Archive for the ‘Agriculture’ Category

North Korean state crackdowns on moonshine

Monday, January 1st, 2024

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Asia Press reported a couple of weeks back about state crackdowns on illegal alcohol sales. It’s interesting that the move is highlighted as an economic measure, to push down the demand for grain:

In mid-November, a reporting partner in Yanggang Province told ASIAPRESS that the authorities had handed down an order saying that there is a complete ban on illegal alcohol manufacturing, which they referred to as an “anti-state act.”

“The authorities handed down the order on November 4 saying that because most (homemade alcohols) are made of corn, the act of manufacturing alcohol with grain supplies is an anti-state act that supports the enemies’ sanctions on the country.”

As this suggests, the reason the authorities are reacting so sensitively to the illicit manufacturing of alcohol is because they believe that the producers’ use of grains, which the government has recently moved to intensify control over, is a waste and serves as a threat to the country’s already short supply of food.

According to the reporting partner, agencies tasked with cracking down on illegally brewed alcohol informed neighborhood watch units that anyone found to be illegally producing alcohol will face at least three months at a short-term forced labor camp to show that the government does not forgive anyone who makes money from producing alcohol from grains.

The reporting partner said that the government made several arrests to show it means business: two members of street-level enforcer teams who failed to stop the production of homebrewed alcohol after receiving bribes were punished, while two officials working at a city construction office were fired for secretly acquiring 10 liters of illegally brewed alcohol.

In context, this also appears to be part of the overall state campaign to control economic activity more tightly, but at the lowest local level.

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Corn prices continue to rise in North Korea in early March, suggesting tightening food supply

Friday, March 10th, 2023

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A few updates on the food situation:

Overall, prices continue to rise, as reported by several outlets. A recent article in Rimjingang reports that fuel prices are in fact double what they were last year this time. Fuel prices are highly sensitive to import conditions, suggesting that getting fuel and oil into North Korea remains relatively difficult:

The international price of fuel rose steadily worldwide due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022; however, it began falling in June of last year. South Korean gasoline prices, for example, have fallen by KRW 558.

Why, then, are North Korea’s market prices for fuel still rising? A reporting partner in the northern part of the country told ASIAPRESS that “it is because the authorities have drastically limited the amount (of fuel) circulating in the market,” further explaining that:

“Supplies of fuel are under state control, but state-run fuel supply depots have sold fuel into markets, allowing anyone to buy it. There has also been a lot of corruption in the military and other government agencies, with people siphoning off fuel (where they can). As a result, it’s now become difficult to buy fuel at fuel supply depots. They don’t sell the fuel unless you have haengpyo, which are used by government agencies and enterprises.”

Haengpyo are akin to checks and are used by organizations to pay for goods or services.

Another possible factor is that while North Korean market prices do tend to follow global ones for many goods, they often do so with a significant time lag. This results from the many barriers that disconnect the North Korean economy from the rest of the world, making it react more slowly to global changes than other countries.

I’ve often pointed out that differences in the relative price between corn and rice is one of the most relevant metrics we have access to for assessing North Korea’s food situation. The two main staple foods are, depending on the season and other factors, corn and rice. Corn is generally much cheaper than rice, because rice is the preferred (and therefore more expensive) good. Corn prices increasing in a way that isn’t seasonally normal is, therefore, a possible sign that the overall food supply is decreasing (for more, see this post).

This is precisely what Daily NK reports is happening, and they in fact note the highest rice prices ever recorded in their index (though this does not seem to take inflation into account). Rice prices are going up more than normal for this time of year, and so is demand for corn:

Early March rice prices in North Korea have hit their highest point ever compared to prices surveyed in early March over the past five years, a recent Daily NK survey of commodity prices in North Korea has found. The survey also found that rice prices are not falling by much following last year’s harvest, but demand is rising for corn, a rice alternative.

According to Daily NK’s regular survey of North Korean market prices, a kilogram of rice in Yanggang Province’s city of Hyesan cost KPW 6,300 as of Mar. 5. That is 3.3% higher than two weeks ago on Feb. 19, when it cost KPW 6,100.

In Hyesan, the price of a kilogram of rice rose to KPW 6,300 in late November and began falling from December to KWP 5,620, but has been rising once again since mid-January.

In fact, early March rice prices in North Korea were found to be the highest ever of all Daily NK surveys taken in early March over the past five years.

