North Korean Economy Watch

KCNA
4/5/2007

A carrot approach being taken by the imperialists serves as a lever to carry out their appeasement strategy. This is a very crafty and wicked plot to create illusion about them by appeasing and deceiving their opponents in a bid to benumb their anti-imperialist spirit and completely disarm them ideologically and morally.

Rodong Sinmun Thursday observes this in a signed article.

It goes on:

The above-said approach may bring consequences as dangerous as open aggression by force of arms.

One should not interpret the above-said approach as a sort of change in the aggressive nature of the imperialists. The carrot approach of the imperialists which is bound to be accompanied by appeasement tactics and smiling diplomacy is designed to do harm to their opponents at a slow pace till they prove ineffective in face of their moves for domination and end up collapsing.

It is the aim sought by the imperialists in the above-said approach to create illusion about them and thus put other countries under the yoke of domination and subjugation and gratify their interests.

The imperialists, while acting an “apostle of peace” by abusing the wish of humankind for a peaceful free world, are craftily working to confuse the spirit of people and cause them to harbor illusion about imperialism.

They are intensifying economic domination and subjugation of other countries by such levers as “aid”, “cooperation” and “loan”.

This is eloquently proved by the reality of those countries which have been put under the yoke of political subjugation after receiving the “aid” and “loan” offered by the imperialists as a “kind gesture.”

There will be disastrous consequences for those countries which abandon their revolutionary principle and meet the imperialists’ demand, taken in by glossy words uttered by them as part of their appeasement policy. Worse still, their wrong behavior may lead to the loss of their sovereignty. All countries should, therefore, be vigilant against the imperialists’ carrot approach and should not be tempted by it under any circumstances.

NK Choson.com

Kimchaek University of Technology, the top college of science and engineering as well as a central higher educational institution of North Korea, is located in Pyongyang, not in Kimchaek.

Colleges and universities in North Korea are classified into two: central and regional. But criteria for the classification differ from those of the South. It’s wrong to assume that those located in the capital are central institutes of higher education, and those housed in provincial cities and towns are regional ones.

Central higher educational institutions as referred to in the North denote “central-grade institutions of higher education founded in Pyongyang and elsewhere in the provinces for the purpose of educating prospective national leaders, engineers and scientists.” Accordingly, colleges and universities located in Pyongyang are not necessarily central institutions of higher education; nor those situated in the provinces are all regional colleges and universities.

Chongjin Mining and Metallurgy College, the only one of its kind not only in the North but in Asia, and Wonsan Agriculture College, the first of its kind in the North, for example, are definitely central colleges, though the former is located in North Hamgyong Province, and the latter in Kangwon Province, respectively. The same applies to Shinuiju Light Industry College located in North Pyongan Province; Sariwon College of Koryo Pharmacy in North Hwanghai Province; and Hamhung Hydrographic and Power College in South Hamgyong Province. Though located in provincial cities, they are all central colleges founded with regional features taken into account.

On the other hand, Pyongyang Machinery College, Pyongyang Agriculture College, Pyongyang Printing Industry College, though all are located in the capital, are classified as regional colleges. Each province or special city under the direct jurisdiction of the central government in the North has two normal and teachers colleges and one arts and physical education colleges, all of which are typical regional ones. Factory, farm and fishing farm colleges attached to industrial entities also belong to the regional category.

What is the central criterion separating central high educational institutions from their regional counterparts? It depends on who administers and manages them. Those administered directly by the Education Ministry are central institutions of higher education; those administered by the Education Department of the People’s Committee of a relevant province or special city placed directly under the jurisdiction of the central government are regional colleges or universities. Needless to say, no regional institutions of higher education are free from Education Ministry guidance; the guidance is only given indirectly through the People’s Committee Education Department of a pertinent province or special city. In an exception, Kim Il Sung University, the most prestigious higher educational institute in the North, is placed under the direct jurisdiction of the cabinet.

Central colleges and universities, wherever they are located, recruit students from across the land, and their graduates are assigned to any agencies, factories, corporations or research institutes in the country. On the other hand, only seniors and graduates from senior high schools in pertinent provinces and special cities are eligible to enter regional institutes of higher education, whose graduates, when given job assignments upon graduation, are confined to offices or factories in their respective administrative areas.

