North Korean Economy Watch

A new Congressional Research Service (CRS) report is out on foreign assistance to North Korea. The authors are Mark Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin.

Here is the summary:

Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with over $1.3 billion in assistance: slightly more than 50% for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. Since early 2009, the United States has provided virtually no aid to North Korea, though episodically there have been discussions about resuming large-scale food aid. Additionally, the Obama Administration officials have said that they would be willing to consider other types of aid if North Korea takes steps indicating that it will dismantle its nuclear program, a prospect that most analysts view as increasingly remote. As of March 2014, barring an unexpected breakthrough, there appears little likelihood the Obama Administration will provide large-scale assistance of any type to North Korea in the near future. Members of Congress have a number of tools they could use to influence the development and implementation of aid programs with North Korea.

Food Aid. Large swathes of North Korea’s population have suffered from chronic malnutrition since the mid-1990s. Food aid—largely from China, South Korea, and the United States—has been essential in filling the gap between North Korea’s supply and demand, though since 2009 donations from all countries except China have dwindled to a minimal amount. Observers and activists attribute the North Korea’s malnutrition and occasional starvation problems to food shortages—which at times have been massive—and more fundamentally to the unequal distribution of food caused in large measure by the North Korean government’s deliberate decisions and policies. In 2013, an improved harvest appeared to reduce North Korea’s chronic grain shortfall to some of the lowest levels since the 1990s. Yet outside food groups reported continued malnutrition among vulnerable sectors of the population, especially children. In 2014, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry on North Korea’s human rights conditions found that the North Korean government’s “act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation” amounted to crimes against humanity.

Providing food to North Korea poses a number of dilemmas. Pyongyang has resisted reforms that would allow the equitable distribution of food and help pay for food imports. The North Korean government restricts the ability of donors to operate in the country. Additionally, multiple sources have asserted that some of the food assistance is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or other uses. However, it is likely that food aid has helped feed millions of North Koreans, at times possibly staving off a repeat of the famine conditions that existed in North Korea in the mid-late 1990s, when 5%-10% of the population died. South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s government has indicated that it would be willing to offer North Korea food aid as part of her plan to foster a “new era” in inter-Korean relations. In 2013, the South Korean government donated around $12 million to United Nations humanitarian organizations that supply humanitarian aid, including some food, in North Korea.

Energy Assistance. Between 1995 and 2009, the United States provided around $600 million in energy assistance to North Korea. The aid was given over two time periods—1995-2003 and 2007-2009—in exchange for North Korea freezing its plutonium-related nuclear facilities. In 2008 and 2009, North Korea also took steps to disable these facilities. However, no additional energy assistance has been provided since 2009, when Pyongyang withdrew from the Six-Party Talks—involving North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—over North Korea’s nuclear program. The move followed condemnation and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for North Korea’s April 2009 launch of a suspected long-range missile and May 2009 test of a nuclear device.

Denuclearization Assistance. In 2007 and 2008, the United States gave technical assistance to North Korea’s nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this purpose. However, following North Korea’s actions in the spring of 2009, Congress rejected the Obama Administration’s requests for supplemental funds to use in case of a return to denuclearization. Since then, Congress has not approved and the administration has not requested any funds for denuclearization since North Korea has not agreed to return to the nuclear disarmament process.

You can read the full report here (PDF).

You can download other CRS reports on North Korea here.

This is my first article with Joseph Bermudez. The subject–the December 7 Facotry aka Korean People’s Army Unit 1501.

The detective work used in this article was a lot of fun.

You can read it here on 38 North.

According to Yonhap:

A total of 360 North Koreans fled their home and arrived in South Korea in the first quarter of this year, registering a slight increase from a year earlier, the unification ministry said Tuesday.

According to the data compiled by the ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, 153 North Koreans settled in the South in January, 111 in February and 96 in March.

The figure for the quarter was slightly higher than the 319 entrants for the same period in 2013 and the 352 people in 2012, the data showed.

