Posts Tagged ‘Sanctions’

Daily NK: North Korean laborers reach Russian construction sites despite sanctions

Wednesday, July 24th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Daily NK reports:

“Recently, there have been many North Korean workers coming in to Russia. They are arriving at Khabarovsk Station via Tumangang Station. North Korean workers are usually dispatched to Khabarovsk and Ussuriysk and most of them are construction workers,” a source familiar with local affairs told Daily NK.

According to the source, a considerable number of new laborers are being deployed to Russian construction sites as well as some factories and logging sites.

In an interim report submitted to the United Nations in March, Russia said that the number of North Korean workers staying in Russia has declined from 30,023 at the end of 2017 to 11,490 at the end of 2018. Although the number with officially granted visas may have declined, it is believed that these new workers are entering Russia using methods other than a work visa, such as student or temporary stay visas.

It has been reported that in addition to the hard labor, those working in Russia have poor working conditions. They are cooking and sleeping at the same construction site at which they are working.

“North Korean workers are working at a building that is attached to the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok’s Russky Island, and work an average of 15 hours per day from 5:00 am to 9:00 pm or even until 11:00 pm,” he said.

“The daylight is long these days in Russia, so they are working until late in the night without lighting. North Korean workers are really angry because they are worked like dogs. And even though they are working so hard, they do not have much left after paying $1200 dollars to the North Korean company they work for.”

Even under such dire circumstances, North Korean laborers still value being sent to Russia because they can make significantly more money than they can in North Korea.

Some of the highly skilled North Korean workers who have been working in Russia for more than three years are said to be finding their own work under the condition that they pay $1000~$1300 dollars to the state enterprise as a loyalty contribution.

“Those with good skills are freelancing. Some even make $2000~$3000 dollars a month,” a separate source in Russia told Daily NK.

“Russian companies also prefer North Korean workers. Their wages are cheap and they are skilled and work very fast. That is why Russian construction companies prefer to hire them.”

Currently in Russia, there are about 23 North Korean enterprises including Rungrado, Namgyong, Cholsan Trading Company, and Number 17 Construction Company that manage North Korean workers. “A Khabarovsk-based North Korean trading company manages about 2000 North Korean workers,” said the source.

However, it has been reported that recently-dispatched North Korean workers in Russia cannot freely move or contact the outside world as they are under tighter surveillance.

Source:
North Korean laborers reach Russian construction sites despite sanctions
Jang Seul Gi
Daily NK
2019-07-24

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China-North Korea trade up in first half of 2019

Wednesday, July 24th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A fairly minor recovery from an already low level, one should bear in mind. SCMP reports:

China’s trade with North Korea recovered in the first half of this year after a sharp fall in 2018, Beijing said on Tuesday.

The announcement comes as ties between the countries improve, with Chinese President Xi Jinping making his first state visit to Pyongyang last month.

Total trade with North Korea reached US$1.25 billion between January and June, up 14.3 per cent compared to the same period a year earlier, Ministry of Commerce figures showed.

Exports to North Korea amounted to US$1.14 billion – a rise of 15.5 per cent – while imports rose 3.2 per cent to US$110 million.

China remains North Korea’s sole military ally and biggest trading partner. Trade in 2018 was worth US$2.7 billion, down 48.2 per cent year on year, the Seoul-funded Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency said last week.

North Korea’s trade with China fell sharply in 2018, taking its overall foreign trade to less than US$3 billion for the first time since North Korean leader Kim Jong-un took power in 2011.

[…]

Zhang Baohui, director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, said China was “doing its work under the UN sanctions regime” but that North Korea might have the strength to work through its economic hardships.

“The country is always economically isolated from the rest of the world, and North Korean people are used to this situation. In fact, self-reliance has been their way of life for a very long time,” Zhang said.

Article source:

China-North Korea trade up 14.3 per cent in first half to US$1.25 billion
Lee Jeong-ho
South China Morning Post
2019-07-24

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Taxes increase on some North Korean markets

Friday, May 3rd, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This sort of news is very interesting, particularly in context: I’ve heard from people who deal with North Korean firms that some of them have received orders to tighten up their accounting, and report their assets to the state in greater detail. Taken together, these snippets of information suggest an overall difficult economic situation, though not desperate or in crisis-mode, where the state is taking more and more measures to drive in cash from the public.