[…]

In early March 2019, before North Korea shut its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the price of rice in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan was KPW 4,200, KWP 4,210 and KPW 4,400, respectively. In early March of this year, it was 38% more expensive in Pyongyang, 42% more expensive in Sinuiju and 30% more expensive in Hyesan.

The current rice prices are even higher than when rice and corn prices spiked following a spate of panic buying of grain after North Korea closed its border in January 2020.

Food prices, of course, vary heavily between regions, partially because domestic transport is so costly and slow:

In early March 2019, before North Korea shut its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the price of rice in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan was KPW 4,200, KWP 4,210 and KPW 4,400, respectively. In early March of this year, it was 38% more expensive in Pyongyang, 42% more expensive in Sinuiju and 30% more expensive in Hyesan.

The current rice prices are even higher than when rice and corn prices spiked following a spate of panic buying of grain after North Korea closed its border in January 2020.

In Pyongyang, however, the price of rice has fallen somewhat compared to Daily NK’s survey of prices taken in mid-February. A kilogram of rice in Pyongyang’s markets cost KPW 5,800 as of Mar. 5, 3.3% less than it cost on Feb. 19, when it cost KPW 6,000.

The fall in rice prices in Pyongyang suggests that the city’s residents may have been able to recently purchase grain through state-run food shops.

[…]

Meanwhile, the price of corn in North Korean markets is rising more sharply than the price of rice.

As of Mar. 5, a kilogram of corn in the markets of Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan cost 6 to 11% more than it did in Daily NK’s survey in February.

A kilogram of corn cost KPW 3,000 in Pyongyang, 11% more than it did on Feb. 19, which essentially means that while demand for rice fell in Pyongyang, demand for corn skyrocketed.

In fact, the price of corn this year is at a five-year high for early March.

This is all happening despite reports that the state has directed its food shops, that usually only operate sporadically, to sell at subsidized prices, with the regime using state supplies to drive down the market price (I spoke with Daily NK about this in a recent interview).

Many question marks remain. My biggest concern about the information that we’re getting right now is regional bias. It’s always an inherent risk in any information coming out of North Korea through grassroots sources. But with border controls tightening so much since the onset of the pandemic, getting information out has become significantly more difficult. With fewer sources — and no one really denies this is the case — single data points from specific regions can carry comparatively larger weight, distorting the overall image.

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What’s going on with North Korea’s agriculture?

Thursday, March 2nd, 2023

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

As the South Korean government has said, this week’s meeting in Pyongyang on the food situation is as close to an open admission either of serious food shortages already prevailing, or that the regime forecasts that things will get worse. But what do we really know? In this post, I look at two main indicators: reports and testimonies from inside North Korea reported by the defector-run news outlet Daily NK, and market prices, primarily of corn and rice.

Overall, the food situation appears significantly more difficult than usual. Increased corn prices is perhaps the most worrying indicator. Comparisons with the famine of the 1990s still aren’t warranted, but there are worrying signs that the state wants to tighten control over agricultural production. At the same time, some of the policies put forward by the government make relative sense, in particular those reported by Daily NK (and have not been confirmed by the government). In conclusion, the situation appears concerning and could reasonably be called a “crisis”, but it still does not appear to be in disaster territory. This could change quickly depending on weather conditions and government policies, particularly on border trade.

 

A note of caution

It’s important to bear in mind that the North Korean regime carefully plans what messages it wants to send to the outside world. It’s not always clear exactly what that message is, but it does exist. The government has a purpose in holding a public meeting of this sort, and in telling the world about it. That’s not saying the regime is being dishonest about the situation, but they do have a clear incentive to let China first and foremost, but also the international community at large, know that they need food assistance. It could also be directed towards the broader international community, and there have been reports that the government has been in talks with UN organs about food aid.

 

The food situation and Covid-19

North Korea’s food situation has made a peculiar and sad journey over the past few years. During Kim Jong-un’s first few years in power, agricultural production increased for the most part, a pattern that began already under Kim Jong-il. The food situation overall continued to seem stabile, for the most part, throughout the “maximum pressure” and negotiations of sanctions in 2017–2019. Things really became problematic when North Korea shut its borders to foreign trade in the winter of 2020 to stave off Covid-19. Although North Korea doesn’t (openly) import much food, its agricultural system relies on imports of fertilizer and some agricultural equipment, and spare parts for tractors and machines.

