North Korean Economy Watch

According to the Financial Times:

“The WFP can continue to support around 1.4m children and pregnant women with fortified foods until the end of June. However, new contributions are required now or the operation will come to a standstill in July. We are hopeful that donors will come forward with contributions, given the situation,” he told the Financial Times.

In 2008 the WFP hoped 6.2m people would receive such aid but found it increasingly hard to get donations. Annual aid to North Korea is equivalent to $4.50 (€3.30, £3) per person across the population. The average across other low-income countries is $37 per person.

The WFP has survived such funding crunches in the past, but UN officials fear donors have now become exasperated with North Korea, which expelled US non-governmental organisations last March. Pyongyang has severely restricted aid workers’ access, has demanded they give longer notice periods before rural visits and has barred teams from using their own Korean speakers.

Rocky relations with the US and South Korea after Pyongyang launched a long-range missile last April and tested an atomic warhead in May have further discouraged donations.

The US, once the leading food donor, has said it will not supply cereals until North Korea resumes proper monitoring, allowing aid agencies to track the final recipients.

North Korea’s harvests cannot feed all its people and in recent years the annual food deficit was about 1m tonnes. People are chronically malnourished and as many as 1m are believed to have died during famine in the 1990s.

It is hard to determine the scale of malnutrition but Kim Jong-il, the country’s dictator, made a very rare apology this year for failing to deliver “rice and meat stew” to the people. Food markets were thrown into disarray late last year by a currency redenomination but Mr Due, based in Pyongyang, said these seemed to be returning to normal.

Read the full article below:
Donor fatigue threatens aid for North Korea
Financial Times
Christian Oliver and Anna Fifield
3/3/2010

Choson Ilbo
2/26/2010

North Korea is still demanding rice and fertilizer in return for an inter-Korean summit, even as it keeps sending increasingly urgent messages to Seoul to bring such a summit about.

Since a secret meeting between South Korean Labor Minister Yim Tae-hee and Kim Yang-gon, the director of the North Korean Workers’ Party’s United Front Department, in Singapore in October, “North Korea has kept asking us for a huge amount of economic aid in return for arranging a meeting” between President Lee Myung-bak and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, a South Korean government source said on Thursday.

But the North seems to have no interest in giving in to South Korean demands to put denuclearization and the repatriation of prisoners of war and abduction victims on the summit agenda. “The North basically wants economic gain in return for letting us make political use of an inter-Korean summit for the upcoming local elections” on June 2, the source said. “It seems that the North still feels nostalgic for the Sunshine Policy,” which netted it huge benefits over the past decade.

The first inter-Korean summit in 2000 was announced only three days before the general election and was bought through a secret payment of billions of won. The second summit in 2007 was announced two months before the presidential election. Since 2000, the North has received more than 300,000 tons of rice and the same amount of fertilizer almost every year worth more than W1 trillion (US$1=W1,163) a year.

In another secret meeting between South Korea’s Unification Ministry and the North Korean Workers’ Party’s United Front Department in November, the North again insisted on specifying humanitarian aid in an agreement to be signed at an inter-Korean summit.

A “tree planting campaign for North Korea” initiated recently by the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion also reportedly went awry because the North demanded a huge aid of food in return for letting South Korea plant trees there.

Kim Jong-il is apparently not aware that Seoul is serious about ending this cash-for-summits policy. A South Korean government official with experience in inter-Korean talks said, “At secret meetings, each side often had its own way of interpreting agendas. Maybe North Korean delegates who are accustomed to the Sunshine Policy are trying to interpret the current government’s messages the way they did with past governments.”

It seems the North has attempted to earn economic aid worth W1 trillion by prevaricating over the issue of the POWs and abduction victims, offering to handle it like part of reunions of separated families, and discussing the nuclear issue only with the U.S. 

Whether the attitude will change remains to be seen. The North is now in a worse economic situation than before in the wake of a recent disastrous currency reform on top of international sanctions and a severe food shortage.

Prof. Cho Young-ki of Korea University said, “The North is in dire need of support from the outside including South Korea to stabilize the regime for a smooth transition of power” to Kim’s son Jong-un. “It is possible that the North will reluctantly accept our request depending on progress in the six-party nuclear talks.”

