North Korean Economy Watch

This should not be a surprise to anyone who is familiar with how socialist and highly regulated economies actually function.  If there is a profit opportunity to be had by breaking a regulation, there will generally be a bureaucrat there willing to pocket some of the earnings to look the other way.

The fact that ordinary North Koreans are willing to pay to get access to Kaesong jobs should send a powerful signal to those who call for the zone’s abolition. Wages and working conditions at the complex, though not popular with Western activists, are relatively better than those on the local collective farm.  When the average Kaesong resident figures out that working there will lead to a better life, baksheesh is inevitable. 

Claudia Rosette covered a similar phenomenon with North Korean loggers in Russia.

The Daily NK covers the Kaesong phenomenon specifically:

Known as a “dream place of employment” among North Koreans, citizens of the North are paying hundreds of thousands of won in the form of bribes to gain employment in the facility.

“They say that one can find a job in the Kaesong Industrial Complex by giving 700,000 North Korean won in bribes for males and 200,000 won for females. If I had used the 200 USD (approximately 700,000 won) spent in obtaining a passport as a bribe, I could have entered the Complex.”

As for the why the Kaesong Complex is so popular, Kim explained, “Commodity provision tickets, equivalent to a worker’s salary, are given to laborers in Kaesong and if one uses these tickets well, he or she can make a huge profit.”

Currently, the official salary for laborers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex is around 60 USD, a small amount of which is distributed as cash and the rest in the form of “commodity provision tickets.”

In the Kaesong Industrial Complex, there are several shops that can only be frequented by Kaesong laborers and the prices at these stores are at inexpensive compared to prices in the jangmadang.

Laborers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex use their “commodity tickets” to purchase products at a cheap price and can make a huge profit by selling the goods, giving the difference to middlemen (currency traders who mediate deals).

Recently, there have even been cases where the middlemen had specific orders for certain items from the Kaesong laborers, asking them to procure a certain amount of rice, oil, and so on. The middlemen can easily make an exorbitant amount of money by selling these goods at the jangmadang.

ADDENDUM REVISITED (The Daily NK is transalted into English and as a result is even less clear than my writing somethimes, so I have revised this post several times to clarify the text):

Opinions of the complex seemingly hinge on one’s policy goals.  If the primary goal is to raise living standards in the North and open the people up to outside influences, then Kaesong seems like progress (although maybe not the most cost effective).  If the primary goal is to minimize the income of the DPRK government, then the Kaesong zone probably is not a good idea…. 

Taking the latter point of view, Joshua at OneFree Korea emphasises the point that  the North Korean government keeps most of the cash wages paid to the workers, and that zone employees survive on the supplemental “commodity tickets”–either consuming the goods they purchase in the company store or selling them to local markets for cash.

Theoretically, though, if the thousands of workers employed in Kaesong were re-selling subsidized goods to the Kaesong public markets, this would have the (short run) effect of lowering or stabilizing food prices for the general public (since Zone employees do not need to purchase food at local markets and their clandestine re-selling of commodities to the markets increases the supply of cheaper goods).  This also means that  in general re-selling to the market is not terribly profitable to any zone employee, except when there is a temporary mismatch beteen supply and demand (which might be common depending on the reliability of the DPRK’s market supply chains).  How the price decrease would affect domestic food producers (and the long term price) is probably a bit more complicated since we are not sure how much North Korean farmers respond to price changes. 

Additionally, even though the North Korean government keeps most of the cash wages, the commodity coupons still give the worker approximately $60 in purchasing power –a decent income in North Korea. 

However, given that the South Koreans pay all cash wages go to the North Korean government and the workers themselves receive an additional $60 in script to use at the company stores, means that the average economic cost of a North Korean worker in  Kaesong is closer to $120/month! 

The whole article can be found here:
Bribery Required to Work at the Kaesong Complex
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/4/2008

North Korean Economy Watch has been named Most Specialised Niche Newcomer  by Aaron Schiff on his list of top 200 economics blogs.

See the full list here.

Thanks to all the readers out there. 