The border closure also significantly disrupted the flow of information from the country. Because of the government’s strict enforcement of border controls, it has become significantly more dangerous and difficult for independent organizations (mostly based in South Korea) with sources inside the country to keep in regular contact, and traders and smugglers cannot venture over to China in the same way they normally have since the early 2000s. North Korea has always been a closed society, but this is even more true since the beginning of the pandemic.

 

What does the state say?

To understand how the North Korean government sees the agricultural situation, it’s worth looking in-depth at the summary report published by Rodong Sinmun today (March 2nd, 2023). The current spotlight on agriculture is really part of a longer focus that began in 2021, and isn’t as sudden as the global interest in it (my emphasis throughout the text):

The plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee had a discussion of historic significance to comprehensively analyze and review the work for 2022, the first year of implementing the programme for the rural revolution in the new era, and further concretize the important tasks and long-term objectives for putting the agricultural production on a stable and sustained growth track and the urgent tasks arising at the present stage of the national economic development and the practical ways for carrying them out.

North Korean parlance has a way of making every issue “the most important”, but it’s very clear that agriculture is explicitly front and center on the economic policy agenda:

The concluding speech raised again the revolutionary change of the rural communities at the present stage of struggle as an important revolutionary task for achieving the prosperity and development of the state and the promotion of the people’s well-being, and put forward the principled matters to be maintained in implementing the programme for the socialist rural revolution in a perfect way. 

It referred to the intention of the Party Central Committee which set the attainment of the grain production goal as the first target of the 12 major goals for the national economic development and the main purpose of the current enlarged plenary meeting, and raised the main goals and tasks for agricultural development.

The problem is, of course, what to do in practice. The report is short on specifics and concrete details, and most statements related to policy appear to advocate modernization for the sake of it, but with what resources? Highlighting the role of irrigation and mechanization suggests the government does have a sense of the most central challenges on the ground, but to develop these areas, North Korea would need to import both machinery and spare parts:

It is necessary to set it as a priority task in ensuring the stable development of agriculture at present to accelerate the completion of the overall irrigation system to cope with abnormal climatic phenomena, and dynamically push ahead with the irrigation project planned for this year and perfect the irrigation system of the country in the period of the five-year plan.

The machine-building industry and agricultural sectors should produce and supply to the rural communities more new and high-efficient farm machines which are the most necessary and effective in putting the agricultural production on a modern and advanced basis, while steadily propelling the work for renovating the farm machine sector in an innovative way. 

From a policy perspective, the emphasis on the role of the state is worrying. In other policy areas, North Korean rhetoric over the past few years has been clear that the state seeks to take back control over the direction of the economy from markets and other non-government players. Further centralizing state control over agriculture could be devastating for efficiency, but I’m not sure this section of the report must be read that way. Rather, it could be about local government organs supporting farmers with what they need (again, unclear with what money):

In order to increase the nationwide agricultural output, attention should be paid to overcoming the lopsidedness in the guidance on farming and keeping the balance to be responsible for farming as a whole and it is important to concentrate on increasing the per-hectare yield at all the farms. This is an important principle for guidance on the agricultural production.

The General Secretary stressed the need to enhance the role of the provincial, city and county guidance organs and all the farms in attaining the long-term objectives of agricultural development.

[…] 

The concluding speech put forward the measures for further expanding the rural construction this year and the policy-oriented tasks to be prioritized and pushed forward with by cities and counties.

In order to attain the gigantic long-term objectives of rural development, it is necessary to decisively strengthen the Party guidance over the agricultural sector and improve the rural Party work.

[…]

He stressed the need for all Party organizations to intensify the struggle against the practices of weakening the organizational and executive power of the Cabinet, the economic headquarters of the country, and thoroughly orient and subordinate the Party work to the implementation of the Party’s policies, thus getting their working efficiency verified in the practical struggle for attaining the 12 major goals for the development of the national economy this year.

 

Reports from independent sources

A few recent articles from Daily NK (henceforth DNK) shine interesting light on the situation. Their reporting gives the impression of a protracted, difficult situation rather than a sudden emergency. DNK reports, for example, that the North Korean currency has strengthened against foreign currencies with expectations that trade may soon begin again:

Because hopes of expanded trade have been frustrated several times before, North Koreans are not rushing out to secure foreign exchange even when the government hands down orders regarding the expansion of trade.

According to Daily NK’s recent survey of North Korean currency rates and market prices, the US dollar was trading at KPW 8,400 in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province as of Feb. 19.

