Archive for the ‘Songun’ Category

North Korean Civil-Military Trends:

Friday, September 1st, 2006

“Military First” Politics to a Point
Ken E. Gause
Strategic Studies Institute
9/1/2006

Download PDF here:  Civil-Military.pdf

Summary
Unlike the study of other authoritarian regimes, first the Soviet Union and more recently China, which have given rise to a cottage industry of analysis on all aspects of things military, the same cannot be said of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the small world of Pyongyang watchers, articles and books devoted to the KPA are few and in most cases deal with the armed forces themselves (order of battle) rather than the high command that oversees the machinery.

This monograph examines the role of the KPA within the power structure of North Korea. The author describes the landscape of military and security institutions that ensure the regime’s security and the perpetuation of the Kim dynasty. He also highlights the influential power brokers, both civilian and military, and describes how they fit into the leadership structure. Finally, he considers the role of the KPA in regime politics, especially as it relates to the upcoming succession and economic reform.

An understanding of the North Korean leadership does not mean only recognizing the personalities who occupy the top political positions within the regime. In his landmark book, Shield of the Great Leader, Joseph Bermudez noted that over its 50-year history, the DPRK has developed into one of the most militarized countries in the world, with the KPA existing alongside the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) as the two cornerstones of the regime. During this time, the role of the high command and its ties to the leadership and decisionmaking have changed.

The KPA was founded on February 8, 1948, approximately 7 months before the founding of the DPRK. As Kim Il Sung struggled to consolidate his power over the regime, his old comrades-in-arms, with whom he had fought against the Japanese, helped him purge the factional groupings and their leaders. After he had secured his power, Kim Il Sung relied on the KWP to rule the country. The high command played its role within the decisionmaking bodies of the state, but it paid its loyalty to the party and the Great Leader.

When Kim Jong Il succeeded his father as the supreme leader in 1994, he faced a regime divided among numerous factions, many of which did not owe allegiance to him. As a consequence, he embarked on a campaign of reshuffling briefs, purging the more dangerous elements of the regime, and making way for a new generation of leaders who would coexist and then slowly replace their elders. At the same time, he began to move more authority from the KWP and to place it within the purview of the military. This transformation of authority culminated in 1998 at the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly, when the National Defense Commission eclipsed the Politburo as the supreme national decisionmaking body. In the years since, the term “military-first politics” (son’gun chongch’i) has been used to signify the privileged status the KPA holds throughout North Korean society and to stress that the regime’s sovereignty rests upon the military’s shoulders.

This monograph tracks the rise of the military inside the North Korean leadership and presents the backgrounds of key figures within the high command and the formal and informal connections that bind this institution to Kim Jong Il. As the first generation has passed from the scene, Kim has consolidated his grip on the military slowly by promoting loyalists to key positions throughout the apparatus. He has promoted more than 1,200 general-grade officers on 15 occasions prior to April 2006. This has not only secured Kim’s power, many have argued it has enhanced the military’s influence over him, especially when compared with its influence over his father.

The question facing many North Korea watchers is the extent to which the military figures into decisionmaking. This report argues that, while the military has grown in stature and influence over the last decade, it remains one of many players within the North Korean policymaking process. The lines of authority and information within the regime are complex, consisting of formal and informal channels. The military has numerous avenues into the Kim apparatus, and on many issues have what amounts to a veto authority. This apparently was made clear recently by North Korea’s decision to cancel the test run for train services between North and South. But this does not mean that the military is the primary decisionmaker; that role still belongs to Kim Jong Il, even though he must weigh seriously military thinking on issues that reach far beyond the national security realm.

This monograph also argues that the KPA is not a monolith, but is made up of a range of views, some more hard line than others. Some senior figures within the high command are rumored to have pushed for reforms both internally and in terms of foreign policy, while many younger field commanders are believed to hold some of the hardest of the hard line views. But one area where there seems to be wide agreement throughout the military leadership is the need to fund the armed forces adequately because it is on their back that the nation’s security depends.

In the next few years, the North Korean leadership will face the implications of the “military-first policy” in very stark terms. If Kim Jong Il is to begin to bring the civilian economy out of the dark ages, the military will have to share some of the burden. But whether the high command will be willing to trade some of its “weapons for ploughshares” is not certain, given the current tensions on the peninsula. In the mix of what is already a contentious argument over guns versus butter is an unfolding succession struggle as Kim seeks to name his heir apparent. As in any totalitarian regime, the succession issue is huge and impacts decisionmaking across the board.

There is a note of caution when reading this report. The subject matter deals with information that is unfolding and will continue to shift in the coming months and years. The author has made every effort to validate through numerous sources the information contained on the various personalities, but in some cases it is still opaque. The reason for this is simple. Information on North Korean leadership issues is a closely held secret inside the Hermit Kingdom. The actions and activity of individual leaders are more often rumor than subject to check and verification.

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Pyongyang pushes ‘army-first’ policy

Wednesday, August 2nd, 2006

From the International Herald Tribune:

Pyongyang pushes ‘army-first’ policy
8/2/2006

Seo Hyang Wol, a 43-year-old North Korean housewife, has given birth to nine children, making her a shining example of a national campaign to increase birth rates.
 
But that is not the only thing that makes “women across the republic abuzz with talk of emulating her,” according to North Korea’s official news media.
 
Inspired by the leader Kim Jong Il’s “songun,” or “army-first,” policy, Seo named three daughters Chong Byol, Pok Byol and Tan Byol – or “Rifle Star,” “Bomb Star” and “Bullet Star.” A son born in 2003 and a daughter born last year were named Son Gun and Hyok Myong. Put together, the names mean “army-first revolution.”
 
“I produced many children hoping they will grow up and become gun-barrel soldiers for our army-first fatherland,” Seo said in an interview in March with Pyongyang Radio. The report added that names like her children’s were “fast becoming a vogue” in North Korea.
 
Although dismissed as ridiculous in the outside world, stories like Seo’s provide an example of how closely tied North Korean society has become to Kim’s army-first doctrine.
 
The doctrine promotes North Korea’s nuclear weapons, missile programs and huge military spending even as the country remains the second-largest recipient of food donations in the world after Ethiopia.
 
That policy, coupled with huge damage caused by recent floods, is pushing 23 million North Koreans into a new food crisis – in a country that has already lost an estimated one million people to famine, according to relief officials in Seoul.
 
After missile tests by North Korea on July 5, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution condemning North Korea, while the United States and Japan are calling for more economic pressure on the country.
 
But at home, Kim Jong Il has since begun a huge propaganda campaign to incite fears of a U.S. invasion and stoke a xenophobic nationalism – at a time when his regime fears that the faith of the people may be weakening because of food shortages and exposure to a thriving market economy in neighboring China.
 
“Comrades, we can live without candies, but we can’t live without bullets,” Defense Minister Kim Il Chol said in a speech last week.
 
North Korea’s missile tests invited rare public criticism from its two main aid providers – China, which had publicly warned against the tests, and South Korea, which suspended food aid in protest.
 
But Kim Jong Il also succeeded in turning the world’s attention – which has recently been focused on Iran – back to his weapons programs.
 
“For Kim Jong Il’s regime, which doesn’t want economic openness to threaten its power, building leverage through his military is the only way for survival,” said Jeung Young Tae, a North Korea expert at the South Korean government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.
 
