North Korean Economy Watch

The Strategic Studies Institute has published a paper on the DPRK’s illicit activities.  You can download the paper here (PDF). It has been added to my DPRK Economic Statistics page.  Here is the forward:

The authors of this monograph have exposed a key piece of the puzzle which helps to provide a better understanding of North Korea’s surreptitious international behavior. For years, North Korea’s military provocations have been obvious to the world, however, much of its decisionmaking is shrouded in secrecy, particularly that of a wide-range of clandestine activities. This monograph is unique in the way that it sheds light on the illicit activities of the regime, and how those illegal activities are used to support its military programs and the government itself.

From drug trafficking to counterfeiting, from money laundering to cigarette smuggling, North Korea’s Central Committee Bureau 39 is an active participant in the criminal economy of the region with tentacles extending well beyond Asia. The authors discuss how these activities have negative strategic consequences for a number of stakeholders and nations throughout the region while describing how such activities provide critical funding streams for military programs and regime supporters.

As a result, North Korea is not just a “rogue state,” but practices what is essentially criminal sovereignty whereby it organizes its illegitimate activities behind the shield of non-intervention while using the tools of the state to perpetrate these schemes abroad. The authors argue that this arrangement has important links to succession issues within the regime. They also argue that policy makers who are concerned with the development of future policies and strategies aimed toward North Korea must view those new policies from a different perspective than that used in the past.

This paper draws heavily on information from Kim Kwang-jin who is working at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Without Mr. Kim’s contributions, much of this activity would remain unknown to us.  You can make a donation to support Mr. Kim’s work here in the US at this web page.

Francoise Nicolas has written a data-driven survey on the DPRK’s changing trade and investment relationships.  The paper can be downloaded here (PDF).  This paper has also been added to my DPRK Economic Statistics page.  Here is the paper’s conclusion:

This brief analysis of the current external economic relations of the DPRK leads to a number of conclusions.  First, the North Korean economy maintains very limited exposure to the outside world and, as a result, to external influence.  In terms of volume North Korea’s trade is miniscule, even in relation with the size of its economy.  This is also the case for foreign direct investment inflows.

Secondly, although North Korea is less isolated than often thought, its trade and investment flows are very heavily polarized both geographically and sectorally, limiting de facto their potential impact.  In contrast to what was the case during the Soviet era, North Korea’s main economic partners are not ideological partners but neighboring economies, namely China and South Korea.  They are major partners in trade as well as in FDI.  Russia still plays a non negligible role but is in no way comparable to what was the case before the demise of the Soviet bloc.

Thirdly, North Korea’s external economic relations are very much dictated by political considerations.  Politics accounts both for the choice of partners and for the nature of the economic relations.

Fourthly, and more importantly, the very distinct nature of the DPRK’s connection with the rest of the world, and primarily with its two major economic partners, sets it apart from other transition economies and in particular from China, but also from Vietnam.  In the case of North Korea, economic openness, although announced time and again as an official objective, cannot be seen as an instrument for enhancing competitiveness or as part of a development strategy.  The recent, renewed signs of reform in the direction of increased openness should thus be interpreted with utmost caution.

Fifthly, the structure of the country’s external trade is indicative of an economy in survival mode.  The substantial aid component in the inter-Korean trade and FDI relationship undoubtedly further substantiates such a claim.  Surprisingly, relations between North Korea and China are more often based on a market-economy logic, although this only holds true for trade flows and not FDI flows.  The Probability of change through trade appears still very limited.

Lastly, the role the European Union may play in the region remains very much an open question but the margin of maneuver is limited.  Given the state of play described earlier, it would be extremely naive to believe that a European engagement strategy vis-à-vis the DPRK could contribute to economic change.  In addition the country’s lack of attractiveness for potential investors is a further obstacle.  However, the persistent uncertainty and the lack of visibility over the political and economic evolution of the DPRK should not deter European investment in the region and, far to the contrary, should provide a strong incentive to closely monitor the economic moves made in Pyongyang.