The government believes that a dramatic turning point in inter-Korean relations could be reached if the North makes “big decisions” in the nuclear or POW issues, according to Kim Tae-hyo, the presidential secretary for foreign strategies.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 10-2-25-1
2/25/2010

Inter-Korean trade, in which South Korea recorded surpluses throughout the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, has now fallen into the red under the current government.

According to customs statistics released on February 25, Seoul ran a trade deficit with North Korea under the Kim Young Sam administration until 1997, then was in the black through the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, almost until the end of 2007. Seoul has fallen back into the red, however, during the last two years of the current government. In other words, the People’s Government (under Kim Dae Jung) and the Participatory Government (under Roh Moo Hyun) exported more to the North than they imported, while this trend has now been reversed under Lee Myung-bak.

South Korea’s surplus in inter-Korean trade grew 11-fold from 37.9 million USD in 1998 to 417.7 million USD by 2005, then fell to 262.2 million USD in 2007. This trend occurred because exports grew at a much quicker rate than imports, from 128.9 million USD in 1998 to 1.0286 billion USD by 2007. However, as the current administration came into power, inter-Korean trade statistics dropped in to the red, with a 54 million USD deficit in 2008 and a 200.9 million USD deficit last year.

South Korean exports to the North grew considerably from the time of the People’s Government until 2008, but have fallen considerably over the past two years. In 2008, exports to North Korea amounted to 883.4 million USD, down 14.1 percent from the previous year. Last year, exports fell another 17.1 percent, to 732.6 million USD.

Last year, electrical products made up the majority of exports, at 24.8 percent (182 million USD). Following electrical products were short, synthetic ‘staple fiber’ (160 million USD) and cotton fabrics (67 million USD), followed by computers and other electronic devices (60 million USD).

On the other hand, clothing (390 million USD), fish (131 million USD), and electrical goods (122 million USD) were the top three imports. While South Korea is in the red, overall trade continues to grow, despite the international financial difficulties. This growth is driven largely by processing-on-commission manufacturing and products from the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

[NkeconWatch: I have a personal probelm with the way “the media” generally reports trade deficits as if they are somehow equivalent or comparable to budget deficits.  They are not.  Additionally, bilateral comparisons of trade deficits are silly. Bilateral comparisons are usually published by someone seeking to generate some kind of political response, but really they don’t tell you anything about what is going on in the economies of the countries involved.] 

According to the Choson Ilbo:

North Korea is believed to have been given 300,000 tons of food either on credit or as aid last year, mostly from China, the Unification Ministry told the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee on Tuesday. That is enough to feed the entire population of North Korea for a month.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization on Monday said North Korea faces a shortage of 1.25 million tons of food, but that did not take into account the amount provided by China and other countries. Unification Ministry Hyun In-taek said, “North Korea has been suffering from problems in food supply and distribution since its currency reform and has been taking measures to deal with the situation.”

Read the full article here:
N.Korea Took 300,000 Tons of Food Aid Last Year
Choson Ilbo
2/24/2010

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/22/2010

In late January, Kim Jong Il held a meeting of his highest officials, including Jang Sung Taek, Director of the Ministry of Administration of the Party, aiming to find ways to alleviate the negative side effects of November’s currency redenomination. In the meeting, the group apparently agreed to release emergency supplies of rice to those on the brink of starvation.

According to a Daily NK source, “Following the meeting, which he chaired, Kim Jong Il handed down a handwritten decree to the chief secretaries of all provinces on January 20 in which it was stated, ‘Preventing anyone from starving to death is your obligation.’”

Chief Secretaries of Provincial Committees of the Party, the recipients of the decree, handed on the threat to their subordinates, warning provincial cadres, “You will resign if anyone starves to death, because this was a direct instruction from the General.”

In the decree, the three most vulnerable provinces were named as Yangkang, South Hamkyung, and Kangwon Provinces, so the officials governing those provinces are understandably nervous. They are the provinces where most casualties occurred during the March of Tribulation, and they remain the most food insecure.

