

Full article here:

Light and shadow: A review of ‘Rebuilding North Korea’s Economy’

Daily NK

2016-09-20

Posted in Daean (Taean) System, DPRK Law on Economic Development Zones, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Juche, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Buy your own North Korean coal, through Alibaba

Thursday, June 30th, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Are you looking for the perfect birthday present or anniversary gift for your loved one? Look no further. It seems you can buy your own North Korean coal through the Chinese shopping website Alibaba.

One company, Dandong Zhícheng Metallic Material, states: “We are professional company of trading the North Korea Briquettes, choose us, trust us.” Buyers can choose to have their coal transported either through the Dalian or Dandong ports, and the company markets both coal briquettes and other types of coal products. The website contains information about the country and their products in both Chinese and Korean, but the text is blurry and appears in a small font, making it difficult to read. I am currently unable to find the original page where these descriptions appear, but below are a few screenshots:

Update 2016-07-03:

Voice of America (Korean version) cites this blog post here, and Yonhap in turn cites VoA here, without citing this blog.

Posted in China, International trade, Statistics, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Kim visits National Defense University

Sunday, June 12th, 2016

Rodong Sinmun and KCNA report that Kim visited National Defense University. ~~The story is not in English on their web sites yet,~~ but the university is in Ryonsong District in Northern Pyongyang (39.169469°, 125.777240°). The Google Earth imagery of it is a little dated, but you can see where those two statues are going to be erected.

Here is the story in Rodong Sinmun:

Kim Jong Un Visits National Defence University

Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, provided field guidance to the National Defence University.

He paid tribute to the statues of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il at the university.

Watching the statues of smiling Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, he said with deep emotion that the university is associated with the exploits they performed by tirelessly working heart and soul for developing the Juche-oriented national defence industry in the whole period of their revolutionary careers.

He said that the statues of the great leaders were erected at the university on the occasion of the 49th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s visit to it, adding that this was a great event of weighty significance in adding eternal shine to the immortal revolutionary exploits of the great leaders recorded in the history of education in the Juche-oriented national defence science and constituted an immense pride and happiness of all teaching staff and students of the university and personnel in the field of the national defence industry.

He went round the room for the education in the revolutionary history and room dedicated to the history of the university.

Kim Il Sung proclaimed the founding of the National Defence College, the predecessor of the National Defence University, in October, 1964 and visited it several times and took meticulous care of it including the establishment of departments, students’ uniform, cap-badge and collar badge and clearly indicated the road to be followed by it.

Kim Jong Il took a measure to newly build the university in an excellent place and led it with loving care so that it could fulfill its mission and duty as a center for training national defence scientific and technical personnel.

Watching historic data, Kim Jong Un said that the university has developed into the highest seat of training Juche-oriented national defence scientific and technical personnel having hundreds of persons with academic degrees and titles, several colleges, faculties, a doctorial institute, etc.

Looking at photos on the board introducing heroes one by one, he said that there are many acquaintances at the university, a clear proof that it has covered a proud path following the party. The university has produced a lot of personnel who have protected our party, he added.

He went round various places of the university including an exhibition hall of education science, e-library, weaponry hall, etc. to learn in detail about the teaching and education and scientific research.

He set forth the tasks to be fulfilled by the university.

Noting that the National Defence University is one of the universities for which he has the deepest affection and to which he attaches importance, he said he would frequently receive reports on the problems arising in the teaching and education at the university and personally settle them. He promised to turn the university into the most prestigious one in the country, an iconic university training hardcore personnel and talents who would shoulder upon themselves the national defence science and the world first class one.

He had a photo session with the officials and teachers of the university.

He was accompanied by Ri Man Gon, vice-chairman of the C.C., the WPK, Yu Jin and Jo Yong Won, vice department directors of the C.C., the WPK.

Here is coverage of the story in Yonhap:

North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un has reaffirmed his intent to stick to nuclear weapons when making his first military-related public activity since the party congress in May, the North’s state media showed Monday.

Kim conducted the so-called field guidance at National Defense University, which the communist country says contributes to its defense industry, according to the North’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). It did not specify the date of his visit.

Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA that the mission of the university is to nurture talented people in a bid to further consolidate the country’s status as a nuclear power state in the East.

It marked the first inspection into the defense sector since the country concluded the congress by the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on May 9.