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/3/2008

Through its publication “North Korea is Changing” the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) highlighted numerous changes and reforms that have occurred in North Korea due to the 2002 “July 1st Economic Maintenance Reform Policy” (Hereon referred to as the “July 1 Policy”). This publication deals with the changes the North Korean economy is undergoing following the economic crisis of the 1990s, and expounds on the country’s prospects for future economic reform.

The following is a summary of the main points introduced in the publication.

The “Invisible Hand” at Work in North Korean Markets

Following the enactment of the July 1 Policy in 2002, agricultural markets transformed into general markets. Soon, industrial products were being sold alongside agricultural products as the free market spirit spread to the country’s distribution system.
Along with the rise of general markets, street markets, and individualized commercial activities, a new merchant class is emerging. People who are able to put to use business acumen and an understanding of market principles are able to accumulate personal wealth. This demonstrates that aspects of Western-style rationalist thinking, including the pursuit of profit-seeking are being instilled in the minds of the North Korean people.

It is difficult to say if this experiment in free market economics will be successful in the long run. More than anything, due to the rigidity of the North Korean regime, the realm in which the “Invisible Hand” can operate is greatly restricted. This is the fundamental paradox facing North Korea’s prospects for reform and opening.

“Hardworking Heroes” Become “People with Two Jobs”

As the economic difficulties became severe, work opportunities evaporated. Living off of the wages provided by the state became impossible. North Korean laborers responded to this by taking on side jobs or engaging in independent sales.

According to defectors living in South Korea, after the July 1 Policy, there has been an increase “People with Two Jobs.” These are people who are engaging in economic activities additional to their primary occupations. People are beginning to accept the notion that it is better to work for personal benefits than to receive the title of “Hardworking Hero.”

Such phenomena have also changed people’s perceptions about occupations in general. For example, the elite classes now prefer diplomatic positions and jobs where they can make international connections, rather than working in party or government positions. The common people prefer agricultural jobs with the benefits of access to the food distribution system and the ability to earn side profits by being a merchant. In addition, common people also prefer being personal drivers, photographers, workers at the Food Distribution Office, servicepersons, or fishermen.

Business Conglomerates Are Emerging in North Korea

With the implementation of the July 1 Policy, North Korea has witnesses the creation of its first business conglomerates. A case in point is the Korea Pugang Corporation, which has expanded to include 9 subsidiaries and 15 foreign offices engaging in various lines of work. The website of the “Korea Pugang Corporation” reveals that the company has around $20 million in capital and does an average of $150 million of business each year.

The executives in charge of the company’s growth are brothers Jon Sung Hun and Young Hun. President Jon Sung Hun is in his early 50s and studied abroad in Tanzania before returning home to teach English at Kim Il Sung University. He later became a businessperson. His English skills are among the top 10 in North Korea. Young Hun is in his 40s and is the president of a company affiliated with the Finance and Accounting Department of the Workers’ Party. His company dominates North Korean diesel imports.

If the Jon brothers are the representative examples of conglomerate-based new capital, Cha Chul Ma ranks high among those who earned capital due to their power in North Korean society. With his focus on doing business with China, Cha is known for his ability to earn foreign currency and dominates the foreign currency earning businesses belonging to the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly. His personal wealth is said to be over $10 million.

As the son-in-law of Lee Jeh Gang, the First Vice Director of the Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party, Cha gets some support from his father-in-law. Cha, who is known to live so freely that he was seen wearing Bermuda shorts on the streets of Pyongyang, is said to be a “Representative Case of a North Korean who succeeded in business on his merits, regardless of assistance from surrounding figures”.

The Number One Worry is Sustenance

North Koreans are said to live three different lives: their family lives, their working or school lives, and their political lives. Their lives are organized by politics from “cradle to grave,” and they must attend various political meetings, organizations, and study sessions. However, there are many people who are unable to participate in regular meetings of their political units due to economic difficulties. As they do not receive sufficient food distributions and their wages are too low, they must seek their food independently through individual economic activities.