Scott Snyder wrote a good piece on recent developents in Rason fo rthe Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief:

The Rajin-Sonbong region in North Korea (also known as Rason following a 2004 administrative reorganization by central authorities) is an underdeveloped backwater near the far northeastern tip of the Korean peninsula bordering Jilin province of China and Primorsky Krai of Russia. Although the area is far from the nerve center of the North Korean regime, Pyongyang, Rajin-Sonbong has strategic significance as the northern-most year-round ice free port in Northeast Asia and therefore is an attractive geostrategic transit point for the shipment of goods to landlocked Northeastern China and the Russian Far East. For this reason, recent reports of new Russian and Chinese investment deals following a rare personal visit by North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong Il, to Rajin-Sonbong in December of last year merit closer scrutiny.

Rajin-Sonbong has been the focal point of periodic efforts by Pyongyang to experiment with economic reforms since it named the area a free economic trade zone in late 1991. At that time, the Rajin port was an essential piece of a UN-sponsored regional development effort known as the Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP)—which encompasses areas within China, Mongolia, Russia and South Korea—but the project never attracted sufficient international investment to take off. The spotlight returned to Rajin-Sonbong briefly in 1996 when North Korea sponsored an investor forum there in an attempt to stir up interest in a revamped set of investment laws for the region, but few investors came and North Korea’s famine later that year diverted attention away from the effort. 

(more…)

According to the Financial Times:

South Korea is to phase out its main import from North Korea, delivering a heavy blow to an impoverished regime already reeling economically from confiscated arms shipments and bungled currency reforms.

Sand was the biggest export to South Korea from the north in 2008, earning Pyongyang $73m (£47m). That represents about twice as much as it gains annually from wages at factories in Kaesong, a cross-border industrial zone for South Korean companies.

South Korean officials told the Financial Times that Seoul would phase out sand exports when existing contracts with its northern neighbour expired.

“Once those companies receive their sand, for which they have already paid, that will be the end,” a senior South Korean security official said.

It could have a profound political impact – but South Korean officials insist the decision was taken because Seoul increasingly dredges its own sand domestically.

Officials admit that South Korea has long worried that money paid for sand goes to the military, but they say increased dredging and the imminent conclusion of numerous outstanding contracts have given it the opportunity to end the trade.

…

North Korea is trying to compensate for South Korea’s decision by seeking alternative sand markets in Russian construction projects.

Russia’s Itar-Tass news agency reported late last year that North Korea would ship sand to Vladivostock for use in building projects for the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation summit in 2012.

Sand shipments to South Korea started in 2002 amid inter-Korean rapprochement – but were suspended last March while North Korea prepared to fire a long-range missile over Japan.

Pressed by construction companies that have been affected by the import ban, Seoul resumed imports from North Korea in November. The current flow, however, is less than one-fifth of previous levels.

In an effort to salvage the trade with South Korea, Pyongyang has offered to provide sand to South Korean companies in exchange for other building materials and fuel.

But the South Korean unification ministry said domestic companies were not interested and had not applied for export licences to conduct such swaps.

Previous posts on North Korean sand can be found here. 

Read the full story here:
North Korea hit by Seoul move to end valuable sand imports
Financial Times
Christian Oliver and Song Jung-a
3/19/2010

According to Yonhap:

Inter-Korean trade soared 52.1 percent from a year ago to US$153.49 million in February, according to the report by the Korea Customs Service.

South Korea’s outbound shipments came to $77.14 million while its imports from the communist country amounted to $76.35 million for the South’s trade surplus with the North reaching $792,000, the report said.

The surge came as the global economy is on the road to recovery. Inter-Korean trade is expected to soar this year thanks to rising demand amid an economic turnaround, the customs office said.

Nearly half of the companies participating in inter-Korean trade responded that two-way trade will increase this year, according to a survey by the Korea International Trade Association.

In January, the country ran a deficit of $9.55 million from its trade with the North after posting a surplus of $23.91 million in December 2009 for the first time in 16 months.

Bilateral trade has increased steadily over the past decade from $328.65 million in 1999 to $651.68 million in 2002 and surpassing the $1 billion mark for the first time in 2005.

Inter-Korean trade reached $1.79 billion in 2007 and peaked at $1.82 billion the following year. But it fell slightly last year to $1.66 billion.

