I have worked with 38 North to publish the DPRK Digital Atlas. This is the most comprehensive and authoritative source of administrative boundaries in the DPRK that is publicly available:
Here is some information on the project:
The DPRK Digital Atlas is a resource developed by 38 North, working with Curtis Melvin (North Korean Economy Watch) and a talented team of programmers. It is part of 38 North’s on-going effort to provide various information and analysis resources to help policymakers, researchers, and the general public better understand the DPRK. The data for this project has been culled and vetted through a number of sources to provide users with the most accurate geographic information available at this time.
The atlas was created in Google Earth and then converted to a browser-based application to allow users to search the map either by name (English and Korean), coordinates, or simply by browsing through the drop down menus. Because it is built on the Google Earth platform, users can see the latest publicly available satellite imagery of any specific point or area as they are searching.
In this first iteration of the atlas, users can browse through the provinces, cities, counties, districts, towns and villages throughout the DPRK. Although it is the most comprehensive satellite mapping project of the DPRK, this remains an on-going GIS project, and future iterations will provide even greater detail and a wider variety of localities and features.
We are in debt to the following people and organizations for their contribution of key resources for the completion of this project: Jonathan Ung, Tam Nguyen, “Hank,” Stephen Mercado, Michael Rank, PSCORE, and the George Washington University Gelman Library’s Asia Reading Room.
The web page is fairly intuitive, but there is a separate page containing instructions. Data sources are listed on the atlas “About” page.
An older version of my infrastructure mapping project, North Korea Uncovered, can be found here. Although it was published in 2009, I have been working on it for nearly every day since. I am not someone who tends to exaggeration, but it is the most authoritative map of the DPRK’s infrastructure that will be made publicly available. I hope to publish it soon…
UPDATE 3 (2017-2-10): According to the White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2013 (2013-05-16), this new prison camp was formed from the remnants of the closed Camp 18 in Pukchang County:
2012년에 확인된 또 다른 변화로는 평남 북창군 신흥리 및 삼포동 일대에 위치하던 북창 18호 관리소가 대폭 축소되어 평남 개천 동림리 지역으로 이전하였다는 사실이다.
Another change confirmed in 2012 is that Camp 18, located in the vicinity of Pukchang, Pyongnam, got downsized by a large degree and moved to 동림리, 개천, Pyongnam.
18호 관리소가 관할하던 지역은 단 계적 해제 과정을 거쳐 일반시설로 환원되었고, 여전히 해제되지 않은 수용자들은 2006~2007년경 개천 지역으로 이전한 것으로 파악된다.
The area controlled by Camp 18 got gradually disassembled and changed into a general facility [Pongchang Coal Mine], and remaining inmates were sent to 개천 area in around 2006 and 2007.
현재 18호 관리소의 수용인원은 2009년 정부 추정치인 1만 9천 명보다 훨씬 축소된 2천~5천 명 규모로 추정된다.
The current estimate of the number of inmates in Camp 18 ranges from 2,000 to 5,000, much down from the 2009 government estimate of 19,000.
ORIGINAL POST (2013-1-18): Today (Friday) Google Earth was updated with new satellite imagery (dated 2011-9-21) of the area around Camps 14 and 18 (Kwan-li-so 14). Camp 18 is said to have been closed for a few years and the area has even been featured on North Korean television (See Pongchang District Coal Mine, 봉창지구탄광, here and here).
While updating my Google Earth file to match the new satellite imagery, however, I noticed the addition of a new area that bears striking similarity to other known “kwan-li-so (관리소)” or prison camps. This area was built sometime between 2006-12-17 and 2011-9-21. It is surrounded by a very visible security perimeter. It is also placed right next to Camp 14– even sharing 3kms of border.
Pictured Above (Google Earth): The location of interest next to Camp 14 in Kaechon County
Let’s look at this new area more closely. The security perimeter is approximately 20km in circumference There are two entrances on the northwestern edge of the fence:
Pictured above is the northern most entrance. The picture on the left is dated 2006-12-17. The picture on the right is dated 2011-9-21.
