North Korean Economy Watch

According to Yonhap:

Trade between South and North Korea plunged nearly 25 percent in the first four months of this year amid growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, a report showed Tuesday.

Inter-Korean trade amounted to US$426.35 million during the January-April period, down 24.8 percent from $566.92 million a year earlier, according to the report by the Korea Customs Service.

The decline comes as tensions mounted after North Korea fired a rocket on April 5, prompting the U.N. Security Council to unanimously condemn the move. The North responded by kicking out outside nuclear inspectors and quitting six-party denuclearization talks.

Trade between the two Koreas, which amounted to $328.65 million in 1999, surged more than five-fold to $1.79 billion in 2007 when leaders from the two sides met for the second time. Last year, trade inched up to $1.82 billion.

Experts say that trade is expected to fall further in months to come as tensions are still running high after the North conducted its second nuclear test last month in defiance of repeated warnings by the international community and recently sentenced two U.S. journalists to 12 years in a labor camp for illegally entering the country.

In addition, we pointed out earlier this month that the South Korean government had barely touched the funds it appropriated for inter-Korean projects in 2009.

Finally, although inter-Korean trade has floundered this year, the DPRK’s trade volume reached a record US$3.8 billion in 2008, due largely to its trade with China.  

Read the full Yonhap story here:
Inter-Korean trade tumbles amid growing tensions
Yonhap
Koh Byung-joon
6/9/2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-4-1
6/4/2009

As inter-Korean relations continue to worsen, cooperative projects and humanitarian aid efforts have practically ground to a halt, leaving inter-Korean cooperation funds almost untouched.

According to the report “South-North Cooperation Fund Statistics” released by the Ministry of Unification on May 31, the South Korean government budgeted just over 1.508 trillion Won (1.2 billion USD) to fund inter-Korean cooperative projects in 2009, but as of the end of April, only 1.8 percent (26.919 billion Won) had been spent.

Some projects originally granted funds include financing for the construction of an East Sea line inter-Korean import facility and joint-use yard (8.795 billion Won); capital loans for Hyundai Asan economic cooperative projects (5.739 billion Won); NGO aid to the North, including nutritional supplements for children and soybean oil from the Catholic Seoul Archdiocese (2.933 billion Won); loans to cover expenses of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) Management Committee (2.08 billion Won); and the construction of a KIC General Support Center (2.444 billion Won).

Use of this fund has hit a low water mark, in part because 800 billion Won allocated for rice, fertilizer and other humanitarian aid has not been spent. A ministry official stated, “Rice and fertilizer aid can only proceed according to an agreement between North and South Korean officials following a request from North Korea, but this year, there was no request from North Korea, and therefore the amount of cooperative funding spent was low.

The South-North Cooperation Fund distributed 674.409 billion Won in 2005, 470.995 billion Won in 2006, 715.734 billion Won in 2007, and 231.205 billion Won last year.

Although the UN World Food Program was asked to leave the DPRK in March, along with US relief workers, the UN children’s fund (UNICEF) is still distributing relief supplies.  Additionally, the UNDP is about to resume activities.  According to Yonhap:

The U.N. children’s agency said Wednesday its humanitarian aid operations in North Korea remain steady amid diplomatic tensions, and that Pyongyang will soon sign an agreement to allow a nationwide nutritional survey.

“The situation with regard to access and monitoring is the same as it has been in the past,” Gopalan Balagopal, UNICEF representative in Pyongyang, said in an email interview.

“UNICEF undertakes regular field visits to monitor progress of work and holds periodic review meetings with counterparts,” he said.

…

As part of efforts to improve the health of North Korean children and mothers, the agency will soon sign an agreement with the North Korean government to conduct a nutritional survey across the country, set to start in October, Balagopal said.

“We are finalizing a memorandum of understanding with the government shortly for going ahead with a multiple indicator cluster survey, which will have a nutrition component,” he said.

Another aid agency, the U.N. Development Program, is also preparing to restart its program in North Korea after a two-year hiatus, he said. Four UNDP members came to Pyongyang on May 19, and two of them are staying there, keeping “busy with work for restarting their program,” Balagopal said.