Since the party event, the North’s young leader has focused on economy-related public activities including visits to a tree nursery and saltern, as he has stressed the need to boost its fragile economy on the principle of self-reliance.

At the party congress, Kim called his country a “responsible” nuclear state, saying that he will “permanently” defend the pursuit of his signature policy of developing nuclear weapons and boosting the country’s moribund economy.

The KCNA said that the National Defense College, the predecessor of the university, was set up in October 1964 during the regime of the country’s founder Kim Il-sung.

Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Rice planting campaign underway in North Korea

Monday, May 23rd, 2016

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Earlier this month, the North Korean government launched a rice-planting campaign, mobilizing citizens for agricultural work. Rodong Sinmun has written about this campaign a few times during May. On the 13th, Rodong dedicated almost a full page to rice plantation, calling for a “breakthrough”. The article contains some language on agricultural organization: for example, it cites an agricultural organization [기술전습회] that urges farmers to be creative in their farming methods and adapt to their separate conditions.

While this might sound like an argument for less central state control, provincial independence has been a hallmark of the Juche system for decades. Kim Jong-il said similar things during the famine years. The issue, of course, is that as long as inputs, land use, production targets and other variables remain centrally planned, local creativity can only go so far.

The article does, however, contain some interesting claims. For example, one senior official (Ri Kyong-rok) is quoted as saying that water conditions are twice as good as last year. Moreover, the article also claims that fertilizer is more abundantly available than last year. Perhaps this is all true (a big perhaps), but if so, it would go against the past year’s trend of worsening conditions for agricultural overall.

On May 16th, Rodong again carried a long piece on the rice planting campaign, calling for every citizen’s participation and hard work, based on scientific methods.

Mass campaigns such as this one can obviously not be fully understand only through North Korean publications. Yesterday, Daily NK carried a piece about how campaigns such as this one play out on the ground, with market trade becoming more restricted as the government strives to ensure that everyone dutifully participates in rice planting:

The mobilization, which commenced on May 15, will remain in effect until June 15, a source from South Pyongan Province told Daily NK. Of most concern to residents is the fact that for the duration of the mass mobilization, official general markets will operate only three hours daily– from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m.–and business-related travel be strictly limited.

This news was corroborated by sources in North and South Hwanghae Provinces, North Pyongan Province, and North and South Hamgyong Provinces.

In addition, alcohol sales in restaurants will be banned for the ordinance’s duration; service establishments including barbers, hair salons, and public bathhouses are permitted to operate, but only after 5 p.m.

All central agencies, state-run factories, social organizations, universities, and high schools are busy gearing up for the mass mobilization. To ensure their compliance, streets are plastered with “farm assistance-battle” posters, and vehicles outfitted with loudspeakers move through neighborhoods from early morning hours, blaring propaganda songs to keep up the pressure; local officials wielding megaphones follow suit on foot, calling on everyone from “homemakers, the elderly, and middle school students to commute to farms nearby and work,” the source said.

“The streets are lined with Ministry of People’s Security personnel [MPS], carrying out orders to step up surveillance and crackdowns to maximize support [for the mobilization]. In parallel, prosecutors and other agents from the judicial system patrol state-run companies and residential areas to check up on the mobilization numbers. If firms fall short of the quotas, company managers face punitive measures, which can include, among other things, imprisonment for up to ten days.”

The heightened control and fear tactics, he added, are to hedge against possible public outrage from a populace forced to participate in successive mobilizations, which hamper market business and thereby severely undermine their livelihood.

Full article:
Rice-planting mobilization order handed down
Choi Song Min
Daily NK
2016-05-22

Daily NK also discussed the campaign with So Jae Pyong, secretary general for the Association of North Korean Defectors:

We saw an article emphasizing grain production on page five of the 13th issue of the Rodong Sinmun entitled, “This Year’s Uphill Battle for Grain” and then again on the front page on the 16th issue, “Band Together for the Rice-Planting Battle.” It would appear that North Korea is still dealing with their chronic grain underproduction. What seems to be the problem?

The main problem is that even the farmers themselves are suffering from hunger and are therefore turning their attention away from their official farm duties and working private secret farms on the side. This is because they till the earth tirelessly all year long on their official farms only to have their produce taken away for the military and State rations. They are only met with poverty and starvation based on this system so it’s easy to see their lack of drive to work hard for more production. Based on this, they have no other choice but to have an almost forced production system on the collective farms. The government needs to implement some kind of policy to improve the quality of the lives of these farmers but that just simply isn’t the case. Farmers have zero interest in the production of their crops because of this system. They’re really only focused on their separate, private crops. I think the only way to alleviate the hunger and poverty that citizens are suffering from is to completely do away with this type of quota system.