Because the transportation infrastructure in the country is not advanced, it takes at least half a month to one month to go into the countryside to search for food and then they must return and sell the food or daily-use items they acquired, leaving little time for any other activities. Ninety percent of North Koreans engage in some form of business, and as a result, only an estimated 30% to 60% participate in required political activities.

Marriage Culture

These days, in North Korea, the ideal spouse is the one who makes the most money. Previously, when North Korean women chose their spouses, they considered the social status of their potential suitor. However, after the economic crisis, they started to prefer businesspersons and people who earn foreign currency, instead of discharged soldiers and cadres. For men as well, they now prefer money to looks as society increasingly revolves around the economy. As a result, an overwhelmingly higher proportion of men marry older woman than before.

Marriage customs are simplifying as well. Before the economic crisis, women usually provided the domestic items for the household and men provided the estate. However, after the economic crisis, dowries have downgraded into simple things like clothes. Because the allocation of estates has been delayed, more and more people are living at their parents’ homes.

Especially for women, there have been some phenomenal changes. Many women consider marrying late or not marrying at all. Reasons for this include the fact that woman cannot marry men just because the men can’t work and needs a woman to bring home money. Even in such a patriarchal culture, such complaints are becoming increasingly common.

Good Friends claims that a prestigious local politician has been executed for his bourgeois lifestyle…

(excerpt)  A cooperative farm chief who was once honoured by North Korea’s founding president has been publicly executed for starting a private farm to support his luxurious lifestyle, a South Korean aid group said Thursday.

The unidentified man — said to be a member of the national legislature — and two colleagues were put to death by firing squad on December 5 in Pyongsong City, 30 kilometres (20 miles) north of Pyongyang, the Good Friends group quoted sources as saying.

The farm chief, his accountant and the local county’s party secretary were accused of selling produce from an unauthorised farming operation to lead a luxurious lifestyle, said a newsletter from the group which provides aid to the hardline communist state.

The farm chief was accused of failing to register 196 acres (79 hectares) of farmland that had been cultivated over the past decade. He allegedly fed retired soldiers with the produce and used them as his private bodyguards.

The man “acted like a king” in Mundok County and had been deemed untouchable because of his status and the gang of retired soldiers who followed him everywhere, Good Friends said.

All those put to death were said to have lived in upmarket two-storey homes and driven illicit cars.

Read the whole story in the AFP here
1/3/2008

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
10/26/2007

There is a prospect of the rise of “second food crisis” next year because of the flood disaster and the resulting food shortage.

A senior researcher at Korea Rural Economic Institute, Kwon Tae Jin said warningly, “Unless North Korea comes up with a special plan to secure food supply, there will come another food crisis next year, which is as severe as the one in the mid and late 1990s.”

Kwon anticipated that North Korea would need 5.2 million tons of grain for domestic consumption. Unfortunately, it is expected that North Korea would produce around 3.8 million tons of grain. This means there will be a shortage of 1.4 million tons of grain.

The statistics indicates there is a real possibility of a food crisis. North Korean authorities announced that the flood inundated about 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland, which accounts for 14 percent of the country’s farmland. It is estimated that 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland produces at least 500,000 tons of grain.

However, another prospect says that although food shortage is inevitable, it will not lead to mass starvation in North Korea as it did in the mid-1990s. Most of defectors from North Korea said, “Since the mid-2000s, things have changed. There won’t be any serious starvation.” They said that the current situation is different from that of those days under the central food distribution system. They added that the Jangmadang (markets) economy has changed a way for life among North Korea people.

◆ The amount of demand for food is overestimated

It should be double-checked whether North Korea really needs a minimum of 5.2 million tons of grain. There is criticism that the estimate of food demand which was calculated by some South Korean experts on North Korea and relief organizations is unrealistic. It is also pointed out that the estimate is calculated based on the nutrition standard of South Korea.

Defectors said that mass starvation would not have occurred if North Korea had at least a half of 5.2 million tons of grain in the mid 1990s.

