North Korean Economy Watch

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
1/30/2007

The North Korean press insists that the “great and immortal” juche idea was designed by the “Great Leader,” Kim Il-sung, in the mid-1920s and has remained the guiding principle of the Korean revolution ever since. But do not expect to find references to juche in Korean publications of the 1950s or even early 1960s.

Even if Kim Il-sung first used the term in his speech in December 1955, it took at least five years before the term became widely known in the country _ and five more years for it to become the name of North Korea’s official ideology.

Only in April 1965, while delivering a lengthy lecture in Indonesia, did Kim Il-sung make it clear that from that point on juche would be considered the basic principle of North Korean ideological policy.

The North Korean leadership badly needed a new ideology in 1965. Why? This was the year when the dispute between the Soviet Union and China reached new heights. The two communist powers had been quarrelling for some time, but from 1965 to 1970 the two countries, which had recently vowed “eternal friendship,” were on the brink of war.

North Korea wisely decided to maintain neutrality, allowing it to milk both sponsors. But in the heavily ideological world of oldstyle communism one needed a theoretical justification for one’s position, even if this position was taken exclusively on account of pragmatic considerations (sounds like academia, doesn’t it?).

Nothing could be as handy as a new ideology, especially since the North had been drifting away from Soviet-style Leninism for some time. A locally designed juche was a good solution to the ideological conundrum.

It was easy to say that North Korea had discovered a new truth that was, needless to say, superior to the truth of Sovietstyle Leninism or Chinese-style Leninism-plus-Maoism. Hence, being bearers of the supreme truth, Koreans could not be ordered around.

But what exactly were the relations between juche and Marxism? For our readers this might appear a rather scholastic question, but the world of communism was based on ideology, and ideological disputes mattered. Of course, communist leaders had long learned how to bend their ideology and how to adjust its postulates to any given current political purpose.

In this regard, they were no different from leaders of supposedly religious states, whose actual policy was not too constrained by their loudly professed faith.

Nonetheless, some explanations had to be invented.

Until the late 1960s, juche was presented as a specific form of Marxism-Leninism, which suited the Korean realities and demands of the Korean communist revolution. It was not separated from Marxism. This explanation found its way into the North Korean constitution of 1972. Article 4 described juche as “a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country.”

The next step in juche’s development took place around 1974 and was perhaps related to the gradual rise of Kim Jong-il. It has been often stated that Kim Jongil introduced new interpretations of juche because he wanted to flatter his father, the founder of juche, and thus demonstrate his loyalty to Kim Il-sung’s cause.

Whatever the reasons, in 1974 some documents signed by Kim Jong-il but actually written by the administration’s chief theoretician, Hwang Jang-yop (currently in Seoul), began to use the term “kimilsungism” as a synonym for juche. In February 1974, Kim Jong-il explained that the works of Marx and Lenin had become outdated.

They described the world as it was 100 or 50 years ago, while juche was suited for the modern world, they argued. Thus, in 1980 the Korean Workers’ Party proclaimed juche the party’s guiding ideology, without mentioning its relationship to Marxism.

That statement doubtless resonated well with the nationalism of Korean cadres because it essentially placed North Korea at the ideological center of the world. Since then, the nationalist element of juche has been increasingly emphasized.

That position was also an open challenge to orthodoxy as understood in Moscow and Beijing. It was as if a local Catholic bishop proclaimed that he had a better grasp of the Holy Scriptures than the pope (or, to take the analogy a bit further, two quarrelling popes) and was able to devise something like a Newest Testament.

These statements made juche-worshipping North Koreans into open heretics within the communist camp, but other “fraternal countries” had to swallow this: Whatever they said, strategic considerations took precedence over ideology. Nobody wanted to alienate Pyongyang, which had been long seen as a strangebehaving sibling of the communist “family.”

However, this family unity did not last. In 1992, the newly amended North Korean constitution completely omitted references to Marxism-Leninism and replaced it with juche as the sole official ideology. Nobody was outraged.

By that time Leninism was patently dead, and even the few countries that still maintained a commitment to that ideology hardly took their own declarations seriously.

However, after the death of Kim Il-sung there were some signs that the significance of the juche idea began to wane.

Donga
1/27/2007

Recently, rumors have been spreading in North Korea that Jeong Ha Cheol (74-year-old), the propaganda secretary of the Workers’ Party, has defected from North Korea, stirring public sentiment.

