North Korean Economy Watch

Asia Times
3/13/2007

Chinese auto maker Brilliance Auto recently signed an agreement with PMC of South Korea on jointly launching an assembly plant in North Korea.

The North Korean facility will be Brilliance Auto’s third after its operations in Egypt and Vietnam.

Brilliance Auto is neither the first nor the most active of the Chinese auto makers making direct investments abroad. Quite a few have already done or are doing so. Among them are Chery, Geely, Jianghuai, Chang’an, Great Wall, and BYD Auto, which have launched greenfield auto plants abroad, and Shanghai Automotive and Nanjing Automotive, which have invested abroad through merger and acquisition.

Chery is a leader in this regard, making great efforts on building CKD (complete knockdown) factories abroad in recent years. Aside from the existing assembly plants in Iran and Russia, it is looking for such opportunities in Egypt, Romania, Turkey, Indonesia, Italy and Argentina. Its Argentina joint-venture project with the local Socma group, involving investment of US$100 million, will be controlled by Chery. If it goes ahead, it will be the first China-invested auto venture in South America. Chery plans to own 12 assembly plants worldwide within a short time.

Geely also has been active in going global. It has invested in Malaysia and is preparing for another new factory in Russia.

Jianghuai, meanwhile, has established light-truck assembly plants in Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia.

Industry analysts hold that excessive capacity in the domestic market after rapid expansion in recent years is prompting Chinese auto makers to look for overseas markets. However, they are often hit with tariff barriers from the importing nations. For instance, Russia levies about a 25% tariff on complete vehicle imports, but only about 3% on knockdowns.

Direct investment overseas is regarded as a solution to such barriers.

So far, the overseas investments of Chinese auto makers have been concentrated in emerging markets such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa.

Daily NK
Kim Song A
3/12/2007

Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation “Motive on driving a stable complex”

A claim has been made suggesting that North Korea will reallocate 3,000 workers from Pyongyang to Kaesung Industrial Complex.

Representative Kim Kyu Chul of the Citizen’s Solidarity for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation revealed on the 11th, “North Korea’s Guidance Bureau for Developing Central Special Economic Zone informed the plan to the South Korean government and enterprisers who are moving in the zone and asked them to provide employees with accommodation.”

Representative Kim informed “In the past, the North has employed workers from other regions to maintain stable human resources… For the first time, workers from Pyongyang will be employed at Kaesung Industrial Complex. These people will be amongst the 18,000 skilled workers already working at Kaesung.”

Furthermore, Representative Kim disclosed his opinion, “The motive behind the North’s recent plan is its determination to establish a more stable Kaesung Industrial Complex and to minimize insecure business aspects related to human resources.”

In response, a South Korean governmental official said “The issue of worker’s accommodation has been a case continuously faced by the North” and added “We cannot know the North’s specific intentional plan for human resources but we will keep in contact to discuss these practical affairs.”

Presently, 11,740 North Korean and 689 South Korean full-time employees are working at Kaesung Industrial Complex. In the case a 3,305km square of factories site on the first phrase is completed as scheduled for this year, then 300 or so companies will be able to lease the area. Consequently, the number of North Korean workers needed at Kaesung Complex will exceed 80,000.

In addition to this, the Korea Industrial Complex Corporation announced that apartments approx. 22.5km square would be on the market until the 14th, for 40 or so companies interested in the factory complex. The Korea Land Corporation will also begin inspections next month in order to find a location for a 1,752km square factory site.

Choson Ilbo
3/12/2007

Intelligence services have information that the Macau home of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s eldest son Kim Jong-nam was burgled, sources say. Authorities are trying to confirm the information. A government official in Seoul told a reporter there was a rumor that homes in an exclusive villa complex in Coloane Island were broken into, and related government offices and police are investigating.

The Zhuyuan Haoyuan villa complex is 15 minutes from downtown Macau and its 80 villas are among the territory’s most exclusive. The average price of each villa is estimated HK$15 million, roughly US$1.92 million. Yellow sunflower symbols adorning the doors of nos. 361 and 371 easily identify them as Kim Jong-nam’s.

The Chosun Development & Investment Fund is a privately structured Limited Partnership Fund incorporated in the United Kingdom and based in London.

Specifically designed for investment in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) or (“North Korea”). Chosun Fund is now beginning to seek subscriptions from qualifying investors. This follows the authorisation of Chosun Fund’s Fund Manager, Anglo-Sino Capital Partners Limited on 19th May 2006 by the UK Financial Services Authority.

Chosun Fund will concentrate entirely on the DPRK and will channel external investment into the economic development of that country.