UNDP withdrew from Pyongyang in early 2007 after suspicions arose over North Korea’s misappropriation of development funds.

June is a typically lean period in the North in terms of food security, and UNICEF sees increasing numbers of malnourished children in nurseries and hospitals, according to the official.

North Korea’s harvest this year is expected to fall 1.17 million tons short of food needed to feed its 24 million people, according to the Seoul government. Even if the North’s own imports and Chinese aid are counted in, the net shortage will likely surpass 500,000 tons, it said.

Balagopal said his agency has secured about half of its US$13 million target budget for operations in North Korea this year.

He noted there are “some indications” that access to the provinces in the northeast may be restricted to the U.N. agencies. He did not elaborate and said the U.N. will stop its assistance if the access is not guaranteed.

Read the full article here:
UNICEF aid flowing steady in N. Korea: Pyongyang chief
Yonhap
6/3/2009

Newsweek has an interesting article which makes the case that the DPRK economy is not as bad as the public tends to think.  According to the article:

…North Korea isn’t broke—and its economy has been moving away from collapse in recent years-. The Hermit Kingdom may not be getting rich—the CIA estimates its GDP at roughly $40 billion, ranking 96th in the world. But it’s not failing either, and for the past decade, its economy has grown at an average rate of about 1.5 percent a year, according to South Korean statistics. While Seoul estimates that the North’s GDP shrank by 2.3 percent last year, some analysts say it actually expanded, arguing that South Korea’s recent figures on the North are deflated for political purposes.

To understand how the Dear Leader has managed this, you must first drop a few of the myths surrounding his country. First, the North Koreans haven’t been living in caves for the past two decades, nor is their economy de-industrializing, as is sometimes reported. Instead, with help from Beijing, Pyongyang has revamped its outdated infrastructure in recent years and repaired the mining facilities that were battered by massive floods during the mid-’90s. It now aims to shift from recovery to growth, with a focus on steel production, mining and light-industrial manufacturing.

Second, the North doesn’t have to rely on the black market to support itself. True, Pyongyang has sold missiles to Iran, Syria and Pakistan, and annual revenue from such exports is roughly $100 million, but analysts say that other illicit activities like drug trafficking and counterfeiting add very little to that sum. According to a former U.S. diplomat in East Asia who asked not to be named discussing sensitive intelligence, during the Bush years Washington investigated the oft-heard counterfeiting accusations, and found that the notes in question had actually been produced privately by former Chinese military officials, in China. “The Treasury Department couldn’t find a single shred of hard evidence pointing to North Korean production of counterfeit money,” the American says.

The biggest myth is that North Korea remains isolated. Despite supposedly comprehensive sanctions, Pyongyang today has diplomatic and commercial relations with more than 150 countries, including most European Union members. North Korea trades its abundant gold reserves—estimated at 1,000 to 2,000 tons—in cities like London, Zurich and Hong Kong, and buys and sells shares on the New York Stock Exchange via a legitimate London-based brokerage firm it essentially owns. While there are no figures on the volume of such transactions, the former U.S. diplomat says that such activities are “a substantial source of hard currency for North Korea.” In recent years, European firms have also begun eyeing investment opportunities there; In 2004, the London-based energy firm Aminex signed a 20-year deal with Pyongyang for exclusive rights to explore on- and offshore oil-and-gas deposits. Other companies are looking for ways to exploit the North’s cheap labor supply, and while most of these deals have yet to take off for technical and political reasons, ties to the outside world are expanding. In 2008, the country’s overall trade rose 30 percent from the previous year, reaching a record $3.8 billion, including imports of $2.7 billion, according to Seoul’s Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency.

North Korea has proved adept at avoiding restrictions: when Tokyo slapped it with sanctions five years ago, Pyongyang simply reshuffled its deals, turning to the BRIC economies as well as South Korea and Singapore. Meanwhile, China now accounts for nearly three quarters of North Korea’s total trade, sending it crude oil, petroleum and manufactured goods in exchange for coal, steel and rare metals like tungsten and magnesite. The North’s natural resources have become a major growth engine: the Musan mine in the country’s northwest is now said to be one of the largest iron-ore fields in Asia, and could eventually yield 10 million tons of ore a year.