“Under Kim, the songun policy has become an ideology. It calls on every sector in North Korean society to think, decide and act according to military logic,” Jeung added.
 
Kim considers his military threats as bargaining chips to get economic aid and security guarantees from the United States, experts say. But Washington says that approach is a political and economic dead end for the regime.
 
Relief officials say the biggest victims of the confrontation are the North Korean people.
 
“Governments talk about economic sanctions. They talk about the regime’s survival. But what about the survival of ordinary North Koreans?” said Noh Ok Jae, a director at Good Friends, a Seoul- based relief agency.
 
Even before Kim took power after his father’s death in 1994, North Korea devoted a large proportion of national resources on the military, building the world’s fifth-largest armed forces despite worsening economic difficulties.
 
Today, with a 1.2 million-member regular army, North Korea has the world’s highest peacetime ratio of soldiers to civilians. It also maintains a pool of six million reserve troops. All factory workers take part in two-week military training exercises every year. North Korea does not release detailed budget figures, but experts believe that under Kim Jong Il, more funds have been funneled to the military.
 
The policy feeds on constant fears of a U.S. invasion inculcated by decades of bellicose propaganda. In kindergartens, children draw pictures of U.S. soldiers killing Korean babies, according to defectors from North Korea. Banners strung up in North Korean villages scream about an impending war that would “settle the final score with the Americans.”
 
Pervasive militarism and anti-Americanism has even invaded the language in North Korea. A popular curse is: “I will kill you like an American imperialist.” North Koreans, when provoked, threatened to turn themselves into “human rifles and bombs,” according to South Korean engineers who have worked in the North.
 
In May, the North’s main daily, Rodong, boasted that North Koreans “love an artillery barrage like the sound of an orchestra.”
 
“Through the speaker we had at every home, they regularly blared the ‘mountain-ranger’s march,'” said Kim Seong Min, who defected to Seoul in 1999. “The song went, ‘Comrades, get ready for battle, arms in your hands’ and it was the signal for an anti-air raid drill. All villagers rushed out with backpacks and ran for shelters.”
 
Under Kim Jong Il’s songun policy, that military influence has become even more pervasive, experts say.
 
When the North canceled test runs of cross-border trains with South Korea in May, it cited objections from the North Korean People’s Army.
 
“What I hear is Big Brothers saying to Little Brother ‘don’t do that’ but we are not a little boy, we have nuclear weapons,” the North Korean vice foreign minister, Kim Gae Gwan, was quoted as saying recently, in a comment that appeared to be aimed at China. The remark was reported by Paul Carroll, an official at the San Francisco-based Ploughshares Fund, who met the official in Pyongyang shortly after the North’s missile tests.
 
In his doctorate paper published last week, Hyun Song Il, a North Korean diplomat who defected to Seoul in 1996, said 17 members of Kim’s inner circle of 38 were military generals or held army- related party posts.
 
“The military is the only force that Kim can rely on when he faces internal unrest,” said Andrei Lankov, a North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul.
 
Kim has dedicated most of his public appearances to visits to military units. In one of those trips, Kim demonstrated the importance of ambidexterity when he faced 10 bottles placed 50 meters, or 165 feet, away at a rifle range, according to North Korean news media, which often mixes fact with fiction when describing Kim’s exploits.
 
“The bottles were swinging wildly on strings in a strong wind. But in a split second, the general gunned down five,” said an account posted on the North Korean Web site Uriminjokkiri. “Then he grabbed the revolver in his left hand and smashed the other five.”

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North Korea’s Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing

Thursday, June 8th, 2006

Nautilus Institute
Alexander V. Vorontsov
6/8/2006

The “Songun Chongch’i” or military-first politics mantra adopted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il as a guideline for domestic governance and foreign policy has elicited mostly negative responses from Korea-watchers. Many view songun as the final phase in the deterioration of North Korea and a serious threat to neighboring states saying that an impoverished country of 24 million inhabitants supporting a military of more than 1 million soldiers is incapable of modernization and economic reform. They argue that greater military participation in politics creates a dual-pronged threat: the army may appropriate a greater share of already-dwindling state funds to increase its readiness and effectiveness; and the generals, supposedly the most militant sector of the policy-making structure, will have a louder voice in foreign policy formulation, which could lead to hostile rhetoric towards South Korea.

A less alarmist interpretation of military-first politics is that Kim Jong-il is trying to maintain the existing order, to strengthen his regime based on personal authority, and consolidate control of military forces with the goal of preventing an overthrow of the state.

So, is military authority a curse or a blessing? The lessons from history are ambiguous, as states ruled by the military have experienced both prosperity and hardship. But some argue that South Korea represents a relatively positive example in which it has experienced a national revival because of a period of military rule.

In 1961, Park Chung-hee, a colonel in the ROK army, seized authority South Korea in a bloodless coup and established a rigid dictatorship with his military comrades. Though politics became more repressive, the national economy grew exponentially and General Park is remembered by many as the “father of the South Korean economic miracle.” Few dispute that this economic growth planted the seeds for the ensuing process of democratization. So it is hardly accidental that, in recent years, Kim Jong-il has started to speak favorably of General Park and his role in the modernization of the Republic of Korea.

The implementation of songun in the mid-1990s increased the role of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in daily life. The army began to participate even more in social and economic decision-making, from large-scale infrastructure development to providing its own food. While military personnel are required to serve for ten years, they spend most of their service participating in different areas of the country’s socio-economic life. Thus, the army is now not as heavy economic burden, and is serves as an important resource and catalyst for developing the national economy.

The movement to the military-first policy has accompanied a gradual transformation of North Korea’s planned economy to the direction of a mixed economy. The result may eventually be a network of large, less state-controlled corporations that share close ties with government agencies, similar to the “chaebol” that Park Chung-hee created in South Korea. Because of this, the North Korean military is now involved in different spheres of economic activity, including foreign economic ties and trade operations, and will likely play a key role in this ongoing process of privatization.

With songun also come changes in ideology. This change and its underlying goal of building a powerful and prosperous state – “kangsong taeguk,” are justified by flexible and creative interpretations of the bedrock ideal of self-reliance – “juche,” a nationalist ideology developed by revolutionary leader Kim Il-sung. The songun concept replaces the proletariat and the vanguard Communist Party with the army as the driving force in society. This innovation is significant because the army is typically a less ideological and more pragmatic institution than the Party.

The army’s role in society is not the only example of Kim Jong-il’s liberation from orthodox ideologies. Since the early 1990s, North Korea has shifted its emphasis from socialist ideals to historical and spiritual values. This is reflected in the use of Confucian norms in public policy and everyday life, and legitimizing the state through reference ancient Korean kingdoms. Again, the parallels with Park Chung-hee are very strong. Kim Jong-il has also sought to reduce the prevalence of the personality cult. From early 2004, for example, there could be only one portrait of Kim Il-sung in public places. Similarly, Kim Jong-il is to be described only by his official positions, rather than the use of laudatory epithets such as “Dear Leader.”

Songun should not be automatically dismissed as an ideological dead-end. As the experience of South Korea under Park Chung-hee demonstrates, military rule can have positive effects on society under certain conditions.

