North Korean Economy Watch

In the last several months the Daily NK has reported on North Korea’s anti-corruption campaigns, particularly in Sinuiju and Hyesan, major DPRK/China trade hubs. Additionally, we have seen stories of how the Chinese are making life harder for resident North Koreans in the run up to the Olympics.

These measures, both of which should have an adverse impact on trade volume between the two coutries—and thus on tax revenues—made this recent report in the Daily NK all the more surprising. China’s Yanji Customs House (along the North Korean border) has reportedly seen a 226% increase in tax revenue this year from trade with North Korea.

How can China and the DPRK make life difficult for traders/entrepreneurs and still see an increase in the value of traded goods and corresponding tax revenue?  According to the article:

Jilin Newspaper in China reported on the 4th that “[…]For the first half of this year, tax revenues vis a vis North Korea totaled 34.22 million Yuan, up 226.2 percent from the year before.

The newspaper continued, “During this period, entrepreneurs in Yanji imported 64 thousand tons of iron ore from North Korea; that is a 2.3 percent increase from the same period a year ago. Accordingly, the tax amount of collected was 29.13 million Yuan, which is 66.1 percent of the total tax revenue derived from North Korea.”

The Yanji Custom House covers seven border gateways with North Korea, such as Juanhe-Wonjeongri, Shazi-Saebyul, Tumen-Namyang, Sanhe-Hoiryeong, Kaishantun-Sambong, Naping-Musan, and Guchengli-Samjangri.

According to the Yanji Custom House statistics, the Naping-Musan border gateway, where iron ore collected from the Musan mine enters China, is the first ranked for commercial traffic, and Guchengli-Samjangri, the gateway for North Korean timber, is second.

Tonghua Steel Group, Yanbian Tianchi Trade Incorporated Compay, and Zhonggang Group purchased 50-year mining rights for North Korea’s Musan mine in 2005. Since late 2007 they had been discussing a seven billion Yuan additional investment in it but that failed due to conflicting views on cooperative investment rate proportions, methods of withdrawing invested funds and other issues. As a consequence of the stalled investment, the Musan mine’s exports to China have not grown relative to last year’s figures.

So most of the trade that goes through Yanji is in raw natural resources, particularly iron ore and timber, and trade in these resources seems to be carried out by Chinese companies and is probably supported (protected) by senior policy makers on both sides of the border.  Rather than looking at politics as an explanation, it might simply be another result of rising global commodities prices.

The tax windfall could come from one of two sources: A volume (unit) import tax (ex: $1 for each ton of iron) or an ad valorem import tax (ex: tax on the monetary value of the goods).  It is not likely they impose much of an export tax to make a difference.

If China imposed a unit tax, the revenue gains would have to come from surging imports.  In this case, it would be likely that the Chinese companies had fixed-price contracts with their North Korean suppliers, and that  the increase in global commodity prices simply made DPRK iron ore comparatively very cheap.  When (if?) global iron prices fell, we would expect to see China decrease imports from North Korea.  But according to the article, iron imports are up only 2.3%—not enough to explain the surge in revenue.

It is more likely that China imposes an ad valorem tax on North Korean imports and the contracts between the Chinese companies and North Korean suppliers are set at (near) market prices.  Simply put, taxing the monetary value of increasingly valuable imports has been beneficial for the Chinese government.  Even though production at the Musan Mine has not increased much, revenues are probably way up.

Given the status of the Musan Mine as the DPRK’s largest, it is likely that funds raised from this mine are firmly under control.  It would be interesting to know the customs receipts in Dandong, Laioning Province, across the river from North Korea’s Sinuiju.  Sinuiju seems to have suffered the brunt of the DPRK’s anti-corruption drive, and it is the main railway and trade artery between North Korea China.  Most of the companies targeted for inspection were in Sinuiju.  Have Chinese tax collections/trade rebounded there?