The exclusive Investment Advisor to Chosun Fund Fund manager is Hong Kong based Koryo Asia Limited (“Koryo Asia”) whose team of principals has over 25 years experience of commercial & financial dealings with the DPRK and in Asia generally.

The principals working with Chosun Fund will initially be concentrating on those areas of the DPRK economy with which they are familiar and which they believe can be developed quickly and efficiently to generate foreign exchange cash flow for the DPRK.

As a completely private initiative it is intended that Chosun Fund is a fully transparent financial vehicle that will assist the DPRK develop its legitimate economic activities along internationally accepted lines and also provide an attractive return to investors.

This first-to-market fund has the capability to deliver a significant return on investment in the near term and considerably enhanced returns after the expected resolution of the current nuclear issue and other problems. This should result in a substantial expansion in the economy of North-East Asia’s last emerging economy.

About the Fund

The idea of an investment fund specifically for The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) began at a conference in July 2000 held by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, and entitled “Engagement and Development in the DPRK” , to which Colin McAskill (McAskill), the originator of this project, was invited because of his experience in dealing with the DPRK.   The conference was also attended by Mr. James Kelly, prior to him joining the US State Department as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the first George W. Bush administration.   Following the conference McAskill was called to the US State Department by a special adviser in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (in the administration of President Clinton), who wished to talk to him about realistic prospects for business in the DPRK – an issue of concern at the time since the “Perry process” held out foreign investment and business as one of the benefits of the DPRK’s engagement with the outside world.

McAskill said that he had come to the conclusion that a private initiative to set up an investment fund, which could initiate or participate in repeated dealings in the DPRK, and thus be seen by the ruling hierarchy as too important to alienate through non-performance, could avoid many of the pitfalls of investing in, or dealing with, the DPRK.   The State Department Official agreed with his analysis and encouraged McAskill to set up such a fund.

Partners were gathered and engaged to set up such a fund. Aware that although this was completely a private business initiative it engendered a certain political sensitivity, McAskill met with US Assistant Secretary Kelly in September of 2001 to brief him on progress.   Kelly had no objection to such a fund as long as it kept within the parameters of US law and asked to be kept informed. By the autumn of 2002 a fund based in the US was ready to be launched but, with the serious deterioration in political relations between the US and the DPRK in October 2002, several partners in the US asked if they could postpone their active participation.

As a result of this, the planning of the fund was reconstituted with the emphasis deliberately shifted to North East Asia, with new partners in Hong Kong and China as well as with experienced fund managers in London.

McAskill has kept the US government informed of the Fund’s progress. Similar to the close contact kept with the US State Department, McAskill has also kept both the UK Foreign Office and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) government fully informed, the latter through contact with the South Korean Ambassador in London as well as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Unification in Seoul. McAskill’s partners in China have similarly informed the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China).

While the organisers and participants in the Fund fully understand the decision to keep relevant governments informed as a matter of courtesy, and to comply with any laws or regulations by those governments that affect the Fund, it should be emphasised that the Fund is a purely private business initiative. Its establishment in London, and the authorisation and regulation of its Fund Manager by the UK Financial Services Authority will ensure complete transparency.

McAskill has been involved in business dealings with the DPRK since 1978 (his first visit to the DPRK was in 1979/1980), primarily in coordinating the emergence of parts of the DPRK’s business community into western markets. This included the certification and sale of DPRK bullion and other minerals in the London market, and also in assisting other significant DPRK state entities in their dealings with western institutions, especially European banks, over their defaulted debts. Dealings with the DPRK became somewhat moribund in the 1990s due to internal political developments there, coupled with the natural disasters that overran the country causing widespread damage and a general contraction of the DPRK economy. During this period McAskill continued to maintain contact with senior associates in both business and banking institutions in Pyongyang.

The DPRK leadership has officially declared that it will pursue a controlled opening to commerce and is seeking foreign capital. In 2002 it introduced internal reforms that allowed the economy to become more market orientated. The reforms are now entrenched and gradually expanding to a point where most outside experts on the DPRK believe they have become irreversible.

The management, partners, and directors of the Fund understand the risk inherent in dealing with the DPRK, but also believe that the Fund can achieve returns commensurate with that risk. The Fund will seek initially to deal with and invest in key areas of the DPRK economy that have been known to operate successfully in the past, concentrating on transactions in sectors that were proven hard currency exporters into Western markets, mainly minerals, but have been subject to recent performance constraints.  Later dealings will take advantage of a wide variety of opportunities that are expected to become available as the DPRK economy opens and develops.