Pictured above is the southern entrance. This appears to more of a staff or auxiliary entrance.
There appear to be six new buildings constructed around the perimeter that could serve as guard posts/facilities. Three of them are identical:
There has been some new residential and administrative units added to the interior as well:
Pictured above (Google Earth): Residential and administrative construction within the perimeter fence. This village does not appear on any North Korean atlas that I have seen.
There is an old coal mine inside the perimeter fence, but it does not appear to be operational. Comparisons of debris show that coal piles have become overgrown with trees since 2004. In addition, the electrical substation that was located here to power the mine (before the fence was built) has been removed:
So I don’t want to jump to any conclusions here, but this facility certainly raises flags. I look forward to hearing opinions and information/criticism from the wider North Korea-watching community.
Kim Jong-un ditched the new year “Joint Editorial” of the Kim Jong-il era and has personally taken on the role of reading a new year speech (appx .5 hrs)–as was done by his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. Here is a video of the speech (in Korean..no subtitles):
Having read it all, I can understand why Kim Jong-il did not want to give these speeches. If I had absolute power I would not want to either. Here is some analysis that others have provided:
The New York Times highlighted Kim jong-un’s softening tone towards South Korea:
“A key to ending the divide of the nation and achieving reunification is to end the situation of confrontation between the North and the South,” Mr. Kim said. “A basic precondition to improving North-South relations and advancing national reunification is to honor and implement North-South joint declarations.”
He was referring to two inter-Korean agreements, signed in 2000 and 2007, when two South Korean presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, were pursuing a “Sunshine Policy” of reconciliation and economic cooperation with North Korea and met Mr. Kim’s father in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.
And on economics:
In his speech, Kim Jong-un, echoed themes of previous New Year’s messages, emphasizing that improving the living standards of North Koreans and rejuvenating the agricultural and light industries were among the country’s main priorities.
But he revealed no details of any planned economic policy changes. He mentioned only a need to “improve economic leadership and management” and “spread useful experiences created in various work units.”
According to the Ministry of Unification in Seoul, “Overall there was no new policy; they stuck to the existing line.”
In last year’s New Year’s Joint Editorial, the Kim Jong Il era equivalent of this morning’s address, a North Korean regime conscious of the risks of succession emphasized little more than the need to adhere closely to the last instructions of Kim Jong Il as a means of promoting social stability. Kim Jong Il’s name was mentioned a total of 34 times in that editorial.
This year, Kim Jong Eun focused on propagating the accomplishments of his first year, predominantly the December 12th rocket launch success, which he set up as an example for all sectors of the North Korean economy to promote growth. He even put forward a rocket-inspired slogan for 2013, calling for overall economic development based on the “spirit that conquered the universe.”
Cho Bong Hyun, a researcher with IBK’s economic research arm, told Daily NK today, “The core characteristic of this year’s New Year’s Address was emphasizing the Unha-3 launch and linking it to the economy. Kim Jong Eun seems to be planning to use the success of the rocket launch as a tool with which to vitalize the economy.”
However, the list of major achievements mentioned in the address included the military parade that marked the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth, the completion of Huichon Dam and its affiliated power plant, and the construction of athletic facilities around Pyongyang. It is hard not to regard such projects as indicators of North Korea’s fundamental economic weakness rather than strength.
Kim made references to reunification and improving relations with South Korea as well, but did not appear to offer a compromise position that could spur dialogue. Indeed, he appeared also to confirm that Kim Jong Il’s military-first political line is set to continue in 2013 and on into Kim Jong Eun’s rule.
Regarding the softer tone with South Korea, the Daily NK had this to say:
The message for South Korea in North Korea’s statement for the New Year was considerably more gracious than that of last year. Kim Jong Eun stated in his address, as per the subsequent official translation, “An important issue in putting an end to the division of the country and achieving its reunification is to remove confrontation between the north and the south.”
