North Korean Economy Watch

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2/24/2011

The trade volume between North Korea and China has steadily increased, reaching its record high of USD 3.4 billion in 2010. Total exports amounted to 1.19 billion USD while imports doubled that figure to USD 2.22 billion. Imports have continued to grow, increasing by 2.4 times over the previous year.

Since the Cheonan incident and the implementation of May 24 sanctions, inter-Korean economic cooperation has come to a halt, naturally resulting in rise in exports to China. In particular, a significant growth in anthracites exports was observed. The monthly anthracites exports that averaged around USD 10 million surpassed USD 70 million mark last August and maintained USD 50 million monthly average between September to November. In addition, cost-per-ton of anthracite in March which was USD 52.2, jumped to USD 82.8 in November, a climb of 60 percent. This boost is attributed to its increased export.

The current supply of electric power consists mostly of hydroelectric power — reaching over 60 percent– but during the winter season most of the hydropower plants are unoperational due to frozen facilities from harsh winter weather. Anthracites were the alternative resource to fill this gap. Sacrificing power production and exporting great amount of anthracites despite severe winter is a strong indication of the poor foreign currency situation in North Korea.

In its New Year’s joint editorial, North Korea placed heavy emphasis on its anthracite export that took up 60 percent of its total exports. In the statement, four vanguard sectors of coal, electricity, metals, and railroads were highlighted as important industries as “rich underground resources that will help with securing funds and resolving raw material problems.” This is the first time in 13 years – that is, since the Arduous March — for coal to be mentioned first in the New Year’s message.

North Korea also began to lift export restraints of mineral resources like coal and silver from the latter half of last year and ordered to increase imports of rice and corns in place of minerals.

The reason food procurement is placed first at the expense of its mineral resources is believed to be associated with the implementation of the succession involving Kim Jong Un, and to keep North Korean people’s dissatisfaction under control and manage the domestic situation.

North had placed restraints on coal, gold, silver, lead, and zinc exports from 2007 through adopting export control of mineral resources.

In addition, North Korea and China will meet in Beijing to sign an agreement on joint development of underground resources. This agreement will include Musan Mine and rare-earth mines that POSCO (The Pohang Iron and Steel Company of South Korea) has shown interest in in the past for development. China’s moves in this sector are suspected as China’s attempt to monopolize the DPRK’s underground resources.

The DPRK’s Joint Venture and Investment Guidance Bureau and China’s Ministry of Commerce were expected to meet on February 15 to discuss agreements related to underground resources development. On the agenda was Musan Mine, abundant in gold and anthracite, and other mines rich in rare-earth elements. Other mines are also known to be specified in the agreement.

China is expected to bring private companies into the underground resources development project after reaching an agreement with the DPRK. According to our source, “both parties will establish a joint venture investment corporation in Hong Kong after signing the agreement.”

Construction of a highway connecting Heilong City of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture to Nampyong and Chongjin of North Korea and railway system linking the cities of Heilong, Nampyong, and Musan are currently underway, expected to be in operation by end of this year. Jilin Province and Ministry of Railways of China began construction of this railway system from October 2010 investing CNY 1.19 billion, which runs a distance of 41.68 km. However, it is expected to extend further onto Chongjin and is considered to become the major transportation hub, integrating economic cooperation between the two countries.

Musan Iron Mine is known as the largest outdoor iron mine in Asia and Tonghua Iron and Steel Group along with three other Chinese corporations acquired 50-year development rights of Musan Iron Mine. They are bringing in about 120 tons of iron ore each year and more is expected to be brought in once the Heilong-Musan rail link is completed.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.11-02-18
2/18/2011

Despite the severed inter-Korean relations, Kaesong Industrial Complex related trade reached USD 1,442,860,000, surpassing last year’s figure (USD 940 million) by 53.4 percent.

Trade at Kaesong continuously rose since 2004, almost reaching USD 1 billion by 2009. Then it sharply jumped over the one billion mark last year in 2010.