“The 2014 tally was slightly higher than that of the previous two years, but it remains to be seen until the end of this year if it indicates any significant changes,” a ministry official said.

Last year, a total of 1,516 North Koreans settled in the South, up slightly from 2012 when 1,502 people crossed the border, according to ministry data. South Korea is now home to 26,124 North Koreans.

Here is additional data provided by the Choson Ilbo:

From 2006 until 2012, the annual figure stood between 2,500 and 3,000, but it fell to an annual average of about 1,500 when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un took power.

A ministry official said that the number has dropped because the regime has cracked down on defections. “It has tightened border security and is bringing defectors back to the country,” the official added.

Last year, defectors on average earned W1.41 million (US$1=W1,024) in South Korea, just 64 percent of the country’s average pay of W2.18 million. Unemployment among defectors stood at 9.7 percent, more than three times the average of 2.7 percent.

The Daily NK also reports the numbers.

Read the full stories here:
360 N. Korean defectors arrive in South in Q1
Yonhap
2014-4-8

Fewer N.Korean Defectors Reaching South
Choson Ilbo
2014-5-8

According to Yonhap:

U.S. exports to North Korea jumped nearly 20-fold in February from a year earlier, a U.S. radio report said Tuesday.

The volume of trade between the two countries reached US$1.2 million in February, compared with $62,000 a year earlier, the Voice of America (VOA) reported, citing data compiled by the U.S. Commerce Department.

The VOA said that humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. private agencies accounted for 95 percent, or $1.13 million, of the total U.S. shipment to North Korea in February.

The rest of the U.S. exports to the North included poultry, footwear and plastic products, the radio report said.

The U.S., however, imported nothing from North Korea during the cited period, it said.

Read the full story here:
U.S. exports to N. Korea jumps nearly 20-fold in Feb
Yonhap
2014-4-8

Quanhe Customs House will be the border facility for managing Chinese traffic into Rason (and further down the coast). Within the administration building on the site is a poster advertising the plans to expand the customs house to manage more traffic.

The billboard offers a conceptual image of the new facility, a map of the new location, and some informative copy (in Chinese).

Here is a Google Earth image of the proposed construction site in relation to the existing border compound:

Here is a translation of the Chinese on the sign text:

Introduction of Construction Project of Quanhe (Guanghe) Port

1. The Proposed Location
The proposed site is located in Quanhe Village, Jingxin-Zhen of Hunchun City, north side of Quanhe Road. The project covers an area of 180,000 square meters (map below).

2. Construction Project
The total investment of Quanhe Port Project is 299,331,500 RMB, and the total construction area is 16992m2. including Passenger Security Channel (5445m2), Cargo Inspection Channel (2000m2), House For Frontier Inspection (1680m2), Cargo Storehouse (2000m2), Inspection And Quarantine Site (2400m2), Dormitory Restaurant (2567m2), Garage And Boiler Room (900 m2).

Passenger Security Channel: Including each 6 channels for entry and exit, and another 4 vehicle channels for touring bus. Designed annual passenger capacity is 2 million.

Cargo Inspection Channel: Including each 4 channels for entry and exit of cargo and another 1 channel for passenger. The designed annual cargo capacity is 1.65 million tons.

3. Remaining
The existing inspection building will be used as channels for border trade and tourism after the new facilities getting into operation.

Thanks to Berhhard Seliger for the info!

According to Yonhap:

North Korea has replaced its commerce minister last month, according to state-run media report Saturday, amid efforts to phase out supporters of Jang Song-thaek, the executed uncle of the current leader.

North Korea’s radio broadcaster Pyongyang Broadcasting Station reported that new Commerce Minister Kim Kyong-nam was in attendance at a food festival marking the birth anniversary of the country’s founder.

It was the first time that Kim Kyong-nam was introduced as commerce minister by North Korean media, but it appears likely the replacement took last month during the nationwide election.

Kim’s predecessor Ri Song-ho, who took office in 2012, failed to be re-elected to the Supreme People’s Assembly in the parliamentary election on March 9.