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The North Korean Criminal State, its Ties to Organized Crime, and the Possibility of WMD Proliferation

Tuesday, November 15th, 2005

Nautilus Institute
David L. Asher
11/15/2005

I am very pleased to be invited back to the Wilson Center to speak today. I enjoyed my time here this summer and want to thank my colleagues for the chance to be affiliated with the Center, which I consider the finest organization of its kind in Washington. I also wish to thank my former boss, Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly and the many members of our inter-agency team for kindly attending today. In particular, I want you to know of the extraordinary work that our friends and colleagues here from the United States Secret Service have done recently to safeguard our nation and our currency from a determined adversary.

I left the State Department in July and I want to be very clear that my remarks today are personal in nature. They in no way should be interpreted as representing the view of the US government, the Department of State or the Department of Defense. They also are drawn strictly from unclassified sources (the vast amount of information now in the public domain is indicative of the scale of the problem of DPRK criminality).

Let me make clear, I am a believer in the Six Party Talks. I applaud the efforts of my former colleagues, Chris Hill, Joe Detrani, and Jim Foster to effect positive diplomatic movement via direct dialog and clearly demonstrate to all the parties seated at the big table within the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse that the US is sincerely willing to join the international community in engaging North Korea to facilitate its denuclearization, its economic development, and its opening to the outside world. At the same time, given this objective, there should be no further room for tolerating the unacceptable and in many ways outrageous criminal and proliferation activities that the North Koreans continue to engage in.

Allow me to begin my remarks by laying out the major aspects of North Korean trans-national criminal activity. I will then look at the specific question of how the DPRK’s growing ties to Organized Crime groups and illicit shipping networks could be used to facilitate WMD shipments. I’ll propose a possible way to reduce this risk. I will conclude by frankly commenting on the nature of state directed criminality in the DPRK and its implications for international law and the DPRK’s status in the international community and the United Nations.

My research topic this summer at the Wilson Center was on the rise and fall of “criminal states” – government’s whose leaders had become intimately involved with trans-national criminal activity. I compared North Korea under Kim Jong Il with Serbia under Milosevic, Romania under Ceausescu, and Panama under Noriega. I won’t get into the details of this comparative research now but, suffice to say, the scale and scope of the other cases pale in comparison with present-day North Korea.

The rise of the criminal state in North Korea is no secret. It has occurred in full view of foreign governments and with increasing visibility to the world media. Over the last three decades agents, officers, and business affiliates of the DPRK have been implicated in hundreds of public incidents of crime around the globe. Incidences of illicit activity have occurred in every continent and almost every DPRK Embassy in the world has been involved at one time or another. This should be no surprise. North Korea is perhaps the only country in the world whose embassies and overseas personnel are expected to contribute income to the “Party Center,” not rely on central government funds for their operations. Such repeated illicit actions from diplomatic premises amount to a serial violation of both articles 31 and 41 of the Vienna conventions on Diplomatic Relations, which respectively convey that A. commercial, and most certainly, criminal activities for profit shall not be conducted by accredited diplomats or via accredited facilities and B. mandate that officials posted abroad must obey the laws of the nation to which they are posted. The DPRK routinely pays no attention to either critical provision of the Vienna conventions.

I am frequently asked “how much is this stuff going on?” Although it is hard to pin down the exact scale of the illicit activity we can make a rough guess. In 2003 the DPRK ran a trade deficit of at least $835 million and that if more broadly measured to exclude concessionary trade with the ROK was more like $1.2 billion. Even making a very bold estimate for informal remittances and under the table payments for that year, the DPRK probably ran a current account deficit of at least $500 million. Moreover, North Korea’s accumulated trade deficit with the ROK and China alone since 1990 is over $10 billion. North Korea has not been able to borrow on international markets since the late 1970s and has at least $12 billion in unrepaid debt principal outstanding. Yet, until recently – at least – it has managed to avoid self-induced hyper-inflation (which should have occurred given the need to reconcile internal and external monetary accounts, even in a communist country). Instead, the street stalls in Pyongyang and other North Korean cities seem to be awash in foreign made cloths, food, and TVs and the quality of life of the elite seems to have improved. What’s apparently filling the gap and accounting for the apparent improvements to the standard of living for the elite? The short answer as I see it: Crime. And if I am right, then the criminal sector may account for as much as 35-40% of DPRK exports and a much larger percentage of its total cash earnings (conventional trade profit margins are low but the margin on illegal businesses is extremely high, frequently over 500%).

Whatever the precise size of the criminal surplus, all analysts and law enforcement authorities agree that overseas illicit and weapons trading activities have become increasingly important sources of foreign exchange for the DPRK. These earnings have provided support to North Korea’s “military-first” economy and contributed to Pyongyang’s ability to resist demands from the international community for an end to its nuclear weapons program. They also apparently have persuaded the Kim Jong II regime it can affordably maintain its political isolation and resist the imperative for sweeping economic and social reforms that all other communist states have had to engage in. Given that periodic exposure of illegal dealings by North Korean officials overseas in the past has not resulted in serious or lasting consequences, Pyongyang may believe that an open door for global criminality exists.

Let’s review the scale and scope of the North Korean “soprano state.” As is well known the North Korean government is involved in a wide range of illicit businesses in partnership with organized crime groups or unilaterally. These include:

1. Production and overseas distribution of narcotics, in particular heroin and methamphetamines:

DPRK Narco trafficking continues as a major income generator, although less prominently perhaps than before. China continues to be the major market for North Korean drugs and the situation became so bad that in March of last year the Vice Minister of the MPS called a highly unusual “press conference” to announce his determination to cut into DPRK drug rings in Jilin province, on the border with North Korea (which some Chinese law enforcement officials have stated is “out of control”). Japan probably still comes in second. From 1998-2002 Japanese police interdicted nearly 1500 kg of meth that in six separate prosecuted cases was shown to have originated in the DPRK. This amounts to thirty-five percent of all methamphetamine seizures in Japan in that period and had a wholesale value of over $75 million and a street value of as much as $300 million. Given the chemical profile for DPRK produced meth (essentially of extremely high purity) several Japanese authorities I spoke with the week before last believe that a fairly large percentage of the meth coming in from Northern China today is consistent with DPRK origin. As elsewhere, in Japan to mask their fingerprints the North Koreans are going through triads, snakeheads, and other indirect channels. This has been less true with Heroin where North Koreans continue to be observed selling the drugs. The Australian seizure of 125 kg of Heroin worth $150 million off the Pong Su – a Worker’s Party linked vessel and with a KWP secretary on board – in my mind was hardly a random or isolated incident (it is not surprising given that the North Koreans had established an Embassy in Canberra the year before that one would assume needed to produce income for the center – it was Pyongyang’s way of saying “thanks very much”).

2. Production and international distribution of counterfeit currency, in particular the US dollar, as well as counterfeiting or illegally reproducing and selling numerous other items, in particular counterfeit cigarettes and pharmaceuticals.

Under International Law, counterfeiting another nation’s currency is an act of causus belli, an act of economic war. No other government has engaged in this act against another government since the Nazis under Hitler. North Korea has been counterfeiting the dollar and other currencies of importance the entire time it has been on the international engagement bandwagon. What does this say about the regime’s intentions?

