Corn prices continue to rise in North Korea in early March, suggesting tightening food supply

March 10th, 2023

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A few updates on the food situation:

Overall, prices continue to rise, as reported by several outlets. A recent article in Rimjingang reports that fuel prices are in fact double what they were last year this time. Fuel prices are highly sensitive to import conditions, suggesting that getting fuel and oil into North Korea remains relatively difficult:

The international price of fuel rose steadily worldwide due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022; however, it began falling in June of last year. South Korean gasoline prices, for example, have fallen by KRW 558.

Why, then, are North Korea’s market prices for fuel still rising? A reporting partner in the northern part of the country told ASIAPRESS that “it is because the authorities have drastically limited the amount (of fuel) circulating in the market,” further explaining that:

“Supplies of fuel are under state control, but state-run fuel supply depots have sold fuel into markets, allowing anyone to buy it. There has also been a lot of corruption in the military and other government agencies, with people siphoning off fuel (where they can). As a result, it’s now become difficult to buy fuel at fuel supply depots. They don’t sell the fuel unless you have haengpyo, which are used by government agencies and enterprises.”

Haengpyo are akin to checks and are used by organizations to pay for goods or services.

Another possible factor is that while North Korean market prices do tend to follow global ones for many goods, they often do so with a significant time lag. This results from the many barriers that disconnect the North Korean economy from the rest of the world, making it react more slowly to global changes than other countries.

I’ve often pointed out that differences in the relative price between corn and rice is one of the most relevant metrics we have access to for assessing North Korea’s food situation. The two main staple foods are, depending on the season and other factors, corn and rice. Corn is generally much cheaper than rice, because rice is the preferred (and therefore more expensive) good. Corn prices increasing in a way that isn’t seasonally normal is, therefore, a possible sign that the overall food supply is decreasing (for more, see this post).

This is precisely what Daily NK reports is happening, and they in fact note the highest rice prices ever recorded in their index (though this does not seem to take inflation into account). Rice prices are going up more than normal for this time of year, and so is demand for corn:

Early March rice prices in North Korea have hit their highest point ever compared to prices surveyed in early March over the past five years, a recent Daily NK survey of commodity prices in North Korea has found. The survey also found that rice prices are not falling by much following last year’s harvest, but demand is rising for corn, a rice alternative.

According to Daily NK’s regular survey of North Korean market prices, a kilogram of rice in Yanggang Province’s city of Hyesan cost KPW 6,300 as of Mar. 5. That is 3.3% higher than two weeks ago on Feb. 19, when it cost KPW 6,100.

In Hyesan, the price of a kilogram of rice rose to KPW 6,300 in late November and began falling from December to KWP 5,620, but has been rising once again since mid-January.

In fact, early March rice prices in North Korea were found to be the highest ever of all Daily NK surveys taken in early March over the past five years.

[…]

In early March 2019, before North Korea shut its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the price of rice in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan was KPW 4,200, KWP 4,210 and KPW 4,400, respectively. In early March of this year, it was 38% more expensive in Pyongyang, 42% more expensive in Sinuiju and 30% more expensive in Hyesan.

The current rice prices are even higher than when rice and corn prices spiked following a spate of panic buying of grain after North Korea closed its border in January 2020.

Food prices, of course, vary heavily between regions, partially because domestic transport is so costly and slow:

In early March 2019, before North Korea shut its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the price of rice in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan was KPW 4,200, KWP 4,210 and KPW 4,400, respectively. In early March of this year, it was 38% more expensive in Pyongyang, 42% more expensive in Sinuiju and 30% more expensive in Hyesan.

The current rice prices are even higher than when rice and corn prices spiked following a spate of panic buying of grain after North Korea closed its border in January 2020.

In Pyongyang, however, the price of rice has fallen somewhat compared to Daily NK’s survey of prices taken in mid-February. A kilogram of rice in Pyongyang’s markets cost KPW 5,800 as of Mar. 5, 3.3% less than it cost on Feb. 19, when it cost KPW 6,000.

The fall in rice prices in Pyongyang suggests that the city’s residents may have been able to recently purchase grain through state-run food shops.

[…]

Meanwhile, the price of corn in North Korean markets is rising more sharply than the price of rice.

As of Mar. 5, a kilogram of corn in the markets of Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan cost 6 to 11% more than it did in Daily NK’s survey in February.