Although the international standard for daily nutritional intake is between 2,000 and 2,500 kcal/day, North Korea sets the standard at 1,600 kcal/day, which amounts to 450 grams of grain.

It is easy to estimate the minimum amount of food demand needed in North Korea. Let us say every individual including children and the elderly needs 550 grams of grain per day, which is equal to the daily amount of food distributed to every adult by the state. With the population of 22 million in North Korea, the country then needs 12,100 tons of grain each day and 4.4 million tons of grain per year.

It is known that the North Korean government provides 550 grams of grain for adults and 300 grams for both children and the elderly. According to CIA’s World Fact Book 2004, the population aged between 15 and 64 in North Korea is around 15 million, which accounts for 67.8 percent of total population. This means the population of children and the elderly together reaches about 7 million. If we do the math, we come into conclusion that the amount of food needed in North Korea every year is 3,777,750 tons of grain.

Recall that North Korean people had received the aforementioned amount of food through the state food distribution until early 1990s. Of course, the country did not suffer from mass starvation back then.

The mass starvation during the mid-1990s resulted from huge decrease in food production between 1994 and 1998. In those years, North Korea produced about 2 million tons of grain, which fell far below the needed levels of food production. Hwang Jang Yop, former secretary of the Worker’s Party also testified that in the fall of 2006, while he was still in North Korea, he once heard the secretary of agriculture Seo Kwan Hee worrying about extremely low food production.

Therefore, it is correct to estimate the minimum amount of food needed in North Korea at 3,777,750 tons of grain. If the food production decreases below 3 million tons, then the food prices will skyrocket, and the possibility of mass starvation will be increased.

◆ A New way of life among North Korean people helps prevent them from falling victim to starvation.

North Koran people do not believe in the state authorities any more. The people know that they suffered from horrible starvation because they relied on the state and its food distribution system. During the crisis, many people had desperately waited for food to be distributed until they collapsed and died. Nowadays, North Korean people find a means of living by themselves at Jangmadang.

“There is no free ride” is the words on everybody’s lips in North Korea, which means that everyone must work hard in order to make a living. The lowest class became a day laborer.

The mass starvation of the mid-1990s has brought a significant change into North Korean society. Except a few, most of North Korean people do not rely on the state’s food distribution system. Instead, they have come up with a variety of survival techniques such as engaging in business, illegal trade with China or real estate transactions, receiving support from defected family members, and house sitting.

In that manner, North Korean people make money and use it to buy rice. An affiliate at the Bank of Korea who studies price trends of North Korea said, “Since the adoption of the July 1 Economic Improvement Measure, the price of rice and corn has increased the least.” If the prices go up, people would tighten their belts and decrease their spending on every item except rice. This means they are not that vulnerable to starvation as they used to.

◆ Businessmen are good at securing food.

Recently, a number of rich businessmen have emerged. Some have tens of thousands dollars, and others as many as several million dollars. Groups of Jangmadang businessmen have been organized with these rich businessmen as the leaders.

These businessmen come and go to China as they please and supply food and goods to Jangmadang in North Korea. If the rice price in North Korea is expensive than in China, they buy Chinese rice and sell it at Janmadang. In this way, they help balance supply and demand at the market.

Furthermore, Chinese residents in North Korea and Chinese businessmen also joined the North Korean businessmen as providers at the market. They too sell food produced in China at Jangmadang when food prices go up in North Korea. If possible, they even sell rice reserved for the People’s Army. There was an accusation that the state authorities supplied food aid from overseas for the People’s Army while collecting food produced in North Korea at the same time.

Of course, some businessmen could deliberately keep a hold on food supply anticipating an increase in food prices. However, that kind of unfair activity is temporary. Although it is too early to tell, the “invisible hand” of the market, however small it is, is operating in North Korea and acting as a preventive measure against starvation.

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/22/2007
(Click on image for original size)

According to DailyNK’s research on prices in North Korea conducted in late September, the prices in Pyongyang are similar to the prices in other parts of the country. The finding shows that Jangmadang (markets) economy has been going through integration and similar distribution process across North Korea.