A closer look at the numbers is as follows: 2004 (USD 41.69 million); 2005 (USD 176.74 million); 2006 (USD 298.79 million); 2007 (USD 440.68 million); 2008 (USD 884.40 million); 2009 (USD 940.55 million); 2010 (USD 1.44 billion).

This rise in trade brought the total trade figure up to USD 1.912 billion by 2010, an increase of 13.9 percent against last year’s total of USD 1.679 billion.

The number of total workers in North Korea reached 42,397 in March 2010, steadily increased to 44,958 in October, and reached 45,332 by November.

However, after the Cheonan incident, South Korea issued a suspension on inter-Korean trade, causing a drop in general trade and processing on commission.

General trade declined by 54 percent from 2009 to USD 117, 860, 000 while processing on commission was down by 22.5 percent to USD 317, 560, 000.

Consequently, the composition of the inter-Korean trade changed, contributing to the proportion of the trade in Kaesong to increase to 75.5 percent from 56 percent in 2009. General trade on the other hand, fell from 15.3 percent to 6.2 percent and processing on commission dropped from 24.4 percent to 16.6 percent from 2009.

In addition, commercial transactions — such as general trade and processing on commission — in Kaesong comprised 98.8 percent of total inter-Korean exchange while noncommercial activities like humanitarian assistance only reached 1.2 percent.

Also in 2010, a total of 13,119 South Koreans visited North Korea, which is an increase of 7.9 percent from the previous year (12,616 people). This is due to the rise in the number of people visiting the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

According to the Ministry of Unification, 94.5 percent (123,023) of the total visitors to the DPRK had involvement with the Kaesong Industrial Complex. This is an increase of 7.9 percent from 2009 (111,811 people).

In comparison, most of the noneconomic related visits to the DPRK declined since the Cheonan incident including socio-cultural exchanges and humanitarian assistance. With the implementation of the May 24 sanctions against North Korea, noneconomic related visitation to North Korea decreased 23 percent from 2,313 people to 1,773 from the previous year.

According to Bloomberg:

North Korea’s exports to China jumped 51 percent to $1.2 billion last year, led by iron ore, coal and copper, Chinese government data show. China’s sales to its ally rose 21 percent to $2.3 billion from a year earlier, with supplies of wheat and oil helping ease chronic shortages of fuel and food. Two-way trade fell 4 percent in 2009, when the United Nations tightened sanctions after Kim’s regime carried out a second nuclear test.

The revival in commerce contrasts with U.S. efforts to isolate North Korea after a year in which 50 South Koreans died in attacks that roiled markets. Kim needs China to meet a pledge to put “rice with meat soup” on every table and build a “thriving nation” by 2012, the centennial of his father and the nation’s founder, Kim Il Sung.

“Even if North Korea’s front door is firmly locked, there is every reason to think the regime can gain what it needs to survive with impunity as long as the back door is open to China,” said Scott Snyder, an adjunct senior fellow for Korea studies at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. China’s trade risks making sanctions “ineffective,” he said.

…

China sold $325.8 million of crude oil to North Korea last year, up 37 percent from 2009. China’s coal imports jumped 54 percent to $394.4 million, while iron ore purchases doubled to $195 million, according to China’s customs department.

Two-way trade of $3.5 billion was still dwarfed by China’s $207.2 billion commerce with South Korea.

London’s Telegraph added this little nugget to the story:

However analysts added that the North’s two-way trade of $3.5 billion – dwarfed by China’s $207.2 billion commerce with South Korea – would still give the regime little more than life support.

Read the full stories here:
North Korea Exports to China Show Birthday-Boy Kim’s `Back Door’ Reprieve
Bloomberg
Bomi Kim
2/16/2011

According to Yonhap:

Half of North Korean defectors’ households in South Korea earn less than 1 million won (US$893) per month, a poll said Wednesday, underscoring the economic difficulties they continue to face in the capitalist society here.