Despite the fact that the “unity of the Korean people” has been a constant theme of North Korean discourse over several decades now, the reaction to Kim’s words was abnormally enthusiastic. Some experts even believe that the speech revealed Kim Jong Eun’s ardent wish to restore inter-Korean relations, and say that North Korea is sure to put more weight on dialogue with South Korea going forward. The state-run Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) concluded that North Korea has returned to a gentler South Korea policy.
Yet the reality is that North Korea has been going back and forth between dialogue and provocation over many years. This was even true under the left wing Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations. Lest we should forget, at the launch of the Lee Myung Bak administration in 2008, the first conservative administration for ten years, North Korea expressed great anticipation that progress in inter-Korean relations was impending.
At that time, North Korea called for the creation of “a new history of peaceful prosperity” and the promotion of legal and institutional mechanisms to prepare for unification. However, as inter-Korean relations went astray and Kim Jong Eun moved closer to the driving seat, North Korea embarked on a set of extreme provocations. Mind you, even then North and South were still discussing the possibility of a summit behind the scenes.
North Korea has chosen to limit its attacks on the new administration for one major reason; to test it. This happened in the 2003 and 2008 addresses (then known as the New Year’s Joint Editorial); indeed, it happens each time a new administration is launched down in Seoul.
The Daily NK also reports that the new year speech’s treatment of economic issues is nothing new:
[…] Promoting the development of light industry has been a key feature of a number of recent New Year’s Joint Editorials, the keynote editorial carried across North Korea’s three main publications; Rodong Shinmun (for the Chosun Workers’ Party), Chosun People’s Army (for the military) and Minju Chosun (for the Cabinet).
Evan Ramstad at the Wall Street Journal highlights a similar theme. In his article, “North Korea’s Message: New Style, Similar Script“, he very cleverly compares 2013, 2012, 2011 publications. They are very similar.
Stephan Haggard confesses to being worn down (as am I), but offers some thoughtful comments nonetheless:
The basic economic message seems to be “do everything,” which is really equivalent to not prioritizing anything at all. But it is possibly worse than that. The slogan for the year is “Let us bring about a radical turn in the building of an economic giant with the same spirit and mettle as were displayed in conquering space!” This approach suggests that the regime’s thinking is still locked into the idea of leapfrogging, “100 day battles,” and monumentalism; indeed, the first reference to economics in the speech is to “Juche-oriented and modern factories and enterprises and reconstructed major production bases in key industrial sectors on the basis of advanced science and technology…”
If there is any logic to the speech—a big assumption—it sounds like heavy industry comes first. (“By adopting decisive steps to shore up the vanguard sectors of the national economy and the sectors of basic industries, we should develop coal-mining, electric-power and metallurgical industries and rail transport on a preferential basis and provide a firm springboard for the building of an economic giant.”) This is disheartening to say the least, but who knows? In the next section, the speech says the country should concentrate on people’s livelihoods, agriculture and light industry “too,” and also with the increasing emphasis seen in recent speeches on “science and technology” as a panacea.
We see three things in the speech, editorials and posters that are discouraging. The first is the ongoing confusion between ends (being a strong and prosperous nation) and the strategy of getting there (heavy industry first, technological leap-frogging, vague injunctions to focus on people’s livelihoods). Second, the emphasis on technology as a form of economic deliverance is everywhere (“Today’s era is an era of science and technology, and we should open up an epoch-making phase in building an economically powerful state with the power of science and technology. The key to crushing the sanctions and blockades by the imperialists and leaping forward into an economically powerful state lies in science and technology.”) A single-minded focus on technology can put a missile in space, and the launch has to be seen as an achievement. But a single-minded focus on technology can’t produce economic growth in the absence of policies that promote ongoing innovation and provide incentives to using technology in an efficient way.In our humble opinion, it is a greater–if more mundane–achievement to grow at 3-4 percent a year than to waste hundreds of millions of dollars on a non-functioning satellite and military posturing.