Daily NK:

Sales fees levied on private distributors have risen in some areas of North Korea. The fees are managed by North Korea’s collection agency and essentially provide a source of tax revenue for the state. Private distributors are expressing discontent over the changes as many are suffering under the country’s already poor economic conditions.

“The authorities recently began demanding outrageous and unfair selling fees from private distributors,” said a South Pyongan Province-based source on April 25. “Collection offices (i.e. tax offices) attached to local people’s committees are required to pay varying fees depending on the product, and the number of fees have been doubled.”

These de facto tax offices were established in each city and county as part of the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measure in 2003 and are managed by the Ministry of Financial Administration. The offices collect fees for land use, market stalls, and various other reasons.

“The authorities are demanding a huge amount of fees to gain control over and restrict the activities of private business people who live in Pyongsong but bring in products from Sinuiju, Rajin-Sonbong, Nampo and Hyesan,” said a separate source in South Pyongan Province.

“Soybean oil sellers, for example, had to pay 3% of their income before, but now have to pay twice that amount.”

The skyrocketing fees are likely due to the fall in tax revenue arising from the economic difficulties the country is facing.

“The government increased the fees they were collecting just as incomes fell among private business people,” she said. “The authorities are simply taking money from the people to make it seem like the state is self-sufficient.”

North Korean authorities have made the fee system more sophisticated while raising fees as part of efforts to generate more income for the regime.

Article source:
North Korea doubles de facto sales tax levied on distributors in some areas
Mun Dong Hui
Daily NK
2019-05-03

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The sanctions relief that North Korea might be asking for

Thursday, February 14th, 2019

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Some interesting reporting by Hankyoreh, citing South Korean government sources familiar with the US-North Korea negotiations, suggests that North Korea is pushing for two concessions from the US:

According to a South Korean government source closely acquainted with the North Korea-US talks, Kim reaffirmed the North’s willingness to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear facilities during the first round of working-level talks in Pyongyang on Feb. 6–8, while demanding the partial loosening of sanctions as a corresponding measure for allowing inspections of the facilities. The North Korean side said it “could offer more generous steps” if the US were to even partially loosen sanctions as a corresponding measure, the source reported.

Politically,  this makes a great deal of sense. Yongbyon dismantlement would make for great photo-ops and video clips, regardless of the actual substantive meaning of such actions. For North Korea, partially loosened sanctions would be highly beneficial for several reasons. For one, it could be a tacit signal to China and Russia that the US will no longer be as vigilant on sanctions monitoring as it has been in the past. Moreover, should North Korea push for the ceiling on its oil imports to be lowered, that would likely save the regime substantial amounts of hard currency that it now has to put towards more expensive, illicit transfers and the like. Gas prices in the country have stabilized over the past few months, but are still higher than in normal times. (I dig into this more in a new working paper published by the Stimson Center, click here to read it.)

And not least, any sanctions exemptions on Mt Kumgang and the like could – hopefully, from the regime’s point of view – be a first step to more South Korean investments and cash flows to tourism in North Korea, one of Kim Jong-un’s hallmark industries.

According to Hankyoreh, none of this is out of the question:

Biegun stated in no uncertain terms that the US would not be able to loosen or lift sanctions. At the same time, he reportedly suggested it may consider loosening sanctions if North Korea were to offer the Yongbyon dismantlement “plus something extra.”

And:

Accordingly, they suggested that if North Korea adopts a more forward-thinking approach on the Yongbyon dismantlement issue during negotiations, the US may grant priority consideration to projects involving inter-Korean cooperation, including partial resumption of the Kaesong Complex and Mt. Kumgang tourism. This prediction was based on the limited range of measures available to the US without touching the current sanctions framework. Indeed, many Korean Peninsula experts have noted that the Mt. Kumgang tourism venture individually would not be in violation of UNSC resolutions and suggested that it should be quickly resumed.

I’m no judicial sanctions expert, but I suspect that this might not be entirely accurate. If sanctions are strenuous enough to prevent South Korean reporters to bring in laptops into North Korea, it’s easy to wonder how large-ish-scale tourism to North Korea through Kumgangsan wouldn’t risk violating sanctions. In a way, the multilateral UN sanctions are easier to loosen in practice. A strong, even informal signal from the US to China could make the latter re-interpret its sanctions interpretations, and make monitoring and enforcement much more loose. Truck traffic has reportedly already increased across the border compared to a few months ago, and it’s a trend that’ll likely become increasingly more pronounced the less vigilant the US is about pushing for rigid sanctions implementation.