The National Police Agency, which conducted a survey of 12,205 households between August and October last year, said 50.5 percent of them fell into that income range. About 23 percent of them earn less than 500,000 won a month, it added.

The figures contrast with South Korea’s per capita income, which stands at around US$20,000. The survey also coincides with another that said earlier this month that the average monthly income of North Korean defectors with jobs here was 1.04 million won and that 38 percent of them were part-timers.

More than 20,000 North Koreans have defected to the South since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. The defections have taken place mostly since the 1990s, and the border between the two Koreas remains heavily fortified.

Nearly 40 percent of the defectors surveyed by the National Police Agency said they were living under tough economic conditions. Fourteen percent complained of cultural differences and 13 percent of difficulties in getting jobs.

Defectors undergo several months of resettlement training once they arrive here from the impoverished communist state, mostly via China. South Korea also tries to cover their initial expenses of resettlement and provides them with citizenship.

Read the full report here:
Half of North Korean defectors’ households earn below 1 million won a month: poll
Yonhap
2/16/2011

According to Voice of America:

US news broadcaster Voice of America has reported that the American government allowed 3.1 million US dollars worth of goods to be exported to North Korea last year.

Out of the 18 export cases 15 of them were humanitarian goods such as food and medical items, while the other three were portable generators.

Currently there are various export restrictions placed on North Korea by the US due to the North’s nuclear programs and its human rights abuses.

But the American government allows certain exports for humanitarian purposes such as blankets, shoes and medicine on a case-by-case basis.

Read the full story here:
US Allowed $3.1 Million Worth of Exports to N. Korea : VOA
Arirang News
2/12/2011

Writing at his new blog, Marcus Noland argues that KOTRA overstates the percentage of the DPRK’s trade coming from China.

According to Noland, there are several problems with KOTRA data that makes it less than ideal for drawing policy conclusions.  KOTRA counts DPRK-ROK trade as a domestic exchange, not international trade.  Once corrections are made for South Korean trade and a few other tweaks, China’s share of North Korean trade falls from appx 80% to 30%.

In a different but related story, Yonhap reports on research findings by Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Nixon Center.  According to the report:

China’s investment in North Korea was less than US$100 million between 2003 and 2009, indicating Beijing’s investment projects in the reclusive country are still relatively small, a U.S. scholar said Thursday.

Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Washington-based Nixon Center, said Chinese investment in North Korea totaled $98.3 million over the seven-year period, compared to $1.2 billion in South Korea during the same period.

It was also less than China’s investments in other neighboring states, including $273 million in Thailand, $473 million in Vietnam, $729.8 million in Myanmar and $890.7 million in Mongolia over the same period.

The majority of Chinese investors in North Korea are small and medium enterprises, though some smaller firms enjoy brand recognition, such as Nanjing Panda Electronics Co., China Minmetals Corp. and Wanxiang Group, the scholar said.

The majority of Chinese investors in North Korea are not state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the Chinese central government, but privately owned companies and provincial-, prefecture- and municipal-owned SOEs.

Of the 138 Chinese-North Korean joint ventures established between 1997 and August 2010, 41 percent engage in mining, 38 percent in light industry, 13 percent in services and 8 percent in heavy industry, he said.

Thompson said Chinese investors in North Korea are geographically concentrated in the two northeastern provinces bordering North Korea.

Twenty-eight percent of Chinese companies involved in joint ventures are from Jilin, with 34 percent from Liaoning. The rest are from other regions, including Beijing, Shandong and Shanghai.

Jilin and Liaoning share a 1,400 kilometer border with North Korea and are increasingly focused on foreign trade and on achieving competitive economic advantages through their proximity to North Korea.

“(North Korea’s) joint ventures with China are an important aspect of the bilateral relationship, because in addition to propping up the regime in Pyongyang, they contribute to economic development in China’s northeastern ‘rust belt,'” the scholar said in an emailed note.