A kilogram of corn cost KPW 3,000 in Pyongyang, 11% more than it did on Feb. 19, which essentially means that while demand for rice fell in Pyongyang, demand for corn skyrocketed.

In fact, the price of corn this year is at a five-year high for early March.

This is all happening despite reports that the state has directed its food shops, that usually only operate sporadically, to sell at subsidized prices, with the regime using state supplies to drive down the market price (I spoke with Daily NK about this in a recent interview).

Many question marks remain. My biggest concern about the information that we’re getting right now is regional bias. It’s always an inherent risk in any information coming out of North Korea through grassroots sources. But with border controls tightening so much since the onset of the pandemic, getting information out has become significantly more difficult. With fewer sources — and no one really denies this is the case — single data points from specific regions can carry comparatively larger weight, distorting the overall image.

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What’s going on with North Korea’s agriculture?

March 2nd, 2023

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

As the South Korean government has said, this week’s meeting in Pyongyang on the food situation is as close to an open admission either of serious food shortages already prevailing, or that the regime forecasts that things will get worse. But what do we really know? In this post, I look at two main indicators: reports and testimonies from inside North Korea reported by the defector-run news outlet Daily NK, and market prices, primarily of corn and rice.

Overall, the food situation appears significantly more difficult than usual. Increased corn prices is perhaps the most worrying indicator. Comparisons with the famine of the 1990s still aren’t warranted, but there are worrying signs that the state wants to tighten control over agricultural production. At the same time, some of the policies put forward by the government make relative sense, in particular those reported by Daily NK (and have not been confirmed by the government). In conclusion, the situation appears concerning and could reasonably be called a “crisis”, but it still does not appear to be in disaster territory. This could change quickly depending on weather conditions and government policies, particularly on border trade.

 

A note of caution

It’s important to bear in mind that the North Korean regime carefully plans what messages it wants to send to the outside world. It’s not always clear exactly what that message is, but it does exist. The government has a purpose in holding a public meeting of this sort, and in telling the world about it. That’s not saying the regime is being dishonest about the situation, but they do have a clear incentive to let China first and foremost, but also the international community at large, know that they need food assistance. It could also be directed towards the broader international community, and there have been reports that the government has been in talks with UN organs about food aid.

 

The food situation and Covid-19

North Korea’s food situation has made a peculiar and sad journey over the past few years. During Kim Jong-un’s first few years in power, agricultural production increased for the most part, a pattern that began already under Kim Jong-il. The food situation overall continued to seem stabile, for the most part, throughout the “maximum pressure” and negotiations of sanctions in 2017–2019. Things really became problematic when North Korea shut its borders to foreign trade in the winter of 2020 to stave off Covid-19. Although North Korea doesn’t (openly) import much food, its agricultural system relies on imports of fertilizer and some agricultural equipment, and spare parts for tractors and machines.

The border closure also significantly disrupted the flow of information from the country. Because of the government’s strict enforcement of border controls, it has become significantly more dangerous and difficult for independent organizations (mostly based in South Korea) with sources inside the country to keep in regular contact, and traders and smugglers cannot venture over to China in the same way they normally have since the early 2000s. North Korea has always been a closed society, but this is even more true since the beginning of the pandemic.

 

What does the state say?

To understand how the North Korean government sees the agricultural situation, it’s worth looking in-depth at the summary report published by Rodong Sinmun today (March 2nd, 2023). The current spotlight on agriculture is really part of a longer focus that began in 2021, and isn’t as sudden as the global interest in it (my emphasis throughout the text):

The plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee had a discussion of historic significance to comprehensively analyze and review the work for 2022, the first year of implementing the programme for the rural revolution in the new era, and further concretize the important tasks and long-term objectives for putting the agricultural production on a stable and sustained growth track and the urgent tasks arising at the present stage of the national economic development and the practical ways for carrying them out.

North Korean parlance has a way of making every issue “the most important”, but it’s very clear that agriculture is explicitly front and center on the economic policy agenda:

The concluding speech raised again the revolutionary change of the rural communities at the present stage of struggle as an important revolutionary task for achieving the prosperity and development of the state and the promotion of the people’s well-being, and put forward the principled matters to be maintained in implementing the programme for the socialist rural revolution in a perfect way. 

It referred to the intention of the Party Central Committee which set the attainment of the grain production goal as the first target of the 12 major goals for the national economic development and the main purpose of the current enlarged plenary meeting, and raised the main goals and tasks for agricultural development.