The DPRK government is aware of these developments, at first via senior DPRK officials engaged in the six-party talks in Beijing whom McAskill met with in July 2005. This was followed by meetings in Beijing in December 2005 and again in Asia in April 2006 with a special envoy sent from Pyongyang to establish direct contact. And, as a result of the earlier meeting, McAskill’s partner and management team member in China was invited to meet the DPRK Ambassador in Beijing on 15th August 2005.

The creation of the Chosun Fund and the authorisation & regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority of Chosun Fund’s Fund Manager has now formally been announced to the DPRK government.

Update: the money went missing.

South Korea criticizes North Korea for failing to disclose how aid was used
Herald Tribune
2/11/2008 

South will give money directly to North Korea
Joong Ang Daily
Lee Young-jong and Ser Myo-ja
3/12/2007

Although South Korea does not allow cash to be given directly to North Korea, it made a deal of its own.

The two countries announced Saturday that Seoul would give Pyongyang cash to buy video conference equipment. A South Korean official said yesterday the amount will be $400,000.

North Korea will use the money to set up video conference calls between families separated during the Korean War, according to a joint statement issued Saturday by the two countries.

The South Korean government has strictly banned humanitarian groups ― as well as all residents ― from giving cash to the North due to concerns the money could be spent for other purposes.

“We decided to assist the North to smoothly resolve the separated family issue,” the official said, adding that the government will thoroughly monitor the spending of the money and the use of the equipment.

The cash payment agreement was first made at a Red Cross meeting in June 2006, but never publicly announced. The money was not exchanged because North Korea conducted a missile test the next month, temporarily freezing inter-Korean relations.

After progress in the recent six-party talks designed to make North Korea nuclear-free, South Korean Red Cross officials pledged again on Saturday at a meeting at a Mount Kumgang resort to give Pyongyang the money, the official said on condition of anonymity.

According to the joint statement, the two Koreas agreed that video conference call reunions will be expanded. The two Koreas also agreed a video conference call reunion center will be built in Pyongyang, separately from the reunion center under construction at Mount Kumgang, and that Seoul will provide construction material and equipment. The material and money will be released at the end of March, the agreement said.

Neither the joint statement nor the press release specified the amount of money, but the Seoul official said it will be $400,000. The construction material to be provided to the North is worth another $3.5 million, he said.

The South Korean government was unable to give the video conference call equipment, such as liquid crystal display monitors and computers, directly to the North because of United States regulations banning the export of dual-use goods to North Korea. Under the United States export administration regulations, strategic goods that include more than 10 percent of United States-made components or technology, are banned for export to state sponsors of terrorism, which include North Korea.

According to the official, South Korea advised the North to purchase the items from China with the cash. Washington could make an exception to the export ban, presumably at Seoul’s request, but it would take time to do so.

In addition to the cash, the $3.5 million worth of goods, such as trucks, construction materials, air conditioners, heaters and cables, will be provided to build a video conference call center in Pyongyang.

At the Red Cross talks, the North also agreed to resume the construction of the reunion center on Mount Kumgang on March 21. The two Koreas began the construction in August 2005, but the work stalled last July. The buildings are about 30 percent complete.

Last week’s Red Cross meeting was scheduled for only one day, for about two hours. Due to the North’s persistent demands for cash and materials, the talks went on for a second day, the government official said.

Chicago Tribune
Bay Fang
3/11/2007

Office closes at the same time an audit was ordered into payments

The United Nations Development Program office in Pyongyang, North Korea, sits in a Soviet-style compound. Like clockwork, a North Korean official wearing a standard-issue dark windbreaker and slacks would come to the door each business day.

He would take a manila envelope stuffed with cash — a healthy portion of the United Nation’s disbursements for aid projects in the country — and leave without ever providing receipts.

According to sources at the United Nations, this went on for years, resulting in the transfer of up to $150 million in hard foreign currency to the Kim Jong Il government at a time when the United States was trying to keep the North Korean government from receiving hard currency as part of its sanctions against the Kim regime.

“At the end, we were being used completely as an ATM machine for the regime,” said one U.N. official with extensive knowledge of the program. “We were completely a cash cow, the only cash cow in town. The money was going to the regime whenever they wanted it.”

Last week, the development program, known as UNDP, quietly suspended operations in North Korea, saying it could not operate under guidelines imposed by its executive board in January that prohibited payments in hard currency and forbade the employment of local workers handpicked by the North Korean government.

But some diplomats suspect the timing of the suspension was heavily influenced by a looming audit that could have proved embarrassing to the United Nations.

Documents obtained by the Chicago Tribune indicate that as early as last May, top UNDP officials at headquarters in New York were informed in writing of significant problems relating to the agency’s use of hard foreign currency in North Korea and that such use violated U.N. regulations that local expenses be paid in local currency. No action was taken for months.