China’s northeastern region is seen as the country’s rust belt, covered with obsolete and unprofitable factories.

According to Yonhap:

North Korea and China are expected to sign an agreement on joint development of the North’s underground resources in the middle of this month in Beijing, a source here said Sunday.

“It has been learned that Pyongyang and Beijing are expected to conclude a deal to jointly develop North Korea’s underground resources on Feb. 15, one day before the birthday of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il,” said the source, noting the accord will be signed in Beijing between China’s Commerce Ministry and the North’s Joint Venture Investment Committee.

“Specifically, the two sides may agree to jointly develop natural resources such as gold, anthracites and rare earths under the bilateral deal. Following the agreement, the two countries are likely to establish a joint venture company in Hong Kong,” said the source, asking to remain anonymous.

Trade between North Korea and China reached US$3.06 billion in the first 11 months of last year, which marked a rise of 9.6 percent from the 2008 annual volume of $2.7 billion. Mineral resources like coals and iron ores account for over 30 percent of the North’s exports to China.

Chinese mining investors have had mixed results in the DPRK despite geographical proximity and monopsony purchasing power (the Chinese can offer lower prices because in many cases they are the only purchaser/investor).

At one point, a Chinese firm had a controlling share of the DPRK’s Hyesan Youth Copper mine (Satellite image here).  As best I can tell, the mine is no longer operable because of flooding from nearby dam construction.

A Chinese firm had also invested in the Musan Mine, the DPRK’s largest, conveniently located on the Chinese border (Satellite image here). This deal also fell trough (see here).

I have heard informally that Chinese mining investors do not particularly like doing business in the DPRK because their North Korean business partners routinely violate contract terms and local officials need to be bribed repeatedly.  Today Chinese mining firms operate across the world in both developing and developed countries, so why bother with the DPRK?

The particular deal mentioned in this Yonhap article is interesting because it hints that the Chinese and North Korean central governments are setting the terms for mining investment in the DPRK for the first time.  This will give local officials less room for post-contractual rent-seeking behavior and could smooth the way for regular/predictable business operations in the DPRK.

Again, centralized corruption is preferable to decentralized corruption for investors.

Read the full Yonhap story here:
N. Korea, China likely to ink deal on joint resource development
Yonhap
2/6/2011

In addition to the Haggard/Noland book release, there were a couple of other interesting North Korea events in Washington DC this week that I wanted to point out:

1. Korea Economic Institute: The Markets of Pyongyang
John Everard, UK Ambassador to the DPRK (2006-2008)

-Read his paper here (PDF).
-See his power point presentation here (PDF).
-See his full presentation in three parts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3.

2. US-Korea Institute at SAIS: Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea
Drew Thompson, Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center

-The event web page is here.
-Read an executive summary here
-Read the paper here.

Both papers are well worth reading.

Pictured Above: Pongchon Coal Mine (Google Earth)

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 11-01-18
1/28/2011

The DPRK Workers’ Party’s newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, recently featured a front-page editorial urging the North Korean people to increase coal production. On January 26, the KCNA reiterated the call, reporting that the newspaper editorial highlighted fertilizer, cotton, electricity, and steel as products suffering from a lack of coal, and that “coal production must be quickly increased in the Jik-dong Youth Mine, the Chongsong Youth Mine, the Ryongdeung Mine, the Jaenam Mine, Bongchon Mine [Pongchon Mine] and other mines with good conditions and large deposits.”

The editorial also emphasized that “priority must be placed on the equipment and materials necessary for coal production,” and, “the Cabinet, national planning committee, government ministries and central organizations need to draft plans for guaranteeing equipment and materials and must unconditionally and strongly push to provide,” ensuring that the mines have everything they need. It also called on all people of North Korea to assist in mining endeavors and to support the miners, adding that those responsible for providing safety equipment for the mines and miners step up efforts to ensure that all necessary safety gear is available.