Full article:
Hearts and minds remain at the ‘jangmadang’ despite propaganda push
Unification Media Group
Daily NK
2015-05-22

(UPDATE 2016-02-24):

Daily NK reports some discontent with rice planting campaign, with complaints about how it interferes with Kim Jong-un’s own policies of raising science and technology in education:

“The students in our province have been sent to agricultural regions such as Koksan County and Yonsan County. During the ‘70-Day Battle,’ the students were forced to plant seeds and pull up weeds. Now, as the students head off to the farms again, they are sardonically spouting off lines about how they are farmers rather than students,” a source in North Hwanghae Province reported to Daily NK on May 20.

“The students have remarked that being pressed into forced labor during the ‘70-Day Battle,’ and now for the ‘Rice-Planting Battle’ is just as laborious and difficult as risking your life on an actual battlefield. They justifiably point out, ‘If these kind of ‘battles’ continue to arise, when are we supposed to study?’“

Since rising to power, Kim Jong Un has frequently underscored the importance of education, describing universities as the “platform for launching the future of the nation, one of the main pillars of society, and the training ground for leaders.” He has also continued to point out that it is important to focus on experiential learning and on-the-job-training in order to elevate the quality of the nation’s education and produce illustrious students with technical knowledge.

However, the record shows a different tale. Students have spent a considerable amount of time being mobilized to work on idolization construction sites and farms. This has severely crippled their educational experience. Consequently, students have become upset that their instruction hours have not been protected and that they are being exploited for their labor.

Added a separate source in South Hwanghae Province, “University students have spent more time working on the farm than they have spent studying for their classes or learning about science/technology. Under such circumstances, students naturally complain that it is difficult to imagine how these universities will be able to fulfill Kim Jong Un’s order to create illustrious students with technological capabilities.”

Full article:
Complaints mounting among university students sent to farms for labor
Daily NK
Kim Chae Hwan
2015-05-23

Tags:2016 Food Shortage, Mass mobilization
Posted in Agriculture, Political economy, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

North Korean economic production and the 70-Day Campaign

Wednesday, May 18th, 2016

UPDATE 1 (2016-5-18): By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A couple of weeks ago, KCNA carried another evaluation of production during the 70-Day Campaign. In the context of claims that the newly launched five-year plan (2016-2020) is the first one in decades, it is worth noting that economic planning as such has never fully ceased to be part and parcel of the official North Korean economy. As communist economies do, North Korea still measures economic success much in terms of mere output. The 70-Day Campaign is one example:

The Korean Central News Agency Thursday released a report on the successful conclusion of the 70-day campaign with a great victory to be specially recorded in the history of the Korean nation under the guidance of Marshal Kim Jong Un.

According to the report, the capabilities for self-defence including the capacity of nuclear attack of Juche Korea have been remarkably bolstered and the campaign plan has been over-fulfilled 44 percent in terms of industrial output value, and industrial production has grown 1.6 times as against the same period last year.

Signal successes have been achieved in the development of Korean-style smaller nuclear warhead, simulated test of atmospheric re-entry of a ballistic missile, test of high-power solid-fuel rocket engine and stage separation, test of high-power engine of inter-continental ballistic missile.

Workers in the four vanguard fields have performed labor feats in the van of day-and-night campaign.

Those in the field of power industry honored their 70-day campaign quotas at 110 percent.

I am not one to draw major conclusions from the order of mentions of areas in reports such as this one, but if the order says anything about priorities, it is worth noting that energy shows up first among other areas than missiles and nukes. Recall that energy has been emphasized by media tied to the North Korean regime.

The Ministry of Coal Industry carried out its coal production plan more than 10 days ahead of schedule and results of capital tunneling and preparatory tunneling have jumped several times as against those in the past.

Those in the steel field and miners hit the goals of production of Juche iron, rolled steel and iron ore.

The field of railway transport carried out the plan for the transport of major freight at 124 percent.

What economic value more transportation carries is unclear…

More than 70 farm machines of over 20 types have been invented and manufactured, typically potato harvester, self-propelled sprayer, combined plowing machine, combined soil governing machine, small multi-purpose farm machine and combined rice thresher.