North Korea has quite a few institutes of higher education that are called colleges, entirely unrelated to central and regional colleges, but whose nature and curricula are totally different. The Yalu River College trains espionage agents sent to the South under the jurisdiction of the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces; Pyongyang College of Technology, also called the State Security Agency Political College, produces prospective leaders of the intelligence agency.

The Automation College, once called Mirim College, is a special college founded for the purpose of turning out manpower needed for waging electronics information warfare, placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. The College of People’s Economics and International Relations College are institutes retraining leading staff of the party headquarters; the College of Communism run by each province or special city is a special educational institute retraining junior leaders of regional chapters of the Workers’ Party.

Joong Ang Daily
Chang Se-jeong and Ser Myo-ja
4/4/2007

An order from Pyongyang directing North Korean diplomats in overseas posts to send their children back home has been met with defiance, sources in Beijing said yesterday. Pyongyang has extended the deadline for sending the children home until the end of this month in the face of the diplomats’ reluctance to obey.

On March 6, the JoongAng Ilbo reported that the communist Workers’ Party of North Korea had issued the order in February, but no explanation was provided. Under the order, children over the age of five were to go back to the North by the end of March.

A businessman in Beijing who has extensive contacts with North Korea said yesterday that the deadline has been extended because diplomats are demanding more time to complete paperwork for the forced homecomings.

In fact, they appear to be trying to resist. “Some are trying their best to make their kids an exception by using personal ties, and others are trying to delay the return as much as possible,” the businessman said.

Another source in Beijing said “diplomats were feeling insecure that their children may not be able to leave the country ever again after going back.”

About 3,000 children of North Korean diplomats in 50 countries are affected by the order.

Yonhap News Agency also reported the rare challenge by the diplomats to their dictatorial regime. “North Korea has reportedly dispatched Kim Chang-kyu, a vice foreign minister, to China, where such resistance has been most visible, to survey actual conditions and sentiments of its diplomats there,” Yonhap reported.

The report also quoted an anonymous source as saying that none of the North Korean diplomats in China have sent their kids back home.

While it was unclear why the North decided to place such strict controls on the diplomats’ children, sources in Beijing speculate that the reason could be related to fears that the children could become a destabilizing force due to their contact with the world beyond the reclusive communist country.

The North Korean leadership is concerned that these children may inform their North Korean friends and relatives about life in the outside world, said another businessman.

It is not the first time that the North has summoned its citizens home. After the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the North ordered all its overseas students to return home.

N Korea envoys ‘keeping children’
BBC
4/3/2007

North Korean diplomats stationed overseas are reportedly refusing an order to send their children home, according to South Korean media.

The order was issued earlier this year in an apparent attempt to stop defections from the hardline regime.

It said diplomats should send all but one of their children back to North Korea by the end of March.

But South Korea’s Yonhap news agency said diplomats were resisting the order, in an “unprecedented” move.

Yonhap quoted an unnamed source as saying the incident could trigger a “major political scandal”, given how unusual it is for North Korea’s ruling Communist Party to be disobeyed.

Old regulation

Diplomatic postings are highly sought-after jobs in North Korea, and are only given to the most loyal supporters of the regime.

But analysts say that once overseas, diplomats’ exposure to foreign thinking brings them under official suspicion in secretive North Korea.

Earlier this year the regime revived an old regulation which said that diplomats posted overseas could only take one child with them, Yonhap reported.

The regulation was suspended in 2002, allowing diplomats to take out many more children.

North Korea now wants the children sent home, and there are reports that hundreds of children could be affected.

Yonhap’s source said opposition to the move was particularly strong among North Koreans living in China, the North’s closest ally.

The reports said that diplomats in China had yet to send a single child back to North Korea, prompting the despatch of a senior official from Pyongyang to Beijing to investigate.

NKorea Orders Return of Diplomats’ Kids
Guardian
3/7/2007

North Korea has ordered its diplomats stationed overseas to send their children back to the communist nation in an apparent attempt to prevent the diplomats from defecting, a news report said Tuesday.

About 3,000 children aged 5 and older must return home within 30 days, according to the order issued last month by North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party. Younger children are exempt from the order, which was reported by South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo.