In the recent New Year’s Joint Editorial, coal, power, steel and railways were named as the four ‘vanguard industries’ of the people’s economy. Of the four, coal took the top spot, and all of North Korea’s other media outlets followed up the editorial with articles focusing on the coal industry. On January 15, Voice of America radio quoted some recent Chinese customs statistics, revealing that “North Korea exported almost 41 million tons of coal to China between January and November of last year, surpassing the 36 million tons exported [to China] in 2009.” It was notable that only 15.1 tons were exported between January and August, but that 25.5 tons were sent across the border between August and November.

North Korea’s coal exports to China earned it 340 million USD last year, making the coal industry a favorite of Pyongyang’s economic and political elites. Increasing coal production is boosting output from some of the North’s electrical power plants, while exports to China provide much-needed foreign capital. However, even in Pyongyang, where the electrical supply is relatively good, many houses lack heating and experience long black-outs. Open North Korea Radio, a shortwave radio station based in the South, reported on January 24, “As electrical conditions in Pyongyang worsen, now no heating is available.” Farming villages can find nearby timber to use as firewood, but because prices are so high in Pyongyang, even heating has become difficult. Some in the city even wish for rural lifestyles, just for the access to food and heat.

UPDATE 3: The JoongAng Daily (2/12/2011) reports on comments made by Robert King:

King explained that in the past, the U.S. had agreed to give North Korea 500,000 tons in food aid, but was only able to give 170,000 tons as North Korea refused the rest and ordered foreigners who had entered North Korea to deliver the aid to leave.

The envoy also said that it has not yet been decided whether the U.S. will grant food aid to the North and that three prerequisites must be fulfilled if it does.

The three conditions, he explained, are whether a real demand for food truly exists in North Korea, whether the North’s need for food is on the same level as other countries in need of aid, and whether monitoring of the aid will be securely guaranteed. Only when these three prerequisites are met can the U.S. grant aid, King said.

UPDATE 2: According to the JoongAng Daily (2/9/2011) the North Koreans have made an official request for food aid to the US government:

North Korean deputy ambassador to the UN, Han Sang-ryol, requested U.S. food aid last month through Robert King, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, a diplomatic source told the JoongAng Ilbo yesterday.

Local analysts suspect that King, who is currently in Seoul, informed the South Korean government of the request and is discussing a joint response to it.

“Ambassador Han met King in New York on Jan. 14 and requested large-scale U.S. food aid for the North,” said the diplomatic source in Washington.

It is the first time in years that a behind-the-scenes diplomatic discussion between Pyongyang and Washington on aid has come to the surface. U.S. food aid to the North has been suspended since March 2009 after the Kim Jong-il regime rejected a U.S. proposal to increase the number of Korean-speaking food-distribution monitors to make sure aid was getting to the public.

Han told King that the North was willing to enhance international monitoring of food aid “as much as the U.S. wants,” the source said.

King, who came to Seoul on Sunday, started meetings with Seoul officials yesterday, including Wi Sung-lac, the top envoy on North Korean nuclear issues. At a brief media conference after the meeting with Wi, King did not elaborate on the purpose of his visit or his discussion with the South Korean envoy, saying only it was “very good, very serious and a very thoughtful discussion.”

When asked whether food assistance to the North was on the agenda, King said they “talked about a lot of issues.”

“[It is] extremely important for the U.S., as we pursue our policies toward North Korea, to coordinate with the government of South Korea,” King said. “We have a close working relationship, we are able to work together well on issues, we share our analysis, we share our ideas in terms of making progress.”

The official United States stance, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said earlier this month, is that it does not have a plan to resume food aid to the North for now.

“The U.S. does not think the North has met conditions to get U.S. food aid,” the source said.

And even if Washington decides to resume aid, it will take time because of congressional procedures, the source said. But some analysts see the possibility of change, citing some opinions in the U.S. State Department in favor of engaging the North with aid to sway its attitude on other issues, including denuclearization.