Party officials have been going door-to-door to remove traces of Jeong from publications without giving any reason. Officials are painting over Jeong’s face with black ink on any pictures that show Jeong accompanying North Korean leader Kim Jong Il or its former leader Kim Il Sung. They are also censuring his name with black ink if there are any passages that include his name and sealing the book. Moreover, writings by Jeong have been torn to pieces. All households which have a few dozens of those books now are required to get rid of them since most North Korea publications are propaganda books.

Jeong Ha Cheol, who studied philosophy at the Kim Il Sung University, was one of the most successful propaganda officials. He served as the editorial chief of the state-run newspaper Rodong Sinmun and the chairman of the Central Broadcasting Station before becoming the propaganda secretary of the Workers’ Party. It is a key post that oversees all the propaganda activities in North Korea, and Kim Jong Il also served in this post before being named as Kim Il Sung’s successor in the mid 1970s.

Jeong, who was considered as one of the closest aides of Kim Il Sung, accompanied Kim every time he paid a state visit to China and even received the Kim Il Sung Decoration, the most highly recognized medal in North Korea at that time.

In fact, rumors about Jeong erupted in December 2005. Some media outlets reported that Jeong has stopped appearing in public since October 2005. There were no news reports on his exile.

Some sources said that he was imprisoned at a concentration camp in North Pyongan Province because his faults were revealed during an intensive investigation into the staff of Central Broadcasting who was caught drinking during the daytime.

According to the sources, Jeong was sentenced as “a traitor against the party and revolution,” and was ordered to be erased from all the records, including publications. In short, he is unlikely to regain his power since he has been completely shunned by North Korean society.

All these people were involved in the so-called, “August Clan Incident.” The names of the children of Kim Sung Ae, Kim Il Sung’s third wife, who fell from political power and Seo Gwan-hee, former agricultural secretary of the Workers’ Party, who was shot to death on charges of espionage, were also removed from publications. You can see black marks quite often on North Korean political books. In North Korea, it is a principle that if one is accused of a serious crime, his or her family members and relatives (father’s side: up to second cousins, mother’s side: up to first cousins) are also sent to concentration camps or deep in the mountains, as it happened in the feudal age.

The most common cause that North Korean committee officials consider as a serious crime is a drinking bout. Criticizing Kim Jong Il or the communist regime after having some drinks can not be tolerated in the North, and that is likely the case with Jeong. It is a felony to shake the regime. Recently, Joo Dong Il, a high ranking official in charge of electricity, was dismissed for suggesting to Kim Jong Il on a private occasion, “How about we use the electricity used for unattended guest houses all across the country for the economic sector?”

However, some analysts speculate possibilities of Jeong’s involvement in serious corruption considering that North Korea lavishly spend money to purchase equipment from overseas for propaganda purposes every year.

Choi Yong Hae, the chairman of the League of Socialist Working Youth and who prepared the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students, was also found guilty of grave corruption. Although Choi was dismissed, his name was not censured with black ink. Chang Sung Taek, a senior official of the Workers’ Party, was also blamed of serious corruption, but he was recently pardoned. Corruption charges are far more lenient compared to criticizing the regime or Kim Jong Il.

Jeong’s case is a good example that illustrates how insecure the power that top North Korean officials have once they lose the trust of Kim Jong Il. If North Korean officials are not cautious all the time, like walking on thin ice each day, they can be out of Kim Jong Il’s favor.

NK Secretary Jung Ha Chol Politically Banished
Daily NK
Han Young Jin
1/29/2007

A rumor has spread alleging that a former secretary for the Propaganda Department of the Chosun Worker’s Party Jung Ha Chol (74) has escaped North Korea, reported the Donga Ilbo on the 27th.

A source told Donga Ilbo “Though the reason has not yet been revealed, North Korean elite officials have recently been erasing remnants of Secretary Jung in published materials” and informed “Secretary Jung’s face has been deleted from all photos taken with Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il.” In addition, Secretary Jung’s name is being erased from all written materials and sealed with tape, and materials directly written by Secretary Jung are being deleted altogether.

With Kim Il Sung’s May 25th teaching in 1967, “North Korea’s revolutionary culture” arose and excluding statements and instructions of Kim Il Sung, any foreign editions and all publications displaying anti-authority or conflict with Kim Il Sung were either burned or erased.