Article source:
N. Korea demands partial relaxation of sanctions in exchange for Yongbyon inspections
Kim Ji-eun
Hankyoreh
2019-02-14

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North Korea’s economic growth – from Pyongyang’s perspective

Monday, October 15th, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Has North Korea’s economy been growing under sanctions? That’s what an economist in Pyongyang claims. In a recent interview with Kyodo (published here by Japan Times), Ri Gi Song at Pyongyang’s Institute of Economics at the Academy of Social Sciences, claimed that North Korea’s GDP per capita grew by 3.7 percent in 2017, a year during which the country was virtually banned from selling its most crucial export goods, and faced very harsh conditions for importing crucial resources such as oil and fuel. When factoring in population growth, the GDP-growth-figure diminishes somewhat to 3.2% (see below), but it’s still firmly in the same range.

Strange as it may sound, it is possible to imagine that North Korea’s economy wouldn’t contract severely during a year of sanctions. GDP growth alone is a poor way of measuring long-run, sustained economic growth and progress. While it may sound counter-intuitive, the sanctions, while depressing the economy in certain ways, may have boosted it through other mechanisms. The ban on coal imports from North Korea, for example, may well have boosted certain industries, as this blog has covered in the past. Because exports have dwindled drastically, the price at which North Korean coal can sell – domestically as well as internationally – gets much, much lower than when it could be sold in greater quantities on a somewhat competitive market. So with lower prices for factors of production, industry could certainly experience growth in the short-run. But this would only be a temporary and meaningless boost, since the losses from unsold goods abroad would be much greater.

In other words, Ri may be partially right, but numbers are also likely inflated for political reasons. Here’s an excerpt from the interview, annotated with comments:

North Korea’s economy grew 3.7 percent in 2017, a professor of a think tank in Pyongyang said in brushing aside the view that the country has faced an economic contraction against a backdrop of international sanctions.

Even though North Korean economic data has become somewhat more public and plentiful in the past few years, there are still undeniable political imperatives in publishing data that makes the country appear resilient in the face of sanctions. After all, if sanctions aren’t “working” (whatever that may mean), what’s the point in keeping them? That, of course, doesn’t mean that such figures are accurate, wholly or partially.

Ri Gi Song, a professor of the Institute of Economics at the Academy of Social Sciences, said in a recent interview with Kyodo News that North Korea has achieved economic expansion without depending on other nations.

Well, he would say that, since that is how Juche is spoken. That doesn’t mean it comes from a place of literal belief; it’s simply what you say if you’re a North Korean economist speaking from your official position, and shouldn’t be read as an expression of delusion or the like.

Ri said gross domestic product totaled $30.70 billion in 2017, up from $29.60 billion in 2016. It is very rare for North Korea to disclose its GDP and also the first time that the country’s GDP data in the past two years have been unveiled.

But it is impossible to verify the accuracy of the figures, as the professor did not make public other economic indicators such as consumer spending, investment and inflation rate.

Although a report released by South Korea’s central bank showed in July that the North’s economy shrank 3.5 percent in 2017 from the previous year, Ri shrugged it off, saying Seoul’s calculation is “only an estimation.”

Ri is right that South Korea’s figures are only estimates, albeit careful ones based on models developed and refined (presumably) through years of experience. But the thing is, Ri’s official North Korean figures, too, are only an estimate. Even in the best of situations, no GDP-figure is exactly certain and precise. To calculate as vast of an “object” as a country’s economy, some assumptions inevitably have to be made. One of them is that various forms of reporting is generally accurate.

In the case of North Korea, however, this problem is incomparably worse than in open, democratic free market-economies. Let’s assume for a moment that the North Korean government genuinely is eager and willing to generate real, trustworthy and truthful economic statistics, which in many ways does seem to be the case. Even so, how do you generate accurate accounts reporting in an environment when the going principle for a long time has been that planning targets must be met regardless of actual conditions? And with so many different forms and models of enterprise in action throughout the country, seemingly with little but perhaps improving consistency across the board, how would it be reasonable to expect the North Korean government to be able to calculate a reasonable GDP-figure? That’s not even getting started on the investments-portion, a crucial variable to determine growth. Private investments into partially private enterprises is still technically illegal in North Korea, but there are many signs to suggest that it’s taking place on an increasingly substantive scale.