The food event was held from Wednesday through Friday in commemoration of the April 15 birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, the current leader’s grandfather.

Experts say the replacement of the minister post is likely a follow-up measure to last December’s execution of Jang, the once powerful uncle of Kim Jong-un.

The March election was seen by some as a way for young leader Kim Jong-un to fill up the Assembly with people close to him and consolidate his power in the reclusive country.

As of this posting, the new minister has not been announced on KCNA.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea ousts commerce minister
Yonhap
2014-4-5

Pictured above: Sepho, Phyonggang, and Ichon Counties. These three counties are home to the Sepho Tableland Project.

According to KCNA:

DPRK, Mongolia Sign MOUs

Pyongyang, April 2 (KCNA) — A memorandum of understanding on setting up the DPRK-Mongolia friendship joint company between the DPRK and Mongolian governments was inked here on Wednesday.

Present at the signing ceremony from the DPRK side were Ri Ryong Nam, minister of Foreign Trade who doubles as chairman of the DPRK side to the Inter-governmental Committee for Consultation in Economy, Trade, Science and Technology between the DPRK and Mongolia, Hwang Min, vice-minister of Agriculture who is also chairman of the Livestock Management Committee in Sepho Area, and officials concerned and from the Mongolian side were Mongolian Minister of Industry and Agriculture Khaltmaa Battulga who is chairman of the Mongolian side to the Inter-governmental Committee for Consultation in Economy, Trade, Science and Technology between the DPRK and Mongolia and his party and Manibadrakh Ganbold, Mongolian ambassador to the DPRK, and his embassy officials.

A MOU was also signed between the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the DPRK and the Ministry of Labor of Mongolia.

The Sepho Tableland Project was announced on November 9, 2012 (KCNA):

DPRK Premier Stresses Importance of Building Large-scale Stockbreeding Base

Pyongyang, November 9 (KCNA) — Premier Choe Yong Rim learned about the preparations for creating vast grass field in Sepho, Phyonggang and Ichon counties of Kangwon Province and turning it into a large-scale stockbreeding base of the country.

The creation of vast grass field in the counties covering tens of thousands of hectares and the construction of combined processing base for livestock products will bring about an epochal turn in carrying out the party’s policy of improving the standard of people’s living by massively breeding grass-eating domestic animals.

Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il gave instructions to Sepho County several times on developing stockbreeding suited to climatic, natural and topographical conditions, while making continued journey of guidance for people’s happiness.

The dear respected Marshal Kim Jong Un unfolded a plan for transformation of Sepho tableland, true to the intention of the great Generalissimos and brightly indicated the orientation and ways for realizing it.

The premier first learned about the vegetable produced in part of the reclaimed Sepho tableland, looking round the field of a sideline farm of a unit of the Korean People’s Army.

Then, he acquainted himself with the area of reclaimed grass field and soil condition in Sepho County in Songsan area of the Sepho tableland.

A consultative meeting of senior officials of party, state and army was held on the spot.

The participants were briefed on a huge map showing the panoramic view of the field. The meeting discussed the goal of reclaiming grass field in Sepho, Phyonggang and Ichon areas and building stockbreeding base and the issue of providing labor, raw materials and equipment necessary for its reclamation and construction.

The meeting called on all the units to channel efforts into achieving the goal of creating grass field and reclaiming and building stockbreeding base in Sepho, Phyonggang and Ichon areas. The goal reflects the far-reaching plan and unusual wisdom of the Marshal.

Practical issues including the work for keeping the designing ahead of the project and providing raw materials and equipment under a plan were discussed and relevant organization of work was made at the meeting.

The premier, concluding the meeting, called on officials and builders to carry out the behests of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and certainly realize the noble intention of the Marshal to create the socialist fairyland in Sepho, Phyonggang and Ichon areas.