Hence, we can surmise that secretary Jung has already been purged from North Korea’s political arena based on the evidence that his photo and name is being obliterated from published materials.

Secretary Jung graduated from the Kim IL Sung University majoring in Philosophy and worked as an editor for the Rodong Newspaper and Head of the Central Broadcast Agency. In 2001, he became the director and secretary for the propaganda department which following the secretary for the Chosun Workers Party is the next best position. Secretary Jung was even selected as Kim Jong Il’s entourage on his visit to China and was even awarded the Kim Il Sung honorary medal.

However, in December 2005 inspectors discovered one of Secretary Jung’s private parties held at a rural village during an agricultural supporting activity. In addition, there had been rumors that the First Minister for the Chosun Workers Party Lee Jae Kang and Secretary Jung had been in conflict. Whatever the unknown reason, whether it was Secretary Jung conducting parties, occurrences or comments made at the party or personal feuds, Secretary Jung was ultimately imprisoned at a concentration camp in South Pyongan, Buk Chang province.

The Donga Ilbo informed “Secretary Jung has been condemned as an anti-revolutionist and is being banished from North Korean society. His existence being deleted from all records indicates that his power will not be reinstated to him.”

“One the main reasons elite officials are ostracized in North Korea is for reproaching Kim Jong Il or the system at parties” and “It is likely Secretary Jung fell into this category” prospected the newspaper.

Another speculation suggested that Secretary Jung had been corrupted. As North Korea carelessly spends vast amounts of foreign currency on propaganda every year, it is possible Secretary Jung made a foolish decision.

However, even Choi Young Hae, former director for Socialist Youth League who swindled vast amounts of foreign currency while preparing for the 13th International Youth and Students Festival in 1989 did not get “deleted” from all publication but just simply demoted. This was the same for Jang Sung Taek who was once overthrown but his position eventually reinstituted. To criticize or compare Kim Jong Il or the regime is an enormous criminal offense. Hence, for Secretary Jung’s existence to be deleted from all published materials denotes that he could never return to the political areana.

Though there is no real evidence to prove that Secretary Jung Ha Chol has defected overseas, he has undeniably been obliterated from politics.

At present, Jung Ha Chol’s position as secretary of the Chosun Worker’s Party has been reassigned to Kim Ki Nam.

Washington Post
Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis
1/27/2007

Those who think that dealing with North Korea is impossible are wrong. Unfortunately, those who think that it is, in fact, possible to deal with North Korea often are not much closer to the truth. The basic problem is that people of both views simply haven’t figured out what it is that the North really wants.

We tend to confuse North Korea’s short-term tactical goals with its broader strategic focus. We draw up list after list of things we think might appeal to Pyongyang on the assumption that these will constitute a “leveraged buyout,” finally achieving what we want: the total, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.

But this list of “carrots” (energy, food, the lifting of sanctions) does not include what the North thinks it must have. It can, of course, help keep the process on track and moving ahead, and it could help cement a final deal and hold it together through the inevitable political storms. But these things are not the ends that North Korea seeks.

North Korea feeds our misperceptions by bargaining so hard over details and raising its initial demands so high. For our part, we tend to be taken in by Western journalists’ repetition of stock phrases about it being “one of the poorest nations,” “one of the most isolated,” “living on handouts.” Accurate or not, these factors are irrelevant to Pyongyang’s strategic calculations.

Those who realize that North Korea does not have visions of grand rewards sometimes move the focus to political steps that many see as “key” to a solution. These include replacing the armistice with a peace treaty, giving the North security guarantees, discussing plans for an exchange of diplomats. But these, like the economic carrots, are only shimmering, imperfect reflections of what Pyongyang is after.

What is it, then, that North Korea wants? Above all, it wants, and has pursued steadily since 1991, a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States. This has nothing to do with ideology or political philosophy. It is a cold, hard calculation based on history and the realities of geopolitics as perceived in Pyongyang. The North Koreans believe in their gut that they must buffer the heavy influence their neighbors already have, or could soon gain, over their small, weak country.

This is hard for Americans to understand, having read or heard nothing from North Korea except its propaganda, which for years seems to have called for weakening, not maintaining, the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. But in fact an American departure is the last thing the North wants. Because of their pride and fear of appearing weak, however, explicitly requesting that the United States stay is one of the most difficult things for the North Koreans to do.