In the past, domestic commodities were sold cheap, and foreign products were sold expensive in Pyongyang.

DailyNK has been conducting quarterly research on prices in the central such as Pyongan Province and Hamkyung Province and northern areas.

This time the research result shows that the price of rice in a Jangmadang in Pyongyang is 1,350 won/kg, which is similar to the price of rice in Sinuiju, 1,400won/kg. In North Korea, the rice price serves as a gauge for price trends.

In Pyongyang, the exchange rate is about 330 thousands won to 100 dollars, which is the same as the exchange rate in other places. The most famous imported cigarettes, Cat (Craven A) is sold at the same cost of 1,500 won in Pyongyang and other areas.

Subsidiary food is more expensive in Pyongyang. The price of cabbage is 400 won/kg, 50 won/kg higher than cabbage price in Sinuiju. The price of pork ranges from 3,500 to 4,000/kg, 500~1,000 won/kg higher than the pork price in other areas.

The prices of seafood such as brown and green seaweed, and dried Pollack are cheaper in Pyongyang. Seafood caught in Kangwon Province and neighboring areas is transported to markets in Pyongyang in refrigerator car. Since the demand is high, seafood is sold in great quantities, and the price remains low in general.

Movie ticket prices range from 200 to 400 won. Telephone service is charged five won per minute. Overall, the price range for each commodity is high, and many different kinds of goods are available in Jangmadang.

Imported items from China such as socks, sports shoes, or underwear are expensive being sold at a cost of 1,000 won in Pyongyang. That is because there are extra shipping rates and labor costs imposed on Chinese goods transported to Pyongyang. On the contrary, in Sinuiju, imported goods from China are circulated on the market right away.

Often, retail prices are higher in Pyongyang because of high levels of consumption among Pyongyang citizens. However, cigarettes or liquor produced in Pyongyang, or clothes from South Korea circulated to other areas via Pyongyang are sold cheap in Pyongyang.

However, in these days the differences in regional price levels have almost disappeared.

A defector from Pyongyang, Ahn Chul Min (a pseudonym) who came to South Korea in 2006 said, “Prior to 2002, there were individuals who hung around from place to place and made money on price differences. But nowadays, the retail prices are almost uniform across the country because people just use a telephone and find out where to get items they want at what prices.

“Since there is no big difference in retail prices, retailers are not doing well in business,” Ahn added, “Instead, individuals driving a truck and selling goods wholesale are making good money.”

Ahn said, “Not everyone who lives in Pyongyang is well-to-do. Despite of their locations whether in Pyongyang or Chongjin, all markets have goods from South Korea and China. The poor people even if they live in Pyongyang should buy cheap and low quality of products from China. In contrast, those who live in Chongjin and have money can buy goods from South Korea anytime.”

Market Prices Consistent Throughout DPRK
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-10-25-1
10/25/2007

The results of a survey conducted by Daily NK on the price of goods in Pyongyang at the end of September show that prices in the capital were similar to those in rural areas. This is an indication that markets throughout the country are integrated, and evidence that goods can be circulated from region to region.

In the past, the price of domestic goods in Pyongyang was relatively cheep, while imported goods were sold at high prices. During that time, Daily NK carried out local price surveys in central regions such as Pyongan and Hamkyung provinces, as well as in northern areas. According to this latest survey in Pyongyang, the cost of one Kg of rice, the standard measure of the cost of goods in North Korea, was 1,350 won, similar to the 1,400 won price in Sinuiju, and the 1,250 won cost in Hyeryung. An exchange rate of 3,300 won per USD is also in line with rural exchange rates, as is the 1,500 won price tag on a pack of Craven A cigarettes, the most favored imported cigarette in North Korea.

Non-essential food goods are more expensive in Pyongyang than in outlying areas, with one Kg of lettuce selling for 400 won, 50 won more than in Sinuiju. Also, pork in the capital runs between 3,500 and 4,000 won per Kg, which is 500 to 1,000 won more than it would cost elsewhere in the country.