Finally, there’s the southern connection. Despite deteriorating relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, factories at the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex are still operating at full gear, earning the North about $35 million annually—enough for eight or nine No-dong missiles. And that figure was projected (before the current crisis hit) to jump to $100 million by next year, says Lim Eul Chul of Seoul’s Kyungnam University.

I should point out that the CIA estimate of the DPRK’s GDP is among the highest.  Most other estimates are below $30 billion for 2008.

Read the full article here:
How Kim Affords His Nukes: The myth of a failing economy.
Newsweek
5/30/2009

According to Yonhap:

North Korean trade with the outside world, excluding South Korea, hit a record US$3.8 billion last year, a report said Monday, despite rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Trade jumped 29.7 percent compared with 2007, the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, a South Korean trade agency, said in the report.

Last year, North Korea’s exports rose 23 percent to $1.13 billion with imports climbing 32.7 percent to $2.69 billion, the report said. The country still posted a trade deficit of $1.56 billion for the year.

The report also showed that China’s influence on North Korea’s moribund economy is rising quickly.

The communist nation exported $750 million worth of goods to China and imported $2.03 billion last year.

“North Korea’s trade with China hit a record last year and keeps growing,” the report said.

“In the face of the global economic slump and the North’s rocket launch, North Korea’s external trade is expected to shrink this year. But, China’s influence on the North Korean economy is likely to grow further,” it noted.

According to the CIA World Fact Book, South Korea’s 2008 exports totaled $419 billion.

Read the full article here:
N. Korea’s 2008 trade hits record US$3.8 bln: report
Yonhap
5/18/2009

UPDATE: DPRK trade deficit hits record high in 2008
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-5-27-1
2009-05-27

North Korea’s overseas trade (excluding inter-Korean exchanges) continues to grow, in particular with China, and last year recorded the highest amount of trade since 1990.

On May 18, results of analysis by the Korea Trade & Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) of overseas trade statistics provided to the Korea Business Center in countries around the world revealed that last year’s exports grew by 23 percent (1.13 billion USD), while imports shot up 32.7 percent (2.69 billion USD). The North registered a 1.56 billion dollar deficit, but the overall volume of trade (3.82 million USD) was the highest since the North’s trade amounted to 4.17 million USD 18 years prior.

Business with China, traditionally North Korea’s largest trading partner, totaled 750 million USD-worth of exports and 2.03 billion USD-worth of imports, as the North’s dependence on trade with its neighbor continues to grow. In 2003, trade with China accounted for 32.7 percent of the North’s overseas trade, but that grew to 48.5 percent in 2004, made up more than half (52.6 percent) in 2005, and rocketed up to 73 percent last year.

KOTRA reported that the North’s imports from China have grown by 46 percent over the last decade, and that in 2008, both trade with China and trade deficit with China hit record highs. At the recent Pyongyang Spring Trade Exhibition (May 11-14), 167 companies from 17 countries, including vendors from China, Russia, Germany, Malaysia, Syria, Sweden, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand showed their wares, but China’s overwhelming presence was felt, with over 100 of the companies present were from the PRC.

Business with Pyongyang’s second-largest trading partner, Singapore, accounted for a mere 3.1 percent (123.6 million USD) of overall trade, although that showed a 116.1 percent increase over 2007. Trade with India and Brazil, the North’s no. 3 and 4 trade partners was relatively stable.

With sanctions in effect by the United States and Japan, the North’s exports to these countries were practically nonexistent, although imports registered 52.1 million USD and 7.7 million USD, respectively.

According to KOTRA, “it appears that, aside from China, North Korea’s overseas trade with other countries showed no significant change,” and, “with negative issues such as the global economic slump and North Korea’s rocket launce, this year North Korea’s overseas trade is expected to contract slightly, while reliance on China will grow as China’s economic influence on the North expands further.”