Read the full story here:
226% Rise in Tax Revenues at Yanji Custom House
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
8/6/2008

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008

Institute for Far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-7-22-1
7/22/2008

On July 18, the North Korean Cabinet publication, “Democratic Choson’, revealed that the cabinet had recently adopted the ‘Border Bridge Trade Complex Management Activities Provision’.

According to the newspaper, the provision spells out to whom the rules and regulations must be applied regarding the orders and management activities of the border bridge trade complex. In addition, “by being adopted, the provision firmly creates regulations on foreign economic activities that cross over border bridges and has prepared the legal support for unceasing improvements of the border bridge trade complex’s management activities.”

North Korea relies on border trade with Chinese areas such as the city of Dandong, in Liaoning Province, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, as cross-border trade shot up to over 200 million USD last year.

According to Yonhap (citing a Ministry of Unification report), trade volume between the two Koreas increased 23% to US$880 million (up from $718.2 million) in the first half of 2008.  This is due to an increase in commercial trade (not official exchanges), which were up 47% to $823.6 million from $558.7 million.  Commercial trade comprises 94% of trade volume, up from 78% last year. The number of firms conducting inter-Korean trade reached 526, up from 324, and and they manufactured 736 items (up from 686).

Goods traded in larger volume than a year ago: plate glass, clams, brackens and textiles from the Kaesong complex.

(UPDATE) Much of this is due to brisk activity in the Kaesong Industrial Zone, which employs 30,084 North Koreans (as of July 4, 2008), up from 225 in 2004.  The zone comprises 72 South Korean firms. 

Total production at the complex has been on a steady rise from US$15 million at the end of 2005 to $373.8 million as of the end of May, up 147 percent from last year, the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee said.

“Such a rise in production is notable in that 33 of the 72 firms in the complex are start-ups operating there for less than one year,” said Kim Min-kyong, a public relations official of the committee.

To learn more, read the full articles below:
Number of N.K. workers at Kaesong complex tops 30,000
Yonhap
Shim Sun-ah
7/8/2008

 Inter-Korean trade rises sharply in first half despite political chill
Yonhap
Shim Sun-ah
7/7/2008

Although political tensions have risen between North and South Korea (list here), Yonhap reports trade between the two countries has increased this year!

According to Yonhap:

South Korea’s trade with North Korea in the first five months of this year surged 30 percent on-year thanks to brisk industrial exchanges that offset a sharp drop in humanitarian aid, the Unification Ministry said Tuesday.

Inter-Korean trade volume increased to US$734.25 million in the January-May period, up from US$562.92 million during the same period last year, according to ministry data. The increase was notable in the commercial sector, which posted US$685 million worth of trade over the months, up 52 percent year-on-year.

However, exchanges in non-commercial areas significantly contracted due to strained inter-Korean political ties. Non-commercial trade dropped by 56 percent to US$49.2 million.

I have been unable to locate this information on the MoU website.  Perhaps it is not listed in English.  If you find it, please send me the link. 

Read the Yonhap article, see below:
Inter-Korean trade rises despite political chills
Yonhap
6/25/2008

North Korea does not publish economic data.  The size of North Korea’s economy is estimated by South Korea’s Central Bank (Bank of Korea), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other think tanks such as the Sejong Institute (Lee Jong Seok). 

According to a recent report by the Bank of Korea, North Korea sufferd its second full year of economic contraction (as defined by GDP), 1.1% in 2006 and 2.3% in 2007.  The bank estimates North Korea’s 2007 gross national income (GNI/GNP) at $26.7 billion, per capita GNP at $1,152 (assuming population of 23 million).  If you are interested in knowing the difference between GNP and GDP, click here.

Here are some highlights from the report:

Agriculture, forestry & fisheries marked a 9.4% decrease following a 2.6% decrease in 2006

Mining increased 0.4% in 2007, down from 1.9% increase in 2006

Manufacturing increased 0.8%, higher than 0.4% 2006 increase. -1.7% growth in light industry, due to the decrease in food products and beverages. +2.3% growth in heavy industries led by expansion of metal and machinery products.