The problem is, of course, what to do in practice. The report is short on specifics and concrete details, and most statements related to policy appear to advocate modernization for the sake of it, but with what resources? Highlighting the role of irrigation and mechanization suggests the government does have a sense of the most central challenges on the ground, but to develop these areas, North Korea would need to import both machinery and spare parts:

It is necessary to set it as a priority task in ensuring the stable development of agriculture at present to accelerate the completion of the overall irrigation system to cope with abnormal climatic phenomena, and dynamically push ahead with the irrigation project planned for this year and perfect the irrigation system of the country in the period of the five-year plan.

The machine-building industry and agricultural sectors should produce and supply to the rural communities more new and high-efficient farm machines which are the most necessary and effective in putting the agricultural production on a modern and advanced basis, while steadily propelling the work for renovating the farm machine sector in an innovative way. 

From a policy perspective, the emphasis on the role of the state is worrying. In other policy areas, North Korean rhetoric over the past few years has been clear that the state seeks to take back control over the direction of the economy from markets and other non-government players. Further centralizing state control over agriculture could be devastating for efficiency, but I’m not sure this section of the report must be read that way. Rather, it could be about local government organs supporting farmers with what they need (again, unclear with what money):

In order to increase the nationwide agricultural output, attention should be paid to overcoming the lopsidedness in the guidance on farming and keeping the balance to be responsible for farming as a whole and it is important to concentrate on increasing the per-hectare yield at all the farms. This is an important principle for guidance on the agricultural production.

The General Secretary stressed the need to enhance the role of the provincial, city and county guidance organs and all the farms in attaining the long-term objectives of agricultural development.

[…] 

The concluding speech put forward the measures for further expanding the rural construction this year and the policy-oriented tasks to be prioritized and pushed forward with by cities and counties.

In order to attain the gigantic long-term objectives of rural development, it is necessary to decisively strengthen the Party guidance over the agricultural sector and improve the rural Party work.

[…]

He stressed the need for all Party organizations to intensify the struggle against the practices of weakening the organizational and executive power of the Cabinet, the economic headquarters of the country, and thoroughly orient and subordinate the Party work to the implementation of the Party’s policies, thus getting their working efficiency verified in the practical struggle for attaining the 12 major goals for the development of the national economy this year.

 

Reports from independent sources

A few recent articles from Daily NK (henceforth DNK) shine interesting light on the situation. Their reporting gives the impression of a protracted, difficult situation rather than a sudden emergency. DNK reports, for example, that the North Korean currency has strengthened against foreign currencies with expectations that trade may soon begin again:

Because hopes of expanded trade have been frustrated several times before, North Koreans are not rushing out to secure foreign exchange even when the government hands down orders regarding the expansion of trade.

According to Daily NK’s recent survey of North Korean currency rates and market prices, the US dollar was trading at KPW 8,400 in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province as of Feb. 19.

As that figure represents a mere 0.2% increase from the previous survey on Feb. 5, when the dollar was trading at KPW 8,380, the rate does not appear to have changed significantly.

In Pyongyang as well, the dollar was trading at KPW 8,360, more or less what it was on Feb. 5, when it was trading at KPW 8,370.

[…]

With rising expectations of reopened trade repeatedly dashed over the last three years, trade-related directives from the North Korean authorities are not immediately translating into renewed trade, a reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK recently, speaking on condition of anonymity.

In fact, North Korean authorities issued orders on Feb. 10 to provincial trading agencies calling for submissions of general plans for import and export activities and foreign currency acquisition.

The reporting partner said trade has failed to restart several times during the COVID period even after the authorities said it would.

“As long as the government issues no clear permissions [to resume] trade, orders to merely prepare [to restart trade] are not leading people to buy yuan,” he said. 

DNK also reports that the steep, recent climb in food prices may have been generated by signals from the state that its food reserves increasingly need to be replenished. These price hikes are very significant, and far larger than normal:

North Korean market rice prices have recently skyrocketed after holding steady since last November’s harvest. A nationwide campaign of soliciting donations of “patriotic rice” may have helped fuel the dramatic rise in market rice prices.

According to Daily NK’s regular survey of market prices in North Korea, a kilogram of rice in Pyongyang’s markets cost KPW 6,000 as of Feb. 19. On Feb. 5, it cost just KPW 5,200, meaning the price climbed 15% in just two weeks.

Thus, the price of rice in Pyongyang climbed about KPW 6,000 for the first time in three months, having held steady in the KPW 5,000 to 6,000 range since last November.