Which brings us to the final problem: what we call the exhortatory approach to economic growth. The endless exhortation in important speeches is not coincidental. In the absence of meaningful incentives, the only way to squeeze more juice out of the workforce is hope that they respond to nationalist appeals by increasing effort. But a country’s workforce can work very hard and remain poor if what it is doing destroys value, as forced-march economic campaigns typically do. As we know from past socialist collapses, a surprising share of the capital stock in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was essentially worthless when the final reckoning came. Effort cannot substitute for fundamentals, if anyone is even paying attention to these campaigns any more.
Evans Revere, writing for Brookings, made some interesting observations:
Kim Jong-un’s choice of venue for the New Year’s speech was important. He delivered his remarks at the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee building, a site selected to reinforce another theme of his year-old leadership: the primacy of the Party over other institutions and the role of the KWP as the main vehicle for his rule. It was no accident that the Party flag was displayed prominently next to Kim as he spoke.
Having sought to convey that he is a leader in his grandfather’s mold, and having reminded the nation (particularly the military) that the Party under his leadership is in the driver’s seat, Kim spent much of the speech holding forth on another central theme of his reign: economic growth. Looking through this section of the speech, one is hard pressed to find details about future economic plans or concrete new ideas aimed at boosting the DPRK’s anemic economy. In fact, its hortatory calls for making new “advances,” “building an economic giant,” and “breaking through the cutting edge” resemble the timeworn, empty exhortations of past New Year’s editorials. Thin gruel indeed.
Andray Abrahamian at Choson Exchange picks up on a similar theme:
For those of you with an interest in empirical measurements, Kim Jong Il’s “Songun” only got six mentions this year. Kim Il Sung’s “Juche” got 13. But as much as the content of Kim’s speech is important, the very fact that he made a speech at all demonstrates his continuing efforts to associate himself with the pre-Songun era of his grandfather. Implicit in Kim’s style is a return to the relative stability and prosperity that Kim Il Sung oversaw.
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies issued two reports on the new year speech:
In the New Year’s address delivered by Kim Jong Un, emphasis was placed on easing the hostile inter-Korean relations and implementation of the June 15 inter-Korean joint declaration.
An intriguing point of this year’s speech was its format, as Kim Jong Un’s delivery of the New Year’s Address was televised — a rare occurrence, considering the last one to be televised was that given by Kim Il Sung in 1994, some nineteen years ago. The Korean Central News Agency and Korean Central Television broadcasted this year’s speech.
The highlight of the speech was Kim Jong Un’s declaration, “To end the state of division of the country and achieve reunification, we must remove confrontations between North and South.” He added, “Respecting and thoroughly implementing the north-south joint declarations is a basic prerequisite to promoting the inter-Korean relations and hastening the country’s reunification.”
This can be interpreted as an effort by the North as a hopeful message to the newly elected South Korean president Park Geun-hye for improved relations and to urge her administration to depart from her predecessor’s North Korea policy and implement the June 15 and October 4 Joint Declarations.
In the 2008 New Year address, North Korea made a similar statement encouraging the then Lee Myong-bak administration to fulfill the joint declarations.
As for North Korea’s foreign relations, Kim stressed that it will expand and develop relations with those countries that are friendly and cooperative to North Korea and affirmed to “strive actively to realize independence in the world and safeguard peace and stability in the region.” However, there was no mention of North Korea’s position on the nuclear issue or US-DPRK relations.
As for the economy, Kim stressed that “the entire Party, the whole country and all the people should wage an all-out struggle this year to effect a turnaround in building an economic giant and improving the people’s standard of living.” The importance of economy and the improvement of the lives of its people were reiterated and agriculture and light industry was named as frontline industries.
Similarly, last year’s New Year joint editorial called for revolution in light industry and agriculture. This year’s message stressed that economic guidance and management must be improved to reflect the realities of development. It also stressed that the North “hold fast to the socialist economic system of our own style, steadily improve and perfect the methods of economic management on the principle of encouraging the working masses to fulfill their responsibility and role befitting the masters of production, and generalize on an extensive scale the good experiences gained at several units.”