The measure is believed to be aimed at preventing defections by diplomats and their families by raising the possibility that their children might be persecuted, the newspaper said.

Yonhap news agency carried a similar report, but said each diplomat would be allowed to bring one child to their overseas post. It cited an unidentified South Korean government official.

An official at South Korea’s Unification Ministry, the main government agency dealing with North Korean affairs, said it was checking the reports. The reports did not say what prompted North Korea to take the measure. There have been no known defections by North Korean diplomats in recent months.

Yonhap
4/4/2007

Despite years of economic hardship and an ongoing dispute over the dismantlement of its nuclear arms program, North Korea is once again setting up the mood for a nationwide celebration of the country’s largest holiday, the birthday of its late leader Kim Il-sung.

Kim, the founder of the North, died of heart failure on July 8, 1994, and his son Jong-il took power afterward in the first hereditary succession in a communist state. The junior Kim was officially named successor in 1980.

The celebrations follow weeks of festivities to mark leader Kim Jong-il’s birthday on Feb. 16, but they also come amid a dispute between Pyongyang and Washington over the North’s first steps toward ending its nuclear weapons program by mid-April.

A mass gymnastics event called “Arirang” is to begin in the North’s capital Pyongyang next Sunday to mark the 95th anniversary of the birth of the late leader, which falls on April 15, the North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Wednesday.

The Arirang festival was held in 2002 and 2005, but was called off abruptly last year due to floods, causing hundreds of U.S. and other Western citizens to cancel their planned trip to one of the world’s last remaining communist states. North Korea said it will organize the event in April and August every year.

The anniversary comes amid a stalemate in international negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear development program, which is adding to the country’s economic difficulties that followed nationwide floods and droughts and ensuing famine in the mid-1990s.

On Feb. 13, North Korea promised to shut down and seal its main nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and allow international inspectors back into the country within 60 days. In return, North Korea would receive aid equal to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from South Korea.

But the latest round of six-nation talks, involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia, broke down in Beijing last month when North Korea refused to participate in further meetings unless its frozen assets at a U.S.-blacklisted Macau bank were released.

The impoverished country has depended on international handouts to feed a large number of its 23 million people, but continues to mobilize massive resources and people to celebrate the late leader’s birthday, known as the “Day of the Sun.”
In a recent meeting with U.N. World Food Program officials, a North Korean vice agriculture minister acknowledged that the communist country has a shortfall of about 1 million tons in food and called for aid from the outside world.

National committees in many countries, including China, Cambodia, Indonesia and France, have been established weeks ahead of the holiday to prepare celebrations and other commemorative events marking the birthday of Kim Il-sung, who the North calls the country’s eternal father and president.

Kim Jong-il rules the country with an iron grip, but officially he is only the chairman of the National Defense Commission and general secretary of the Workers’ Party. He reserves the office of president for his late father as a way of showing his filial piety.

The North is officially headed by its titular leader Kim Yong-nam, the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the country’s parliament.

Yonhap
4/4/2007

South and North Korea will open their first joint college later this year in a show of warming ties between the two sides, officials said Wednesday.

The Pyongyang Science and Technology College is scheduled to open in the North’s capital on Sept. 10 and will initially house 150 graduate students for such courses as master of business administration (MBA).

“We had originally planned to open it in April but strained inter-Korean ties delayed the project. The favorable environment will make the project go smoothly this time,” said Lim Wan-geun, a boarding member of the Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture.

Kim Jin-kyong, dean of Yanbian Science and Technology College, will be the first dean of the inter-Korean college, the official said. The college will consist of a five-story building for lectures, a four-story building for a library, dining facilities and research and five dormitory buildings.

Inter-Korean relations have warmed considerably since the 2000 summit of their leaders, but tension persists since the rival states are still technically in a state of war, as no peace treaty was signed at the end of the Korean War.

South Korea suspended its food and fertilizer aid to North Korea after it conducted missile tests in July. A possible resumption of the aid was blocked due to the North’s nuclear bomb test in October.

But the relationship was revived after North Korea promised to end its nuclear weapons program in return for energy aid, and the two sides held the first ministerial talks in seven months in March.