Then, under pressure from the United States, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon on Jan. 19 ordered an audit of all U.N. operations in North Korea to be completed within 90 days, or by mid-April.

The Board of Auditors, the U.N. body tasked with the audit, made no movement on the audit for 40 days after Ban’s order. It sent out its notification letter for the beginning of the audit on the same day the development program announced the closure of its office — March 1.

That timing, combined with past concerns about the UNDP’s transparency, has raised suspicions that suspending operations would be a way to hamstring the audit, the results of which may prove damning to the organization.

“The office was closed precisely for that reason,” said another U.N. official with extensive knowledge of the program. “With no operations in place, first of all, you have no claim to get auditors into the country. Second, it will take months and months to get documentation out of the office there, to transfer to somewhere else like New York.”

The U.N. sources who spoke about the development operations in North Korea requested anonymity either for fear of retribution or because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the subject.

The saga of the UNDP in North Korea joins a list of other episodes in which critics have complained that the United Nations is a sprawling bureaucracy with few safeguards and little accountability. The Bush administration has been particularly outspoken about the United Nation’s need for reform.

The Oil-for-Food scandal, which erupted in 2004, involved corruption in a program designed to provide humanitarian aid for Iraqis, whose country faced economic sanctions. Ultimately, it emerged that the program had resulted in $1.8 billion in kickbacks and surcharges paid to Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Ban, a South Korean who took office in January, has sought to present himself as a fresh-faced reformer.

All this occurs against the backdrop of intensifying talks with Pyongyang over its nuclear weapons capacity, the most recent of which took place last week in New York. Last month, the United States and four other nations signed a deal with North Korea promising aid in exchange for the shutting down of a nuclear reactor and a series of steps toward disarmament and normalized relations.

A spokesman for the U.S. mission to the United Nations, Richard Grenell, said the United States supports the audit going forward to find out the extent of the problems at the UNDP office in Pyongyang. North Korean officials could not be reached.

Despite the closure of the UNDP office in North Korea, the audit is moving ahead. U.N. officials say they expect the audited documents to show not only the hard currency transfers to representatives of Kim’s government, but also the inability of staff on the ground to confirm that the money was going to its programs.

According to sources familiar with UN operations in North Korea, the international staff of the development program and other UN agencies were not allowed to leave the compound without a government escort.

They were not allowed to go outside Pyongyang without receiving special permission from the military at least a week in advance. They were not allowed to set foot in a bank. And under no circumstances were they allowed to make unrestricted visits to the projects they were supposed to be funding.

These rules mirror the restrictive conditions set by the U.S. government on diplomats from North Korea who must stay within 25 miles of New York City.

The UNDP, whose mission is to help the country develop economically, was one of several UN agencies operating in North Korea, including UNICEF and the World Health Organization. The United Nations is one of few channels for foreign aid in the secretive, authoritarian country.

One of the UNDP projects, sources said, involved the purchase of 300 computers for Kim Il Sung University. The computers supposedly arrived in Pyongyang, but the international staff was not allowed to see the equipment it had donated.

Finally, after a month and a half of pressuring their North Korean handlers, staffers were led to a room in which two computers sat. They were told the others were packed in boxes, which they were not allowed to open.

And while the UNDP’s programs — which have included projects such as “Human Resource Upgrading to Support Air Traffic Services” and “Strengthening of the Institute for Garment Technology” — cost anywhere from $3 million to $8 million a year total, the development program also acted as the administrative officer for all the UN agencies and wrote checks for tens of millions of dollars worth of programming every year.

The UNDP’s financial officer and its treasurer in Pyongyang, who issued those checks, were both North Korean.

UN officials privately describe a vivid scene playing out at the agency’s compound each day.

A driver in a UN-issued Toyota Corolla would pull out of the compound’s gate, taking UN checks to the bank. A short time later the driver, a North Korean employed by UNDP, would return with manila envelopes stuffed with tens of thousands of dollars in hard currency.

Then the windbreaker-clad North Korean official would show up and take the cash away.

UNDP spokesman David Morrison said the use of hard currency and the hiring of staff through local governments was standard practice in authoritarian countries like North Korea. Morrison said his understanding was that the agency had never had problems with site visits, and that in 2005 its staff had visited 10 of its 11 monitorable projects.

The agency was complying with the audit, Morrison said, “in order to take away even the perception that anything was untoward.”

But others believe the development program has no choice but to cooperate with the audit.

In January, a letter written to the head of UNDP by Mark Wallace, the U.S. ambassador to the UN for management and reform, was leaked to the U.S. media. The letter, which drew on Wallace’s review of internal audits dating back to 1998, accused the program of having been “systematically perverted for the benefit of the Kim Jong Il regime.”