UPDATE 1: According to the Donga Ilbo (2/6/2011):

The U.S.-based Radio Free Asia says the U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations are discussing the resumption of food aid to North Korea.

Quoting diplomatic sources in the U.S., the broadcaster said Washington has not decided to resume food aid to Pyongyang but is having many talks and discussions on the issue.

Voice of America said Friday that the World Food Program and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, both of which are under U.S. influence, also plan an additional survey of the North`s food situation for about a month from Feb. 10.

In an interview, Dr. Kisan Gunjal of the food organization said he will survey the North’s food security and crop situations from Feb. 10 to March 12 at Pyongyang’s official invitation.

In a phone interview with The Dong-A Ilbo, an official at a South Korean aid group said, “The U.S. has asked South Korean non-governmental organizations about North Korea’s crop and food supply situations in 2011 since the North’s artillery provocation on Yeonpyeong Island in November.”

Washington, however, remains officially cautious. U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley told a news briefing Monday that the U.S. government has no immediate plans to provide humanitarian aid to the North.

ORIGINAL POST: According to the Donga Ilbo (1/31/2011) the US and DPRK are talking food aid once more:

The U.S. and North Korea have begun their third round of food diplomacy, with Washington considering resuming food aid to Pyongyang.

The U.S. has halted food aid to the North twice since its first provision in 1996 after blaming Pyongyang for diverting the aid.

The North has always asked for food aid first since North Korean leader Kim Jong Il confronted a series of crises in the early 1990s, when the former Soviet Union and China stopped economic assistance to the Stalinist country.

His father and the North`s founder Kim Il Sung died in 1994. When the North was devastated by floods and other natural disasters nationwide, Kim Jong Il ordered state cadres to beg the U.S. for help.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry then formed a committee for flood damage and went hat in hand to Washington. The Clinton administration provided 19,500 tons of food through the World Food Program in 1996, expecting the North to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework and be docile in talks for the repatriation of remains of American soldiers killed in action in the Korean War.

Washington increased its food aid from 177,000 tons in 1997 to 695,000 tons in 1999. In 2000, a joint communiqué between the North and the U.S. was signed.

North Korea, however, diverted the food aid in ignoring U.S. and international principles for humanitarian aid.

As public opinion in the U.S. worsened over the assistance, the George W. Bush administration slashed the aid volume from 350,000 tons in 2001 to 40,000 tons in 2003. The U.S. Congress demanded greater transparency in the distribution of the food aid in 2004, when it passed the North Korean Human Rights Act.

Rejecting the demand, Pyongyang expelled World Food Program staff in 2005. Washington opted not to provide food aid to Pyongyang in 2006.

Flexing its muscles in November 2006 by conducting its first nuclear test, North Korea again requested U.S. aid in 2008. The Bush administration, which was nearing the end of its term, chose to sit at the negotiating table with the North and offered 500,000 tons of food aid through the World Food Program.

The North received 169,000 tons of food by expanding the areas where food distribution is monitored and agreeing to allow more Korean-speaking monitoring personnel.

In early 2009, Pyongyang decided to test the newly inaugurated Obama administration by launching a long-range rocket and preparing for a second nuclear test. In March that year, the North expelled humanitarian aid groups, saying it would not be able to keep its promise of distribution transparency.

In fall last year, North Korea unveiled its uranium enrichment program and showed its centrifuges to the U.S. in a virtual threat to conduct its third nuclear test with uranium bombs if Washington failed to provide food.

What the U.S. will eventually do is attracting interest since South Korea is opposed to aid to the North.

Read the full stories below:
Pyongyang asks U.S. to restore food aid: source
JoongAng Daily
Kim Jung-wook, Moon Gwang-lip
2/9/2011

US, N. Korea begin 3rd round of food diplomacy
Donga Ilbo
1/31/2011

Radio Free Asia: US, NGOs discussing food aid to NK
Donga Ilbo
2/6/2011