So, even if the North Korean government’s statistical authorities have all the right intentions, I don’t envy their working conditions one bit.

He said North Korea’s population grew to 25,287,000 last year from 25,159,000 in 2016. Based on the figures, the country’s per capita GDP stood at $1,214 last year, equivalent to that of Myanmar.

This means that the actual growth rate claimed by Ri, factoring in population growth, is 3.2%. This, however, still isn’t the “real” growth rate. To get those numbers, we’d need to factor in inflation, and no reliable numbers are available to let us do that. But on the face of it, judging by the price trends for foreign currency and rice through 2016–2017, inflation wasn’t visibly large or out of the ordinary. Even so, we simply don’t know.

In an attempt to overcome the negative impact of international economic sanctions, North Korea has “developed various technologies” under the spirit of “self-reliance,” Ri said, adding the nation has implemented measures to save the utilization of crude oil, for example.

This is certainly true to an extent. Just look at the masses of North Koreans purchasing solar panels for electricity rather than relying on scantly available government supplies of power. And as mentioned above, there is some sense in this argument, if interpreted in a slightly broader manner, that North Korea’s economy may have experienced some gains in efficiency from sanctions, as people are forced to find new, creative ways to get around increasingly tricky conditions. And industry may have gotten a boost from lower energy prices, as may other consumption, since citizens can theoretically spend more on other items if energy prices fall.

Still, this boost would only be marginal, and temporary at best. It certainly wouldn’t create 3.2 percent growth rates, although it might have contributed.

[…]

Ri acknowledged that North Korea has suffered food shortages, but emphasized that the heavy and light industries as well as the chemical sector have been growing and electric power conditions have been improving.

Amid a thaw in inter-Korean relations, Ri expressed hope for economic cooperation with the South.

Full article:
North Korea’s economy grew 3.7% in 2017, Pyongyang professor estimates
Japan Times/Kyodo
2018-10-13

At the end of the day, as Andray Abrahamian points out, neither North nor South Korea publishes their methodology for calculating North Korea’s growth rates, so all we can do is speculate about the assumptions that go into the models.

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North Korea exports coal as ‘Russian’ to get around sanctions

Tuesday, August 7th, 2018

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Reports Radio Free Asia:

In a move aimed at evading U.N. sanctions, North Korea is exporting coal to foreign buyers by sending shipments first to Russian ports, where the coal is falsely labeled as Russian-origin, North Korean sources say.

The export of North Korean coal is strictly banned under international sanctions punishing Pyongyang for its illicit nuclear weapons program, but North Korea has now opened new routes for trade with Russian help, a trade worker in North Pyongan province told RFA’s Korean Service.

“As sanctions on North Korea came into effect a couple of years ago, export routes for coal were blocked,” RFA’s source said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“So North Korean trading companies have been shipping coal to the ports of Nakhodka and Vladivostok in the southern part of Primorsky Krai, in Russia. North Korean coal is then disguised as having come from Russia and is sent on to other countries under fake documents,” he said.

Loading ports for North Korean coal were formerly at Nampo and Songrim, on North Korea’s west coast close to China, but have now been moved to Chongjin and Wonsan, on the country’s eastern coast close to Russia, he said.

“When North Korean coal arrives at Nakhodka, a Russian company records its time of arrival, the length of the ship’s stay in port, and the amount of coal taken off. They then create false papers including a statement of the coal’s quality,” he said.

With these documents declaring the coal to be of Russian origin, “North Korea now has no problem exporting coal to other countries,” he said.

“The name of the Russian company that my company has been working with is Greenwich, and is located at the port in Nakhodka,” RFA’s source said. “They ask for two dollars per ton to disguise North Korean coal as Russian, and the North Korean trading company pays them right away.”

Still in demand

Also speaking to RFA, a North Korean trade worker based in the Chinese border city of Dandong said that North Korean representatives based in South and North Pyongan provinces collect information on countries needing coal and act as brokers for its export.

“Coal from these western-district mines is very high quality, so there is still a demand for it from other countries even though sanctions are in force,” he said.

A 30 percent deposit from the buying countries is required before the coal begins to move, with 30 percent of the balance due when the coal leaves its Russian port. The remaining 40 percent is then paid when the coal arrives at its final destination, the source said.

“For this three-step payment process, the money is deposited in a “borrowed” Chinese bank account, with the North Korean trading company paying banking fees,” he said.