The National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) published a paper by Karin Lee and Julia Choi which presents the history of U.S. and UN sanctions against North Korea.   A brief review of phases in US economic policy toward the DPRK is followed by longer sections tracking the major changes in U.S. and UN sanctions over the past six decades. Next, there is a summary of measures taken by other relevant governments, particularly following the missile test and nuclear test in 2006 and the rocket launch in April 2009.  The paper concludes with a summary of U.S. sanctions against North Korea from 2000-April 2009, a timeline listing major events in U.S.-DPRK relations and the imposition and relaxing of U.S. sanctions, and a matrix of luxury items prohibited for export to the DPRK in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 (2006).

You can download the paper in Word format here, or in PDF here.

According to Yonhap:

South Korea’s unification ministry on Tuesday closed its bureau on humanitarian aid to North Korea and created a new one to better analyze Pyongyang’s internal politics as part of government restructuring.

The Cabinet approved the ministry’s proposal to shut down its Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau and set up the tentatively-named Political Analysis Bureau, Kim Jung-tae, assistant minister for planning and coordination, said in a press briefing.

Additionally, the South Korean government seems to be laying the political and regulatory groundwork to apply more economic pressure on DPRK.  Again, according to Yonhap:

“The process of monitoring items exported to North Korea has no order of priority, raising concern that there could be a chance of strategic materials going to North Korea,” the audit agency said after an investigation requested by the National Assembly.

Strategic materials refer to equipment or technology used to make nuclear or biological weapons or missiles that are prohibited from being carried into the North. Such materials or items that may fall into that category are sometimes overlooked as the ministry’s checklist, generally used by the tax agency and other government agencies, is too broad, it said.

The ministry failed to spot and investigate packages of black powder, an explosive mixture of sulfur, that were transported into North Korea by a local firm last year, the agency said, though it could not say whether black powder is a strategic material.

The audit agency also found that 270 used computers were exported to North Korea in a possible violation of the law. The computers were initially destined for China, but their owner changed the destination to North Korea without informing the government, it said.

Other computers that were subject to return to the South were not brought back in time, it noted. South Korean law allows citizens to bring computers to North Korea on condition that they bring them back within a year.

The ministry failed to keep track of more than 2,000 computers taken to a joint industrial complex in the North’s border town of Kaesong over the past year by South Korean workers, it said.

The Unification Ministry said in a statement that some of the items noted by the customs agency were not strategic materials, but added it will “prepare a manual to effectively control” such items.

Inter-Korean trade volume reached US$1.82 billion last year, the audit agency said. More than 186,000 South Koreans, not counting over 303,000 who toured North Korean resorts, visited North Korea for business and aid projects during the period, up 18 percent from the previous year, it said.

Read the full stories here:
Unification ministry closes N. Korea aid unit, bolsters intelligence
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
5/12/2009

Audit agency questions lax monitoring of North Korea trade
Yonhap
5/13/2009

This week, The South Korean government announced that if the North unilaterally files formal charges against a detained South Korean worker it will reevaluate regulations for its citizens to enter the zone which would require each border crosser to obtain a written guarantee of his safety from Pyongyang before leaving South Korea.  Although the number of South Korean workers allowed to cross the DMZ was reduced after the North’s missile launch, this would effectively prevent South Korean managers from entering the Kaesong Zone and would likely bring an end to operations there.  According to Yonhap:

South Koreans may be barred from visiting North Korea if the communist country takes legal action against a Hyundai Asan employee who has been unlawfully detained by Pyongyang, a government source said Sunday.

The Hyundai employee, who works at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and is identified only by his family name of Yu, has been held for 28 days for allegedly criticizing Pyongyang’s political system and trying to lure a North Korean female worker to defect to the South.

The worker in his 40s has yet to be interviewed by South Korean authorities to determine the exact nature of the detention.

“Under the special arrangement governing the Kaesong complex, the two Koreas must reach an understanding on how to deal with serious offenses involving South Koreans (that carry punishments) exceeding warnings, fines and expulsions,” the source, who declined to be identified, said.