The price of rice climbed in other regions, too. The price of rice in Sinuiju and Hyesan climbed 9% and 5%, respectively, between Feb. 5 and Feb. 19.

[…]

The recent spike in North Korean rice prices is smaller than the climb immediately following the border closure; however, the spike is much steeper that the usual increase in prices early in the new year.

On the other hand, the price of corn in North Korean markets has trended differently from region to region.

A kilogram of corn cost KPW 2,700 in Pyongyang as of Feb. 19, 6% less than it did on Feb. 5, when it cost KWP 2,900.

This means that while demand for rice has increased in Pyongyang, demand for corn has fallen.

In Sinuiju, a kilogram of corn cost KPW 3,000 as of Feb. 19, the same as it did earlier in the month. On the other hand, in Hyesan, the price of corn has climbed. A kilogram of corn in Hyesan’s markets cost KPW 3,300 as of Feb. 19, 6% more than it did on Feb. 5, when it cost just KPW 3,100. In Hyesan, the price of rice and corn both rose 5 to 6%. 

The state is both supporting market prices more through grain distribution, but also demanding more from the people. This means that while prices have been kept somewhat stable by the state opening its storage houses for some public distribution during the winter, the state is signaling shortages by demanding more rice from the public:

The recent climb in market rice prices appears influenced by the country’s nationwide campaign for “patriotic rice” contributions and insufficient supplies at official grain shops.

Daily NK recently reported through a source in North Hamgyong Province that North Korea is asking all citizens to contribute at least 5 kilograms of “patriotic rice.”

There are price differences region to region, but since rice generally costs twice as much as corn, the North Korean government is treating 10 kilograms of corn as equal to five kilograms of rice when accepting donations. In fact, many North Koreans are donating whichever grain is cheaper in their areas of residence. As a result, rice prices have spiked sharply in Pyongyang and Sinuiju, where rice had been relatively cheap compared to corn.

Moreover, entering February, state-run food shops have sold only small amounts grain to consumers, which appears to have helped contribute to the spike in market grain prices. 

Thanks to DNK, we also have some sense of at least what some North Koreans have been told about the plenary meeting on agricultural issues. Interestingly, the policies mentioned appear much more prudent and wise than those included in the Rodong Sinmun report:

In particular, North Korea’s government ordered each province to secure irrigation facilities appropriate for their geographic conditions and draw up plans to ensure water for terraced fields, calling irrigation facilities that work no matter what the climatic conditions “the most important issue.”

North Korea’s leadership also ordered the preparation of various data, including soil analyses of farmland, analyses of irrigation conditions and analyses of progress in agricultural mechanization.

[]

The province’s authorities also ordered the writing of a draft plan for scientific farming in accordance with soil and lot conditions, and called on officials to hurry construction of modern agricultural housing as per this year’s plans, the source said.

How far these measures can go is very hard to tell and, again, no major change will occur unless the state dedicates significant resources to agricultural development. That would mean moving resources from higher-priority areas, which the state is unlikely to do in the near future.

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The possibly dangerous direction of North Korean economic policy

February 7th, 2023

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The North Korean economy really do seem to be going from bad to worse. I was slightly optimistic at the beginning of the year that trade with China (and to an increasing extent Russia) would move back toward its pre-Covid-normal or even increase given international tensions.

But what if the state simply doesn’t want that to happen? We’ve seen a clear retrenchment in overall economic policy, and the state has centralized foreign trade. But what if it wants to lower foreign trade overall? Self-reliance, after all, remains the core ideology.

This recent report from Daily NK sources in Yanggang seems to suggest as much, where trade cadres have been told off by the Party for pushing for too much for trade to scale up. Sounds to me like they’re just doing their jobs.

This hasn’t been confirmed as a broader policy, and we need much, much more information to say anything concrete. But the report is an interesting data point and a worrying one. Even more retrenchment from global trade would be potentially disastrous for the population.

It is of course possible that the report only represents a specific instance and has more to do with internal political or financial feuds than with anti-trade sentiments. All this is more speculative than predictive.

But, I do think we need a broader, and perhaps more speculative debate, on worst-case-scenarios inside North Korea. I don’t think we’re near 1990s-levels yet, but the economy is incredibly fragile to begin with and policies right now seem both messy and dangerous.