These claims by the United States, supported by Japan, the two biggest donors to UNDP, pressured the secretary general to quickly order the audit.

“If there were simply the use of hard currency, or simply no site visits, that’s one thing,” said a UN diplomat familiar with the issue. “But when you combine the fact that large cash payments were made directly to officials of Kim’s government with the fact there were no site visits to verify how the cash was being used, that’s a great cause of concern.”

The first phase of the audit is scheduled to begin Monday in New York. It remains unclear whether the auditors will attempt to visit North Korea. It is possible that even if the UNDP office were still open, Pyongyang would not have granted them visas.

Even with its limited scope, the audit could yield significant revelations about how the agency worked in a dictatorial, tightly controlled society.

“There wasn’t a snowball’s chance in hell that they’d allow us to see what they did with all the cash they received,” said a member of the diplomatic community in New York. “But UNDP headquarters and the country office should be able to tell us what kinds of checks they were making, were they paid in cash, what, who, where the money was going to.”

The Board of Auditors had no comment for this article, but Morrison, the UNDP spokesman, said the organization was making arrangements to safeguard documents by transferring them to one of the other UN agencies in Pyongyang. He said that those necessary for the initial stages of the audit would be copied and carried to New York in electronic form by the UNDP chief in Pyongyang, who is due to leave North Korea within days.

But some suggest the mid-April deadline does not leave enough time to produce a thorough review.

“I don’t think this is an audit you can whip through in 30 days; this may take some time,” John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the UN until the end of last year and a staunch critic of the world body, said when contacted by the Tribune for a reaction to the newspaper’s reporting of the cash payments. “But I think for the reputation and integrity of the UN system, it’s critical that it proceed without delay.”

Daily NK
Park Choel Yong
3/10/2007

Forced Memorization of Kim Family History Ruining Student Potential

In the past, the greatest pleasure of North Korean university professors was meeting students whose abilities were superior to their own. However, these professors say new generations of students cannot be properly educated and their academic ability is declining because they are forced to memorize the revolutionary history of the Kim family. North Korean preschoolers are two through six years old.

Compulsory education consists of four years in elementary school and six in middle school, followed by an optional four year university degree. During the important middle school period when student development could be the greatest, students are instead directed to devote their efforts to rote memorization of North Korean revolutionary history. No exceptions are allowed even for gifted students.

The most important subject is Revolutionary History

In every province and city, there is “The 1st Middle School” in which the most brilliant students study. In Pyongyang there are the 1st Middle Schools in three districts: Chanduk School, East-Pyongyang 1st School and Moranbong 1st School. The best school among those 1st schools is Pyongyang 1st Middle School where the most gifted students in the country can study.

Pyongyang 1st Middle School used to be the Namsan Loyal Middle School where only children of high authorities and patriots who had fought against the Japanese colonial government can attend. Because Kim Jong Il graduated there, it has become a special school for the gifted.

To enter the Pyongyang 1st Middle School, high grades in Revolutionary History are necessary. There are sub-items under the Revolutionary History: “Revolutionary records of the respectable Father, Kim Il Sung”, “Revolutionary records of the beloved Leader, General Kim Jong Il” and others.

Students must completely memorize the history of Kim Il Sung’s activities along with those of his son Kim Jong Il. High grades on Revolutionary History entrance exams give students priority in attending the school.

Fortunately, Kim Il Sung achieved independence from Japan instead of his father

In order to enter the school, students develop their powers of retentive memory at the expense of intellectual learning. North Korean policy dictates that memorization of revolutionary history should be a cradle to grave endeavor, beginning in pre-school and lasting through university study and beyond. Students abbreviate “the Great Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary history” as “GR (‘Wihyuk’ in Korean)” and “the beloved Kim Jong Il’s revolutionary history” as “BR (‘Chinhyuk’ in Korean).”

Adding to student misery has been the inclusion of “MR (‘Eohyuk’ in Korean)” in 2000, meaning “the Heroine Kim Jong Suk, the Mother’s revolutionary history.”

Students cynically claim that it is fortunate that Kim Il Sung won independence from Japan instead of his father Kim Hyung Jic because the amount of material to be memorized would have doubled.

Foreign media focus on the starvation and ruined North Korean economy caused by Kim Jong Il. However, the destruction of North Korea’s educational system and the subsequent waste of human resources represent some of his most serious crimes. Revolutionary history brainwashing is destroying the intellectual development of future generations.

Daily NK (Part 1)
Han Young Jin
3/10/2007

The reason North Korea’s regime can persevere is because of the central class’ fear of regime collapse.