Under the decree, the Ministry of Procurement and Food Policy makes daily deliveries of 5kg of relief rice to each people’s unit and 5-15kg to each factory and enterprise. Chairpersons of people’s units and managers of factories are required to observe the circumstances of the people under their control and provide those in the greatest danger of starvation with relief rice first.

In late January, quite a number of households were reportedly facing starvation due to the aftermath of the currency redenomination; notably sky high prices coupled to strict market regulations. However, there have been no reports of starvation since relief rice deliveries began on February 1.

Alongside the chairpersons of People’s Units, cadres working for local government offices are required to cross-check whether or not starvation is occurring. In theory, they are reprimanded if they do not report the situation truthfully.

Upon hearing the news, a defector in Seoul commented, “It seems that the people will not lie still and suffer that dire situation. Kim Jong Il may have done this because he senses a crisis situation this time.”

Thanks to a responsive employee at the UNFPA, I obtained a summary of the DPRK’s census findings.  You can download the summary here.

Thanks to a reader I was able to obtain a copy of the entire census data set.  You can download it here.

Both documents have been added to the “DPRK Economic Statistics Page“. Happy reading.

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UPDATE 1: The Wall Street Journal’s Evan Ramstad published some analysis of the DPRK’s 2008 census data.  According to the article:

North Korea is getting bigger, older and less healthy, according to data from the country’s latest census, and its fabled million-man army might have fewer than 700,000 people.

The authoritarian government in December released results of the census conducted in 2008, saying its population had climbed to 24 million people from 21.2 million in the previous census in 1993.

More details have been published by the United Nations Population Fund, which helped North Korea conduct the census and sent five teams of observers to monitor it.

Even so, it’s difficult for outsiders, with so little access to the country, to be certain of the precision of North Korea’s data. For decades, the government has cut off the dissemination of most information about the country. The new census numbers provide a rare glimpse of official statistics.

The census reported that North Korea’s population grew at an annual average rate of 0.85% for the 15-year period, a time that included a devastating multiyear famine that analysts and foreign aid agencies estimate killed between one million and two million people.

A separate U.N. report published last year found that North Korea’s population has grown more slowly since 2005, at an annual rate of 0.4%. The global population has grown 1.2% annually since 2005, the U.N. report said.

North Korea’s census said the country’s population has proportionately fewer children and more middle-aged people than it did in 1993.

It also reported that people are less healthy.

Babies are more likely to die: The infant mortality rate climbed to 19.3 per 1,000 children in 2008 from 14.1 in 1993, though North Korea’s rate is still well below the world average, which a 2009 report by the U.N. agency put at 46 per 1,000 children.

North Koreans are living shorter lives—average life expectancy has fallen to 69.3 years from 72.7 in 1993.

As in many places, women live longer than men, with a gap of about seven years, compared with the world average of 4.4 years.

North Korea has 5.9 million households, with an average of 3.9 people in each, according to the census.

The typical home is 50 to 75 square meters in size (540 to 800 square feet). About 85% of homes have access to running water and about 55% have a flush toilet.

The census provided only a glimpse of the country’s economic structure, but even that produced some surprises. The occupation that provides the most employment—farming—has more women, 1.9 million, than men, 1.5 million.

The second-biggest occupation, working for the government or the military, employs 699,000 people. The census doesn’t break that group down further, but the figure suggests North Korea’s military isn’t as large as had been thought.

The military is often portrayed by outside military analysts and media as a force of one million people, mostly conscripts who are required to serve 10 years.

The third-largest employment sector by number of workers is education, followed by machinery manufacturing, textiles and coal mining. About 40,000 people work in computer, electronic or optical-product manufacturing.

North Korea hasn’t shared meaningful information about its economy or its financial system with the outside world since the early 1960s.

Outside estimates of its economic performance, most prominently an annual estimate by the South Korean central bank, the Bank of Korea, are filled with assumptions that even their authors say render them almost meaningless.

Word of the availability of the North Korea census data was disseminated last week on North Korea Economy Watch, a Web site run by Curtis Melvin, a Virginia-based graduate student in economics and a specialist in North Korea.