Read the full article here:
Inter-Korean trade jumps 52 percent in Feb.
Yonahp
3/17/2010

According to Yonhap:

North Korea brought in 13,834 tons of grain from the neighboring ally in January, a 3.6-fold increase from 3,869 tons in January last year, said Kwon Tae-jin, a senior researcher on the North’s agricultural sector at the South’s Korea Rural Economic Institute in a posting on his blog.

Rice accounted for about 61 percent or 8,425 tons of the North’s grain import from China, followed by corn with 3,448 tons, beans with 1,553 tons and wheat with 304 tons, Kwon said, citing data from the Korea International Trade Association.

“The big rise in imports of corn and beans, which the North didn’t bring in last year, appears to be not only because corn harvests were not good, but it also suggests the North increased imports over concerns about possible food shortages,” he said.

Kwon also said that the North’s regime could have increased imports to enlarge state food rations after last year’s currency reform caused strains on the country’s food supply system.

North Korea has relied on foreign handouts to feed its 24 million population after natural disasters and mismanagement devastated its economy. The situation worsened in recent years as South Korea halted regular food aid to the North after President Lee Myung-bak took office in early 2008 under a policy to link aid to Pyongyang’s process in ending its nuclear weapons programs.

… 

The U.N. food agency, Food and Agriculture Organization, said early this month that the North is expected to be short of about 1-1.2 million tons of food this year.

I think the data for this story came from this KITA web page, but I can’t be sure since my Korean is exceptionally limited. Here is a description of the KITA page in English.

On a personal note, I wish the major South Korean media outlets  would get into the habit of posting links to their sources.  It is not difficult to do this.  

Read the full article here:
N. Korea’s food imports from China more than triple in January: expert
Yonhap
3/12/2010

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s trade appears to have dropped for the first time in 11 years in 2009 as its trade with China, South Korea and other major business partners declined, a South Korean state-run think tank said Wednesday.

The Korea Development Institute said in a report that Pyongyang’s trade with foreign countries were projected to have contracted “at least” 5 percent last year compared with a year earlier, citing statistics provided by China’s customs authorities.

“North Korea’s trade data have yet to be officially compiled but its trade with China and South Korea, its two major business partners, shrank last year (based on China’s statistics),” the report said. “Trade with the European Union also declined. Based on the statistics, its total trade is sure to fall last year.”

North Korea’s trade with China, its biggest business partner, amounted to $2.68 billion last year, down 4 percent from a year earlier, while its trade with South Korea dropped 8.4 percent, the report showed. The two nations accounted for 81.7 percent of Pyongyang’s annual trade.

“Even if its trade with all other nations held unchanged, North Korea is expected to see a decline considering trade figures with China and South Korea,” the report said. “This would mark the first contraction in 11 years since 1998.”

North Korea’s trade has been on a steady increase over the past decade with the amount estimated at $5.64 billion in 2008, up from $2.39 billion in 2000, the report showed.

The Korea Development Institute regularly publishes analysis of the North Korean economy—in Korean. I believe the data cited in this story comes from this February 2010 report, however I am not exactly sure. If any Korean readers can confirm this, I would appreciate it.

UPDATES in the comments.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 10-2-25-1
2/25/2010

Inter-Korean trade, in which South Korea recorded surpluses throughout the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, has now fallen into the red under the current government.

According to customs statistics released on February 25, Seoul ran a trade deficit with North Korea under the Kim Young Sam administration until 1997, then was in the black through the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, almost until the end of 2007. Seoul has fallen back into the red, however, during the last two years of the current government. In other words, the People’s Government (under Kim Dae Jung) and the Participatory Government (under Roh Moo Hyun) exported more to the North than they imported, while this trend has now been reversed under Lee Myung-bak.

South Korea’s surplus in inter-Korean trade grew 11-fold from 37.9 million USD in 1998 to 417.7 million USD by 2005, then fell to 262.2 million USD in 2007. This trend occurred because exports grew at a much quicker rate than imports, from 128.9 million USD in 1998 to 1.0286 billion USD by 2007. However, as the current administration came into power, inter-Korean trade statistics dropped in to the red, with a 54 million USD deficit in 2008 and a 200.9 million USD deficit last year.