As the recent DOJ indictment of Sean Garland and other members of the Official IRA for their partnership in the criminal distribution of counterfeit US currency reads: “Beginning in or about 1989, and continuing throughout the period of this Indictment, a type of high-quality counterfeit $100 FRNs began to be detected in circulation around the world. Their high quality made it particularly difficult for them to be detected as counterfeit by untrained persons. The United States Secret Service initially designated these counterfeit notes as “C-14342” and they came to be known as “Supernote” or “Superdollar.” Quantities of the Supernote were manufactured in, and under auspices of the government of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”). Individuals, including North Korean nationals acting as ostensible government officials, engaged in the worldwide transportation, delivery, and sale of quantities of Supernotes.”

The Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon investigations that were concluded this summer revealed a willingness to sell millions of dollars in DPRK supernotes into the US by Asian OCs linked to the North Korea government. Whether this was a deliberate act of policy decided in Pyongyang or just business among crooks is hard to tell but it seems unusual that according to the public indictment the cost of the notes was less than 40 cents per dollar, far below the market value associated previously with the counterfeit supernotes, given their ability to be circulated without ready detection by the naked eye. One wonders how such a price could be obtained unless the notes were coming from a very high source inside the country in question.

The relatively sophisticated shipping methods for transporting supernotes uncovered in the FBI-USSS Royal Charm/Smoking Dragon investigations also needs to be given scrutiny, especially given our topic today. The following slides, reproduced from a Taiwanese newspaper article gives you a sense of how they move the notes around, falsely manifesting the cargo as a non-dutiable item (in this case as “toys”), falsifying port of origin information (to indicate a port in Northern China instead of in the DPRK), and cleverly concealing the contraband.

The production of counterfeit cigarettes also appears to be a very large and profitable business for North Korea and one with global reach. Indeed, Counterfeit cigarettes may well be North Korea’s largest containerized export sector with cargoes frequently coming from the ports of Najin and Nampo for shipment via major ports in China and the ROK throughout the world. Phillip Morris International, Lorillard, Japan Tobacco and others have identified numerous factories producing counterfeit cigarettes in North Korea. Affected industry participants have worked assiduously with relevant government authorities around the world to stop this trade. The numbers explain why. A forty foot container of counterfeit cigarettes might cost as little as $70,000 to produce and have a street value of 3-4 million dollars, so it’s not surprising that the North has focused on this business line-with its profits increased if tax stamps are forged (something that has been observed repeatedly of late, costing affected states such as California tens of millions in stamp revenue per year). A 1995 Associated Press article reported the seizure by Taiwan authorities of 20 shipping containers of counterfeit cigarette wrappers destined for North Korea. According to officials of the cigarette company whose label and trademark were being violated, the seized materials may have been used to package cigarettes with a retail value of $1 billion. Increasingly DPRK counterfeit cigarettes, counterfeit pharmaceuticals (especially counterfeit Viagra), and counterfeit currency are being moved in parallel. Royal Charm revealed that weapons, too, potentially even manpads might be run through the same channels. What could be next?

3. Smuggling sanctioned items, including conflict diamonds, rhino horn and ivory, and endangered species, utilizing official diplomatic means

I find this to be one of the most outrageous and unacceptable of the DPRK’s criminal acts, absolutely contravening international law, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. There are numerous notorious examples to cite. In the early 1980’s, five North Korean diplomats were forced to leave Africa for their attempts to smuggle rhino horns. The horns were transported from Luzaka to Addis Ababa to South Yemen. From there, they traveled to the consulate in Guangzhou, which ran operations in Macau, Zhuhai, and Hong Kong. This kind of activity has apparently not changed. As Stanford researcher, Sheena Chestnut, noted in a recent thesis, in the years since 1996, “at least six North Korean diplomats have been forced to leave Africa after attempts to smuggle elephant tusks and rhinoceros horns.” Ivory seizures directly linked to North Korean officials amounted to 689 kg in Kenya in 1999; 537 kg in Moscow in 1999; and 576 kg in France in 1998. I don’t have more recent data I can share publicly but I don’t think they have given up on the illicit ivory trade.

4. Money laundering for its own account and in partnership with recognized organized crime groups abroad:

The extent to which the DPRK uses banking partners around the world to launder funds has recently gotten a lot of attention in the wake of the Macau based Banco Delta Asia designation under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act. The Treasury Department’s website paints a pretty clear picture: “One well-known North Korean front company that has been a client of BDA for over a decade has conducted numerous illegal activities, including distributing counterfeit currency and smuggling counterfeit tobacco products. In addition, the front company has also long been suspected of being involved in international drug trafficking. Moreover, Banco Delta Asia facilitated several multi-million dollar wire transfers connected with alleged criminal activity on behalf of another North Korean front company.”

5. Weapons smuggling and trading in WMD

Even while its customer base diminishes, North Korea defiantly remains in the business of selling MTCR class missiles and base technologies. It also continues to field more advanced systems domestically that could be exported. Logically speaking, as its stockpile of WMD grows so could its willingness to export technologies, systems, and even materials. Business and ideology conveniently mix in the minds of North Koreans, it seems, as they calculate where, when, and how to sell weapons and weapons systems.

Moreover, in the face of increased surveillance of DPRK flagged vessels, the threat of using conventional shipping means to move cargoes increases as does the incentive to use organized crime channels.

There are several thousand containers each year coming out of North Korea from its two main container cargo ports: Najin on the east coast and Nampo on the west coast. To get into the international maritime transport system, they have to go through friendly ports, typically in China, the ROK, and Japan. Virtually none of these containers in China is subject to inspection and few in the ROK. Japanese customs has made a bigger effort but it remains insufficient in regard to cargoes destined for non Japanese ports.

As we learned from the investigations concluded this summer, containers of counterfeit cigarettes, counterfeit currency, weapons, and other illicit items apparently produced in the DPRK or linked to a distribution chain it has ready access to have managed to make their way into the US. So could North Korean WMD if we don’t create a system to better scrutinize cargoes and enhance Maritime Domain Awareness to protect our SLOCs.

Unfortunately, neither the PSI no the CSI are attuned to addressing these threats. The Container Security Initiative is a worthy effort to move US customs outward, inspecting select cargoes destined for US waters overseas before they embark in our direction. I am impressed by the work being done by US Customs and ICE officers overseas to look into suspect cargoes and the dedication of personnel at the National Tracking center to identify ships and cargoes that may have not been covered by the CSI or fallen through the loop. Nonetheless, the CSI has no application to containers destined for non-US ports and, moreover, it is only operating in a small number of foreign venues. What happens to the majority of containers coming here or going elsewhere? Nothing.

Moreover, the hallowed Proliferation Security Initiative unfortunately remains much more talk that action. I support the initiative but it is not sufficient and does not substitute for a dedicated DPRK counter-proliferation policy. It is nice to see countries getting together to agree to intercept shipments but it is another to engage in such interdictions. There has not been one single PSI interdiction of a DPRK flagged vessel that I am aware of. Does this mean they have stopped sailing? A quick look at the “Lloyd’s List” database reveals this to not be true with many notorious North Korean vessels like the Sosang, which was interdicted shipping missiles to Yemen in December 2002 (before the PSI existed), still plying the high seas. What are these ships carrying? Moreover, I find the implicit premise that interdiction alone is adequate for stopping proliferation unsettling. Stopping a weapons shipment on the high seas is like stopping a drug shipment under dark of night-easier said than done. The odds are not good, especially when you face an adversary with access to near state of the art communications, excellent denial and deception, diplomatic immunities, and friendly criminal partners to facilitate its activities.