Electricity, gas & water production increased 4.8%, (+2.7% in 2006), from hydroelectric and steam power generation.

Construction production -1.5%, (-11.5% in 2006), from reduced non-housing construction and civil engineering.

Services +1.7%, (+1.1% in 2006). Hotel, restaurant, transport, post & telecom industry expanded.

Trade volume (goods) fell 1.8% to $2.941 billion, 1/248 South Korea’s. Exports fell 3.0%, imports fell 1.3%.

These estimates are based on trade figures obtained from the Korea International Trade Association, Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, fuel and food aid figures from aid groups such as the International Red Cross and the World Food Program, as well as information provided by frequent visitors.

More information here:
Full report by Bank of Korea  and data (recomended)

North Korea’s Economy Shrank in 2007, Second Annual Contraction
Bloomberg
Heejin Koo
6/17/2008

Good Friends reports (via Yonhap) that China recently increased its yearly grain export quota to North Korea from 50,000 to 150,000 tons to help ease the DPRK’s food shortage.  China initially restricted food exports because of its rising domestic food prices.

North Korea’s corn imports from China rose 1,523 percent to 27,600 tons in February this year alone from the same period last year, according to statistics released recently by the Chinese authorities.

Read the full story here:
China softens food export ban to help alleviate N.K. food shortage: aid group
Yonhap
6/9/2008

UPDATE: Although the Daily NK originally reported stellar growth rates in 2008 for Hyundai’s North Korea projects, today the Choson Ilbo highlights that profits are still elusive:

According to the Financial Supervisory Service on Sunday, Hyundai Asan suffered a net loss of W9.64 billion (US$1=W1,041) in the first quarter this year, three times greater than the W3.34 billion in the corresponding quarter last year.

Despite the large number of tourists, which, at 125,000 as of mid May this year, nearly doubled since last year, it is the largest loss reported since the tours to Mt. Kumgang began in 2004. Over 45,000 people have traveled to the North Korean city of Kaesong since the tour program began in December 2007, and it is almost certain that the company would reach its goal of 100,000 tourists for this year.

So what is the explanation given for this?

The reason for such struggle is the weakness of the won against the U.S. dollar, since North Korea charges admission fees to Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang in dollars — US$ 100 for one and $80 for the other per person for three days and two nights. As the dollar has risen more than 10 percent since the beginning of the year, from W940 to W 1,040, so has the initial cost. The tour program to Kaesong has reportedly gone into the red already. Moreover, Asan has to pay off $200 million of North Korean foreign debt in return for the license to develop Mt. Kumgang granted in 1999.   

ORIGINAL POST
From the Daily NK:

According to the Ministry of Unification, despite the stalemate between North and South Korea, cooperation and exchange at the civilian level have increased rapidly in the months of January to April compared to the previous year.

Compared to the same period last year, North-South trade increased by 37% (corresponding to USD 410.099 million the same period last year) and the coming and going of people and the tour of Geumgang Mountain increased by 144% and 76% respectively, contributing to a significant rise in civilian cooperation and exchange.

Related to the North-South trade, following the expansion in economic cooperation, commercial transactions (regular trade + processing of brought-in materials + economic cooperation) increased by 53.3% (to USD 531,960,000) compared to the same period last year (USD 346,990,900). Only, uncommercial trade decreased by 53.8%, recorded at USD 29,570,000 according to the reduction in aid to North Korea.

69 enterprises are operating in the Kaesong Industrial Complex as of April 2008 and 44 of them seem to be constructing factories. It is anticipated that 100-some enterprises will be operating by the end of the year.

The first quarter production volume increased 71% or by USD 6,770,000 compared to the same period last year. The export amount declined 58% to USD 13,280,000. The total number of North Korean workers is 26,885 and South Korean sojourners 1,018, the latter rising by 52.6% from the previous year, despite the evacuation of South Korean personnel.

The Mount Geumgang and Kaesong tours, compared to last year, are maintaining a huge growth rate. The number of Mt. Geumgang tourists have increased 76% to 100,510 and the Kaesong tour, which began in December of last year, logged 40,525 visitors thus far.