South Korean exports to the North grew considerably from the time of the People’s Government until 2008, but have fallen considerably over the past two years. In 2008, exports to North Korea amounted to 883.4 million USD, down 14.1 percent from the previous year. Last year, exports fell another 17.1 percent, to 732.6 million USD.

Last year, electrical products made up the majority of exports, at 24.8 percent (182 million USD). Following electrical products were short, synthetic ‘staple fiber’ (160 million USD) and cotton fabrics (67 million USD), followed by computers and other electronic devices (60 million USD).

On the other hand, clothing (390 million USD), fish (131 million USD), and electrical goods (122 million USD) were the top three imports. While South Korea is in the red, overall trade continues to grow, despite the international financial difficulties. This growth is driven largely by processing-on-commission manufacturing and products from the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

[NkeconWatch: I have a personal probelm with the way “the media” generally reports trade deficits as if they are somehow equivalent or comparable to budget deficits.  They are not.  Additionally, bilateral comparisons of trade deficits are silly. Bilateral comparisons are usually published by someone seeking to generate some kind of political response, but really they don’t tell you anything about what is going on in the economies of the countries involved.] 

Thanks to a responsive employee at the UNFPA, I obtained a summary of the DPRK’s census findings.  You can download the summary here.

Thanks to a reader I was able to obtain a copy of the entire census data set.  You can download it here.

Both documents have been added to the “DPRK Economic Statistics Page“. Happy reading.

_________________

UPDATE 1: The Wall Street Journal’s Evan Ramstad published some analysis of the DPRK’s 2008 census data.  According to the article:

North Korea is getting bigger, older and less healthy, according to data from the country’s latest census, and its fabled million-man army might have fewer than 700,000 people.

The authoritarian government in December released results of the census conducted in 2008, saying its population had climbed to 24 million people from 21.2 million in the previous census in 1993.

More details have been published by the United Nations Population Fund, which helped North Korea conduct the census and sent five teams of observers to monitor it.

Even so, it’s difficult for outsiders, with so little access to the country, to be certain of the precision of North Korea’s data. For decades, the government has cut off the dissemination of most information about the country. The new census numbers provide a rare glimpse of official statistics.

The census reported that North Korea’s population grew at an annual average rate of 0.85% for the 15-year period, a time that included a devastating multiyear famine that analysts and foreign aid agencies estimate killed between one million and two million people.

A separate U.N. report published last year found that North Korea’s population has grown more slowly since 2005, at an annual rate of 0.4%. The global population has grown 1.2% annually since 2005, the U.N. report said.

North Korea’s census said the country’s population has proportionately fewer children and more middle-aged people than it did in 1993.

It also reported that people are less healthy.

Babies are more likely to die: The infant mortality rate climbed to 19.3 per 1,000 children in 2008 from 14.1 in 1993, though North Korea’s rate is still well below the world average, which a 2009 report by the U.N. agency put at 46 per 1,000 children.

North Koreans are living shorter lives—average life expectancy has fallen to 69.3 years from 72.7 in 1993.

As in many places, women live longer than men, with a gap of about seven years, compared with the world average of 4.4 years.

North Korea has 5.9 million households, with an average of 3.9 people in each, according to the census.

The typical home is 50 to 75 square meters in size (540 to 800 square feet). About 85% of homes have access to running water and about 55% have a flush toilet.

The census provided only a glimpse of the country’s economic structure, but even that produced some surprises. The occupation that provides the most employment—farming—has more women, 1.9 million, than men, 1.5 million.

The second-biggest occupation, working for the government or the military, employs 699,000 people. The census doesn’t break that group down further, but the figure suggests North Korea’s military isn’t as large as had been thought.

The military is often portrayed by outside military analysts and media as a force of one million people, mostly conscripts who are required to serve 10 years.

The third-largest employment sector by number of workers is education, followed by machinery manufacturing, textiles and coal mining. About 40,000 people work in computer, electronic or optical-product manufacturing.

North Korea hasn’t shared meaningful information about its economy or its financial system with the outside world since the early 1960s.

Outside estimates of its economic performance, most prominently an annual estimate by the South Korean central bank, the Bank of Korea, are filled with assumptions that even their authors say render them almost meaningless.

Word of the availability of the North Korea census data was disseminated last week on North Korea Economy Watch, a Web site run by Curtis Melvin, a Virginia-based graduate student in economics and a specialist in North Korea.