Those in the fishery field built multi-purpose fishing boats of “Hwanggumhae” series by their own efforts and with indigenous technology in a brief span of time and put them into operation.

The plan for the production of machine tools has been over-fulfilled more than 60 percent and index-specific campaign plans have also been carried out in the machine-building industrial field.

Workers in the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex and Hungnam Fertilizer Complex produced 1.2 times as much fertilizers as before and the February 8 Vinalon Complex significantly increased the production of vinalon and various kinds of other basic chemical goods.

The nationwide cement production plan has been carried out at 141 percent and a boost has also been recorded in the production of varieties of building materials including glass.

Workers of forestry stations and mine pillars production stations honored timber production plan set by the Ministry of Forestry at 137 percent.

Agricultural workers across the country have made full preparations for farming by their devoted efforts.

But note that no numbers are given for farming output, or any agricultural output other than fishing and seaweed.

Officials and workers in the fishery field have over-fulfilled their plan for fishing and seaweed culture more than 10 percent when the results of the Ministry of Fisheries are taken as a whole.

The gross industrial output value in the field of light industry has been over-fulfilled 54 percent and the index-specific performance has shown a marked jump over the period before the campaign.

A number of consumption goods producers have hit their goals for the first half of the year or the yearly ones. Some of them even set a record by fulfilling two-year production quotas.

Those in the field of land and environment protection and workers and other people across the country including youths and students planted hundreds of millions of trees in mountains covering more than 100 000 hectares.

The Paektusan Hero Youth Power Station No. 3 and the Wonsan Army-People Power Station have been successfully completed.

In just one month after breaking the ground for the construction of Ryomyong Street, its builders finished ground excavation for dozens of blocks of apartment houses and are now pushing forward the ground concrete tamping in its final stage.

Baby homes, orphanages, orphans’ primary and secondary schools sprang up across the country and the Mindulle Notebook Factory was built.

New structures have been built one after another. They include Dyke No. 2 of Nunggumdo Tideland, Outdoor Sapling Cultivation Ground of the Central Nursery of the Ministry of Land and Environment Protection and Pyongyang Athletic Apparatus Factory.

Scientists and educators across the country registered three times as many research achievements as against the same period last year to be conducive to the economic development of the country and the betterment of the people’s living standard.

Unprecedented achievements have also been made in the fields of literature, arts, education, public health and sports.

The 70-day campaign of loyalty clearly showed the world how the great Kim Jong Un‘s Korea is advancing toward the eminence of the century.

The full article was published by KCNA on May 6th.

ORIGINAL POST (2016-4-30):

“Industrial establishments over-fulfill production targets as the 70-day campaign comes to an end” (Pyongyang Times: 2016-4-30)

The Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex, one of the model units in the current 70-day campaign of loyalty, hit its steel and pig iron production targets 101 percent respectively as of April 20.

Smelters of the UHP electric arc furnace have so far reset the peak production record of molten iron per charge several times. They gave full play to the spirit of collectivism of helping and leading one another forward, while introducing advanced working methods to shorten the time of heating and increase the output of molten iron per charge.

The workers of the continuous ingot steel workshop carried out their daily production plan at 102 percent on average, 110 percent at maximum.

Those of the Sunchon Cement Complex drastically raised cement production on the first day of the campaign to renew the daily peak production record for the first time in 20 years. Without resting on their laurels, they worked hard and finally achieved their campaign goals.

The Ministry of Coal Industry carried out its highly-set campaign target ahead of schedule as of April 20 with the coal production plan 101 percent and major, preliminary and boring tunnelling 101.5, 105.5 and 106. 6 percent respectively.

Coal-mining machine factories across the country manufactured and repaired thousands of coal wagons and made over 1 800 wheels more than planned under the uplifted self-development-first banner. A great deal of achievements were also made in the production of coal-mining equipment and their parts.

The Chongchongang Thermal Power Station increased power generation to exceed its campaign plan by 2.2 percent as of April 25. The workers of the station repaired equipment and increased the number of boilers in operation to ensure uninterrupted power generation.

The February 8 Vinalon Complex gave priority to the supply of raw materials and fuel, staggered production and organized management of equipment and technology scrupulously to boost production, thereby surpassing the vinalon production goal by 50 percent.
Workers of the Wonsan Salt Works increased production 2.2 times over the same period of last year by fully storing seawater in reservoirs while introducing an advanced seawater freezing method which suits the conditions on the east coast throughout the winter.