The number of coming and going of people, excluding the Mt. Geumgang and Kaesong Complex tourists, increased by 144% within the year to 93,019 and such a growth rate seems to have originated from the hike in visitors related to economic cooperation and North-South trade as well as the Complex itself. Only, the number of visitors related to aid to North Korea was reduced from 2,935 to 1,129.

Although the increase in tourism numbers was expected, the positive spin put on the Kaesong Zone contradicts earlier reports.  

Read the full stories here:
North and South, Politics at a Stalemate, Economic Cooperation Is Bright
Daily NK
5/14/2008
Jeong Jae Sung

Hyundai Asan Losses From N.Korea Tours Mounting
Choson Ilbo
5/19/2008

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland published a piece focusing on North Korea’s economic integration.  Download it here: petersoninstitute.pdf

Although not the focus of the piece, here is an excerpt:

A first corollary of the injunction to avoid top-down approaches is that any collective development assistance must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance will have only marginal effects and may even have negative consequences if not coupled with policy changes. It is not simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in the North.

A second corollary of the injunction against top-down approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows (including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic rehabilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North Korea is to evolve toward a self-sustaining market-oriented economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Participation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint gain rather than as political tribute.

(and)

North Korea is in need of depoliticized technical assistance for a whole panoply of issues running from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaningful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commercial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as they emerge; establish and implement international trade and investment policies; and so on.

Read the full paper here:
A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension
Staphen Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Policy Brief
April 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Bfrief No. 08-3-13-1
3/13/2008

International fuel and food prices are skyrocketing, while the cost of Chinese goods continues to rise, so that this so-called ‘triple-threat’ is sending shockwaves through the North Korean economy. In this year’s New Year’s Joint Editorial, North Korea championed the banner of a ‘strong and prosperous nation’, and declared that this year would focus on the economy, however this ‘triple-threat’ will likely make it extremely difficult for the North to meet its policy goals.

With oil prices peaking at over 110 USD per barrel, if these high oil prices continue, North Korea, which imports crude and refined oil from China, Russia and other countries, will face a growing import burden. In accordance with the February 13th agreement reached through six-party talks, South Korea, the United States and others will provide some heavy fuel oil, and the agreement stipulated the amount of oil to be delivered, rather than the value, so this will not be affected by rising prices. However, this oil does not cover all of the North’s needs, and as for the remaining portion, either the amount imported will have to be reduced, or the North will have no choice but to invest considerably more in fuel. In addition, as a large portion of North Korea’s oil is imported from China, Pyongyang’s trade deficit with its neighbor will also grow.

According to the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), North Korea imported 523,000 tons of crude oil from China in 2005, 524,000 tons in 2006, and 523,000 tons last year, each year accounting for approximately 25 percent of total oil imports. North Korea’s trade deficit with China has shown a steadily growing trend, reaching 212,330,000 USD in 2004, 588,210,000 USD in 2005, and 764,170,000 USD in 2006. With grain prices also skyrocketing, and North Korea depending largely on China and Thailand for rice and other grain imports, the burden on the North’s economy is growing, and this is one factor in the instability of domestic prices in the DPRK.

According to the Chinese Customs Bureau, North Korea imported 81,041 tons of rice and 53,888 tons of corn last year, increases of 109.9 percent and 37.4 percent, respectively. North Korea’s corn, rice and oil imports from China are subject to market price controls, so that rising international prices directly affect the North’s cost burden. Last year, the price of Chinese goods rose 4.8 percent, recording the largest jump in ten years, and this trend extends to a wide variety of goods. 80 percent of disposable goods in North Korea are produced in China, and rising Chinese prices are directly reflected in North Korean import costs, which is passed on to DPRK citizens.

As North Korea emphasizes the building of its economy, it appears unlikely that residents will feel any direct effects of Pyongyang’s promise to prioritize the stability of its citizens’ livelihoods.