As a result of this perseverance, North Korea has been able to resist isolation and pressure for more than half a century, with the system even defeating the “March of Suffering” where tens and thousands of people died of starvation.

Today, powers maintaining the North Korean system are the hierarchical upper class including the North Korean Workers’ Paryy, the National Security Agency, the National Protection Agency, prosecutors and adjudicators.

Overall, there are about 4 millions members in the North Korean Workers’ Party (statistics as of 1995), this being roughly 20% of the population. Retrospectively, these people control the 23mn North Korean citizens.

The central class incorporating junior secretaries to the party, training officers, novice elites, generals from the army, safety and protection agents use their power position to control directly the North Korean people.

The most of these people have strong loyalty for the regime. In particular, military generals or party officials especially fear punishment and the thought that their privileges may be removed. Though they may be leaders, it is not one’s own desire to escalate in power but fear of retaliation from new powers.

Local party officers, security agents and protection agents directly control, inspect and punish civilians. In essence, they absolutely control the North Korean people and hence fear direct retaliation from the people. The collapse of the regime, also means that they may become jobless and troublesome.

In the 80’s, there was an incident where the Kangkye Munitions Factory incurred an explosion. The people who thought that a war had risen killed the security agent in charge and threatened to evacuate the country regardless of war or not. The people armed with weapons even raided the home of the security agent in charge, with stones and batons. As this rumor spread, security officers throughout the country felt the tension and were all on alert. Hence, control forces even to the lowest rank have become the trustworthy pillar to the North Korean regime.

Since the early stages of the regime, North Korea trained members of anti-Japan protestors and their families, Mankyungdae Revolutionary Academies and distinguished servicemen from the Korean War. As a result, the mindset of North Korea’s central class is relatively high in societal class awareness, as is their loyalty to Kim Jong Il.

Ideology amidst the central class and brainwashed passion

These people believe that the survival of the North Korea system is directly connected to their lifeline. They fear that they will not be able to receive the same privileges given by Kim Jong Il, if the current North Korean regime were to collapse. They believe that Kim Jong Il’s fate is their fate.

The North Korean regime is currently strengthening the multiple control system for their central class so that the ideology of the class is not shaken and the principals of Kim Jong Il kept intact.

In North Korea, every position and decision is focused around Kim Jong Il and his every single word is glorified. In one sense, it is a specialty of the dictatorial regime, but in reality it is a way to force the upper class to stand in awe and even dread the grand Kim Jong Il. Some defectors, once members of North Korea’s elite say that people work having no conscious awareness of their heavy duty or how to modify words spoken by Kim Jong Il.

Educational jobs by the central class are different to that of the common citizen. As the former Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc was merging in the 90’s inflicting collapse to the regime, elite officials internally passed video tapes on the end of Romania’s former President Nicolae Ceausescu to calm other comrades but in the end stirred greater fear.

Recently, it is said that tapes on the Iraq situation have been televised for commanders and military elites to see. The aim of this viewing, to plant into the minds of the commanders that compromises to the protection of the system means death.

The Kim Jong Il regime gives privileges to inspire the people supporting them. For example, people who work for the Central Committee systems department or the elite propagandists, receive a Mercedes Benz with the number plate ‘2.16’ symbolizing Kim Jong Il’s own birthday, and depending on the position, the car series is upgraded.

Other elites from the Central Committee and figures in key military posts are provided with luxurious apartments in Pyongyang. The apartment blocks are built and located separately to the average house. Soldiers guard the homes, even restraining relatives from entering the apartment premises. These homes are furnished with electrical goods, sofas, food and goods made in Japan, as well as being accompanied with western culture.

As Military First Politics was implemented in the late 90’s, private nurses, full-time house maids, private apartments and country residences, private cars, office cars, as well as “recreational clubs” with beautiful women, were granted as privileges to the head military and provincial officers.

Every Lunar New Year, expensive foreign gifts are presented to the core central class. However, across the bridge, local and system secretaries, public control officers await common goods that can be found in South Korea’s supermarkets such as mandarins, apples, cigarettes and alcohol. Nonetheless, people who work for North Korea’s local offices are more than happy to receive these gifts are it distinctly segregates them from the common North Korean citizen.

OK to Capitalist Goods But NO to Capitalist Regime
Daily NK (Part 2)
Han Young Jin
3/11/2007

The higher the class, the closer one is to the 2nd and 3rd tier network. If a person is discovered to be in opposition to the regime they will be brutally punished and so a person is cut off early if they are found to show any signs of anti-Kim Jong Il.