Pictured Above (KBS):  A map of the planned high-speed rail project

UPDATE 4 (2014-4-29): The Choson Ilbo reports that Ms. Choi has returned from the DPRK:

The Organisation for Co-Operation between Railways (OSJD) has decided to hold two major meetings, the Commission on Freight Traffic in 2015 and Conference of General Directors in 2019, in Seoul.

KORAIL president Choi Yeon-hye made the announcement at Gimpo Airport on Monday after returning from an OSJD meeting in Pyongyang. It is unprecedented for an associate rather than full member to host the conference.

The OSJD is an organization of 27 former and current communist countries, including Russia, China and North Korea.

“We don’t know yet whether the North will attend the meetings in 2015 and 2019, but the participants unanimously decided to hold them here, and the North didn’t oppose it, so we expect them to come,” she added.

The annual conference of general directors alternatively takes place in Asia and Europe, but exceptionally the 2019 meeting will also be held in Asia following the 2018 meeting in Vietnam.

The government here is keen to work with the railway body to link South Korea to Eurasia via North Korea.

Here is coverage in Yonhap.

UPDATE 3 (2014-4-22): The Choson Ilbo reports that the head of Korail has left for the DPRK:

KORAIL president Choi Yeon-hye is appropriately on her way to North Korea by train.

Choi left for Pyongyang on a train from Beijing on Monday afternoon to attend a meeting of the Organisation for Co-Operation between Railways (OSJD), KORAIL said Monday.

The OSJD is an organization of 27 former and current communist countries, including Russia, China and North Korea.

The government approved Choi’s request to visit to the North on Sunday after the North sent her a letter of invitation. She got a visa from the North Korean Embassy in Beijing the same day.

The train runs from Beijing to the North Korean border city of Sinuiju in 24 hours, where she switches trains for the 225 km stretch to Pyongyang.

A KORAIL executive said, “Choi’s visit is the North’s first approval of a South Korean official’s visit” since the South imposed sanctions against North Korea in 2010.

She is the first senior South Korean figure to visit Pyongyang since the inter-Korean summit in 2007.

President Park Geun-hye is keen to connect South Korea to Eurasia by railway, which requires cooperation from the OSJD.

Here is coverage in Yonhap.

UPDATE 2 (2014-4-7): KBS has a report (in Korean) on the project. See the report here. Seoul Village has translated some of the details.

Construction would last 6 years, with two waves that have not been fully detailed yet:
1st stretches: 80 km
From the North: Sinujiu Station – Tongrim Station (Sinujiu-Dongnim, 40 km)
From the South: Kaesong – Yonan (Gaesong-Yeonan, 40 km)
2nd stretches: 296 km

From the North: Tongrim – Chongju – Sinanju – Pyongyang (Dongnim-Jeongju-Sinanju-Pyongyang, 147 km)
From the South: Yonan – Haeju – Sariwon – Pyongyang (Yeonan-Haeju-Sariwon-Pyongyang, 149 km)

UPDATE 1 (2014-4-7): Korail may be involved in the high-speed rail project. According to the Hankyoreh:

News of a recent agreement between North Korea and China to build an international high-speed railroad and highway between Sinuiju (a city on the Chinese border) and Kaesong is raising questions about the fate of a scheduled North Korea visit on Apr. 24 by Korail CEO Choi Yeon-hye.

If Korail does participate in the project, it would bring South Korea one step closer to the Asian continent via the North Korea-China high-speed rail project, which comes on the heels on North Korea‘s Rajin-Hasan development project with Russia.

South Korean businesspeople in China who are closely involved in the high-speed rail project said on Apr. 6 that a contract for the railway/highway construction was signed in Beijing on Feb. 24 by North Korea’s State Economic Development Commission, chaired by Kim Ki-sok, and a Chinese consortium headed by the Shangdi Guanqun investment company. The line would be 376 km in length and connect Sinuiju with Chongju, Sukchon, Pyongyang, Haeju, and Kaesong, with the five-year construction beginning in 2018 with a budget of US$21 billion, or around 22 trillion won. The method would be a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement, with an international North Korean-Chinese consortium providing the investment and delivering the line to North Korea once the costs are recouped. A survey team for the Chinese consortium is reportedly scheduled to visit North Korea in late April.