Some of the coal sent from Russia now goes to South Korea and Japan, RFA’s source said.

“But North Korean company names don’t appear on the shipping papers, so the North Korean trading firms aren’t worried at all,” he said.

Resolve questioned

South Korea’s foreign ministry on Tuesday dismissed allegations that a foreign-flagged ship seen earlier at Nakhodka had delivered North Korean coal to South Korea’s southeastern port of Pohang, claiming the ship’s cargo was of Russian origin, according to an Aug. 7 report by the Yonhap news service.

“Critics here question the left-leaning Moon Jae-in administration’s resolve to curb the transport of North Korean coal,” a source of hard currency for the sanctions-hit Pyongyang regime, Yonhap said.

“But the government has stated that it remains committed to strictly abiding by U.N. mandates despite inter-Korean reconciliation,” Yonhap added.

The United States has meanwhile pointed to what it calls credible reports that Russia is in violation of U.N. sanctions against North Korea, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Aug. 4 urging full compliance with measures aimed at forcing the North to give up its nuclear weapons program.

Article source:
North Korea Exports Coal as ‘Russian’ in Bid to Beat Sanctions
Hyemin Son
Radio Free Asia
2018-08-07

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Lack of fertilizers behind North Korea’s subdued harvest

Saturday, August 4th, 2018

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

History repeats itself, it seems, and shows how fragile North Korea’s more or less autarkic agriculture still is. Much has changed in the way agriculture is managed in the country, to be sure, but the bottleneck of lack of fuel translating into lack of fertilizer, remains. That’s one of the main reasons this harvest is expected to lag behind that of last year. It remains to be seen what actually happens, as actual harvests don’t always correspond with expectations. In any case, things don’t look great. Korea Times:

“With the record heat, food production in North Korea is expected to be reduced by 5-10 percent this year, said Nam Sung-wook, professor at Korea University’s Department of Korean Unification, Diplomacy and Security.

“In particular, a fall in July precipitation will have a negative impact on rice farming,” said Nam, whose study focuses on North Korean agriculture and economy.

However, he said that there was a more fundamental reason ― a lack of fertilizer, agricultural machinery and agricultural chemicals.

“North Korea’s repeated failure year after year to achieve its crop production goal shows that the country does not have the economic conditions to maximize productions,” Nam said. “For example, North Korea cannot produce chemical fertilizers because they are made out of refined crude oil. North Korea’s crude oil imports have been under sanctions since last year.”

He said North Korea’s media often promoted the development of compound fertilizers to increase agricultural production, but those compounds were organic, and there was a limit. Another problem was the way the socialist cooperative farms operated, with no incentives for workers.

“The development of the general economy and the introduction of private farms to give incentives are necessary to increase food production,” he said. “The Rodong Sinmun reports can also be seen as a signal to both South Korea and the U.S., to offer food aid, while also calling on residents to be patient.”

The workers’ party mouthpiece carried front page reports on Thursday and Friday for two consecutive days about the country’s struggle with drought.

Rodong Sinmun also emphasized that solving the food problem was a “pressing task,” as was securing an adequate supply of water.

Article source:

Lack of fertilizers adds to North Korea agriculture crisis
Jung Da-min
Korea Times
2018-08-04

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Further indications that China’s sanctions pressure on North Korea is decreasing

Friday, July 27th, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This blog has previously covered the fact that China’s sanctions pressure on North Korea seems to be decreasing, according to a number of signs, after the spring of summits. No official announcement or the like has been made (which wouldn’t come in any case), but the trend is consistent with China’s previous patterns in sanctions enforcement against North Korea: keep the pressure up while global attention focuses on North Korea, and scale it back once things calm down. A recent NK Pro article lends credence to this view, based on information from sources that have visited the Sino-North Korean border, as well as other visible signs. I won’t copy and paste from it since it’s for subscribers only, but here are some of the main points:

  • Traffic across the Friendship Bridge between Dandong and Sinuiju, estimated to be carrying some 60 percent of Sino-North Korean trade, appears to have gone back to somewhat more normal levels, if not fully to what they would be in normal times. It should be mentioned that estimating traffic by counting trucks – which I have done myself – is a tricky method, since we can’t really know what volumes are inside the trucks. Still, it’s one of few methods that exist for estimating traffic over the bridge.
  • The construction of a bridge between Tumen city in China and Namyang in North Korea, which paused as tensions increased, appears to be continuing. According to NK Pro’s source, China is paying for it all.
  • Chinese tourism to North Korea has spiked in July, as other outlets have reported as well.
  • Gas prices in North Korea have fallen in July, as this blog has also covered before.

