North Korean Economy Watch

UPDATE 4: Circus gets coverage in Dutch media.  Story here.  You Tube video of the circus performing in Pyongyang here.

UPDATE 3: Video report of the performance in the Netherlands here. (hat tip to NOS)

UPDATE 2: Werner found out the information for Germany:

In Frankfurt / Germany they will perform from 4th to 28th Sept.

For place, time and tickets please look at:
http://www.ticketcenter.de/Sonstiges/The-Great-Flying-Circus-Nordkorea/Tournee-03248.html

UPDATE 1: Thanks to a reader for finding the information and posting in the comments:

It appears they are going to perform in Amsterdam’s Koninklijk Theater Carré from 08/01/2008 to 08/31/2008. Tickets can be ordered at this URL: http://wereldzomerfestival.theatercarre.nl/actiesite.php. 

ORIGINAL POST: According to Yonhap, the Pyongyang Circus Troupe will be touring Germany and the Netherlands for the next three months, showing off their 10 signature stunts.

From the article:

Formed over 50 years ago, the troupe is one of North Korea’s foremost cultural groups, making a visit to South Korea in 2000 on the eve of the first inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang.

“This is the first time the troupe is giving a solo performance in Europe,” the paper said, adding the tour will help improve relations between North Korea and European nations.

I imagine this is the circus that performs on Kawngbok street in Pyongyang.  There is a second “Korean People’s Army Circus” in Moranbong district.

I do not know where they will be performing, or where to get tickets, so if anyone out there can find out, please let me know.

Read the full article here:
N. Korean circus troupe to tour Europe: report
Yonhap
7/26/2008

Brendan Carr over at Korea Law Blog dug up some information on law firms operating in the DPRK.  All the information he posts is worth reading, but here are some highlights:

[T]he prospect of working as a foreign lawyer in Pyongyang has been on my list since I’ve been a lawyer.

Michael Hay, a foreign legal consultant in Seoul since 1990, actually did this—striking out from “Big Four” firm Bae, Kim, & Lee in 2001 [domain lapsed] to focus on being a full-time North Korea consultant. He established KoreaStrategic Inc. as a consultancy (its domain lapsed in June 2006, though), then with a splash announced the formation of Hay, Kalb & Associates as the first foreign/North Korean joint venture law firm in Pyongyang. The Hay, Kalb website, too, disappeared sometime in 2005, and I lost touch with Mike Hay around the same time. I remain curious to know about his adventure up North; I’m sure it’s been fascinating. However, he was always extremely tight-lipped about what he was doing there. Other than that he was focusing on North Korea “full-time, all the time” it was hard to get any specifics out of him.

There are two other law firms advertising their services and office presence in North Korea: Italy’s Birindelli e Associati (now Chiomenti after being acquired) and Singapore’s Kelvin Chia Partnership. 

But today I found that the International Financial Law Review’s IFLR Legalwire, to which I hadn’t previously subscribed, recently (May 2008) reported on Birindelli partner Sara Marchetta’s experiences in Pyongyang. It’s fascinating stuff, published in two parts—go read Part 1 and Part 2. The article gave the impression that Hay, Kalb was still trading, which is promising, but Marchetta says that Birindelli kept no expatriate lawyer there year-round, because there were only four or five clients a year needing legal services, mostly in resource-extraction and processing ventures.

From Marchetta’s interview, I thought the following observations were worth noting:

Obtaining copies of laws: 

The first issue is looking for legal resources  – the law- as it is extremely complicated to get them.  Even if you are a law firm and have people who are well-connected, its still a very long process to get a copy of a law.  Even if the law has already been enacted and should be public, you still need special permission.  If the law has not yet officially been translated into English, then you need to obtain special permission to get it and translate it.