As that figure represents a mere 0.2% increase from the previous survey on Feb. 5, when the dollar was trading at KPW 8,380, the rate does not appear to have changed significantly.

In Pyongyang as well, the dollar was trading at KPW 8,360, more or less what it was on Feb. 5, when it was trading at KPW 8,370.

[…]

With rising expectations of reopened trade repeatedly dashed over the last three years, trade-related directives from the North Korean authorities are not immediately translating into renewed trade, a reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK recently, speaking on condition of anonymity.

In fact, North Korean authorities issued orders on Feb. 10 to provincial trading agencies calling for submissions of general plans for import and export activities and foreign currency acquisition.

The reporting partner said trade has failed to restart several times during the COVID period even after the authorities said it would.

“As long as the government issues no clear permissions [to resume] trade, orders to merely prepare [to restart trade] are not leading people to buy yuan,” he said. 

DNK also reports that the steep, recent climb in food prices may have been generated by signals from the state that its food reserves increasingly need to be replenished. These price hikes are very significant, and far larger than normal:

North Korean market rice prices have recently skyrocketed after holding steady since last November’s harvest. A nationwide campaign of soliciting donations of “patriotic rice” may have helped fuel the dramatic rise in market rice prices.

According to Daily NK’s regular survey of market prices in North Korea, a kilogram of rice in Pyongyang’s markets cost KPW 6,000 as of Feb. 19. On Feb. 5, it cost just KPW 5,200, meaning the price climbed 15% in just two weeks.

Thus, the price of rice in Pyongyang climbed about KPW 6,000 for the first time in three months, having held steady in the KPW 5,000 to 6,000 range since last November.

The price of rice climbed in other regions, too. The price of rice in Sinuiju and Hyesan climbed 9% and 5%, respectively, between Feb. 5 and Feb. 19.

[…]

The recent spike in North Korean rice prices is smaller than the climb immediately following the border closure; however, the spike is much steeper that the usual increase in prices early in the new year.

On the other hand, the price of corn in North Korean markets has trended differently from region to region.

A kilogram of corn cost KPW 2,700 in Pyongyang as of Feb. 19, 6% less than it did on Feb. 5, when it cost KWP 2,900.

This means that while demand for rice has increased in Pyongyang, demand for corn has fallen.

In Sinuiju, a kilogram of corn cost KPW 3,000 as of Feb. 19, the same as it did earlier in the month. On the other hand, in Hyesan, the price of corn has climbed. A kilogram of corn in Hyesan’s markets cost KPW 3,300 as of Feb. 19, 6% more than it did on Feb. 5, when it cost just KPW 3,100. In Hyesan, the price of rice and corn both rose 5 to 6%. 

The state is both supporting market prices more through grain distribution, but also demanding more from the people. This means that while prices have been kept somewhat stable by the state opening its storage houses for some public distribution during the winter, the state is signaling shortages by demanding more rice from the public:

The recent climb in market rice prices appears influenced by the country’s nationwide campaign for “patriotic rice” contributions and insufficient supplies at official grain shops.

Daily NK recently reported through a source in North Hamgyong Province that North Korea is asking all citizens to contribute at least 5 kilograms of “patriotic rice.”

There are price differences region to region, but since rice generally costs twice as much as corn, the North Korean government is treating 10 kilograms of corn as equal to five kilograms of rice when accepting donations. In fact, many North Koreans are donating whichever grain is cheaper in their areas of residence. As a result, rice prices have spiked sharply in Pyongyang and Sinuiju, where rice had been relatively cheap compared to corn.

Moreover, entering February, state-run food shops have sold only small amounts grain to consumers, which appears to have helped contribute to the spike in market grain prices. 

Thanks to DNK, we also have some sense of at least what some North Koreans have been told about the plenary meeting on agricultural issues. Interestingly, the policies mentioned appear much more prudent and wise than those included in the Rodong Sinmun report:

In particular, North Korea’s government ordered each province to secure irrigation facilities appropriate for their geographic conditions and draw up plans to ensure water for terraced fields, calling irrigation facilities that work no matter what the climatic conditions “the most important issue.”

North Korea’s leadership also ordered the preparation of various data, including soil analyses of farmland, analyses of irrigation conditions and analyses of progress in agricultural mechanization.

[]

The province’s authorities also ordered the writing of a draft plan for scientific farming in accordance with soil and lot conditions, and called on officials to hurry construction of modern agricultural housing as per this year’s plans, the source said.