The chances of South Korea participating are higher in the wake of President Park Geun-hye’s speech in Dresden on Mar. 31. There, she declared that an “organic linkage between South Korean capital and technology and North Korean resources and labor could contribute to building a future economic community on the Korean Peninsula.”

She also said she planned to “achieve shared development for the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia both through collaborations with North Korea and Russia, as with the current Rajin-Hasan distribution project, and collaborations with North Korea and China focusing on Sinuiju.”

Further increasing the possibility of South Korean participation are guidelines handed down in January by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who said North Korea should work with China and South Korea on an international line through a privately funded BOT arrangement.

Meanwhile, Korail is awaiting Ministry of Unification approval on a request to allow CEO Choi Yeon-hye to travel to North Korea to attend a general directors’ conference for the Organisation for Co-Operation between Railways (OSJD), which is scheduled to take place on Apr. 24.

“Our basic position is to approve visits to North Korea in cases of international events,” said an official from the ministry on condition of anonymity, adding that a final decision would be made “after discussions with the other agencies.”

But Korail remains cautious about the possibility of future cooperation, whatever the outcome for Choi’s visit ends up being. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source there said, “We’re preparing data on things like a plan to expand cargo transport for different continental rail zones, which is one of the topics on the agenda at the OSJD meeting.”

“We’ve never officially examined the North Korea-China high-speed rail project, and it doesn’t look like it would be economically feasible anyway unless a section is opened between Seoul and Kaesong,” the source added. “Anyway, the government has not decided on participating, and that‘s not a matter that KORAIL can weigh in on by itself.”

ORIGINAL POST (2013-12-20): High Speed Rail and Road Connecting Kaesong-Pyongyang-Sinuiju to be Built
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2013-12-20

On December 8, 2013, North Korea reached an agreement with a consortium of international companies to construct highways and high-speed railroad connecting Kaesong, Pyongyang, and Sinuiju.

The agreement between North Korean authorities and a consortium representing the Chinese companies was signed in both Chinese and Korean by Kim Chol Jin, Vice-Chairman of State Economic Commission of North Korea and representatives from state-owned enterprises of China’s Commerce Department.

The construction period was designated as five years and businesses will operate the rail for 30 years and return the operation rights to North Korean government in the form of a BOT (build-operate-transfer) project, worth a total of 15 trillion KRW. The high-speed rail will be a double-track system with a speed of more than 200km per hour, and the construction of four-lane highway will be built adjacent to the railway. Fence will also be built to prevent unauthorized access to the railway.

The construction zone will cover the areas of Kaesong, Haeju, Sariwon, Pyongyang, Sinanju, Jongju and Sinuiju, approximately 400 km in total length and from Sinuiju will connect to Chinese cities via railway while from Jongju will connect with the Rajin-Sonbong SEZ (special economic zone) to the Russian Khasan railway to be linked with the Eurasian railway.

The consortium working group is planning to visit North Korea to confirm the specific construction plans. It was tentatively decided that the formal contract be signed in Pyongyang based on the proposal submitted by the consortium.

The subject of agreement is a multinational consortium of international investment group, which also includes a South Korean company, which is known as a company involved in North Korean mineral resources development. Once the project is in progress, there are plans of bringing other South Korean companies into the project.

In exchange, businesses will obtain the development rights of extracting gold from Hyesan City (Ryanggang Province) and iron ore in Musan (North Hamgyong Province). North Korean officials are claiming that this project was the legacy of Kim Jong Il and welcomed the participation of South Korean companies.

In March 2011, former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is reported to have instructed that inter-Korean exchange programs be continued. Upon the completion of the railways and highways, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly will proclaim international road operations to ensure its stable operation.

The operation rights will be given to the consortium for 30 years while the ownership rights will be shared by the North Korean government and the consortium.

China is also building new railway lines up towards the North Korean border.