On the other hand, seaweed, dried Pollack, and other marine products are cheaper in Pyongyang than elsewhere. Ocean harvests from Kangwon and neighboring provinces are brought to Pyongyang markets by way of refrigerated trucks. Because of high demand, a variety of goods get delivered, yet overall, prices are held fairly low.

Overall, the price range on a particular ware was very wide, indicating that there was a variety of products available in the markets. The survey found that goods such as undergarments, socks, sneakers imported from China were selling for the high cost of 1,000 won each. In Sinuiju and other northern areas, goods from China are brought directly to markets, but by the time these same goods reach Pyongyang, additional labor and transportation costs force prices up. Pyongyang residents typically have more money to spend than those in rural areas, also leading vendors to raise prices on some goods, however cigarettes and alcohol produced in Pyongyang and distributed to rural areas, as well as South Korean goods which reach DPRK markets by way of Pyongyang, are slightly less expensive in the capital.

Recently, regional price differences have nearly disappeared. Prior to 2002, some traders earned their living traveling from region to region exploiting price differences. However, now with one simple phone call, North Koreans can find out where and for what price goods are being sold, leading the majority of retail prices to be similar throughout the country.

Daily NK
Yoon Il Geun
10/21/2007

Since the 10th, registration for new students at the Foreign Language High School, International High School, and other special-purpose high schools in Gyeonggi Province started for the 2008 school year. According to the Gyeonggi Department of Education, over 19,000 students out of 156,000 students sat for the examination for special high schools displaying the fervor for special-purpose high schools.

“Special-purpose high schools” also exist in North Korea and the efforts by parents to send their children to these schools are highly cut-throat.

North Korea has free education system, but it is not an exaggeration to say that Senior-middle school education (equivalent to high schools in South Korea) is an elite education for a minority of students entering “special-purpose high schools.”

North Korea’s compulsory education system, in contrast with South Korea, is an 11-year required education system, which consists of 1 year of pre-school, 4 years of elementary school, and 6 years of Senior-middle school.

North Korea’s special-purpose Senior-middle schools exist in the form of No. 1 Senior-middle Schools. foreign language schools and art schools in each site, including Pyongyang. The most-representative special-purpose high school is the No. 1 Senior-middle School, equivalent to South Korea’s Science High School.

Only graduates from the No. 1 Senior-middle School can go onto college

“Pyongyang No. 1 Senior-middle School,” “Shinuiju No. 1 Senior-middle School,” and other schools with the name “No. 1 Senior-middle School” are a type of advanced schools for gathering and educating prodigies.

After Pyongyang No. 1 Senior-middle School was established in 1984 until 1985, such schools were built in each city under the direct control of the central government. 20-some schools were in operation and starting in 1999, up to 200 schools were set up in districts and counties across the country.

Afterwards, with reactions such as increased competitiveness and demand for the expansion of university quotas for No. 1 Senior-middle Schools, the number of schools was reduced again and presently, only one is left per city. In Pyongyang, there are “Pyongyang No. 1 Senior-middle School,” a mid-level school for advanced students, and three other special schools–“East Pyongyang No. 1 Senior-middle School,” “Changduk Senior-middle School,” and “Moranbong No. 1 Senior-middle School.” The children of the Party leaders can enter these schools regardless of their grades. In North Korea, granting special privileges for children of leaders is a normal occurrence.

In the provinces, elementary school graduates whose grades excel and have a talent in language and sciences are selected for Korean, mathematics, and natural science subject tests. Only by passing all preparatory exams in each region (per district) and formal exams administered by schools can one enter a No. 1 Senior-middle school.

In No. 1 Senior-middle schools, textbooks which differ from average Senior-middle schools are used and education conditions next to college, such as dormitories and modern laboratories are offered. Further, top teachers, degree holders for example, are stationed by priority.

Reputable colleges all filled with No. 1 Senior-middle school graduates

Graduates from No. 1 senior-middle schools go onto Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongyang Medical College, and medical schools, science schools, and top universities in each city. In college, they are educated in advanced classes separately formed for them.