The second thing is that the intended implementation of the law in a western sense does not exist.  Especially when you go out of Pyongyang and Kaesong [North Korea’s special economic zone], everything is pretty much left up to political decision: whether you can stay here or there, what you do and cannot do…

Just to give you an example: in terms of a corporate tax, you go to a place, make an investment and you pay a corporate tax even if you don’t profit.  It’s sort of a tax for being there.  Corporate tax ends up being interpreted as a presence tax , which is paid independently of whether you make profits or not.  In a few cases, we did find this type of interpretation, which is obviously extremely bizarre.    So it is really a matter of general legal culture – which is totally lacking – and education of the administrative middle to low levels.

Does [this environment] hinder getting things done?  Yes and no. Yes in the sense that getting a deal done takes more time because you do not have all of the information available at the beginning.  No in the sense that once there is the intention of getting the deal done, there is a lot of facilitation from the bureaucratic and governmental point of view.  If they say yes, its basically yes and it will happen.

How big is your office in Pyongyang:

It is currently staffed with two people.  We have no expatriates.  It is a joint venture as we are there in cooperation with a DPRK government entity called the Korean Justice Committee [KJC].  It is equivalent to the Chinese Ministry of Justice.

Are your lawyers at the office North Koreans?

Yes, they are North Korean lawyers. One of them is a pure lawyer, the other one is more someone who is well-connected in the government and has also PR and English capabilities.  One side has the legal knowledge, and on the other side, fluent in English that they use to work with foreigners.

Does your JV status with the KJC give you an advantage over foreign firms?

As a matter of fact, from an operational point of view: yes.  From the client’s point of view, I don’t know.  I have no idea.  I don’t think this is something that is hindering the expansion of our client base in Pyongyang, but I am not sure if it enhancing it.

What types of clients do you serve?

We serve companies looking at setting up a presence in the DPRK.  These are large companies that deal with natural resources, like mining or consumer goods, and most of them have already a presence in China.

What are teh key sectors of Work?

Well we deal with mining projects.  This means that yo go there, you test the product and if it’s okay then you give the technology to be extracted in a proper way.  You do part of the processing of the mineral and export it.  This is one deal.  On the other side, before advising on an investment we advise our clients on precessing contracts.  Obviously this can be done not just for mining, but for shoes, clothes, and any other product that can be exported.  The deal structure is basically these two.

Looking forward, is there enough going on to fairly classify the DPRK as an “emerging market”?

Not in terms of a domestic market.  I don’t think that the domestic market is going to develop very much, but the DPRK is a good place for processing contracts.  I mean, you send raw materials and they send back the finished product.  There is also a strong market for natural resources and low-to-medium technology projects.  There, you can produce basic chemicals, basic pharmaceutical products and some consumer goods.  The Chinese are doing clothing here, doing shoes, and a lot of other things.

Do you predict enough work growth to expand?

Not for the time being for a number of reasons.  One, we do not see an increase in DPRK-related work.  We have two, three, four, maximum five clients a year and that’s basically it.  So this is the main reason.  Then you have always the political issue.  It’s always there.  The political wind is really swinging a lot and it changes by the season and is very much affected by the situation of the six-party talks.  So for the time being, we are looking at what is happening and we are doing what we can do, but we do not have plans to enlarge our presence in the DPRK for the time being.

Koryo Tours has tremendous access to the DPRK and they are pursuing several interesting projects.  Check out their newsletter here.  Of special note, there will be two different mass games performances this summer/autumn.  From the newsletter:

As before the big news though in terms of tourism in DPRK is the Mass Games event – this year for the first time two different performances have been arranged with the classic Arirang show being performed on Mon, Wed, Fri and Sat, and the brand new, not-yet-seen (even by the critics!) Prosper the Motherland! taking place on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Both of these shows feature the full complement of 100,000 performers in the May Day Stadium and both will run to approx 90 minutes offering anyone who s there the chance to witness what is simply the greatest show on Earth, some information on the events can be found here. The Olympics will pale in comparison… a double dose of Mass Games will undoubtedly be vastly superior to the sight of amateur athletes running around in circles and throwing things!