Read the full article here:
Pyongyang Reports an Aging, Less Healthy Population
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad
2/20/2010

UPDATE 2 (1/12/2011): According to the Choson Ilbo:

Each year, Statistics Korea publishes population figures for North Korea in a booklet based on surveys conducted by international organizations like the UN and data released by the Education Center for Unification under the Unification Ministry.

Most of these statistics were compiled based on a census the North took in 2008 with the UN’s help.

North Korea’s only previous census was in 1993, which established that the population is 21.21 million. Although rumor has it that several millions of people starved to death during the famine of the 1990s, nobody knows how many exactly died.

The second census in 2008 was taken with funds provided by the UN Population Fund to obtain basic data for humanitarian aid to the North. The North accepted the offer, presumably because it wanted a good grasp of the reality to develop its own economy.

The census lasted for 15 days, from Oct. 1 to 15, 2008. The North’s Central Statistics Bureau surveyed 5,587,767 households nationwide by mobilizing a total of 35,000 census takers through municipal and provincial statistics offices. The questionnaire consisted of 53 questions about income, furniture, electronic home appliances, toilets, heating system, and tap water and sewage facilities, as well as basic personal information such as age and gender.

Like in South Korea, the North Korean census takers visited homes to ask the questions face to face. Statistics Korea officials flew to China, where they taught North Korean officials census methodology and techniques, and the South gave the North as much as US$4 million for the census from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

According to the census, the North’s population was 24,062,000, up 2.85 million from 1993. Average life expectancy was 69.3 years, and infant mortality was 19.3 per 1,000. But these data are quite different from UN estimates, which put life expectancy at 67.3 years and infant mortality at 48 per 1,000. The credibility of the North’s census data has not been verified.

According to the Daily NK:

Since the redenomination on November 30 last year, the cost of crossing the Tumen River has risen as high as 10,000 Yuan on the back of tighter border regulations.

A source from North Hamkyung Province told the Daily NK on Thursday, “Since border security was strengthened in February, it has cost at least 10,000 Yuan to cross the border into China.” This is equal to around 400,000 North Korean won at the black market exchange rate, or $1400.

In 2006, the cost of crossing the Tumen River around Musan and Onsung in North Hamkyung Province was just 500 Yuan.

The reason is because now there is an alliance of brokers monopolizing the crossing business, and a number of regulations designed to both circumscribe the ability of citizens to cross and limit the relationship between guard companies and local citizens.

In the distant past, if people wanted to cross the river, they approached guards and haggled over the price directly. However, now people have to rely on professional brokers who put them in contact with guards and guides in China. One pays a price to the broker, who shares it with North Korean border guards and Chinese guides respectively at a ratio of 4:3:3.

The North Korean authorities designated the period from February 5th until Kim Jong Il’s birthday on the 16th as a period of “special vigilance,” handing down special instructions to strengthen the border guard and regulations covering migration in border cities.

According to a Daily NK source, this measure is primarily intended to limit the ability of those suffering since the redenomination to smuggle or cross the border to make money in China, as well as to regulate citizens in advance of Kim Jong Il’s birthday, which is customary.

The source emphasized, “Since December last year, the number of citizens using human networks in China to make money has been increasing. Therefore, agents of the National Security Agency and the People’s Safety Agency have been watching those people closely.”

The source further explained, “Now, the authorities are forcing border guards to observe each other in order to track down those doing business with brokers and border crossers. In January, in Yusun-dong, Hoiryeong, one company commander was dismissed after a platoon commander informed on him for assisting border crossers.”

In the mid-2000s, along the border near settlements such as Namyang, Sambong, and Jongsung in North Hamkyung Province, the authorities set up nail boards and extra barbed wire along the Tumen River in order to inhibit defection. However, as these physical measures were not as effective as hoped, in 2006 the authorities took to switching guard posts between different guard companies without notice and awarding a prize, membership of the Party, to guards who caught people crossing the border. These measures were designed to break down connections between individual guards and the local populace

Therefore, the source added, “These days, no border guards are helping people cross the river, and the cost is soaring.”