When the all-civilian public service (military service duty system) was implemented in 2000, the effort of parents trying to send their children to No. 1 middle schools doubled. In the North, only graduates from No. 1 middle schools can immediately progress to college and the rest have to wait until the completion of their military duty.

Graduates from other middle schools have to go to the army, construction sites, or the field. Besides No 1. middle schools, college entrance quotas, with the exception of a few, are not even issued for average middle schools.

Moreover, among special-purpose middle schools in North Korea is a foreign language school equivalent to the Foreign Language High School in South Korea. Here, English, Russian, Chinese, Japanese and other foreign language are exclusively taught. Entrance exams for the language school are just as competitive to entrance exams for No. 1 middle schools. The foreign school also selects distinguished students among graduates of elementary schools.

Foreign language school graduates enter Kim Il Sung University’s Foreign Language and Culture Department, Pyongyang Foreign Language University, Kim Hyong Jik College of Education, Pyongyang Commerce School, Yalu River University (the foreign language university within the army), and foreign language and literature departments of master schools in each city. However, the volume of students moving onto college from foreign schools is smaller than No. 1 middle schools School graduates.

In North Korea’s special-purpose senior-middle schools there are also arts schools. In Pyongyang, there are “Geumsung No. 1 and No. 2 Senior-middle School” and arts schools in each city. Graduates of arts schools can advance onto Pyongyang Music and Dance College, Pyongyang Film and Theater School, etc. or can join performing arts groups or a military unit.

Recently in North Korea, the phenomenon of receiving special tutoring from talented teachers, who were monthly compensated with rice and money, increased in order to aid admission into special-purpose high schools.

In January 2007 I visited the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Below are my phhotos.  Stories coming soon.

Tehran Photos

Tehran Subway

Golestan Palace

Tehran Bazar

Old U.S. Embassy 

National Museum

Glass Museum

Imam Khomeini Mausoleum

Shah’s palace in Northern Tehran

Road to Qom 

Qom

Road to Kashan

Kashan

Isfahan

The road to Shiraz

Pasargat

Necropolis

Persepolis

Shiraz

Road to Hamadan

Hamadan

(This site is under construction)

In October 2006 I visited Turkmenistan with Koryo Tours.  After visiting North Korea  the previous two years, I was eager to compare the legendary personality cults of Kim Il Sung/Kim Jong Il to Turkmenbashi the Great, Saparmurat Niazov.  Additionally, I knew nothing of Central Asia, an increasingly strategic region of the globe, particularly in terms of the escalating competition for energy resources between Russia/Europe, China, and the US. I flew to Ashgabat from London Heathrow.  Most of the passengers on the flight were continuing on to India, so the in flight reading was pretty limited.  A photo of Turkmenbashi stared directly at me from the panel in front of my face.  A nice warm smile,”gangster gold ring,” and that blue suit kept me company as I struggled to sleep on the overnight flight.  I was not able to sleep well on the flight, so I arrived at Ashgabat Turkmenbashi the Great International Airport somewhat delirious. As I deplaned, I pulled out my camera and snapped a shot of the plane.  The security official on the tarmack did not like this and ordered me to hand over my film.  What a great start to thrip.  I was not even into the airport and already my film was being confiscated!  I convinced him that I was just taking apicture of the plane for tourist reasons and he eventually relented.          Looking at Ashgabat from Google Earth you can’t enjoy the full ambiance of soviet architecture.  From the sky the airport looks like a modern marvel built from the largess of natural gas exports. Guess, what…it is a dump.  It looked as though it was constructed in the 1970s and not a thing had been touched since then.  I also think the metal detectors screwed up my film! Clearing the airport itself took HOURS.  We all first had to purchase our visas and obtain the proper entry forms, which were more complicated than the old Soviet procedures.  I signed a total of at least twelve signatures and was given duplicate copies of numerous forms to keep with me throughout my visit.  The price of the visa fluctuated by $10 throughout the whole process. Next we had to retain our luggage.  this could have been quick but the security agents in charge of the luggage room made sure that all of the baggs owners had the proper sticker with matching serial numbers so the owners could be properly identified.  Next we had to clear customs.  Customs agents checked the papers and bags of every single passenger to get off the plane.  As best I could tell there was no difference between the “declare” and “nothing to declare” line, except the nothing to declare line was longer. Several hours later, we emerge in Turkmenistan.  Ashgabat Lenin Statue The Turkmen are not Russians.  They consider themselves Central Asians not Middle Easterners (even though they share a border with Iran). Nor do they consider themselves Europeans, despite the heavy influence of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.  This Lenin statue was interesting precisely for its attempt to give Lenin an indeginious flavor.
          