Koreas to open first joint university
Korea Herald
Cho Ji-hyun
3/15/2007

The first joint university between South and North Korea will open in Pyongyang in September, a senior member of the founding committee told The Korea Herald.

South Koreans including Park Chan-mo, president of POSTECH in Pohang, visited Pyongyang yesterday to discuss the establishment and operation of Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, or PUST.

Early last year, the Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture, a Seoul-based nonprofit organization, agreed with the North’s education authorities to open PUST as early as last October.

The schedule has been delayed due to the lack of progress in their talks amid tensions caused by North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests last year.

Their contacts have recently resumed as the ties between the two Koreas improved following the six-party agreement on the North’s nuclear programs in Beijing.

In an interview with The Korea Herald, Park, a member of the founding committee, said the school will open in September and that further discussions will take place before the opening.

The visiting delegation includes Kim Chin-kyung, president of Yanbian University of Science and Technology, who assumes the post of founding president of the Pyongyang university.

Choi Kwang-chul, professor of Seoul’s Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, also joined the trip.

For the four-day trip, they are to inspect the progress of construction work, and discuss the cross-border passage of faculty and internet connections for the school.

“We will raise two demands – constructing a land route between the two Koreas to allow professors to travel across the borders and providing internet connection,” Park said.

A Seoul government official also confirmed that the school will open in September.

The project was first initiated in 2001. The Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture plans to expand the school into a university with 240 professors and more than 2,000 students from both countries.

However, the university plans to open with 50 professors and 200 students participating in master’s and doctoral programs in its first year, university officials wrote on their school website.

The university project is led by Park, Lee and Malcolm Gillis, former university president of Rice University in Texas.

In a separate effort, POSTECH has worked on a joint project with the Pyongyang Informatics Center, or PIC, since April 2001, according to Park.

Using PIC’s three dimensional computer aided design program, POSTECH has completed the development of a software called “Construction,” which offers a virtual walk through the construction site to detect errors, he said.

Yonhap
4/3/2007

Incoming Prime Minister Han Duck-soo said Tuesday that goods produced in a joint industrial complex in North Korea will benefit from a free trade pact agreed upon with the United States the previous day.

Denying reports that the free trade agreement put aside the country-of-origin issue for future negotiations, Han said that the two countries cleared the way for treating goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex as made in South Korea.

“The media reports that the Kaesong Industrial Complex was put on as a ‘built-in’ agenda are not true,” Han, who took office early in the day, told reporters in his inaugural press conference at the government building.

A “built-in” agenda refers to a negotiating scheme for sensitive issues in which the countries involved agree to put them on hold and discuss them in the future. Local reports have called the Kaesong issue “built-in,” as Seoul has been pushing for its inclusion in the trade deal despite Washington’s objection.

Under the deal, the two sides agreed to establish a “committee on outward processing zones on the Korean Peninsula” to discuss the Kaesong issue as part of their trade liberalization. But they also stipulated that such a step will be made under specific circumstances, such as the progress in denuclearizing North Korea, according to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Han said the agreement is in line with South Korea’s constitution that its territory is the entire Korean Peninsula, and it does not recognize North Korea as a state.

Han also said the government will make public all of the contents of the agreement in mid-May when it is expected to be completed, and all the documents related to the agreement will be released three years later.

The Kaesong complex, just north of the inter-Korean border, is one of two flagship projects the South operates in the spirit of reconciliation with the North following the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000. Over 11,000 North Korean workers are employed by dozens of South Korean companies there, where they produce garments, utensils and other labor-intensive goods. Another reconciliation project is the operation of tours to the North’s scenic Mount Geumgang.

South Korean companies operating in Kaesong say the inclusion of the goods in the FTA is crucial, as this will allow them to export goods to the world’s largest market, as well as provide a template for future trade deals with other countries. 

U.S. Accepts Kaesung Industrial Complex as an “Outward Processing Zones”
Daily NK
Kim Song
4/3/2007

A press conference was held following the conclusion of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on the 2nd where Korea’s Trade Minister Kim Hyun Chong announced, “The U.S. agreed to recognize the Kaesung Industrial Complex as a remote location.” By this he meant that goods manufactured in Kaesung complex would be accepted as goods made in Korea.