More decisive action is required, well beyond the PSI’s current scope. The AQ Khan network was brought down by a network disruption strategy that utilized all aspects of national power. Such a strategy may need to be mounted soon to stop a determined North Korea engaged in the weapons trading business.

Fortunately, there are some things in the area of peaceful international cooperation we can do to minimize the chance North Korean contraband, missiles, or WMD will get into the international distribution system. I propose that a special Container Security Initiative be created and applied to the DPRK, beginning in China and the ROK. Specifically, all containerized cargo out of North Korea should be mandated for inspection at the first international port of conveyance. Legitimate trade would be allowed to pass but illicit cargoes would be stopped. The US could not accept containers from ports that do not wish to join this special inspection regime. Such a regime would dramatically reduce the risk of weapons proliferation and cut into crime. Were all ships coming from the DPRK, whether bearing containers or not, subject to first order inspection the system would be even more effective. Given that DPRK trade represents a drop in the bucket for even major Chinese and Koreans ports, instituting such a regime should not be particularly onerous.

Down the road a more elegant solution is possible, whereby only smart containers can gain access to the international shipping system. The President recently announced a new policy on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). As Vice Admiral John Morgan has recently written, “MDA is the collection, fusion and dissemination of enormous quantities of data – intelligence and information to form a common operating picture (COP) – a web of integrated information which will be fully distributed among users with access to data that is appropriately classified.” Through the COP, specialists should eventually be able to monitor vessels, people, cargo and designated missions, areas of interest within the global maritime environment, access all relevant databases, and collect, analyze and disseminate relevant information.

This goal of Maritime Domain Awareness may sound overambitious, if not down right impossible. However, within the next five years, we likely will see the global deployment of such “smart-containers.” These sophisticated containers will be equipped with RFID tags that can not only broadcast the precise geo-location of the container but also be linked to relational databases that reveal detailed information on the container’s cargo: where it was loaded and by whom, when and where it was produced, and a host of other important information. IBM and Maersk have in fact just announced a pilot project to validate this smart container concept and allow the data to be trackable via an open information architecture.

In effect, driven by industry requirements even more than government regulations, by the end of the decade we can look forward to the development of a “world wide web of things” – the physical data tracking equivalent of the internet. Such a web promises to dramatically enhance supply chain management for multinationals, expedite and safeguard trade, and reduce counterfeiting. This is not science fiction: companies like Walmart have already demanded that their suppliers insert RFID tags into products with the goal of eventually being able to track in near real-time the status of virtually every asset in the company’s supply chain domestically and – relatively soon – globally.

Countries, ports, or companies not subscribing to smart container standards would be subject to automatic inspection or simply not be allowed to engage in international trade with countries participating in the initiative.

Conclusions:

North Korea is the only government in the world today that can be identified as being actively involved in directing crime as a central part of its national economic strategy and foreign policy. As a result, Pyongyang is radically – and perhaps even hopelessly – out of synch with international law and international norms. In essence, North Korea has become a “soprano state” – a government guided by a Worker’s Party leadership whose actions, attitudes, and affiliations increasingly resemble those of an organized crime family more than a normal nation.

North Korea’s serial violation of international laws and agreements begs the question whether it should be allowed normal protections granted to states under the United Nations treaties.

Its reliance on illicit activity for maintaining what my former colleague Bill Newcomb has termed the “palace economy of Kim Jong Il” perhaps makes it very hard for North Korea to abandon such activities and also provides Pyongyang a means to avoid serious engagement with the outside world. Thus, unless and until the North finds itself censured for its involvement in such activities and its illicit finances come under great pressure it may have few incentives to be cooperative and come clean and act normal.

The North must cease its dealings with trans-national organized criminals, its illicit export of weapons, its nuclear reprocessing, its threats to engage in nuclear proliferation, etc. Instead it should accept the extremely reasonable terms the US, with the others parties in the talks, have offered for promoting a positive and peaceful transformation of relations in the context of full denuclearization. If it does then next month’s talks should represent a turning point in the history of our relations with the DPRK. If it does not, as I have shown the evidentiary ground exists for the DPRK’s comprehensive diplomatic isolation and a systematic denial in diplomatic privilege, if not as a pariah state with nuclear weapons but as a criminal state engaged in causus belli acts against the United Nations, its laws, and its principles. I hope Mr. Kim Jong Il makes the right decision.

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Mother of All Mothers: The Leadership Secrets of Kim Jong Il

Wednesday, September 1st, 2004

Atlantic Monthly
B. R. Myers
9/1/2004

You’ve just finished your life’s work, a bold new history of the Watergate burglary in which you manage to prove that the White House was out of the loop, but the ink is hardly dry when an eighteen-minute tape surfaces in a Yorba Linda thrift shop, and soon the whole country is listening to Nixon gangsta-rap about how he personally jimmied the door open. It’s every revisionist’s nightmare, but Bruce Cumings, a history professor at the University of Chicago, has come closest to living it. In a book concluded in 1990 he argued that the Korean War started as “a local affair,” and that the conventional notion of a Soviet-sponsored invasion of the South was just so much Cold War paranoia. In 1991 Russian authorities started declassifying the Soviet archives, which soon revealed that Kim Il Sung had sent dozens of telegrams begging Stalin for a green light to invade, and that the two met in Moscow repeatedly to plan the event. Initially hailed as “magisterial,” The Origins of the Korean War soon gathered up its robes and retired to chambers. The book was such a valuable source of information on Korea in the 1940s, however, that many hoped the author would find a way to fix things and put it back into print.

Instead Cumings went on to write an account of postwar Korea that instances the North’s “miracle rice,” “autarkic” economy, and prescient energy policy (an “unqualified success”) to refute what he calls the “basket-case” view of the country. With even worse timing than its predecessor, Korea’s Place in the Sun (1997) went on sale just as the world was learning of a devastating famine wrought by Pyongyang’s misrule. The author must have wondered if he was snakebit. But now we have a new book, in which Cumings likens North Korea to Thomas More’s Utopia, and this time the wrongheadedness seems downright willful; it’s as if he were so tired of being made to look silly by forces beyond his control that he decided to do the job himself. At one point in North Korea: Another Country (2004) we are even informed that the regime’s gulags aren’t as bad as they’re made out to be, because Kim Jong Il is thoughtful enough to lock up whole families at a time.

The mixture of naiveté and callousness will remind readers of the Moscow travelogues of the 1930s, but Cumings is more a hater of U.S. foreign policy than a wide-eyed supporter of totalitarianism. The book’s apparent message is that North Korea’s present condition can justify neither our last “police action” on the peninsula nor any new one that may be in the offing. It is perhaps a point worth arguing, particularly in view of the mess in Iraq, but Cumings is too emotional to get the job done. His compulsion to prove conservative opinion wrong on every point inspires him to say things unworthy of any serious historian—that there was no crime in North Korea for decades, for example—and to waste space refuting long-forgotten canards and misconceptions. Half a page is given over to deriding American reporters who once mistook Kim Il Sung’s neck growth for a brain tumor—talk about a dead issue.