Thousands of hectares of farmland have been rezoned in Kaesong and Jangphung County, with over 19 300 patches and paddies and more than 1 260-kilometre-long ridges between paddy and dry fields removed and hundreds of hectares of land brought under cultivation. This paved the way for comprehensive mechanization of farming on all fields and consequent increased cereals production.

Officials and workers of the Sinuiju Textile Mill have produced three times more cotton yarn and fabrics than before the campaign. Amidst the dynamic collective emulation drive between workteams, shifts and workshops, many workers and workteams have carried out the first half year and annual production plans as well as campaign plans and the number is growing.

More than 200 factories and enterprises in Pyongyang have hit their 70-day campaign goals and first half year plans ahead of schedule.

“Nation’s Industrial Production Rises 1.2 Times” (Pyongyang Times: 2016-3-16)

Industrial output grows rapidly thanks to the heightened revolutionary enthusiasm and creative spirit of selfreliance and self development of service personnel and people, who have risen up in the day and night march true to the call of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea for launching a 70day campaign of loyalty for the Seventh Party Congress, according to a report of the Korean Central News Agency on March 12.

The nation’s industrial production increased 1.2 times in the first ten days of March over the same period of last year.

The Pukchang and Pyongyang thermal power complexes and other thermal and hydropower stations across the country pressed on with power generation as scheduled, far exceeding the tenday targets set by the Party.

Coal mines in the western areas including Tokchon and Sunchon cut thousands of tons of coal more every day.

The Ministry of Coal Industry overfulfilled the tenday production plan by 13 per cent and the results of major and preliminary tunnelling far surpassed the plan, securing hundreds of reserve coalcutting faces.

The workers of the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex doubled the Juche iron output over the same period of last year, and all metallurgical bases conducted a dynamic drive to increase iron and steel production.

Amidst the heated emulation and experiencesharing in iron ore mines in Musan, Unnyul, Thaethan and other areas, the Jaeryong Mine increased daily production over 1.5 times on average, thus taking the lead in the supply of concentrated iron ores to metallurgical factories.

The Ministry of Railways, all the railway bureaus and their branches commanded railway transport scrupulously and gave top priority to concentrated transport without accident to overfulfil the plan for main freight.

The increased production in the vanguard economic sectors injected a new lease of life into the overall major industrial sectors such as machinebuilding, chemical, building materials and mining industries and forestry.

The Taean Heavy Machine Complex completed the production of generating equipment till March 9 in a matter of two months and sent them to the construction site of Paektusan Hero Youth Power Station No. 3 on March 10.

The workers of the large machinebuilding bases in Ragwon and Ryongsong and the Sungni Motor Complex speeded up the processing of products and increased the production of spare parts including various kinds of gears and speed reducers, a great contribution to a 1.5 times rise in the production of thermal power generating equipment of the Ministry of Machine Building Industry.

The workers of the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex hit the Juche fertilizer production target for the first ten days of March.

Cement production is also growing in the Sangwon Cement Complex whose workers and technicians have turned out to break the production record again this year after last year.

Many forestry and prop production stations carried out their first quarterly and yearly timber production quotas.

Farming preparations were brisk on the agricultural front, resulting in a 1.7 and 2.8 times growth in the securing of hukposan and microbial fertilizers and an over 1.3 times increase in the acreage of field carpeted with humus soil.

Officials and fishermen carried out the plans of the Ministry of Fisheries for ten days 121 per cent.

Daily amount of catch increased rapidly and fishing results saw a leap in the fishery stations on the east and west coasts.

Hundreds of workers hit their targets for the first quarter and half of the year in the field of textile industry. Kumkhop, Pomhyanggi and Maebongsan and other popular brands saw a sharp rise in sales.

Many major construction projects progressed apace including those for Paektusan Hero Youth Power Station No. 3, reconstruction of Kim Il Sung Stadium, secondstage reconstruction of the Central Zoo, capacity builup of the Central Tree Nursery of the Ministry of Land and Environment Protection, the central class education hall and Wonsan Army People Power Station.

Many young people volunteered to work in labour consuming fields and hundreds of workers carried out their yearly plans.