As annexes to the agreement, Committee on Outward Processing Zones on the Korean Peninsula must be established. Undeniably, the article also states that the contents would have to be approved by the U.S.

It seems that both sides agreed that this approach would be the U.S.’s minimal request and compromise on the Kaesung issue and a built-in tactic to keep the negotiating flame burning rather than a deal-breaker.

Previously, the U.S. made concessions regarding Outward Processing Zones with Singapore and Israel’s FTA. As for Korea, these preferential tariffs, not only acknowledges goods manufactured from Kaesung by the FTA, but sets a standard to other sectors in the world such as the European Free Trade Association and ASEAN.

It appears that the recognition of Kaesung as an Outward Processing Zone was based on an agreement that the Korean Peninsula would advance towards denuclearization.

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will eventually lead to the removal of laws that will further eliminate hostile diplomacy and trade between the U.S. and North Korea. It is possible that denuclearization will establish the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations and solve the issue of Kaesung naturally, in due time.

However, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not something to be solved within a short time. As a U.S. official once revealed, amity between the U.S.-North Korea can only be possible when North Korea decides to comply with the rules of the international community. In the bigger picture of the Korean Peninsula and economic conglomerate, Kaesung in relation to denuclearization is only a long-term sketch.

Furthermore, there is one minor glitch. Kaesung complex does not match the international standards accepted by the U.S. in relation to labor requirements and such. At any opportunity given, Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, has continuously targeted wage issues at Kaesung complex. Additionally, there have been many criticisms on pay issues regarding North Korean laborers working even within the nation, as well as violations to contracts of employment.

Throughout the FTA, President Roh Moo Hyun has been striving to protect rice while trying to negotiate the Kaesung Industrial Complex. Though President Roh argues that political calculations were omitted from the negotiations, these two issues contradict his words.

Some argue that the future will depend on South Korea’s attitude to the U.S. It is even possible that this is a political attempt by the U.S. to lure North Korea into denuclearization.

Urgent: How to Topple Kim Jong Il
Foreign Policy Magazine
March/April 2007, P.70-74
Andrei Lankov

From: Andrei Lankov
To: Condoleezza Rice
RE: Bringing Freedom to North Korea

When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon late last year, one thing became clear: The United States’ strategy for dealing with North Korea is failing. Your current policy is based on the assumption that pressuring the small and isolated state will force itto change course. That has not happened—and perhaps never will.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Il and his senior leaders understand that political or economic reforms will probably lead to the collapse of their regime. They face a challenge that their peers in China and Vietnam never did—a prosperous and free “other half” of the same nation. North Korea’s rulers believe that if they introduce reforms, their people will do what the East Germans did more than 15 years ago. So, from the perspective of North Korea’s elite, there are compelling reasons to resist all outside pressure. if anything, foreign pressure (particularly from Americans) fits very well into what Pyongyang wants to propagate— the image of a brave nation standing up to a hostile world dominated by the United States.

Yet, sadly, the burden of encouraging change in North Korea remains the United States’ alone. China and Russia, though not happy about a nuclear North Korea, are primarily concerned with reducing U.S. influence in East Asia. China is sending considerable aid to Pyongyang. You already know that South Korea, supposedly a U.S. ally, is even less willing to join your efforts. Seoul’s major worry is not a North Korean nuclear arsenal but the possibility of sudden regime collapse. A democratic revolution in the North, followed by a German-style unification, would deal a heavy blow to the South Korean economy. That’s why Seoul works to ensure that the regime in Pyongyang remains stable, while it enjoys newfound affluence and North Koreans quietly suffer.

Do not allow this status quo to persist. Lead the fight for change in North Korea. Here are some ideas to make it happen:

Realize a Quiet Revolution Is Already Under Way: For decades, the Hermit Kingdom was as close to an Orwellian nightmare as the world has ever come. But that’s simply not the case anymore. A dramatic transformation has taken place in North Korea in recent years that is chronically underestimated, particularly in Washington. This transformation has made Kim Jong Ii increasingly vulnerable to internal pressures. Yes, North Korea is still a brutal dictatorship. But compared to the 1970s or 1980s, its government has far less control over the daily lives of its people.