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North Korea strengthens neighborhood surveillance routines, says RFA

November 30th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

According to a report by Radio Free Asia, which cannot be fully confirmed, North Korean authorities have recently strengthened the neighborhood-level surveillance regime by formally instituting fines (presumably for the inminbanjang or by some neighborhood account, though the article doesn’t specify) for not registering outside visitors who stay overnight. This registration has long been a practice in North Korea and goes back at least to the 1950s, but during the last 20 years of marketization, has reportedly been less enforced at least in some parts of the country.

The surveillance regime in North Korea, like most other aspects of the country’s governance, is highly segmented along geographic lines. So we don’t know to what extent the development described here is relevant for the whole country. Nonetheless, it’s an interesting data point in what increasingly appears to be Kim Jong-un’s campaign to take North Korea’s surveillance system back to its roots (article only in Korean):

함경북도의 한 주민소식통은 24일 “오늘 도당위원회의 지시에 따라 새 ‘가정경비법’이 청진시 주민들에게 일제히 포치되었다”면서 “이 법은 이미 짜여진 사회안전망에 더해 주민자체 경비구조를 한층 강화하는 주민 통제법”이라고 자유아시아방송에 전했습니다.

소식통은 “오늘 청진시 포항구역의 매 인민반마다 ‘가정경비법’에 관한 인민반회의가 열렸다”면서 “회의에서는 ‘지역에서 주민들의 안전한 생활을 보장하기 위해 기존의 주민 자체경비체계를 더욱 강화하라는 법 내용에 대한 설명이 있었다”고 증언했습니다.

소식통은 “이번 가정경비법은 주로 인민반별 자체경비를 철저하게 해서 불순분자들의 침투를 막아야 한다는 것”이라면서 “이에 일부주민들은 불순분자의 침투를 막는다는 핑계로 주민 상호 감시를 더 강화하라는 것 아니냐며 불만을 토로했다”고 말했습니다.

소식통은 이어서 “현재 인민반 마을입구마다 있는 경비초소에는 주민들이 당번을 정해 돌아가면서 빨간 경비완장을 팔에 끼고 경비를 서고 있다”면서 “그런데 이번에 발표된 가정경비법에는 경비를 서는 주민이 외부인의 마을 출입 상황을 기록하지 않아 발생한 사건사고에 대해서는 책임지고 해당한 벌금을 물도록 되어 있다”고 설명했습니다.

(Source and full article: 김지은, “북, 주민통제 강화하는 ‘가정경비법’ 새로 제정,” Radio Free Asia, 25/11/2022.)

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Satellite imagery shows North Korean government investments in surveillance and border security

November 18th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Al-Jazeera reports:

North Korean authorities have imposed “excessive and unnecessary” border measures since January 2020, including upgraded fences, guard posts and patrol roads, an analysis of satellite images by Human Rights Watch (HRW) shows.

The beefed-up security includes the addition of 169 guard posts and nearly 20km (12 miles) of new fencing in the vicinity of the border city of Hoeryung, a popular transit point for smuggling and trade, between November 2020 and April 2022.

HRW said it had spoken to five North Korean defectors involved in smuggling goods in or out of the isolated country who have been unable to carry out their activities since February 2020.

“The North Korean government used purported COVID-19 measures to further repress and endanger the North Korean people,” said Lina Yoon, a senior Korea researcher at HRW.

“The government should redirect its energies to improving access to food, vaccines and medicine, and respecting freedom of movement and other rights.”

Yoon said past experience had shown that relying on state-run distribution of food and essential goods “only entrenches repression and can lead to famine and other catastrophes”.

Hanna Song, director of international cooperation at the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), which was not involved in the report, said the findings mirrored other data, including the sharp decline in defections to South Korea, which fell from 1,047 in 2019 to just 42 so far this year.

“Using COVID-19 has been a great excuse for the Kim Jong-un regime to tell its people that they are protecting them, while actually just meeting their objectives of keeping the North Korean people isolated,” Song told Al Jazeera.

“That being said, NKDB has been able to see that the North Koreans are not completely closed off,” Song added. “In a survey that NKDB did with 399 North Korean escapees in September 2022, 71 people said that they had sent money to North Korea in 2022 and 87 people have had some form of contact with family members in North Korea.”

(Source and full article: “‘Excessive’: North Korea’s COVID curbs blamed for food crisis,” Al-Jazeera, November 17th, 2022.)