Pictured Above (Google Earth): Haemaji Restaurant in Pyongyang

Choson Exchange reports that the Haemaji Restaurant group is offering a new “loyal customer program”. According to their web page:

There is now a Haemachi-wide loyalty card, which operates as you’d expect: keep spending, earn points, use the points for things later.

Here is breakdown of the reward structure (again provided by Choson Exchange):

The left hand column is labeled “Money Paid (Foreign Money)”. The right hand column reads “Score (Points)”.

Here is the program announcement in English:

So this program is a reboot…version 2.0? Here is the relevant text:

This card was developed for more service in our restaurant, overcoming weakness of the previous free-service-cards.

I am curious what weakness the initial reward card program contained that caused them to relaunch the effort?

Choson Exchange also reported that the Rakwon Department Store also had a customer loyalty program. I also wrote about a another form of customer loyalty program at the Kwangbok Supermarket back in December 2012.

Previous reports indicated that the execution of Jang Song-thaek has to date had little effect on DPRK-China trade. According to the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (2014-3-12):

Trade between North Korea and China in January has increased roughly 16 percent against the previous year. After the December 2013 purge of Jang Song Thaek it was predicted that trade between the two countries would decrease; however, there is no visible sign of this yet.

According to the Korean Foreign Trade Association’s* data, trade between North Korea and China in February increased from 471 million USD to 546 million USD, up 15.9 percent compared to the previous year.

February also showed an increase in anthracite exports, North Korea’s main export to China, rising 21.3 percent to 102 million USD. Iron ore exports also showed a slight increase of 35 million USD compared to last year.

Chinese exports to North Korea, including leading export commodities such as cellular phones and other wireless radio/communication devices, increased 28 percent compared to January of last year, totaling 14.5 million USD. In February, goods exported through China to North Korea increased by 10.2 million USD, a 38.6 percent increase compared to January of last year.

The trade gains in this report are annual for the most part…comparing 2013 data with 2014 data. This reveals little about the change in trade volume from month to month.

Now a story in Yonhap offers January and February 2014 data, and journalists have reached the opposite conclusion. Jang’s execution has played a role in DPRK-China trade. According to the article:

“In January and February this year, North Korea significantly stepped up checks on its coal exports to China,” a source in Beijing said on the condition of anonymity.

“Such reinforced checks appear to be related to the execution of Jang Song-thaek,” the source said.

According to the latest data by the Korea International Trade Association* in Seoul, North Korea’s exports of coal to China in February fell 26 percent from a month ago to 920,000 tons. The North’s exports of iron ore to China also fell 23 percent in February from a month earlier to 197,000 tons.

The North’s total trade with China in February plunged 46 percent from a month earlier to US$255 million, the data showed.

In Dandong, the Chinese border city with North Korea where about 80 percent of bilateral trade is conducted, the flow of goods in and out of North Korea appears to be affected by the execution of Jang.

“In previous years, the North Korean authorities had usually set their annual targets for exports and imports, and given quotas to trading firms,” said another source in Dandong who is doing businesses with North Korea. “But, no quota has been given yet this year.

“Obviously, the mood is different than previous years,” the source said.

No progress has been made on special economic zones, including Hwanggumphyong and Wihwa, set up by the North on the border with China, according to the source.

“Under the current circumstances, Chinese investors will not invest in the North’s special economic zones,” the source said.

Does this mean anything?  Well, we don’t know enough about these numbers, or the cause for such dramatic change in trade patterns, so we will need to continue to watch the data.  Even before the February numbers came out, Scott Snyder reminded us that DPRK-China trade has taken a dip between January and February for each of the last three years!

Then there are the caveats: 1. This only counts legitimate trade (no illicit, secret, or military trade) 2. No aid 3. No official or unofficial transfers 4. No capital flows.

*Presumably the Korean Foreign Trade Association and the Korea International Trade Association are the same thing.

Read the full Yonhap story here:
N. Korea’s trade with China shaken after Jang’s execution
Yonhap
2014-4-4