With the state-run economy in shambles, the government no longer has the resources to reward “correct” behavior or pay the hordes of lackeys who enforce the will of the Stalinist regime. Corruption runs rampant, and officials are always on the lookout for a bribe. Old regulations still remain on the books, but they are seldom enforced. North Koreans nowadays can travel outside their county of residence without getting permission from the authorities. Private markets, once prohibited, are flourishing. People can easily skip an indoctrination session or two, and minor ideological deviations often go unpunished. It’s a far cry from a free society, but these changes do constitute a considerable relaxation from the old days.

Deliver Information Inside: North Korea has maintained a self-imposed information blockade that is without parallel. Owning radios with free tuning is still technically illegal— a prohibition without precedent anywhere. This news blackout is supposed to keep North Koreans believing that their country is an earthly paradise. But, today, it is crumbling.

North Korea’s 880-mile border with China is notoriously porous. Smuggling and human trafficking across this remote landscape is rampant. Today, 50,000 to 100,000 North Koreans reside illegally inside China, working for a couple of dollars a day (a fortune, by North Korean standards). In the past 10 years, the number of North Koreans who have been to China and then returned home may be as large as 500,000. These people bring with them news about the outside world. They also bring back short-wave radios, which, though illegal, are easy to conceal. It is also becoming common to modify state-produced radios that have fixed tuning to the state’s propaganda channels. With a little rejiggering, North Koreans can listen to foreign news broadcasts.

But there are few broadcasts that North Koreans can hope to intercept. It was once assumed that South Korea would do the best job broadcasting news to its northern neighbor. And that was true until the late 1990s, when, as part of its “sunshine policy,” South Korea deliberately made these broadcasts “non-provocative.” There are only three other stations that target North Korea. But their airtime is short, largely due to a shortage of funds. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America each broadcast for roughly four hours per day, and Free North Korea (FNK), a small, South Korea-based station staffed by North Korean defectors, broadcasts for just one hour per day.

Being a former Soviet citizen, I know that shortwave radios could be the most important tool for loosening Pyongyang’s grip. That was the case in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, some 25 percent of Russia’s adult population listened to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week because they were one of the only reliable sources of news about the world and, more importantly, our own society A dramatic increase in funding for broadcasts by Voice Of America is necessary.  It is also important to support the defectors’ groups that do similar broadcasting themselves. These groups are regularly silenced by South Korean authorities, and they have to do everything on a shoestring. A journalist at the FNK gets paid the equivalent of a janitor’s salary in Seoul.  Even a small amount of money- less than U.S. military forces in Seoul spend on coffee-could expand their airtime greatly. With an annual budget of just $1 million, a refugee-staffed station could be on air for four hours a day, 365 days a year.

Leverage the Refugee Community in the South: There are some 10,000 North Korean defectors living in the South, and their numbers are growing fast. Unlike in earlier times, these defectors stay in touch with their families back home using smugglers’ networks and mobile phones. However, the defectors are not a prominent lobby in South Korea. In communist-dominated Eastern Europe, large and vibrant exile communities played a major role in promoting changes back home and, after the collapse of communism, helped ensure the transformation to democracy and a market economy. That is why the United States must help increase the influence of this community by making sure that a cadre of educated and gifted defectors emerges from their ranks.

Today, younger North Korean defectors are being admitted to South Korean colleges through simplified examinations (they have no chance of passing the standard tests), but a bachelor’s degree means little in modern South Korea. Defectors cannot afford the tuition for a postgraduate degree, which is the only path to a professional career. Thus, postgraduate scholarships and internship programs will be critical to their success. Without outside help, it is unlikely that a vocal and influential group of defectors will emerge. Seoul won’t fund these programs, so it will be up to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations to do so. Fortunately, these kinds of initiatives are cheap, easy to enact, and perfectly compatible with the views of almost every U.S. politician, from right to left.

Fund, Plan, and Carry out Cultural Exchanges: The Cold War was won not by mindless pressure alone, but by a combination of pressure and engagement. The same will be true with North Korea The United States must support, both officially and unofficially, all policies that promote North Korea’s Contacts with the outside world. These policies are likely to be relatively expensive, compared to the measures above, but cheap in comparison to a military showdown with a nuclear power.