“If Pyongyang takes unilateral action to indict the worker, it will be a violation of the fundamental rules related to cross-border interactions and will compel Seoul to rethink its stance on allowing South Korean to visit the North,” the source stressed.

The bilateral agreement makes clear that Pyongyang should respect the rights of South Korean workers, dwellings and property in Kaesong and the special tourist region in Mount Kumgang on the east coast. The latter has been closed since the shooting death of a female tourist by North Korean guards last July.

He said that if protection for South Koreans nationals cannot be ensured, Seoul will be compelled to review its policies on allowing visits from scratch.

“If this is the case, even employees working at Kaesong will have to get individual, written permission from North Korea that they will not be detained,” the official said.

Such a move could effectively make it hard for South Koreans to go to North Korea, crippling normal operations at the complex just north of the demilitarized zone that separates the two countries.

As of March, 101 South Korean factories operated in the complex, employing about 39,000 North Korean workers. The Kaesong park opened in 2005 and produces labor-intensive goods such as clothing, kitchen wares and watches. (Yonhap)

Given the trajectory of North-South relations this year, it is no surprise that inter-Korean trade dropped 30% in March.  According to Yonhap:

Monthly trade between South and North Korea fell more than 30 percent on-year in March, as tensions ran high over South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise, government data showed Monday.

The two Koreas exchanged goods and services worth US$108.74 million over the last month, down 31.1 percent from $157.9 million in the same period in 2008, the data from the Unification Ministry said.

North Korea sealed the border three times in March, disrupting South Korean production in a joint industrial complex in the North’s border town of Kaesong. Pyongyang imposed the ban in retaliation against a joint military exercise South Korea staged with the United States from March 9 to 20 south of the border.

Pyongyang blasted the joint exercise as a rehearsal for a “second Korean War,” while the two allies say the annual drill is purely defensive.

More than 100 South Korean firms operate in the Kaesong industrial venture, just an hour’s drive from Seoul, joining their capital and technology with North Korea’s cheap but skilled labor.

North Korea demanded the South raise wages, pay fees for land use and revise existing contracts for the Kaesong venture during inter-Korean government talks last week, the first official dialogue in more than a year. Seoul is gathering opinion from South Korean firms and plans to respond to the North Korean demand as early as this week.

Hyundai Asan, which has seen a dramatic reversal of fortune in the last year, has launched a new tourism project to make up some of its lost revenue.  Unable to offer trips to Kaesong and Kumgangsan, they are still trying to capitalize on the mystery of the DPRK:

Hyundai Asan said its new programme includes one-day tours costing 46,000 won (34 dollars) per person to border areas at Paju and Yeoncheon, north of Seoul.

Two-day tours to the border area at Yanggu, 175 kilometres northeast of Seoul, and to Mount Sorak on the east coast, will cost 118,000 won.

“Along with trips to front-line fences, tourists will be allowed to see wildlife and other places which remained untouched for decades,” a Hyundai Asan official told AFP.

Visitors will not be allowed inside the DMZ itself.

Hyundai Asan said the new programme would help ease its financial woes, which began when a South Korean woman tourist was shot dead when she strayed into a military zone at Kumgang last July.

The Seoul government halted tours to Kumgang after the shooting, while Pyongyang barred the one-day tours to Kaesong city as relations worsened.

The company’s other major joint project, the joint industrial complex near Kaesong city, is also facing problems due to sour cross-border ties.

The communist North has expelled hundreds of South Korean staff and restricted access to the Seoul-funded complex.

On March 30 it detained a Hyundai Asan employee for allegedly criticising the North’s regime and trying to persuade a local woman worker to defect.