“KCNA Reports about Signal Successes in Various Fields in Early March” (KCNA: 2016-3-13)

The Korean Central News Agency Saturday said in a report that the industrial production in the first ten days of March when the 70-day campaign of loyalty is under way grew 1.2 times as compared with the corresponding period of last year.

According to the report, production in the vanguard and basic industrial fields of the national economy including electric power, coal, metal and railway transport sharply rose.

Thermal power plants and hydro-power stations across the country have over-fulfilled their daily quotas.

The production plan of the Ministry of Coal Industry for ten days in March was over-fulfilled 13 percent.

The workers of the Chollima Steel Complex boosted the production of rolled steel 32 percent.

A dynamic drive for increased iron and steel production is under way in metallurgical bases across the country including the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex.

The Jaeryong Mine increased daily quotas over 1.5 times on an average, thus taking the lead among the iron ore mines in Musan, Unryul, Thaethan and other areas.

The Ministry of Railways, all the railway bureaus and sub-bureaus over-fulfilled main freight haulage plan.

The increased production in the vanguard sectors of the national economy injected vitality into major industrial fields such as machine-building, chemical, building material and mining industries and forestry.

The custom-built equipment for different fields of the national economy were turned out and the production of nonferrous metal ore, chemical fertilizers, cement, sheet glass, timber, etc. radically increased.

The Taean Heavy Machine Complex completed the production of generating equipment in a matter of two months and sent them to the construction site of the Paektusan Hero Youth Power Station No. 3 on Mar. 10.

The Ministry of Machine Industry increased the production of thermal power generating equipment 1.5 times.

Mines under the Phosphate Fertilizer Industry Management Bureau honored its plan at 150 percent.

The workers of the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex hit the goal for the production of Juche fertilizers.

The workers and technicians of the Sangwon Cement Complex are working hard to surpass the peak production year again this year.

The Sunchon Cement Complex, the Chonnaeri Cement Factory and the Sunghori Cement Factory boosted the production over 10 percent.

Many forestry stations and pit prop production stations also honored their first quarterly and yearly timber production quotas.

The production of homemade fertilizers and their transport, tractor overhauling and maintenance and other farming preparations are nearing completion thanks to the devoted drive of agricultural workers across the country.

The fishery officials and workers over-fulfilled their production plan of the Ministry of Fisheries for ten days 21 percent.

The field of light industry over-fulfilled the production plans for textiles, knitwear and shoes.

In the field of textile industry hundreds of workers honored the half yearly and first quarterly quotas and famous products and goods favored by the people are on the increase.

Many major construction projects are making rapid progress.

A lot of young people volunteer to work in the hard and labor-consuming fields.

Across the country hundreds of workers honored their yearly plans, at least 3,600 people carried out the first half yearly plans and more than 15,400 people hit the first quarterly goal.

A lot of members of the women’s union are giving helping hands to builders in power stations, workers of coal and ore mines. War veterans, honorary party members and pensioners have turned out in the 70-day campaign in South Phyongan Province and other parts of the country to fully demonstrate the noble traits of our society advancing with the might of single-minded unity.

“Rapid Economic Growth Witnessed in DPRK” (KCNA: 2016-4-8)

The DPRK has made a rapid progress in major construction or reconstruction projects and industrial production in recent 40 days after the start of the 70-day campaign.

In particular, Pyongyang, its capital city, showed an increase of twice in the tempo of construction or reconstruction projects and 1.6 times in industrial production.

The Aeguk Vegetable Processing Factory and the Mangyongdae Children’s Camp were rebuilt on a modern basis and the second-stage renovation of the Central Zoo is progressing apace at the final stage.

Besides, 80 percent of total work has been carried out in scores of construction and reconstruction projects, including the Ryuwon Shoes Factory, Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory and the Pyongyang Cornstarch Factory.

Electricity and coal outputs went up at thermal-power and hydro-power stations and coal mines.

The Pyongyang Steel Works and the Pyongyang Cast Iron Pipe Factory fulfilled their production plans 120 percent on an average, 150 percent to the maximum.

An increasing number of units in light industry and foodstuff industry have finished their yearly and half-yearly production quotas.

Such successes are reported from railway, agricultural and other industrial sectors.

Tags:70-Day Campaign
Posted in Agriculture, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Military, Railways, Statistics, Transportation, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch

Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

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Kim visits National Defense University

Rice planting campaign underway in North Korea

North Korean economic production and the 70-Day Campaign

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