Cumings is even harder to take when he’s in a good mood. By the time he has noted a vague resemblance between Kim Jong Il and Paul Anka, sniggered about “horny” Korean housewives, and mocked both a tour guide’s English and an African man’s surname (“I dissolved in hysterics”), most readers, with no photograph of the author to go on, will find themselves mentally exchanging his professorial tweeds for a very loud leisure suit. Most offensive of all is the book’s message that we shouldn’t be too hard on the dictatorship in Pyongyang, because human rights aren’t as important to Koreans as to the rest of us.

Does this system promote human freedom? Not from any liberal’s standpoint. But from a Korean standpoint, where freedom is also defined as an independent stance against foreign predators—freedom for the Korean nation—here, the vitriolic judgments do not flow so easily. This is a cardinal virtue among a people that has preserved its integrity and continuity in the same place since the early Christian era … After all, there is one undeniable freedom in North Korea, and that is the freedom to be Korean.

It seems to have slipped the professor’s notice that many countries manage to stay independent without dragging children off to gulags, and that North Korea is a place where a lot of characteristically Korean behavior—speaking bluntly, for example—is punishable by execution. The only significant part of the culture that can be freely indulged under Kim is its ethnocentric streak, which is what Cumings all but reduces it to; confusing cause and effect, he sees propaganda as the reflection of the popular soul instead of (to use Stalin’s metaphor) the engineer of it. The Korean people have always been more outward-looking than their insecure leaders, and for centuries this was especially true of those in the northern part of the peninsula. Even in the months after our disgraceful bombing campaign during the war—a campaign that Cumings rightly calls a holocaust—diplomats in Pyongyang noted no signs of indiscriminate xenophobia.

This was soon to change. Throughout the 1950s the regime resorted to crude racism in its anti-American propaganda, often treating inset eyes, big noses, and other Caucasian features as the manifestation of villainy. To the consternation of the diplomatic community, little effort was made to enlighten people about the existence of friendly big-noses, even though—as this spring’s Cold War International History Project bulletin makes clear—North Korea’s cities were rebuilt and its people fed and cared for with enormous amounts of assistance from Eastern Europe. “They expect foreign countries,” one Hungarian diplomat noted, “to give them everything.” Reading the CWIHP bulletin has the odd effect of making one realize what a relatively sensible bunch of people the Soviets were. In the mid-1950s they opposed Kim Il Sung’s brutal collectivization of agriculture; Kim brushed off their advice, only to demand food aid when a murderous famine ensued.

The more the regime evinced its incompetence by relying on foreigners, the more it needed to restrict the people’s contact with them. By the 1960s the party line had taken a turn that reminded a Soviet diplomat of Nazi Germany, as citizens who married Europeans were banished to the provinces for “crimes against the Korean race.” A diplomatic report translated in the CWIHP bulletin shows how the masses finally got into the spirit of things. In March of 1965 the Cuban ambassador was driving his family and some Cuban doctors around Pyongyang when they stopped to take pictures. Hundreds of adults and children quickly swarmed the diplomatic limousine, pounding it with their fists, tearing the flag off, and ordering the occupants to get out. Their rage and insults, directed mainly at the ambassador “as a black man,” abated only when a security force arrived to beat back the mob with rifle butts. (Not for nothing did Eldridge Cleaver say that the North Korean police made him miss the Oakland police.)

“The level of training of the masses is extremely low,” a party official later admitted to the ambassador. “They cannot differentiate between friends and foes.” In other words, everything was going as planned. The regime went on to blur the distinction further by excising all mention of outside assistance from the history books, even as it continued to squeeze billions of dollars from its cash-strapped allies. For decades a foreign proletariat toiling in dingy factories from Vladivostok to Karl-Marx-Stadt helped bankroll Pyongyang’s transformation into a proud monument to ethnic self-reliance, so that someday a Bruce Cumings could boast that it is anything but the ugly Communist capital one might expect. Well into the 1980s Kim was telling leaders of aid-donating states that he was having trouble meeting the basic needs of his people. If South Korea’s dictatorships were America’s running dogs, then North Korea was the Eastern bloc’s house cat: intractable, convinced of its superiority, and to some observers a more independent creature, but never much good at feeding itself—even after the can openers started falling silent in 1989.

The question of where Europe ends and Asia begins has troubled many people over the years, but here’s a rule of thumb: if someone can pose as an expert on the country in question without knowledge of the relevant language, it’s part of Asia. Europeans hoping to lay claim to North Korea should therefore brace themselves, because Bradley Martin’s publisher is touting Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader (2004) as the definitive work on its subject, though it belongs squarely in the “a puzzled look crossed the faces of my guide and interpreter” tradition of monoglot scholarship. Although hardly definitive, it is still an excellent book, well researched and lucidly written. It is especially refreshing to find someone showing serious interest in North Korean propaganda instead of merely hooting at it.

The problem is that the official translations on which Martin was forced to rely do not always reflect the original. Kim Il Sung’s title Eobeoi Suryeong means not “Fatherly Leader”—a common rendering that encourages Martin to exaggerate the influence of Confucianism on the personality cult—but “Parent Leader,” the most feminine title the regime could get away with. As the country’s visual arts make clear, Kim was more a mother to his people than a stern Confucian patriarch: he is still shown as soft-cheeked and solicitous, holding weeping adults to his expansive bosom, bending down to tie a young soldier’s bootlaces, or letting giddy children clamber over him. The tradition continues under Kim Jong Il, who has been called “more of a mother than all the mothers in the world.” His military-first policy may come with the title of general, but reports of his endless tour of army bases focus squarely on his fussy concern for the troops’ health and comfort. The international ridicule of his appearance is thus as unfair as it is tedious. Anyone who has seen a crowd of Korean mothers waiting outside an examination hall will have no difficulty recognizing Kim’s drab parka and drooping shoulders, or the long-suffering face under the pillow-swept perm: this is a mother with no time to think of herself. When it comes to the Workers’ Party, the symbolism is even more explicit, as in this recent propaganda poem:

Ah, Korean Workers’ Party, at whose
breast only
My life begins and ends
Be I buried in the ground or strewn
to the wind
I remain your son, and again return to
your breast!
Entrusting my body to your
affectionate gaze,
Your loving outstretched hand,
I cry out forever in the voice of a child,
Mother! I can’t live without Mother!

It’s easy to imagine what Carl Jung would have made of all this, and he would have been right. Whereas Father Stalin set out to instill revolutionary consciousness into the masses (to make them grow up, in other words), North Korea’s Mother Regime appeals to the emotions of a systematically infantilized people. Although the propaganda may seem absurd at a remove, it speaks more forcefully to the psyche than anything European communism could come up with. As a result, North Korea’s political culture has weathered the economic collapse so well that even refugees remain loyal to the memory of Kim Il Sung.