In 2012, North Korea announced its ‘June 28 policy’. There is speculation that changes are taking place in various parts of the country to pilot changes in its economic system.
The New Year address also emphasizes the military. “The military might of a country represents its national strength; only when it builds up its military might in every way can it develop into a thriving country and defend the security and happiness of its people.” Kim Jong Un also emphasized that “The sector of defense industry should develop in larger numbers sophisticated military hardware of our own style that can contribute to implementing the Party’s military strategy.”
South Korean government showed a lukewarm response to North Korea’s New Year address. While the format of the address was relatively novel in that it was televised, most North Korea watchers see the content and format of the joint editorial as similar to past addresses. Kim Jong Un placed heavy emphasis on the economic sector, but the method of improvement revealed no major changes from the current policy. Likewise, no concrete measures were suggested for the improvement of inter-Korean relations except for a general suggestion to open the doors for dialogue.
and…
North Korea’s National Science and Technology Council calls the New Year’s Address, “A Shortcut Measure to Become an Economic Powerhouse”
2013-1-11
In the 2013 New Year speech by Kim Jong Un, plans to strengthen the National Science and Technology Council can be noticed to serve as a driving force for the future economic construction of North Korea.
According to the Chosun Shinbo, a pro-North Korean newspaper in Japan, the National Science and Technology Council assessed the New Year speech to substantiate, “The teachings of our leader Kim Jong Un, to stipulate the power of science and technology in order to provide a shortcut in constructing a strong economic nation.”
The news evaluated 2012 as a year of revolutionary achievement for succeeding in the satellite launch as it was the last year of the “Third Five-Year Plan” of scientific and technological development.
According to the newspaper, the National Science and Technology Council was acclaimed as an esteemed mechanism in conducting scientific research contributing to the nation’s economic development and in creating a new foundation for various scientific research sectors to carry out its projects.
As a result, the news claimed noteworthy achievements were made in state-of-the-art scientific research, with over hundreds of studies conducted in reconstruction and modernization projects in factories and enterprises across the country.
The 2013 marks the first year of the “Fourth Five-Year Plan of Scientific and Technological Development” and the National Science and Technology Council outlined its major goals and tasks of this year: “Our scientists and technicians will carry out the tasks put forth by the New Year speech to realize the modernization of our economy and build a strong nation from advancement in science and technology.”
The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly decided last month to award the Medal of Kim Jong Il to the Korean Committee of Space Technology (KCST) for the successful launch of the Kwangmyongsong 3-2 satellite and commended it as the “paramount event and celebration in our national history of 5,000 years and of our people.”
The successful launch of the long-range rocket was lauded as a major national achievement to North Koreans, with the opportunity to embark on the building of a new satellite named “Kim Jong Un.”
In addition, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of Workers’ Party of Korea, declared that the era of President Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il should be known as the “100 Years of Juche,” while the newspaper referred to Kim Jong Un’s era as the “new 100 Years of Juche.”
For Kim Jong Un, it is critical that his regime improve the North Korean economy in order for him to fully consolidate his power and win the hearts of the North Korean people. Kim is likely to continue to push forward with economic development efforts in 2013, through promoting political stability.
In this year’s New Year’s message, the year 2012 was named as the “year of the people” while agriculture and light industry were said to be major fronts for economic construction of a kangsong taeguk, or strong and prosperous nation. Food shortage and livelihood of the people were also named as major challenges to be resolved to realize kangsong taeguk.
From this year, “June 28 Policy” is likely to continue and already, pilot measures were implemented in selected rural areas to improve economic management and expand autonomy of factories and work sites. Depending on the outcomes of the pilot measure, changes in economic policy is likely to occur this year.
Some new measures likely to take place are as follows: in the agricultural sector, the expansion of farmers’ right to dispose of grain yield; in the industrial sector, the increase of incentives via increasing the autonomy of each company.