Read the full story here:
Tight Rules Make Border Costs Soar
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
2/19/2010

According to Yonhap:

South Korea said Tuesday it will send 1 billion won (US$866,000) worth of hand sanitizer next week to North Korea to help the impoverished neighbor combat the spread of the H1N1 flu virus.

The shipment of 200,000 liters of sanitizer, scheduled for next Monday, comes after South Korea delivered some $15 million in anti-viral medications to the North in December in the first state-level cross-border humanitarian aid in nearly two years.

North Korea first acknowledged cases of Influenza A virus infection on Dec. 9, but it has yet to report any flu-related deaths.

The hand sanitizer will be transported to the North Korean border town of Kaesong on South Korean trucks across the military demarcation line and handed to the North there, Unification Ministry spokesman Chun Hae-sung said.

“North Korea agreed to accept the aid on Feb. 22,” he told reporters, adding about 20 25-ton trucks will likely be mobilized to deliver the aid.

The Tamiflu aid in December marked the first humanitarian assistance provided by the South Korean government to North Korea since conservative President Lee Myung-bak took office in Seoul in early 2008. Lee cut off the unconditional aid that his liberal predecessors had shipped to the North over the past decade, conditioning exchanges on progress in the North’s denuclearization.

Read the full story here:
S. Korea to deliver anti-viral sanitizer to N. Korea next week
Yonhap
2/16/010

UPDATE: The shipment has been delivered

SKorea sends 2nd batch of swine flu aid to NKorea
AP via Business Week
2/23/2010

South Korean trucks have crossed the border into North Korea to deliver a second batch of swine flu aid.

Unification Ministry spokeswoman Lee Jong-joo says South Korea sent 52,840 gallons (200,000 liters) of hand sanitizers to North Korea on Tuesday.

South Korea sent enough doses of the antiviral drugs Tamiflu and Relenza for 500,000 North Koreans in December in its first direct humanitarian aid to the communist country in nearly two years. North and South Korea have remained in a state of war since 1953.

North Korea acknowledged in December that swine flu had broken out in the country though hasn’t mentioned any virus-related deaths.

Tamiflu is made by Switzerland’s Roche Group. Relenza is a procuct of GlaxoSmithKline.

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s food shortage is expected to further worsen this year, as the communist state’s grain output in 2009 is believed to have fallen from the previous year, a government official in Seoul said Wednesday.

The North is estimated to have produced 4.1 million tons of grain last year, a drop of about 200,000 tons compared to 2008, the Unification Ministry official said on condition of anonymity.

Read the full article here:
Food shortage worsens in N. Korea: official
Yonhap
2/10/2010

Marcus Noland wrote an op-ed for the BBC which is posted on the Peterson Institute web page.  There are some differences in the two (the BBC piece is shorter), so you can read whichever you prefer.  Below, however, I have posted the graphs from the Peterson Institute web page with some commentary:

This chart indicates the market for rice was surprisingly efficient before the currency conversion.  Over a two year window, the observed price seems remarkably stable (although the scale of the graph makes it hard to see the the actual level of price volatility).  Still, it seems fair to say that North Korean rice producers, vendors, and smugglers are quick to spot and eliminate regional price differentials through arbitrage. The supply of rice must also be highly highly elastic.  If the North Korean economy was experiencing inflationary pressures in this time, productivity gains and competition would have to have kept the nominal price essentially flat and caused the real price of rice to fall!

The price of corn is somewhat more volatile and I would be interested in hearing theories as to why this is. 

This chart is surprising as well. We see a highly stable US Dollar/DPRK won black market exchange rate (though again, the scale of the graph makes it difficult to determine just how stable).  Although the DPRK has not published its monetary policy goals (as far as I am aware), I think it is fair to say that the North Koreans practice exchange rate targeting. Most likely the target is not the US dollar, but the Chinese yuan–which trades at a nearly constant level with the US dollar.  Since China is the DPRK’s largest trading partner, it would make sense that the authorities would aim for exchange rate stability.  This would suggest, however, that the DPRK’s monetary authorities are well aware of the black market value of their currency and have the tools to  affect the exchange rate (i.e. lots of RMB reserves to sell on the black market).  I am not sure how plausible this is, but I am not sure how else we can explain this level of exchange rate stability.