The Yangs, for example, are former Party members who recently defected to the South with their two boys. As part of a campaign to prevent the formation of a refugee ghetto in Seoul, the family was resettled in Mungyeong, a charmless sprawl of apartment blocks and love hotels a few hours to the southeast. I visited them there in May. As we sat on the floor of their tiny living room, I told them how a young refugee once shrank from my approach because—as she later explained—I looked like the stick-nosed Yankee effigies she used to run knives into after school. “Yes, you do have …” the mother shouted over the general laughter, but she caught herself in time. Turning to the older boy, who is sixteen, I asked what wisdom he could remember from the Parent Leader. “Man is the master of his own destiny,” he said shyly, his voice trailing off. What about his parents? “We didn’t memorize sentences,” the mother said, embarrassed, so I asked her to explain Kim Il Sung’s ideology of Juche for me in her own words. “The main thing is, man is the master of his destiny,” she said briskly. “And?” I asked. Silence. “Well,” I said, “if people are the masters of their destiny, why do they need a leader?” The younger boy came to his mother’s aid: “It was something about flowers needing the sun to grow.” Everyone frowned at my pen scratching away; they were letting the Parent Leader down. “It wasn’t so much what Kim Il Sung said,” the father blurted out at last.

This is of course true. Expanses of tautological prose have been ghostwritten to fatten the spines of the two Kims’ collected works, but few people ever read them. North Korea is a unique socialist country in that its ruling ideology is conveyed through what is written about its leaders, not by them, and the message could hardly be simpler: Foreigners bad, Koreans good, Leader best. “The most important thing to us was that Kim Il Sung suffered for the people; he fought for us,” the boys’ mother said. With a start I realized that this elegant fortyish woman, who now sells American cosmetics for a living, had tears in her eyes. “The Leader would sit on the ground with farmers, just like we’re sitting here now. And if he shook someone’s hand, that person would be happy forever. Of course, Kim Jong Il is not like that.” Conversation turned to the railway explosion in the North at the end of April, and to the regime’s immediate focus on the material damage. “It’s because Kim Jong Il never suffered,” the father said bitterly. “What does he know about the common people?”

It would appear that Kim knows just enough. The border with China remains so porous that even children often sneak back and forth, and yet no more than three or four percent of the population has chosen to flee for good. The regime obviously did the smart thing by publicly acknowledging the food shortage and then blaming it on American sanctions, instead of pretending there was no food shortage at all, as Stalin used to do. The Dear Leader has also deftly exploited the tradition according to which Koreans care for their parents in old age: the masses are told that it is their job to feed him, not the other way around, and his famed diet of “whatever the troops are eating” is routinely invoked to shame everyone into working harder. Never has a dictator been such an object of pity to his people, or such a powerful source of guilt. In 2003 North Korean cheerleaders, living it up on a rare visit to a sports event in the South, responded to a rain-soaked picture of Kim by bursting into a hysterical lament that baffled their hosts.

To concede the effectiveness of the personality cult is not to agree with Selig S. Harrison’s startling assertion, in Korean Endgame (2002), that Koreans have a “built-in readiness … to accept as truth what is dispensed from higher authority.” No regime ever needed to subject its citizens to a lifetime of brainwashing in order to make them follow their natural inclinations. What must be acknowledged is that Kim Jong Il has evinced a genius for propaganda ever since managing the efflorescence of his father’s cult in the 1960s. Even so, he cannot cover his lack of charisma completely; it’s as if Hitler died and left the Third Reich to Goebbels.

Kim must also be aware that the infantilization of the people has come at a price. Away from Pyongyang’s carefully monitored tourist sites, North Korea is a much more raucous place than any dictator could be comfortable with. “One surprising thing,” Michael Breen writes in Kim Jong Il: North Korea’s Dear Leader (2004), “surprising because you expect robots, is … how frequently fights break out.” According to refugees, even women fight out their differences, and young female teachers are said to hit children the hardest. This lack of restraint is a problem for many North Koreans trying to adjust to life in the South. Social workers complain that the refugees pick fights with strangers, and storm off jobs on the first day. “I’d have thought they’d be better at controlling themselves, coming from a socialist system,” is a common lament.

In short, the conventional Western view of North Korea’s official culture as a stodgy combination of Confucianism and Stalinism—two ideologies that prize intellectual self-discipline above all else—could not be further from the truth. Fortuitously enough, this view has so far encouraged Americans to stay cool in the face of Kim Jong Il’s missile-rattling. But misperceptions of hostile regimes are inherently dangerous, especially when Uncle Sam is doing the misperceiving, and this one has as much potential to excite tensions as to reduce them. On August 18, 1976, a detail of U.S. and South Korean soldiers at the DMZ were pruning a tree when People’s Army soldiers demanded that they stop. The Americans refused, prompting the North Koreans to wrest away their tools. In the ensuing clash two American officers were killed. Unable to conceive that Communist troops could act out of spontaneous rage, Washington assumed that Kim Il Sung had ordered the incident. Troops were set on high alert, and nuclear-capable B-52s dispatched to skirt North Korean airspace. Luckily for everyone, the Parent Leader issued an apology for his children on August 21. As the Americans saw it, of course, Kim had “backed down.”

Perhaps the most unsettling thing about the nuclear accord brokered by Jimmy Carter in 1994 is the decade of crowing it set off in North Korea. A high-school textbook remembers, “The Great Leader dragged the Americans, who had fallen into a state of extreme terror and unease, to the negotiating table … All problems discussed during the talks between America and Korea were resolved to Korea’s advantage, and the intense nuclear standoff ended in our victory.” This is evidently sincerely believed; if it weren’t, the North Koreans would not still be so enamored of Carter and Robert Gallucci, the chief U.S. negotiator back then. Both men—and this must thrill them no end—are praised in propaganda literature as fervent admirers of Kim Il Sung.

It is reassuring, then, to read in Harrison’s book that the agreement actually represented a victory of high-ranking North Korean “doves” over their hardline colleagues. I just wish he had explained why even the most hawkish propagandists remember it so fondly. What bothers me more is the author’s insistence on interpreting the two Kims’ every act as part of a rational pursuit of national security. We are told, for example, that the deployment of atomic weapons in South Korea in 1958 frightened Pyongyang into starting its own nuclear program. As the CWIHP bulletin makes clear, however, Eastern European diplomats in the early 1960s were aghast at the North Koreans’ assertions that a nuclear confrontation was nothing to be afraid of, and that the time had come for another invasion of the South. It is by no means certain that this sort of adventurist thinking has been abandoned. In a propaganda novel set in 1993, Kim Jong Il and his generals regard a likely American air strike on the Yongbyeon nuclear facility as the perfect opportunity for a “sacred war” (seongjeon) of reunification. Harrison ignores such things, which may well be better than overreacting to them; but to approach North Korea as if it were the détente-era Soviet Union is asking for trouble. When he gets his next update on the hawk-dove struggle from officials in Pyongyang, a city where most foreigners count themselves lucky to learn their tour guide’s name, he should perhaps keep in mind that North Korea has always viewed the existence of similar factions in Washington as the manifestation of a ludicrous disunity. No one under Kim Jong Il would describe his government in such terms to a Yankee visitor unless the goal were to extract more concessions from the outside world.

Considering that for decades the North Koreans refused to listen to their own allies, it seems naive for the author of Korean Endgame to assume that what Washington does “will largely determine what the North … will do.” The Juche regime has received substantial U.S. aid since the famine, but the dominant slogans of anti-American prop-aganda remain “A hundred thousand times revenge” and “A jackal can never become a lamb.” In other words, even as the regime tells the outside world it wants nothing but better relations with Washington, it tells its own people that better relations are neither desirable nor conceivable. In January of 2003 Pyongyang issued a taunting poster of a missile attack on the Capitol.Later that year, with the six-party talks in progress, an old tale of murderous missionaries was reprinted in four North Korean magazines, complete with racist caricatures.