It makes sense for the U.S. government to bring North Korean students to study overseas (paid for with U.S. tax dollars), to bring their dancers or singers to perform in the West, and to invite their officials to take “study tours.” Without question, North Korean officials are wary of these kinds of exchanges with the United States. However, they will be less unwilling to allow exchanges with countries seen as neutral, such as Australia and New Zealand. In the past, Pyongyang would never have allowed such exchanges to happen. But nowadays, because most of these programs will benefit elite, well- connected North Korean families, the temptation will be too great to resist. in-other words, a official in Pyongyang might understand perfectly well that sending his son to study market economics at the Australian National University is bad for the communist system, but as long as his son will benefit, he will probably support the project.

Convince Fellow Republicans That Subtle Measures Can Work: Some Republicans, particularly in the U.S. Congress, might object to any cultural exchanges that will benefit already-privileged North Koreans. And, for many, funding Voice of America isn’t as attractive as pounding a fist in Kim’s face. But these criticisms are probably shortsighted. As a student of Soviet history, you know that mild exposure to the world outside the Soviet Union had a great impact on many Soviet party officials. And information almost always filters downstream. A similar effect can be expected in North Korea. During the Cold War, official exchange programs nurtured three trends that eventually brought down the Soviet system: disappointment among the masses, discontent among the intellectuals, and a longing for reforms among bureaucrats. Money invested in subtle measures is not another way to feed the North Korean elite indirectly; it is an investment in the gradual disintegration of a dangerous and brutal regime.

North Korea has changed, and its changes should be boldly exploited. The communist countries of the 20th century were not conquered. Their collapse came from within, as their citizens finally realized the failures of the system that had been foisted on them. The simple steps outlined here will help many North Koreans arrive at the same conclusion. It may be the only realistic way to solve the North Korean problem, while also paving the way for the eventual transformation of the country into a free society. This fight will take time, but there is no reason to wait any longer.

New York Sun
Benny Avni
4/3/2007

As federal investigators examine how the leading U.N. agency in North Korea illegally kept 35 counterfeit American $100 bills in its possession for 12 years, documents indicate that more officials were aware of the existence of the fake currency — and earlier — than the agency has reported.

Spokesmen for the United Nations Development Program have said top officials at the agency’s New York headquarters learned in February that their safe in Pyongyang contained the counterfeit bills and immediately reported it to American authorities. But several documents shown recently to The New York Sun indicate that higher-ups knew much earlier that the safe held counterfeit money.

The documents are part of a worldwide reporting system that allows the agency to keep track of the contents of its office safes.

Read the rest of this entry »

Reuters
4/2/2007

South Korea’s second-largest refiner, GS Caltex, was picked as the supplier of fuel oil promised to North Korea in return for shutting down a plutonium-producing reactor by April 14, a company source said on Monday.

“Yes, we will supply fuel oil if North Korea shuts down the reactor,” the source said.

GS Caltex plans to skip fuel oil exports in April to divert 50,000 tonnes to state-run Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) , which has been tasked by Seoul to send the fuel to North Korea and is now building up the stocks, the source said.

But the source added that the supplies appeared uncertain at the moment as talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme ended abruptly last month, derailed by the issue of funds frozen in a Macau bank.

Pyongyang avoided discussing a February deal to shut its main nuclear reactor by mid-April, demanding that $25 million at Macau’s Banco Delta Asia first be transferred to a bank in Beijing.

The White House insisted Pyongyang must live up to the deal it struck for taking steps toward nuclear disarmament in exchange for energy aid and security pledges.       

U.S. Treasury officials and North Korean diplomats have since met last week to work out the transfer of funds frozen in the Macau bank and smooth the way for the resumption of disarmament talks.

Under the February accord, North Korea will get an additional 950,000 tonnes of fuel oil from the six-party participating countries after getting 50,000 tonnes from South Korea once it permanently disables the plutonium factory at Yongbyon and reveals all its nuclear-related materials and programmes.

The 950,000 tonnes will be divided among the countries involved in the six-party talks, but industry sources say South Korea is likely to supply the most, citing geographical reasons.