How far these measures can go is very hard to tell and, again, no major change will occur unless the state dedicates significant resources to agricultural development. That would mean moving resources from higher-priority areas, which the state is unlikely to do in the near future.

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North Korean rice prices stabilize in September

Friday, September 23rd, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Following a quite usual pattern, rice prices have stabilized in the past few weeks after climbing during July, the country’s “lean season” in food. Daily NK reports:

North Korean rice prices appear to be falling this month after climbing past KPW 6,000 a kilogram in late July.

According to Daily NK’s regular survey of North Korean market prices, a kilogram of rice in Pyongyang cost KPW 5,600 as of Sept. 18. This is about 11% less than it cost on July 26, when a kilogram of rice climbed to KPW 6,280.

In fact, the price of rice in Pyongyang has continued to fall since the July 26 survey.

In other regions such as Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province and Hyesan, Yanggang Province as well, rice prices have continued to drop, falling 8 to 12% since late July.

It appears rice prices are falling from July because double-cropped wheat, barley and potatoes have been harvested, and because the authorities provided some North Koreans with unglutinous rice, glutinous rice, wheat flour and other foodstuffs earlier this month to mark the anniversary of North Korea’s founding on Sept. 9.

However, the provisions were primarily aimed at Pyongyang residents and cadres of state agencies. Ordinary people in the provinces received nothing in particular.

According to the source, in some regions such as Yanggang Province, rice of relatively poor quality is currently circulating in markets. Considering the poor state of the musty, moldy rice, it appears some low-quality rice in military storage found its way into markets after it was given to soldiers.

North Korean authorities recently ordered officials dispatched overseas to obtain grains such as unglutinoius rice, corn and soybeans. However, the authorities have yet to provide the imported grains to ordinary people.

According to another source in the country, some military units have gone directly to Nampo, where the imported grain is being stored, to load up on unglutinous rice.

(Source and full article: Seulkee Jang, “N. Korean rice prices fall after climbing past KPW 6,000 per kilogram in late July,” Daily NK, 23 September, 2022.)

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Is the North Korean economy in crisis territory?

Thursday, September 8th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Is the North Korean economy in a crisis following years of tough sanctions and the Covid-19 border closure? In a new report, the Bank of Korea’s answer is yes. They point to factors such as vast price increases on several basic goods to show that shortages have led to a price inflation virtually across the board for crucial consumer products:

The price of sugar in North Korea has multiplied by a factor of 8.3 between 2017 and late June of this year, from 5,201 won to 43,000 won per kilogram. During the same time period, the price of flour grew 3.7 times in the country as well, from 5,029 won to 18,700 won per kilogram.

Sugar and flour are two of the main food products North Korea imports from other countries. The extent to which their prices jumped in North Korea exceeds what might be observed in South Korea today due to high inflation. What could have happened in North Korea in the past five years to occasion such a surge in prices?

On Monday, the Bank of Korea published a report titled “North Korea’s Economy in the Past Five Years and Its Future Outlook,” which pointed to how the country’s economic environment changed during the time period. In a nutshell, the report argued that North Korea’s economy has entered yet another period of crisis after the 2000s, when its economy grew, following the 1990s, when the country experienced an economic crisis and a famine, also known as the Arduous March. North Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 2.4% on average every year from 2017 to 2021 and is estimated to have dropped by a total of 11.4% during this time period.

What prompted the crisis in North Korea were economic sanctions against the country as well as border closures due to COVID-19.

(Source: Park Jong-O, “Why the price of sugar went up 726% in N. Korea over the last 5 years”, Hankyoreh, September 6th, 2022.)

Broadly speaking, given the data available, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion. At the same time, it is crucial to keep a few things in mind. First, much of the economy is adapted to a situation with very little foreign trade, because even in a normal year, North Korea’s external trade is exceptionally small compared with most countries in the world.
Second, there’s like to be considerable regional variation in the economic situation. Transportation inside North Korea has improved considerably over the last 10-15 years but getting goods from, say Hyesan in the northeast to Pyongyang, or a southern city like Sariwon, is still difficult, complicated and time consuming. So we are not necessarily talking about one, unified market with similar conditions across the country, but rather about a very fractured system.