Also, Nick Bonner is producing a new (non-documentary) film in North Korea. The plot, according to the newsletter:

Comrade Kim goes Flying – we are in development with our new romantic comedy feature film…to be filmed in Pyongyang with Korean cast and crew….more about this later – but a coal miner dreams of flying on the trapeze until she is thwarted by the strong man….

UPDATE: Here is an interview with KT’s Simon Cockerell on Interview Blog.

According to Lankov and Kim’s “North Korean Market Vendors: The Rise of Grassroots Capitalists in a Post-Stalinist Society” there is an electrified perimeter fence surrounding North Korea’s first  “special economic zone,” Rajin Songbon.

I have spent a lot of time looking at this area on Google Earth, but never seen the electrified fence.  Last night, however, I found it.  Before reading Lankov’s article, I thought it was a highway, or highway construction, on account of its approximate 35 mile/56 km length (as calculated using the Google Earth ruler).  The image of the perimeter (shown below) will be added, along with a few other new locations, to the next version of North Korea Uncovered (due in early August).

Click on image for larger version

And in case you missed it, Lankov’s article mentions North Korea’s largest market in Pyongsong.  Satellite imagery of this location is below.

 
Click on image for larger view
 

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008

UPDATE: from Simon:

There’s no way that the suggestions [below] are the way that the passport popped up on screen, that isn’t how the application process works. Is it not more likely that they have a little scanner at the check-in desk and that’s how it popped up? Also when you run the magnetic strip of a passport though the passport control machines doesn’t this contain a picture of the passport that comes up on the screen? Anyway whichever way it is, it isn’t from a scanned copy of the passport being sent in advance, this isn’t how it works.

The new plane is indeed much better than the old ones, they show a movie (same one in both directions) currently it is Order-027 which has plenty of fights and is a reasonable film, nervous flyers like myself will probably not love the part where a helicopter explodes while the plane descends!

I read some report that said that the plane was bought reasonably cheaply due to poor sales of the model, also Air Koryo is a company run for profit after all (even if it doesn’t make any, subsidising airlines would hardly be unique to NK, who pays for any new planes for major airlines then?), so those funds would have been what paid for it most likely.

BTW the food on the Beijing – Pyongyang leg of the flight is still the same but they have reverted back to the ‘Koryo Burger’ that was much loved/hated previously, this time though the bun is vastly enlarged meaning that you have to bite through about 2 inches of bread on either side of the burger to get to it, as before, about 50% of passengers didn’t bother with it (burger at 9AM is a bit early for some)

ORIGINAL POST: A recent visitor to North Korea (Stephan) posted a set of photos on flickr.com.  Normally I am not impressed with North Korea tourist photos, but in this case, I was pleased because they are the first I have seen of the inside of Air Koryo’s new Tupolev.

Click on image to see larger version at flickr.

Veterans of Air Koryo’s older planes are familiar with the on-board speaker announcement welcoming visitors to the Juche paradise led by the Great Leader, Kim Jong Il.  Now travelers can expect a professional video!

The food looks the same.

In true communist fashion, there is still a business class section.

And for the intelligence coup…below is a photo of North Korea’s (new?) passport control system.  It appears to be Windows-based.  It also appears that there is a database and ethernet (?) connection between the North Korean embassy in Beijing, the Foreign Ministry in Pyongyang, and Sunan Airport.  I draw this conclusion because it seems like the passport control officer in the photo is looking at a digital scan of the passport ID page.  This means the image was probably captured when the visa was issued in Beijing and it was sent to a central database to be pulled up when it the passport is scanned.  Anyone have a better idea?

UPDATE: according to the photographer, he delivered a scan of his passport to KITC (Korea International Travel Company) in Beijing.  KITC probably sent the image via email to the DPRK embassy.  So what kind of wire network connects the DPRK embassy in Beijing with the Foreign Ministry/Sunan Airport back home?  I would like to think there is a dedicated/encrypted line, or satellite feed (rented from China), but I would not be surprised if the DPRK embassy just emails the images to someone back in Pyongyang who puts them on an internal network.