If the United States has leverage, it is not in its ability to supply fuel oil or grain or paper promises of nonhostility. The leverage rests in Washington’s ability to convince Pyongyang of its commitment to coexist with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, accept its system and leadership, and make room for the DPRK in an American vision of the future of Northeast Asia. Quite simply, the North Koreans believe they could be useful to the United States in a longer, larger balance-of-power game against China and Japan. The Chinese know this and say so in private.

The fundamental problem for North Korea is that the six-party talks in which it has been engaged — and which may reconvene soon — are a microcosm of the strategic world it most fears. Three strategic foes — China, Japan and Russia — sit in judgment, apply pressure and (to Pyongyang’s mind) insist on the North’s permanent weakness.

Denuclearization, if still achievable, can come only when North Korea sees its strategic problem solved, and that, in its view, can happen only when relations with the United States improve. For Pyongyang, that is the essence of the joint statement out of the six-party talks on Sept. 19, 2005, which included this sentence: “The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.”

And that is why the North so doggedly seeks bilateral talks with Washington. It desires not “drive-by” encounters, not a meeting here and there, but serious, sustained talks in which ideas can be explored and solutions, at last, patiently developed.

Robert Carlin, a former State Department analyst, participated in most of the U.S.-North Korea negotiations between 1993 and 2000. John Lewis, professor emeritus at Stanford University, directs projects on Asia at the university’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Both have visited North Korea many times, most recently in November.

Nautilus Institute
Bryan Port
1/17/2007

North Korea’s recent nuclear test clearly demonstrates that the Korean peninsula is the crux of Asian Security. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea’s official name, poses a range of challenges. Though the nuclear challenge appears to be the most extreme and urgent, developments in the DPRK could lead to violent conventional military spasms or humanitarian disaster, each with consequences as grave as those posed by DPRK weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Regardless of the challenges, Korea’s future has significant ramifications for the balance of power in East Asia and by extension on American security and prosperity. One day, DPRK leader Kim Chong-il will pass the keys to the kingdom and the nuclear launch codes to a successor. Kim’s choice and how he goes about the succession process will impact East Asia for decades and consequently requires significant consideration in US strategic planning.

Effective foreign policy requires an in depth understanding of the historical, social, and cultural context of other nations, their leaders, and their people. Though the DPRK is opaque, much is known about its history and even its people. From what we know we can develop significant insight. However, the balance of what we don’t know requires that we conduct considerable alternative analysis to define a range of possibilities to facilitate effective planning and policy development. Alternative analysis is imperative regarding the succession issue. Though it is nearly impossible to confidently predict who Kim will choose to succeed him, much less the successor’s prospects, analysts can define a range of plausible scenarios which can play a positive role in strategic planning, and leave the US a fighting chance of avoiding strategic surprise.

DPRK CONTEXT. Before analyzing scenarios for DPRK leadership succession, one must first consider the context and circumstances of the DPRK. The dearth of information available on the DPRK and its leaders can lead analysts to over emphasize a given aspect of the DPRK and through this narrow prism turn the DPRK into a caricature. We commonly see this in how the media and others portray Kim Chong-il. Analysts are also at risk of mirror imaging or applying one’s own cultural and historical frames of reference to the DPRK.

The DPRK is a deeply stratified society. An individual’s place in DPRK society is based largely on one’s family history (Songbun) and political reliability. Those with blood connections to Kim Il-sung or those who fought with Kim Il-sung against the Japanese (partisans), and their offspring, comprise the majority of the DPRK’s elites. It is rare for someone without this background to ascend to elite status in the DPRK. Some may gain a certain level of stability, power, or privilege, for example members of the military or scientists, however without the right bloodlines they will not climb to the pinnacle of power in the DPRK.

Despite its societal stratification, there is a shared societal and historical perspective that must be taken into account when thinking about North Korea or North Koreans. Understanding what the DPRK is, or understanding its leaders, requires placing oneself in the historical mindset of a North Korean. The DPRK is the most Orwellian society the world has ever known. The DPRK is not a communist nation; certainly not in the sense of Marx or the perversion of Marx that was the Soviet Union. North Korea has never known a pluralistic political system, much less democracy.