Third, the word “crisis” in the context of the North Korean economy comes with very serious connotations since the famine of the 1990s. But we are decidedly not talking about a situation with mass starvation, and the Bank of Korea acknowledges this. Because of the expansion of the market system, the economy can respond very differently to shortages today than it could in the 1990s and early 2000s. Consumers can and likely have switched to less desired goods that can be procured and produced domestically. Both flour and sugar can, after all, to some extent be substituted for less desired but more easily available goods. We’ve also seen an increase in the price over corn over rice, which exemplifies this well: when the more desired good (rice) becomes more expensive, a greater number of people switch over to corn. This does suggest economic conditions have worsened, but not necessarily that they are disastrous.

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North Korea seeking rice donations abroad

Wednesday, September 7th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

I’m not convinced the main point of this news report is that North Korean state representatives have reached out specifically to Indian representatives. Rather, this suggests a much wider campaign, with North Korean diplomats and other functionaries posted abroad ordered to scout around for possible donations from abroad. Voice of America:

VOA’s Korean Service has learned that Pyongyang has turned to India for rice, its staple food, which it usually imports from China.

Manpreet Singh, executive president of the Indian Chamber of International Business, an organization that helps small to midsize Indian companies expand globally, told the Korean Service in an August 30 email that North Korean Embassy officials visited the organization in New Delhi.

“We have been approached by the Embassy to look at possibilities for donations of rice” as “floods destroyed most of the crop,” said Singh.

North Korea’s U.N. Mission in New York City did not respond to VOA Korean Service’s questions about its food situation and whether it is seeking outside aid. North Korea has dismissed South Korea’s offer of economic aid in exchange for its denuclearization, a deal outlined in South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s “audacious initiative,” introduced August 15.

(Source and full article: Jiha Ham, “North Korea Turns to India for Rice Amid Food Shortages,” Voice of America, September 7th, 2022.)

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Market conditions in North Korea, amid rising prices

Monday, July 11th, 2022

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Unfortunately, Daily NK recently ceased general publication of their detailed price data, but a recent report details how prices are rising in the country. In combination with the crackdown on unauthorized small-scale trade, conditions are tough for the many North Koreans sustaining themselves through market trade:

A recent spike in the price of staples such as rice and corn at North Korean markets is making things even tougher for ordinary people in the country.

A source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Wednesday that the price of rice at markets in the city of Hyesan has been increasing since the beginning of last month.

Moreover, since June 30, the price of one kilogram of rice has gone above KPW 6,000, leaving more North Koreans without access to grain and stoking anxiety among the public, the source said.

He also reported that rising food prices have made things even harder for street vendors, who were already hit hard when the North Korean authorities closed the national borders  and intensified crackdowns on the vendors.

According to the source, one resident of Hyesan who supports herself by selling rice cakes on the street has made few sales since June. Crackdowns by the Ministry of Social Security have kept her from selling rice cakes, putting her further in debt.

Without any income, the woman cannot even keep up with the interest on the loans she took out to fund her business. If she misses a second deadline for making her interest payment, the interest will balloon and her credit will collapse, leaving her unable to borrow any more money, he explained.

On top of her predicament, food prices in the market continue to rise, and the woman is now afraid she will become completely destitute.

“Even though the ‘barley hump’ has passed, food prices just keep getting higher and higher. The mood among the populace is so grim that some are afraid people will resort to cannibalism if things keep on like this. Many people are so famished because of the high cost of food that they can’t even go to work,” the source said.

(Source: Lee Chae-un, “Recent spike in rice and corn prices make things even more difficult for ordinary N. Koreans,” Daily NK, July 8th, 2022.)

Price data from Rimjingang also reflects this trend. Prices in their data set went from 5,400 won/kg for rice on June 10th, to 6,700 on the 17th and 6,600 on the 24th, and stabilized somewhat at 6,300 won on July 8th. In USD terms, that’s an increase from 0,72/kg to 0,86 most recently, an increase of almost 20 percent.

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(Updated) North Korea’s 2022 flooding season

Friday, July 1st, 2022

North Korea’s flooding season has begun. AP:

North Korea’s weather authorities predicted this year’s rainy season would start in late June and issued alerts for torrential downpours in most of its regions from Monday through Wednesday.

The official Korean Central News Agency said Tuesday that authorities in the North’s central and southwestern regions “have concentrated all forces and means on the work to cope with possible flood and typhoon damage.”

Officials and workers were working to protect crops, equipment at metal and chemical industrial establishments, power plant facilities and fishing boats from heavy rains, KCNA reported. It said the country’s anti-disaster agency was reviewing the readiness of emergency workers and medical staff.