Still, the thrust of Harrison’s book is valid.

The goal of the United States should be to disengage its forces gradually … over a period not longer than ten years, whether or not this can be done as part of a negotiated arms-control process … The stage would then be cleared, as it were, with the initiative left to Seoul and Pyongyang. Washington would have its hopes and its advice but would recede into an unaccustomed posture of detachment, ready to let the two actors make their own mistakes.

This is excellent counsel. Far from being a stabilizing factor on the peninsula, the U.S. presence serves only to rally the North Koreans around their military-first government. As Harrison makes clear, this is no time to get sentimental about our old ally. Seoul asks that U.S. troops stay, but at the same time it poses as a neutral mediator of the resulting tensions, often playing down the nuclear threat just as Pyongyang seems bent on playing it up; a disastrous miscommunication among the three parties seems all but preordained. It is a shame that Harrison does not place greater stress on the need to extricate our troops even if the arms-control process fails, because it’s hard to see how it can succeed. Kim Jong Il refused to let South Korean doctors tend to blinded children after the North’s railway explosion last spring; such a pathologically secretive man must be expected to balk at an early stage in the verification of nuclear dismantlement, no matter what agreement he has signed. Washington will then renege on its part of the bargain, prompting Seoul to voice regret over American “intransigence.” This, in turn, will embolden the North to demand a re-negotiation of the point in question, and we will all be right back where we started, albeit with even more nukes to worry about.

In the meantime, anything can happen. Having predicted the speedy downfall of the regime back in 1994, Pyongyang-watchers now predict that it will be around forever, but North Korea is already well into a precarious post-totalitarian phase. Thousands of citizens in border regions chat with refugees by smuggled cell phone, and millions more enjoy illegal access to television broadcasts from outside the country. The majority of the population has bought and sold things at open-air markets, and many young people in rural areas have simply stopped attending school and political meetings. The personality cult will find it hard to adjust to this kind of change without routine recourse to anti-American alarmism, and if there are no grounds for confrontation, Kim Jong Il can be expected to create them. All the more reason, then, for America to heed Harrison’s advice and pull out. But will we do so? Our patriotic dash into the Iraqi quagmire hardly inspires confidence that we wouldn’t follow our own Dear Leader into a new conflict in North Korea, especially since the WMD really do look like a “slam dunk” this time.

The only comfort to be had from the new batch of Korea books is provided by Breen’s biography of Kim Jong Il, which details a hedonistic streak as wide as the DMZ. Apparently the dictator lives in a huge palace stocked with Paradis cognac, and every summer a fresh “Joy Brigade” of high school beauties gets to admire the ceiling. Breen waxes indignant about this, but would he rather Kim were sharing a tent with a mountain goat and a well-thumbed Koran? We can all breathe a little easier knowing that our most formidable adversary wants his virgins in the here and now.

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North Korea Development Report 2003/04

Friday, July 30th, 2004

KIEP has published the North Korea Development Report 2003/04 (follow the link to download all several hundred pages!)

Summary: As a result of North Korea’s isolation from the outside world, international
communities know little about the status of the North Korean economy and its
management mechanisms. Although a few recent changes in North Korea’s economic system have attracted international interests, much confusion remains as to the characteristics of North Korea’s recent policy changes and its future direction
due to the lack of information. Therefore, in order to increase the understanding of readers in South Korea and abroad, KIEP is releasing The North Korea Development Report in both Korean and English. The motivation behind this report stemmed from the need for a comprehensive and systematic investigation into North Korea’s socio-economic conditions, while presenting the current status of its industrial sectors and inter-Korean economic cooperation. The publishing of this second volume is important because it not only supplements the findings of the first edition, but also updates the recent changes in the North Korean economy. The topics in this report include macroeconomics and finance, industry and infrastructure, foreign economic relations and inter-Korean economic cooperation, social welfare and science & technology.

This report also covers the ‘July 1 Economic Reform’ launched two years ago and
subsequent changes in the economic management system. The North Korea
Development Report helps to improve the understanding of the contemporary North
Korean economy.
Table of Contents  
 
Part I Macroeconomic Status and Finance
Chapter 1 Current Status of the North Korean Economy and Its Prospects
Chapter 2 National Financial Revenue and Expenditure
Chapter 3 Banking and Price Management

Part II Industrial Management and Problems
Chapter 4 The Industrial Sector
Chapter 5 The Agricultural Sector
Chapter 6 Social Overhead Capital
Chapter 7 Commerce and Distribution Sector
Chapter 8 The Defense Industry

Part III International Economic Activities
Chapter 9 Foreign Economic Relations
Chapter 10 Special Economic Zones
Chapter 11 Inter-Korean Economic Relations

Part IV Social Security and Technology Development
Chapter 12 Social Security and Social Services
Chapter 13 Science and Technology Sector

Part V The Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 14 The Contents and Background for the Recent Policy Changes
Chapter 15 The Features and Problems of the Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 16 Prospects and Future Tasks of the July 1 Economic Reform  

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DPRK cabinet reshuffle

Thursday, September 4th, 2003

Financial Times
September 4, 2003
Page 4
by Andrew Ward 

Kim Jong Il yesterday staged a rare cabinet reshuffle, replacing several top officials with younger men in an apparent attempt to strengthen his power base. 

Mr. Kim face a twin threat to his Stalinist regime from looming economic collapse and increasing pressure from a US government angered by the state’s development of nuclear weapons. 

Mr. Kim replaced his prime minister, two of his three deputy premiers and five ministers in what South Korean reporters said was the most far-reaching government shake-up for five years. 

Analysts in the south speculate Mr. Kim was replacing ageing officials associated with Kim Il Sung his late father and former leader.  In their place, had come younger officials more loyal to the current leader. 

Diplomats and intelligence officials, who admit their assessments about the reclusive regime are little better than guess work, hoped the promotion of younger officials would clear the way for political and economic reforms resisted by the old guard. 

Economic reforms introduced last year – wages and prices were raised to meet market values – fuelled hopes that North Korea might open up, but there have been few further signs of change. 

Some of those replaced held important economic planning posts, perhaps reflecting Mr. Kim’s concern about the parlous state of the country’s economy. 

South Korea‘s Yonhap news agency said 52% of North Korea’s new power elite was aged under 55.  However there was no sign of a shift away from Mr. Kim’s “army first policy” of concentrating power and resources with North Korea’s 1.1 million-strong army. 

Most top military leaders kept their jobs – including Mr. Kim himself, who was re-elected Chairman of the National Defense Commission, the country’s most powerful body – and the legislature approved measures to strengthen the “nuclear deterrent force”. 

Pak Pong Ju, former minister for the chemical industry, was elected prime minister, replacing Hong Song Nam, according to North Korean media monitored by Yonhap. 

“The cabinet will work out a scientific and bold economic strategy and operational plan as required by the new century and dynamically implement them to build a strong national economic power suited to the great prosperous powerful nation,” Mr. Pak said.

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