They said GS Caltex, a 50:50 joint venture between South Korea’s GS Holdings Corp. and U.S major Chevron Corp. , was likely to supply high-sulphur fuel oil to the North. But the company official declined to confirm this.

All five of South Korean refiners had exported less volumes in March in anticipation of winning the bid for the contract. They exported about 40 percent less fuel oil versus a year ago, Reuters estimates showed. 

United Press International
Marc S. Ellenbogen
4/2/2007

The most effective way to influence the future of North Korea is through economic development and incentives. The 500 million euro North Korea Investment Fund exists to economically engage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. While the six-party talks continue — which they should and must — Global Panel and the Prague Society will continue to grow this fund.

At the 4th Session of the North Korea Initiative in Bratislava just weeks ago, there was a consensus that growing the NKIF is a good strategy for engaging the DPRK. The NKIF will be used for entrepreneurial ventures, to provide micro loans, for knowledge transfer, healthcare and for building, energy and infrastructural projects.

The biggest task facing Pyongyang is converting one of the worlds most centrally planned and isolated economies into something remotely resembling a free market. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Industrial and power output has declined as well. The development of former East Germany cost 1.2 trillion euros. It is calculated that the redevelopment of the DPRK will cost 5 trillion euros. Pyongyang will only allow development if it can simultaneously protect its power position.

In the 1980s companies failed to predict the collapse of the centralized Soviet system. They were wholly unprepared and certainly had few dedicated funds in place (George Soros was an exception) when the changes in Central Europe came about. The NKIF seeks to remedy this mistake by having funds in place that can be used to aid a changing North Korea at the point change takes place. The NKIF targets investors who know a return of investment is years in the future but recognize the need for such a fund.

A prerequisite for the fund’s future success is confidence-building measures. General Dieter Stockmann, the former NATO deputy commander, made comparisons to China. As the head of the bilateral German-China security talks, he noted that “we need access to human resources.” He was quick to point out that the DPRK military will play an indispensable role in the DPRK’s economic future.

Paul Beijer, Sweden’s special representative on Korean peninsula issues, noted that the Australians have experience with micro-loan projects. Others observed that Sweden, Switzerland and the European Union have separately held conferences in Pyongyang focused on economic reform. There have been both government and private — through international foundations — conferences in the DPRK.

Poverty is out of control in the DPRK. The World Food Program and the Carter Center have calculated some 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Even the nascent micro-markets have virtually collapsed. The gap between the wealthiest and poorest is staggering — amongst the most dramatic on earth.

Previously, there had been a period when small and middle-sized entrepreneurs had done fairly well in North Korea. Tapping into these existing entrepreneurs must be a key goal of the NKIF. The NKIF must provide educational training for this entrepreneurial class and help it grow. Training, also of those doing the training, will be a specific area to add value.

The selection process will be difficult, and nearly impossible without a physical presence in the DPRK. North Korea is a huge market for the development of a financial infrastructure and financial services. Companies interested in participating in the future can aid in these trainings and seminars, which would give them a chance to get their foot in the door.

One expert commented that the DPRK government is highly compartmentalized and that it is extremely difficult to get the different agencies to sit together. It was suggested that a conference in Pyongyang focusing on a narrow topic — modern accounting, microfinance — might be of value. Eduard Kukan, until recently the long-serving Slovak foreign minister, cautioned that Pyongyang remains very weary of outsiders and that even good intentions could very likely be seen as interference.

Any investment must be linked to certain performance benchmarks. It must be linked to practical steps and an action plan. A critical component must be systems in place to monitor outcomes. At the moment, this is virtually impossible with the DPRK. Many who criticize the concept of engagement believe monitoring to be the weakest link. They argue one cannot make sure investments are being used solely for intended civilian economic and industrial purposes.

It is difficult to engage a country that is essentially disinterested in being engaged or only interested in doing so under very strict conditions.

Even the government in Pyongyang cannot ignore basic facts. It recognizes the problems that exist but fears losing its power base. Any solution must convince the current elite that the future is good for it. This, on the other hand, is a very difficult sell to many who wish to punish the current DPRK government.

Regardless, before the NKIF is put to use, a monitoring process should be in place. And this allows time for the fund to grow and to find its niche.