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What upgrades of North Korea’s surveillance equipment say about policies and priorities

November 7th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein 

According to a recent report, North Korean authorities upgraded their system for monitoring and detecting use of foreign-made cell phones (which is illegal) along the border. This is all part of the general crackdown on “anti-socialist” phenomena over the last four-five years, and under Covid-19 in particular:

North Korea has replaced radio wave detectors installed in regions along the China-North Korea border with the latest models.

The authorities use the radio wave detectors to crack down on illegal mobile phones.

According to a Daily NK source in Yanggang Province, North Korean authorities recently replaced the radio wave detectors in border regions such as Hyesan and Samjiyon as part of its efforts to ferret out locals who use illegal foreign-made mobile phones.

The Ministry of State Security’s Bureau 10, the division in charge of radio wave surveillance, replaced the equipment under top secrecy from Oct. 1 to Oct. 15.

The source said that given how the ministry upgraded its detectors along the border to the latest models, it seems the ministry will once again wage a fierce war to root out users of illegal foreign-made mobile phones.

In fact, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of State Security has been conducting a sweeping “mop-up war” and “war of annihilation” in border regions against people who use illegal foreign-made mobile phones.

The Ministry of State Security has arrested many border residents on espionage charges, subjecting them to forced labor of varying severity. In serious cases, the ministry has even dragged off locals to political prison camps.

With border residents continuing to use illegal mobile phones to contact China, South Korea or other countries despite these efforts, the Ministry of State Security appears to have replaced its existing radio wave detectors with high-end ones capable of tracking the location of mobile phone users more quickly and accurately.

A defector who came to South Korea in 2019 told Daily NK that given how the Ministry of State Security installed the old radio wave detectors several years ago, it may have been time to replace them.

“In fact, if the ministry replaced them with new, highly capable radio wave detectors, it means they want to root out more Chinese-made mobile phone users, and even if not, the rumor that it installed new devices would have been effective in generating fear that the authorities will catch people who use Chinese-made mobile phones,” he said.

(Source: Kim Chae-hwan, “N. Korea replaces radio wave detectors on border with the latest models,” Daily NK, November 3, 2022.)

None of this information is possible to confirm, and the report relies on a small number of sources. Nonetheless, if accurate, the news is interesting for several reasons. For one, it highlights the regime’s increasing reliance on, and investments in, technology for surveillance. Moreover, it further highlights the government’s emphasis on border control and information censorship, which has increased significantly over the past few years.

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North Korean imports from China turning toward food

November 3rd, 2022

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The first items North Korea imported from China when railway freight trade started back up were mainly industrial goods, but lately, imports appear to have shifted more toward foodstuffs. Daily NK

According to a Daily NK source in China last Friday, freight trains have been departing every morning from the Chinese city of Dandong for the North Korean city of Sinuiju since Sept. 26.

From late September to early October, the freight cars have been mostly laden with aluminum window frames, tiles, living room lights and other construction supplies, but from mid-October, the trains are carrying a wider range of cargo.

Trains entering North Korea still carry construction or interior supplies such as aluminum window frames, wood for furniture and sawdust, as well as medical supplies like masks and antibiotics. However, since mid-October, foodstuffs have accounted for a far higher share of imports, so much so that over half of freight cars have been laden with various food items.

In fact, the items now accounting for a greater share of North Korean imports by freight trains from China include soybean paste, soy sauce, red pepper powder, sugar, seasonings, vinegar, garlic soybeans and other items. In particular, imports of foodstuffs needed to make kimchi have reportedly increased with the start of kimjang, or the kimchi-making season.

However, the freight trains have yet to begin carrying grains such as rice or wheat flour.

(Source: Seulkee Jang, “N. Korea is now focusing on importing food from China,” Daily NK, November 1st, 2022.)

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North Korea reportedly sending more workers to occupied Ukraine

October 26th, 2022

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein 

I want to emphasize that this is all far from confirmed and that Daily NK, by the nature of their work, often has to rely on a very small number of sources. Nonetheless, this report suggests authorities in North Korea are preparing to send additional workers to Russian-occupied Ukraine, other than those that have already supposedly been selected. Although the move itself is political in context, as the source notes in the article, reasons are likely mainly financial for North Korea.

North Korea plans to select additional laborers to send to Russian-occupied regions of eastern Ukraine. In fact, Pyongyang plans to send about 300 people, with the primary goal being to earn foreign currency.