The people who inflict the greatest control are the military high commanders. North Korea’s military can be seen as a branch of national politics that really does represent half of the regime. Political elites from the military closely control high commanders with under cover spies whose job is to specifically tattle on suspicious officers to the Party. Then, the protection agency in command contacts an expert who equipped with bugging devices carefully monitors the high commander’s every move, 24 hours a day.

In addition to this, control over university students who are being trained to become North Korea’s next elite group is also severe. In order to intensify regulations on university students, the protection agency initiates secret movements. Protection agents and even information staff are grouped to control the student’s movement with one information staff in charge of monitoring every each 5 students.

Even amidst the Workers’ Party and the ministries, national safety agents are dispatched to monitor the elite.

“Capitalist goods are good, but reform is unacceptable”

Though envious of South Korea’s economic development, North Korea’s upper class are opposed to growth and reform.

There is a popular story of an elite North Korean official who visited the South and frankly revealed “Though we may crawl and be worn, we cannot follow South Chosun’s economy.” It is also a well known fact that elite officials preferred Samsung digital cameras and showed interest in Hyundai cars at a South-North Cabinet talks and Aug 15th event in Seoul. Nonetheless, when it comes to acknowledging the need for capitalist reform, North Korea’s central class discards it with a wave of the hand.

The reason that capitalist goods are preferred but reform rejected is a result of the ideology that their individual power will be lost with change to the regime. Those who have loyally followed authorities have no mindset nor special skills that will enable them to survive a capitalist system. Rather than confronting a competitive society, they prefer their current position and the glory that comes with it.

The central class is also well aware of the restraints on North Korea’s economy. Every year as the harvest season arrives, they see citizens march onto the fields malnourished and underfed. They know that the economic policy implemented by authorities has failed and is incoherent. Yet, ultimately they are unwilling to let go of the small privileges they are endowed upon by the preposterous and unreasonable regime.

These people have become accustomed to their power which is utilized to gain them their privileges and tyranny. Even if North Korea enters a famine, they need not worry about food or clothing.

For example, in the case of an official factory secretary, he/she satisfies ones own personal needs by selling factory goods. Using the excuse that factory profits are being raised, he/she orders the workers to engage in more work, on the side. This is how tyranny occurs with the factory secretary manufacturing personal gains. Yet, these officials are not punished with any legal sentences.

Newly-rich dualism, collaborative relationship with official powers

Following the July 1st economic measures in 2002 trade became legal and North Korea experienced a sudden boom in newly rich elites. What led this new rich class to accumulate so much wealth was the fact that they had introduced an enterprise system which allowed trade with China.

The newly rich have a great interest in reform and development, and are well aware that the North Korean regime will not be able to solve the economic issue without facing reform.

However even this class of people are disinterested in bringing an end to the regime. They have already accumulated their wealth and feel no onus in the poverty stricken situation in North Korea. Whether capitalism or the current North Korean regime, as long as they can sustain a living, these people can continue to remain in a dualistic mindset.

While North Korean authorities are strengthening control over this new class, they are in another sense, receiving money and bribes to protect them. Where investigations are involved, authorities are risking their own identities being revealed and hence often ignore the illegalities of the people, even going to the extent of passing on information.

It is a fact that North Korea’s central class is acting as the forefront in sustaining the regime, but then again, these people have greater educational standard than the average commoner and they have had more opportunities to experience Western civilization. Hence, they can compare the North Korean regime with the outside world. Though the majority of this class accommodates to the North Korea regime, the possibility that a fraction of the elites may have some sort of antagonism against the Kim Jong Il regime and the odds that these people may just act upon these feelings cannot be discarded.

In addition, as North Korean society continues to decay, the organization of its systemic corruption may just be hit with danger. As corruption deepens and a crack appears in the regime, authorities will try to control this leak but while doing so, it is possible that endless punishment may just incite some elites to secede.

Particularly, the more information about foreign communities flow into North Korea and the people’s animosity against Kim Jong Il increases, even the elite will not be able to completely suppress feelings of antipathy.

Korea Times
3/10/2007

The United States has promised North Korea that it would lift financial sanctions against the communist country, the North’s chief nuclear envoy said Saturday in Beijing.

“The U.S. has promised to end financial sanctions on the Banco Delta Asia and the North is keeping a close eye on the promise,” Kim Kye-gwan told reporters at Beijing Shoudu Airport before taking a flight to Pyongyang.

“If the U.S. fails to solve the issue completely, we will have to take partial actions against it,” Kim said.

Kim was leaving Beijing after meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei to prepare for a fresh round of denuclearization talks on the North’s nuclear disarmament on March 19.

He also briefed Wu on the outcome of his U.S.-North Korea normalization talks in New York on March 5-6 with Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. envoy to the six-party negotiations.