None of these indicators give hard evidence that Chinese sanctions enforcement is slacking off, but taken together, they provide a pretty clear picture. I recently spoke to a person who just visited Dandong, and said that traffic remains unusually slow, both according to their own impression and that of local businesspeople. But traffic may be slower on a given day or during a given week for other reasons. At the end of the day, we don’t really know for sure, but taken together, the impression is that things appear to be moving away from “maximum pressure” pretty consistently.

 

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China and Russia blocked US request for North Korea oil suspension at UN

Friday, July 27th, 2018

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Reports NK News:

China and Russia have blocked a U.S. request made at the UN Security Council (UNSC) to stop oil transfers to North Korea, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN – Nikki Haley – confirmed on Friday.

The U.S. made the request following a submission of evidence to the 1718 committee that claimed North Korea conducted up to 89 prohibited ship-to-ship (STS) transfers involving oil in the first five months of 2018.

Haley, speaking alongside U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, reiterated that the U.S. had proposed the complete ban on exporting petroleum products to North Korea as the STS transfers would have exceeded the annual cap for such products established under UNSC Resolution 2397.

“China and Russia blocked it. Now for China and Russia to block it, what are they telling us? Are they telling us that they want to continue supplying this oil?” she said.

“They claim they need more information. We don’t need any more information, the sanctions committee has what it needs, we all know it is going forward, we put pressure today on China and Russia to abide … and to help us to continue with denuclearization,” she added.

Haley was speaking at a press briefing in New York following meetings between herself, Pompeo, UNSC members and officials from Japan and South Korea – including Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha.

Pompeo, who spoke to the press prior to Haley’s comments, said he was also there to update the UNSC on diplomatic progress between the U.S. and the DPRK.

Sanctions enforcement, however, was at the forefront of the discussions and despite China and Russia blocking the U.S. request for the halting of oil transfers to the DPRK, Pompeo said the council was in agreement on other key elements.

“The UN Security Council is united, on the need for final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea as agreed to by Chairman Kim. Members of the UN Security Council and by extension all UN member states have unanimously agreed to fully enforce sanctions on North Korea and we expect them to continue to honor those commitments,” Pompeo said.

Full article:
China, Russia blocked U.S. request for North Korea oil suspension at UN
Hamish Macdonald
NK News
2018-07-20

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Seoul needs sanctions exemptions, official says

Monday, July 23rd, 2018

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

If anyone ever doubted that the US and South Korea are not in lockstep on sanctions…The question is how hard Seoul is pushing behind the scenes, and how hard it is prepared to push. Joongang:

A South Korean delegation that traveled to New York over the past weekend said Seoul needed to be exempted from some international sanctions against the North to implement the Panmunjom Declaration.

The remarks came on the same day that U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterated that sanctions against Pyongyang will remain in place until the North fully denuclearizes.

The rare show of discrepancy between the allies came at an unusually sensitive time between the South and North, after North Korean media excruciated South Korean authorities for what it said was kowtowing to the U.S. on inter-Korean issues.

A local official said Pyongyang appeared to be fed up with Seoul’s reluctance to help the regime wiggle out of sanctions.

South Korea’s official stance has been to support sanctions on the North until the country gives up its nuclear weapons, but from time to time officials have expressed a hope to seek exemptions, especially to work out the cross-border projects that South Korean President Moon Jae-in agreed to with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during their first summit on April 27.

Last Friday in New York, a high-level South Korean official who spoke on the condition of anonymity decided to convey that hope to reporters – just as Pompeo highlighted in a different news conference that all UN member-states unanimously agreed to fully enforce sanctions on the North. The official was part of a delegation led by South Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Kang Kyung-wha, who traveled to New York to co-host a briefing session with Pompeo on peninsular issues for representatives of the UN Security Council.

Soon after the briefing, the official told South Korean correspondents in New York that the South Korean government “needed” some exemption from international sanctions on the North to implement the Panmunjom Declaration, adding that it was asking the international community to grant that exemption as it was leading the North through dialogue and cooperation.

Full article:
Seoul needs sanctions exemption, official says
Jung Hyo-Sik, Yoo Jee-Hye, and Lee Seung-Eun
Joongang Daily
2018-07-23

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