A source in North Korea told Daily NK on Monday that the country plans to start the second round of selections on Nov. 1. He said the authorities have issued “recommendation rights” to each Cabinet ministry and committee, and that each workplace must submit recommendations to the Workers’ Party’s Cadres Department (human resources department) by the end of November. 

Daily NK previously reported that North Korea had selected personnel to dispatch for reconstruction efforts in regions of eastern Ukraine occupied by Russia.

“Through the second round of selections, North Korea plans to organize a total of six teams [to be sent to Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine],” said the source. “About 50 people will be in each team, so it seems about 300 people will be chosen nationwide. Considering the first round of selections [about 800-1,000 people], the country plans to send a large number of people overseas.”

The source said people in Pyongyang or with connections to the Cadres Department are not inquiring about the location — presumably because they already know about Ukraine — nor do they want their family members to apply for the job.

“Since Pyongyang residents aren’t going, the authorities are giving as many recommendations as they can to provincial residents,” he said.

The source further explained that officials in the cadre departments of major cities like Pyongyang, Nampo and Pyongsong complain that this is the first time in 30 years that they have seen people avoid a chance to go overseas. They say this is a marked contrast with the old days, when people needed official recommendations to go abroad.

On the other hand, provincial residents reportedly demonstrate no real hesitation to apply. The source said volunteers do not believe they are going to die, even if eastern Ukraine is a conflict zone.

“Some provincial residents optimistically believe that the state would never drive them to their deaths,” said the source. “It seems they think the government will conclude a good contract with Russia so that they can work in the safest place possible.”

(Source: Mun Dong Hui, “N. Korea to select additional laborers to work in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine,” Daily NK, October 26th, 2022.)

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North Korean trade with China in September highest since Covid-19 began

October 25th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein 

The latest figures are out for China-North Korea trade. Overall, trade in September was at its highest since Covid-19 began, which is particularly significant considering that rail traffic, one of the most central routes for goods, only started back up late that month. Total trade stood at $142.7 million. In January 2020, the same figure was slightly under $200 million. This was already a fairly low figure, but one that would have likely climbed steadily were it not for Covid-19.

$14.2 million consisted of exports, with the vast majority being imports. North Korea’s main export goods were iron ore and other mineral- and mining-related products.

North Korea mainly imported medicines and industrial goods, with truck tires being its main import. It is a crucial good for most sectors that depend on domestic transportation and the shortage of tires (whose domestically produced quality is low) has likely caused considerable difficulties.

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North Korean workers selected to go to Russian-occupied Ukraine, will go in November

October 21st, 2022

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

I don’t think we’ll fully know how solid and extensive plans are for the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine until “boots” actually start to arrive on the ground, if even then. A recent report by Daily NK says that authorities have finished selecting workers who will go. It suggests that any contingent that may be sent will be fairly small — 800 to 1,000 — and that they will begin to arrive in November:

North Korea has completed the process of selecting workers to take part in reconstruction efforts in Russian-occupied parts of eastern Ukraine, with plans to send the workers to the region in early November.

A source in North Korea told Daily NK on Monday that the authorities carried out the selection in Pyongyang from July, and that “800 to 1,000” workers were recruited.

Daily NK reported in August that North Korea had planned to send some North Korean workers already in Russia to the Donbas, and that North Korean authorities had also selected workers in North Korea to dispatch to the region.

In fact, Daily NK’s source said the newly selected workers in North Korea would be sent in turns in small teams of 30 to 60 people.

“No firm date has been selected, but they plan to send the selected workers in early November as they select new workers,” he said.

This suggests that North Korea — having weighed when to send the workers while carefully watching the progress of the war — is preparing to send personnel in early November, and also intends to conduct a second round of selections of workers to send to the Donbas.

As for how the workers would get where they need to go, officials are discussing plans to send them by train from the northeastern city of Rason, or by flying them aboard an Air Koryo flight to Vladivostok. Also reportedly being discussed is a plan to send them to Moscow or Saint Petersburg via Beijing.

The source said China has “decided to feign ignorance” since the workers are only transiting through the country, not stepping foot in it.

“North Korea, China and Russia have agreed that sending North Korean workers to Russian-occupied areas would not constitute a violation of sanctions,” he said.

The source added that since sending the workers to Russia through Beijing would cost about the same as sending them through Vladivostok, officials are largely considering sending the workers through the Russian city.

(Source: Mun Dong Hui, “N. Korea finalizes selection of workers to join reconstruction efforts in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine,” Daily NK, October 21st, 2022.)

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