In the normalization talks, both sides also agreed to resolve issues surrounding the designation of North Korea as a terrorism-sponsoring state and the application of the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act, Kim said.

“We agreed to resolve the issues based on our strategic interests and normalize ties between North Korea and the U.S.,” Kim said. “On those two items, there still are diplomatic issues between us.”

In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted Banco Delta Asia in Macau for its suspicious role in helping the North launder money. Thus, the bank froze $24 million on North Korean accounts.

The North interpreted the financial sanctions as a U.S. attempt to isolate Pyongyang from the international community, and had boycotted the six-party talks until last December.

During the New York talks, Kim discussed with Hill measures for the normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the U.S., following a breakthrough denuclearization agreement which was signed in the six-party talks in Beijing on Feb. 13.

Kim said the U.S. has promised to resolve the financial sanctions against the North within 30 days.

He added that if the U.S. kept its promise, we will shut down our nuclear facilities in 60 days.

Under the disarmament accord, North Korea committed to take intial steps to disable its nuclear weapons program in return for economic aid, security guarantees and diplomatic incentives from South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia.

The steps require the North to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear complex and admit international inspectors into the country by mid-April

With a two-month deadline, the other parties will provide 50,000 tons of fuel oil and discuss normalizing diplomatic relations with the North.

Donga Ilbo
3/10/2007

820 2nd Avenue, New York City. This is the address of the permanent mission of North Korea in the United Nations, the only North Korean diplomatic arena in the U.S. It is a four-minute walk from the UN headquarters and a two-minute walk from the permanent mission of South Korea to the U.N. It is located on the 13th floor of the “Diplomatic Center.”

About 10 North Korean diplomats including North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Pak Gil Yon are working in this place. When you look at the list of member states of the U.N., you’ll find names like ‘Mrs. Pak’ and ’Mrs. Kim’ right below the list of North Korean diplomats. These are diplomats’ wives who help their husbands at the office by answering phones.

They live in an apartment on Roosevelt Island located on the opposite side of the U.N. headquarters. Many diplomats from poor countries such as North Korea and African nations live there because the rents are relatively inexpensive compared to those of Manhattan.

The diplomats except for Ambassador Park go to work together via minivan. Deputy Ambassador Kim Chang Guk is in charge of U.N.-related affairs and Minister of Political Affairs Kim Myong Gil handles U.S.-related issues. North Korean diplomats have a good command of English. Minister Kim’s English is fluent enough to communicate with reporters in English. Some young diplomats speak French as well.

However, during North Korea-U.S. talks, Choi Son Hee, a fellow researcher of North Korean Foreign Ministry, interpreted for the North Korean delegation headed by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. She is not only an interpreter but also a diplomat. Choi, who visited the U.S. for the third time, drew attention as an excellent interpreter.

North Korean diplomats are required to get permission from the State Department when they travel beyond the 30-mile limit from the Columbus Circle in Manhattan. When Ambassador Park has to go to Washington, he has to get permission.

Recently, Harvard University was going to invite Mr. Park to hold a forum but failed because the State Department did not issue permission. So the host tried to change the location to Columbia University, which is located within the 30-mile limit. .

South Korean diplomats contacting North Korean diplomats directly or indirectly say they are not financially abundant. It is said that ethnic Koreans who are friendly to North Korea help the North Korean representatives in one way or another. The North Koreans sometimes visit a Korean restaurant on the 32nd Street but not often. Some people say they saw them eat at a delicatessen.

North Koreans often use a Chinese restaurant just beside the North Korean mission when they have an official meeting. A lunch set menu costs about 40 dollars per person and the restaurant offers delicious food so that many South Korean diplomats visit the place. North Korea invited the U.S. delegation to the restaurant for lunch as a return courtesy.

The Korea Society sponsored a large sum of money for the 7-day stay of the North Korean delegation consisting of 7 members, and Stanford University`s North Korea expert group paid for the money needed for the stay in San Francisco. The National Committee on American Foreign Policy also chipped in. Non-profit organizations in the U.S. sponsored the delegation from hotels, restaurants and musicals, as well as round-trip flights from Beijing to San Francisco and New York.

The Korea Society, an organization founded by Korea experts dedicated to the promotion of greater awareness, understanding and cooperation between the people of the United States and Korea, says funding for its programs is derived from contributions, endowments, membership dues and program fees on its website. Many U.S. branch chiefs of Korean conglomerates such as Hyosung and Posco work in the board of directors, and many U.S. companies trading with South Korea sponsor the organization. The South Korean government is supporting it indirectly through the Korea Foundation. A 2004 document shows that the foundation gave 1.1 million dollars to the Korea Society.