Recent Google Earth satellite imagery of central Pyongyang shows that three new apartment buildings are going up in the Workers’ Party Complex next to the “Red Wall” apartment buildings and just north of the Organization and Guidance Department:
Pictured above (Google Earth: 39.022592°, 125.742889°): Images of the new housing construction in Central Pyongyang. Image Dates: 2012-6-20, 2012-10-13.
This is the second visible residential renovation in the area following the updating of Residence No. 15 (in 2009-2010):
The buildings surrounding the new construction house KWP VIPs, doctors, secretariat staff, guard command staff, and deputy directors, so it is likely that these new buildings will also house the families of new VIPs.
The buildings are being constructed on a tract of land that previously served as garden plots for nearby residents.
On Yanggak Island (Yanggakdo) we can see the new health complex taking shape where the golf course used to be:
Here is a poster of the completed project which is on display on Yanggak Island:
NK News gets creative: The innovative and informative NKNews.org is selling goodies this holiday season to fund its operations (I wish I had thought of that). When I saw these playing cards, I laughed out loud:
Inside Air Koryo:Martyn Williams notified me of this web page put up by tourists that took an aviation tour in the DPRK. Some incredible photos to be seen. Here is just one:
The photo set also includes interior pictures of the “famous” Ilyushin-14 given to Kim Il-sung. UPDATE: The source claims that Stalin gave the plane to Kim Il-sung in 1955, however, as a reader points out, Stalin died in 1953.
Mobile phones: A few days ago, NK News posted a link to these photos taken by Russian tourists to the DPRK. Among the lot was this great photo of North Koreans filming/photographing fireworks in Pyongyang with their mobile phones:
Rodong Sinmun photoshop: Perhaps it is unfair to hold Rodong Sinmun to the highest standards of professional journalism, but if you are going to photo-shop a picture, at least put some effort into it:
Click picture for larger version.
I am unsure why Rodong Sinmun felt compelled to badly photoshop what would otherwise have been a lovely photo. Is it really so hard to get a photo of a girl playing a violin in front of her (very loyal) family?
Rodong Sinmun has inspired me to coin a new word: Frankenphoto. Here is a working definition: When all of the compositional elements of a single photo were originally copied from separate pieces and painfully (badly) rendered together into a new image that at times seems to violate the laws of nature.
Just weird [revised]: Below is a very strange act that appeared on North Korean television. I did not understand it at all. After posting it, however, a reader informs me that is is a knock off of an act that appeared on Soviet Television. The original Latvian actor was named Arkady Raikin (Аркадий Райкин). See video of Raikin here. Wikipedia page here.
In this North Korean version, skip to the 3:26 mark. New characters emerge at 5:26, 7:08, 8:17, 10:06.
UPDATE: The Choson Ilbo, Yonhap, Guardian, Telegraph, and BBC all published this satellite photo without crediting the source–this web page. Thanks guys. Very classy.
ORIGINAL POST (2012-11-19): I am taking a break from blogging during Thanksgiving week. During the interval, I will leave you with an interesting image from Google Earth…
While going over new satellite imagery of Ryanggang Province, I noticed for the first time hill-side propaganda praising Kim Jong-un:
The propaganda reads “Long live the sun of Songun (military-first) Korea, General Kim Jong-un!” and it is positioned just behind the Samsu Power Station (Google Earth Coordinates: 41.308824°, 128.157993°).
Happy Thanksgiving to my American readers. To everyone else, have a good week!
Although this site does not focus on human rights issues, I wanted to quickly point out a recent publication that is the result of a collaboration between Joseph Bermudez (Digital Globe and author of The Armed Forces of North Koreaand KPA Jounrnal) and The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). It offers new satellite imagery and analysis of the DPRK’s camp 22.
Comrade Kim goes Flying: [Official web page here]The new North Korean film got an audience at the Busan International Film festival. According to Yonhap:
The film, which cost approximately 1 million euros to produce, is a three-way collaboration between North Korea filmmaker Kim Gwang-hun, Daelemans, and British entrepreneur Nick Bonner, whose Beijing-based company, Koryo Tours, has been taking global tourists into North Korea since 1993.