Read the full stories below:
Gov’t warns it can bar S. Koreans from visiting N. Korea
Yonhap
4/26/2009

Inter-Korean trade drops 30 percent in March during political tension
Yonhap
4/27/2009

South Korean firm to start tours along North Korea border
Channel News Asia
4/27/2009

From the National Comittee on North Korea:

On April 10, 2009 the Japanese government renewed sanctions on the DPRK that were set to expire on April 13. The sanctions, first implemented in 2006, ban entry into Japanese ports of all North Korean flagged vessels and charted flights between Japan and the DPRK, as well as ban, in principle, visits by Japanese government officials to the DPRK and visits by DPRK government officials to Japan. The sanctions also ban all DPRK imports and payments for imports from the DPRK. The 2006 sanctions, initially implemented for six months and renewed for six month periods thereafter, were renewed for a full year on April 10.

The Japanese government also instituted stricter reporting requirements on the amount of funds people in Japan can remit or transfer to the DPRK. The new regulations reduce the amount of funds that can be transferred undeclared to the DPRK from 30 million yen (US$298,000) to 10 million yen ($99,000). In addition, travelers can bring only 300,000 yen cash ($2,990) to the DPRK without reporting it; this is down from a previous limit of over a million yen.

Although the new reporting requirement has been called a “new sanction,” it does not seem to be a genuine sanction since it does not limit remittances to the DPRK. According to Xinhua, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura told reporters, “The measure is aimed at getting a clearer picture of fund flows to North Korea (DPRK).” He also said that the move is “appropriate giving consideration to the unsettled abduction issue.”

Japan considered but rejected a ban on all exports to the DPRK. Newspapers report that the Japanese government thought such a ban would have little impact.

And according to Bloomberg:

Trade between Japan and North Korea fell 97 percent to 793 million yen in 2008 — all in Japanese exports — from 21.4 billion yen in 2005, according to Japan’s Finance Ministry.

You can read the full Bloomberg story here:
Japan Imposes New North Korea Sanctions After Missile Launch
Bloomberg
Takashi Hirokawa and Toko Sekiguchi
4/10/2009

Marcus Noland, co author of The North Korean Famine and Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics, wrote a short policy piece in the Asia Pacific Bulletin calling for more effective sanctions on North Korea to deter Pyongyang’s belligerence:

Regrettably, toothless trade restrictions have provided inadequate to deter Pyongyang ex ante, and the world is now faced with dealing with the situation ex post.  Willingness to impose a comprehensive set of sanctions–trade, aid, travel, energy assistance, and finance–might reign in reckless North Kean behavior before another provocation fundamentally destabilizes the situation in Northeast Asia. (Noland, 2009)

The Asia Pacific Bulletin article draws from a thorough empirical study Noland conducted on the (non) impact of UN sanctions on North Korea’s trade. “The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea” can be downloaded here.  Here is the abstract:

Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications in Asia. Based on a visual inspection of the data and statistical models, this study finds that, although the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the export of heavy arms and luxury goods to North Korea within one week of Pyongyang’s nuclear test, the imposition of these sanctions has had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with the country’s two largest partners, China and South Korea.
policy implications:

1. North Korea appears to have calculated correctly that the direct penalties to its foreign trade for establishing itself as a nuclear power would be modest (or, alternatively, Pyongyang put such a high value on demonstrating the country’s nuclear capability that it outweighed the downside risks, however large). Presumably this experience will condition the reactions of North Korean policymakers in the future—making deterrence with respect to this issue and other sources of conflict more difficult.

2. Despite pre-test diplomatic warnings not to test, the post-test behavior of public and private sector actors in China and South Korea has been accepting of North Korea’s nuclear status. Thus if such warnings are to be heeded in the future, they must embody credible threats of penalty, be much more enthusiastically implemented, and be more broadly targeted.

Though I have tremendous respect for Dr. Noland’s work, I am fairly skeptical about the ability of economic santions to change the DPRK’s policies or behavior.  Carrots and sticks are essential tools for any diplomatic negotiation, but China, the DPRK’s strongest political ally and largest trading partner is simply not interested in implementing rigid economic restrictions vis a vis North Korea (for many rational reasons).  Given the uncanny ability of the North Korean elite to remain in power despite severe economic problems, I am afraid that any achievable sanctions regime would only make life more difficult for “ordinary” North Koreans with little possibility of delivering changes at the top.