Click on image for larger version

(hat tip to benms)

“North Korean Market Vendors: The Rise of Grassroots Capitalists in a Post-Stalinist Society”
Andrei Lankov and Kim Seok-hyang
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 81 Iss.1 
(subscription required)

Abstract:
The article deals with the social changes that have taken place in North Korea [from 1994-2002], when the collapse of the centrally planned economy led to the growth of private commercial activity.  This activity remains technically illegal, but the relevant bans and restrictions have rarely been enforced due to endemic corruption and disorganization of the state bureaucracy.  The article is largely based on in-depth interviews with North Korean black market operators [who have defected to South Korea].  It traces their origins, the type and scale of their business, and changes in their mode of operation.

The article demonstrates that the “second economy” came to dominate North Korean economic life by the late 1990s, since authorities’ attempts to limit its scale were largely ineffective.  The growth of the “second economy” produced new grassroots capitalists who sometimes came from underpriveledged social groups, but more typically represented people with good official connections.  It is also remarkable that foreign connections (usually with China) played a major role: to a large extent, merchandise sold at the North Korean markets either came from overseas or was exported overseas eventually, and in many cases the merchants’ initial capital was also provided by relatives residing overseas.

Some highlights:
1. Changsa is the North Korean word for “dealings in the marketplace.” Tonju is the word for money changers/lenders meaning “master of money”. 
2. Public Distribution System (PDS) rations were cut for the first time in 1973.
3. The DPRK system restricted market activity primarily through three mechanisms: limited size of family farming plots, inminban surveillance system, and travel permits.
4. Before the arduous march, North Koreans were not inclined to resort to market trade.  These transactions were seen as ethically suspect.  Once the famine hit, people took up market trading remarkably quickly.
5. Before the arduous march, bribery was rare, even though patronage and indirect forms of corruption were rampant.  Mid-level bureaucrats had to vie for preferred access to poor-quality consumer goods, better schools, and study trips abroad.
6. At the height of the arduous march (1997), production was at 46% of capacity.
7.  North Korean traders seldom if ever have to deal with the protection racket.  When asked directly, respondents did not mention threats from mobsters as one of their security concerns (I wonder if this is still the case).
8. Pyongsong market is reputed to be the largest in the country.  It is just outside Pyongyang, making it accessible to citizens inside the capital as well as those who cannot get permits to enter the city (Pictured below with Google Earth coordinates).

Institute for Far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-7-22-1
7/22/2008

On July 18, the North Korean Cabinet publication, “Democratic Choson’, revealed that the cabinet had recently adopted the ‘Border Bridge Trade Complex Management Activities Provision’.

According to the newspaper, the provision spells out to whom the rules and regulations must be applied regarding the orders and management activities of the border bridge trade complex. In addition, “by being adopted, the provision firmly creates regulations on foreign economic activities that cross over border bridges and has prepared the legal support for unceasing improvements of the border bridge trade complex’s management activities.”

North Korea relies on border trade with Chinese areas such as the city of Dandong, in Liaoning Province, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, as cross-border trade shot up to over 200 million USD last year.

I am told that in the 1980s Tom and Jerry was a poplar show on DPRK and USSR state television.  In the DPRK they even kept the names Tom and Jerry.

From Daily Business News Mongolia:

At the submission of the Government of Mongolia, the Parliament ratified Mongolia-North Korea Inter-governmental Agreement on exchanging work forces on the 20^th of July, 2007. According to the Agreement, Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor of Mongolia is to negotiate in the near future with Foreign Trade Ministry on realizing the agreement and exchange of work force, especially number and need of work force, the minimum wage /by USD/, labor conditions /normal and abnormal/, social welfare /social insurance/ and therefore those interested in employing North Korean wok force in 2009 should formulate their TORs accurately as well as submit them to the MSWL within 23 July. Currently orders should be submitted on the basis of position vacancy since number of workers is not specified yet.

Read more here.