…
“Where this film differs from North Korean movies, though there are North Korean romantic comedies, is that this is a film about girl power,” said Bonner. “It is a film about a young girl achieving her dream — for herself.”
…
“When we wrote the script it was never our intention to put propaganda in but to make a movie for North Korean people, that is why we had to make those lines,” conceded Daelemans. “We tried to avoid putting a Western stamp on the movie, we wanted to stay as close to North Korean culture as possible.”
The filmmakers say they suffered no censorship from Pyongyang authorities, but there were cross-cultural issues — one of which appears specially designed to sink a romantic comedy.
“In Europe, a kiss is nothing on film, but in North Korea, a kiss is not possible,” said Daelemans. “But that is not so strange — in Bollywood films they don’t kiss either.”
While no romantic comedy might be expected to focus on the North Korean issues that capture headlines — missiles, nuclear programs, human rights abuses, malnutrition — the film’s publicist is working to ensure that cynical reporters pick up the film’s positive vibe.
The Busan audience on Wednesday, largely youthful South Koreans, appeared charmed, laughing at all the right moments.
“It was a bit like South Korean soap operas and home dramas with family settings,” said audience member Hwang Yun-mi, a 32-year-old teacher of English and film studies. “It was not alien to me.”
It is too early yet to discuss commercial releases. Their North Korean partners hold the rights in North Korea, while Bonner and Daelemans have the rights for the rest of the world.
They may hope to fare commercially better than the last European-North Korean co-production: The forgettable Italian-North Korean actioner “Tenzan: The Ultimate Mission” (1988) was described by one reviewer as “truly lamentable.”
However, a key market may be tricky to enter. With South and North Korea technically at war, all Pyongyang media is blocked by Seoul authorities, making it uncertain whether “Comrade Kim” can be viewed by South Koreans outside film festivals, where censorship is lifted.
Even so, Bonner said that South Korean authorities last month granted special permission for the film’s cast to visit South Korea for the festival; unfortunately, there was no time to arrange their visit. And he was delighted at South Koreans’ reaction to the film’s Busan premiere.
“Showing this film here, right now, having Han Jong-shim being loved in the north of the country and for you in the south to love her too — that is more than Anja and me could ever have dreamt,” he said following the screening.
The Associated Press has also released some more footage of the film:
Korean war footage: While exploring YouTube, I found this video made from USAF archival footage. It shows USAF pilots planning and executing an attack on railway bridges in Anju and what used to be the Nampho Smelter. Quite interesting:
Pyongyang Sinmun Advert: According to the Korea Times:
The ads in the Pyongyang Sinmun include those for flowers and flowerpots; “hanbok” or traditional Korean dress; and a water-heating device using solar power. Analysts say new leader Kim Jong-un is tinkering with the economy after pledging to improve living conditions.
Flower kiosks have gone up in several places in Pyongyang–most notably at the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital (how thoughtful). I suppose flower consumption is on the rise!
The solar powered water heaters are produced in a factory in Mangyongdae. Based on discussions with former North Koreans I assume these water heaters are valued for providing warm bathing water–a rarity for many North Koreans.
This is what wikipedia has to say about the Pyongyang Sinmun:
Pyongyang Sinmun (Pyongyang News) is a North Korean newspaper founded on 1 June 1957 by Kim Il-sung.[1] It launched an online version on 1 January 2005.[2] It is published by the Workers’ Party of Korea Pyongyang Municipal Committee[3] six times per week under the editorship of Song Rak Gyun.[4]
Date: October 18th (Thursday), 6:30pm
Location: New York: Learning Center, Unification Church, 4W 43rd Street (2 blocks from Grand Central Station)
Tickets are free but seating is limited. To RSVP, please visit us at www.hanconcert.org
There are increasing evidence of outside media trickling into the tightly locked country- South Korean dramas are a hit in the North Korean black markets. Will Korean popular culture (K-pop) be the new ping-pong diplomacy? Will the increase in informational flow have an impact in the general North Korean psyche- is a North Korean Arab Spring to be expected?