KCNA said North Korean officials are urging residents and laborers to abide by pandemic-related restrictions during the country’s monsoon season. It said medical workers were ready to deal with any potential major health issues and officials were working to ensure epidemic control measures at shelters for people evacuated from flood-damaged areas.

As flooding spreads, the work to contain the damage ramps up. As state media reported on June 30th:

Officials and working people across the country are striving to minimize the damage by disastrous abnormal weather to the crops.

As soon as a warning on downpour was issued, the North Hwanghae Provincial Party Committee sent its officials to reservoirs, emptying gates and drainage pumping stations and ensured that officials in cities and counties went to the medium and small rivers and co-op farms in their areas to take measures for flood damage prevention. The province also pays attention to the threshing and keeping of wheat and barley.

South Hwanghae Province takes the best possible steps to send powerful forces and means to stricken areas in an emergency. Hundreds of excavators, lorries, tractors, etc. are ready to go to the afflicted areas.

(Source: “Proactive Efforts Made in DPRK to Minimize Damage by Flood to Crops,” Korean Central News Agency, June 30th, 2022.)

How well prepared can we presume North Korea to be to meet this year’s floods? Over the past few years, the regime has directed increasing attention and effort to disaster risk mitigation. It is obviously not a coincidence that Premier Kim Tok Hun inspected the State Hydro-meteorological Administration and the State Emergency Disaster Committee this week:

Learning in detail about the weather observation of the State Hydro-meteorological Administration, he said that it is very important to ensure the exactness and promptness of weather forecast in guaranteeing the successful implementation of the state policy tasks for the latter half of the year, including the grain production plan for this year, set forth at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth WPK Central Committee.

He stressed the need to minimize the damage from such disastrous weather phenomena as typhoon and downpour by enhancing the level of scientific forecast and analysis of the ever-changing weather conditions and their effect.
Visiting the State Emergency Disaster Committee, the premier called on all the sectors and units out in the campaign for preventing damage in rainy season to swiftly cope with any emergency and meticulously organize the work for protecting the state assets and ensuring the normal economic activity, regarding it as a core issue to protect the safety of the people.

He also called for establishing a proper work system and order to control in a stable way any crisis under the state’s unified direction and push ahead with the work for securing enough means and materials needed to tide over the crisis.

(Source: “Premier Inspects Hydro-meteorological Administration and Emergency Disaster Committee,” Korean Central News Agency, 29/6/22.)

I will continue to post updates on the events here as they are reported.

Update 10/7/22: The raining continues. From Reuters:

North Korean towns along the border with China were flooded this week after heavy rain, threatening to exacerbate an already critical food and economic situation in the country.

North Korea state broadcasters said the city of Sinuiju had reported its heaviest rainfall of the year on Thursday, with at least 132.5 mm (5.2 inches) of rain by 4 p.m.

To the east, in North Hamgyong Province, officials were working to ensure water supplies remained sanitary by supervising sewage disposal and ensuring that residents boiled water before drinking, state news agency KCNA reported.

North Korea has reported an epidemic of an unspecified intestinal disease – suspected by South Korean officials to be cholera or typhoid – and has blamed foreign objects from the border with South Korea for sparking a COVID-19 outbreak.

(Source: “North Korean streets flooded as heavy rains exacerbate economic crisis,” Reuters, July 8th, 2022.)

Meanwhile, more state publications that focus on disaster management and planning. Rodong Sinmun: 

Scientists and officials of the State Hydro-meteorological Administration and the Academy of Agricultural Science in the DPRK have jointly conducted the crop growth forecast to cope with the unfavorable weather conditions.

A command group consisting of guidance and research forces from the two units publishes a bulletin on the crop growth forecast at 10-day intervals.

The State Hydro-meteorological Administration strengthens the grasp and analysis of the mean temperature, precipitation, sunshine rate and current agricultural climate conditions in liaison with the meteorological observatories across the country. And it provides the Academy of Agricultural Science with the basic information on the predicted agricultural weather conditions.

The Academy of Agricultural Science informs, through the forecast bulletin, of detailed agricultural technological measures according to cereal, vegetable, industrial crops, fruit and other sectors. It also presents to each issue of the bulletin excellent experiences on farming, agricultural sci-tech common knowledge, advanced farming technological data and answers to the questions conducive to the farming works in corresponding period.