Read the full article here:
Pyongyang Reports an Aging, Less Healthy Population
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad
2/20/2010

UPDATE 2 (1/12/2011): According to the Choson Ilbo:

Each year, Statistics Korea publishes population figures for North Korea in a booklet based on surveys conducted by international organizations like the UN and data released by the Education Center for Unification under the Unification Ministry.

Most of these statistics were compiled based on a census the North took in 2008 with the UN’s help.

North Korea’s only previous census was in 1993, which established that the population is 21.21 million. Although rumor has it that several millions of people starved to death during the famine of the 1990s, nobody knows how many exactly died.

The second census in 2008 was taken with funds provided by the UN Population Fund to obtain basic data for humanitarian aid to the North. The North accepted the offer, presumably because it wanted a good grasp of the reality to develop its own economy.

The census lasted for 15 days, from Oct. 1 to 15, 2008. The North’s Central Statistics Bureau surveyed 5,587,767 households nationwide by mobilizing a total of 35,000 census takers through municipal and provincial statistics offices. The questionnaire consisted of 53 questions about income, furniture, electronic home appliances, toilets, heating system, and tap water and sewage facilities, as well as basic personal information such as age and gender.

Like in South Korea, the North Korean census takers visited homes to ask the questions face to face. Statistics Korea officials flew to China, where they taught North Korean officials census methodology and techniques, and the South gave the North as much as US$4 million for the census from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

According to the census, the North’s population was 24,062,000, up 2.85 million from 1993. Average life expectancy was 69.3 years, and infant mortality was 19.3 per 1,000. But these data are quite different from UN estimates, which put life expectancy at 67.3 years and infant mortality at 48 per 1,000. The credibility of the North’s census data has not been verified.

According to the Daily NK:

Since the redenomination on November 30 last year, the cost of crossing the Tumen River has risen as high as 10,000 Yuan on the back of tighter border regulations.

A source from North Hamkyung Province told the Daily NK on Thursday, “Since border security was strengthened in February, it has cost at least 10,000 Yuan to cross the border into China.” This is equal to around 400,000 North Korean won at the black market exchange rate, or $1400.

In 2006, the cost of crossing the Tumen River around Musan and Onsung in North Hamkyung Province was just 500 Yuan.

The reason is because now there is an alliance of brokers monopolizing the crossing business, and a number of regulations designed to both circumscribe the ability of citizens to cross and limit the relationship between guard companies and local citizens.

In the distant past, if people wanted to cross the river, they approached guards and haggled over the price directly. However, now people have to rely on professional brokers who put them in contact with guards and guides in China. One pays a price to the broker, who shares it with North Korean border guards and Chinese guides respectively at a ratio of 4:3:3.

The North Korean authorities designated the period from February 5th until Kim Jong Il’s birthday on the 16th as a period of “special vigilance,” handing down special instructions to strengthen the border guard and regulations covering migration in border cities.

According to a Daily NK source, this measure is primarily intended to limit the ability of those suffering since the redenomination to smuggle or cross the border to make money in China, as well as to regulate citizens in advance of Kim Jong Il’s birthday, which is customary.

The source emphasized, “Since December last year, the number of citizens using human networks in China to make money has been increasing. Therefore, agents of the National Security Agency and the People’s Safety Agency have been watching those people closely.”

The source further explained, “Now, the authorities are forcing border guards to observe each other in order to track down those doing business with brokers and border crossers. In January, in Yusun-dong, Hoiryeong, one company commander was dismissed after a platoon commander informed on him for assisting border crossers.”

In the mid-2000s, along the border near settlements such as Namyang, Sambong, and Jongsung in North Hamkyung Province, the authorities set up nail boards and extra barbed wire along the Tumen River in order to inhibit defection. However, as these physical measures were not as effective as hoped, in 2006 the authorities took to switching guard posts between different guard companies without notice and awarding a prize, membership of the Party, to guards who caught people crossing the border. These measures were designed to break down connections between individual guards and the local populace

Therefore, the source added, “These days, no border guards are helping people cross the river, and the cost is soaring.”

Read the full story here:
Tight Rules Make Border Costs Soar
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
2/19/2010