Around Ashgabat The currency in T-stan is the Manat.  There were approximately 25,000 of them for each US$.  The highest valued note, however, was only US$.50–So if you changed $50 into Manat, you got a big pile of cash.  How fun.  Architecturally, the city is a combination of Soviet-era communist apartment and office buildings mixed with new Niazov inspired marble-domed buildings.  Blocks and elephants.                                

Ashgabat’s Propaganda In the last days of the Niazov regime (it was brought to an end by a heart attack just a few weeks after my visit), his vision of Turkmenistan’s future was promoted through the education system, the political system, and through public propaganda.  Some aspects were less subtle, such as public billboards, and others were more ostentatious-like the gold statue of Turkmenbashi that rotates so it always faces the sun (Pictured below with the Arch of Neutrality)! 

Ashgabat Russian Market (North West of the Arch of Neutrality) Although the market has another formal name, everyone calls it the Russian Market.  It is very colorful and all manner of foods are temptingly displayed.  When in Ashgabat, I ate here at least once a day.  Kebabs, bread, lamb, yogurt, fresh fruit, meat pastries, alcohol, and tobacco were all readily available.  Outside the central part of the market, you can purchase clothes, school supplies, books, etc.  There is a store near the market that exclusively sells volumes 1 and 2 of the Rukhnama.  These books did not appear in any of the market stalls, which gives you a signal of the book’s actual demand.  One beggar did approach me in the market.  He was Russian and tried to explain to me in English about his mother’s large hospital bill.  I said “Sprechen sie Deutsch?”–and he switched over immediately to German.  I rolled my eyes, laughed, and moved on.

Presidential Square This first photo of the presidential palace is actually illegal.  Luckily I took it when no other security agents were around.  Others I was traveling with tried this as well and had to delete the pictures from their camera.

Arch of Neutrality My guide, Ata, was a nice guy and very helpful.  We had elections in the US a couple of days earlier, so I gave him my “I Voted” sticker to wear.  I figured it would be a while before he got one himself.  Check out the gold statue of Turkmenbashi!             

Earthquake Monument  

Ertogrul Gazy Mosque Turkmen are not very religious.  Of course, they self identify as sunnis, but people do not bother to go to mosque very often, and I never once heard a call to prayer.  The Soviets took different strategies in dealing with Catholocism in the Baltics and Islam in Central Asia.  Is the Baltics, they faught it and made it into the premier organization for resisting communism.  In central Asia, the mosques were all brought under state control and the Imams made party members and put on the state payroll.  Fast forward a few generations and most people do no care about being that religious.  Still, I heard a couple of Turkmen express anger at the Rukhnama (Turkmenbashi’s book on all things Turkmen) being elevated to the status of a holy book in Islam.            

Independence Tower

                  Rukhnama Statue

Ashgabat Puppet Theater (No puppets in performance)

Underground Lake

Mosque

Tolkuchka Bazar

Nisa

Desert Village

Trip to Mary

Merv

Dashoguz

Konye Urgench

Kony Urgench 2

After spending New Year’s in the Islamic Republic of Iran, I am getting back on top of my life.  Blogging will continue shortly.

In short, I had an amazing time and I recommend it to everyone.  My travel agent, Ace Vacations, did a fantastic job securing the visas, as well as planning and executing the travel agenda.  

A more detailed description of my trip will come soon.

On an unrelated note, I also just visited Turkmenistan. My country count is now at 44.