(Source: “DPRK Pays Efforts to Crop Growth Forecast,” Rodong Sinmun, July 7th, 2022.)

 

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Some brief thoughts about North Korea’s food situation, late June 2021

Wednesday, June 23rd, 2021

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

By all accounts, the current food situation in North Korea appears difficult. It’s a crucially important topic that I unfortunately have not had much time to follow over the past few weeks. A few brief thoughts:

First, it’s important to keep in mind when hearing phrases such as “worst in a decade” that North Korea went through an actual famine in the 1990s and early 2000s. So that the food situation has gotten better over the last decade, while the country was arguably still rebounding from the famine, should not come as a surprise.

Second, it’s difficult to tell precisely how bad things are. Food production estimates, though only approximations, paint a picture of relative shortage compared to the past few years, but still not near disaster levels. North Korean authorities and international organs often sound the alarm bell over looming disasters, while little follow-up is done about what actually happened in the end. Anyone remember the famine warnings in early 2019, by the state and some foreign analysts alike? It’s impossible to tell how representative this report by Daily NK is, but if it’s true, the government is failing to stabilize prices because consumers choose not to buy rice in bulk for cheaper but lower quality from state-owned stores. If the country was approaching a genuine famine, this likely wouldn’t be the case.

Third, all this said, things do seem difficult. Bill Brown outlines in an excellent and thorough report here some of the alarming signs: relatively major fluctuations in both exchange rates and food prices. Although price levels aren’t at levels never seen before, fluctuations like this are relatively unusual. I suspect much of it is driven by future expectations of shortages based on information suggesting that the state will not open the border to China for trade within the foreseeable future.

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Kim Jong-un’s claim of the “worst-ever situation”

Sunday, April 18th, 2021

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Perhaps I am late to the game already (the long weekend here in Israel is to blame for that), but it has been puzzling to see the media reporting on Kim Jong-un’s claim that North Korea faces its “worst-ever” economic situation at the moment, under both international sanctions and a self-imposed border lockdown.

It seems that Kim’s words have been misinterpreted or lost in translation. Colleagues at 38 North have rightly and importantly pointed out that the original Korean-language statement is not nearly as drastic. This is often the case with KCNA articles and translated statements from North Korea:

In the vernacular report, however, this term read kuknanhan (극난한), which would be better translated as “very hard” or even “extremely difficult.”[2] North Korea’s English-language media sometimes omit passages or provide translations that are different from the vernacular text, and without analyzing years’ worth of data, it is impossible to conclude whether they do so deliberately, or if they are simply oversights.

It is clear, however, that Kim did not say “the worst-ever situation” at this event. Even if he had, the North Korean leader has made similar remarks in connection with the country’s current circumstances in recent months. For example, Kim’s opening address at the Eighth Party Congress in January referred to the past five years as a period of “unprecedented, worst-ever trials.”

None of this means that the situation is not bad. But “worst-ever” would be extremely drastic for a country where the failings of the economic system led to a famine in the 1990s and early 2000s that took the lives of between 600,000-1.5 million people. Today’s conditions simply aren’t grave enough to warrant such comparisons.

Precisely how difficult conditions are remains hard to tell. The Russian ambassador to North Korea recently gave an interview where he said that the country’s food situation is not at all catastrophic, and that there are no signs suggesting an ongoing famine. He is probably right, but at the same time, we should be careful not to extrapolate too much about the situation in the provinces, for example, based on an assessment of the store shelves in Pyongyang. The country’s society is highly stratified and its economy relatively fragmented. The situation in one locality may well be much more dire than in another.

At the same time, we should also be careful not to take Kim Jong-un at his word. What, except for Kim’s own statement, suggests that today’s situation is worse than the one in 1995, after both economic collapse and heavy flooding took a severe toll on the economy? Sure, things are incredibly messy right now, a view that both circumstances and data support. Kim’s own statement, not least, is another solid data point showing just how grim things appear to be. But famine, meaning large numbers of people dying from starvation or malnourishment, is simply a different dimensions. Let us hope that North Korea does not get there, neither now nor in the future.

There are reasons to believe that it will not. The market system, for its faults and flaws, is able to react to changes in supply and demand, unlike the state distribution system in the 1990s. Moreover, China would likely step in with serious quantities of food aid if the situation got truly disastrous. Many signs suggest that North Korea and China expect to resume and even expand trade in the short-term. Should a drastic need arise, China would likely increase humanitarian shipments as well, although it is far from certain.

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