For nearly its entire history Korea has been a feudalistic society, constantly on the edge of survival at both the societal and individual level. Korea has been under constant threat of invasion. Koreans have struggled merely to subsist, with bouts of hunger or famine a common occurrence. Even in South Korea, stability, to say nothing of prosperity, is a recent development. It is only in the last 20 to 30 years that South Korea moved beyond its history.

Even for the most elderly of today’s North Koreans, the historical context is Japanese colonization, Korean War, emerging totalitarian state under Kim Il-sung, relative stability, Kim Chong-il’s accession to power, famine, and economic depression. North Koreans lack outside information and thus lack the basis for comparative thought about their society. Of course, comparative thought about politics presumes the freedom, sustenance, energy and time required to engage in political thought or activity. Only the elite in the DPRK are positioned to have the luxury of political thought, and they are the stakeholders in the current system.

Though it is difficult to understand from an American perspective, many in the DPRK, including its leaders, do genuinely fear the United States and for that matter other foreign powers including Japan and perhaps even China. This is based on Korea’s history of being subject to multiple foreign conquests and leads to the desire for self-sufficiency. Kim Il-sung very effectively manipulated this historical perspective and Kim Chong-il continues to do so.

DPRK CIRCUMSTANCES. The DPRK is in dire straights. A crumbling infrastructure, local ad hoc solutions to problems and corruption are the common denominators of government, economy, and society. Resources, privileges and even security are obtained through barter or by outright buying the services of a corrupt official. Almost everyone is corrupt from the lowest private in the Army to the senior members of the Korean Workers Party.

The DPRK remains a pervasive police state with a population that lacks even the most rudimentary elements of a functioning civil society. Though corrupt, the security services are powerful. While individuals within the security services are “for hire,” when the regime is threatened the security services can mobilize quickly and effectively against individual or group opposition, real or perceived.

Still, KCI cannot take for granted the continued effectiveness or loyalty of the security services. Although Kim has multiple security services to perform checks and balances, eventually the deterioration of ideological integrity, to say nothing of ruinous state of physical infrastructure and corruption, are emboldening entrepreneurial security personnel. More mischief is possible, and emboldened individuals are more likely to seek out other like-minded individuals, at first for profit, and then perhaps for power.

At this point it appears that members of the security services are happy to simply use and abuse their positions to survive, or in the case of senior members enrich themselves. However, the security services as a whole, and their individual members, will face tough questions about their futures deriving from succession. Some may still consider a successor in ideological terms. Is the successor worthy? Pure enough? Others may consider the successor in terms of their position in the security services and the maintenance of their privileged positions in society. Is the successor capable enough? Will they be demoted or purged? How the security services react to the successor issue will be a key determinant to the successful installation of a successor, and ultimately the stability of the DPRK.

DPRK ELITES. North Korea’s elites face a paranoid, schizophrenic existence. This is not to suggest that KCI, or other DPRK elites, suffer from mental disease. Though it is not unreasonable to believe that like people everywhere, even leaders, that some North Korean leaders suffer from mental illness. Rather, elites in the DPRK have much to loose in the event of political change and corresponding to the stakes are at best anxious and likely paranoid about maintaining their positions. The only person who is secure in his position in the current regime is Kim Chong-il.

Chang Song-taek is married to Kim Chong-il’s younger sister Kim Kyong-hui. Until 2003, Chang was considered the second most powerful man in the DPRK, and held the title of first deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Department. In 2003 KCI had Chang arrested. No one is certain as to the reasons for Chang’s fall from power, but speculation exists that Chang had been too overt in his support of Kim Chong-il’s oldest son, Kim Chong-nam, in the race for succession. Even though Chang has been rehabilitated and returned to a position of power, his situation shows that no member of the DPRK elite is secure. The security apparatus is ever present and mistakes often lead to a concentration camp or death.

North Korea’s elites face incredible challenges and pressure. They must at once protect their own interests and also take actions that preserve the regime, which is the source of their relatively privileged existence. These two goals are often at odds, and may even be mutually exclusive. North Korean elites must apply the filter of Juche ideology to their actions and/or be prepared to explain or justify actions in ideological terms.

Elites in the DPRK share in common with elites everywhere a calculating nature and wish to position themselves and their allies to survive and prosper in the future. For this reason, it is imperative for elites in the DPRK to analyze the succession issue, and conduct their affairs so as to maintain favor with KCI, but also be at the vanguard of a successor’s regime.

Some elites may reach the conclusion that Kim Chong-il’s successor has little chance of consolidating power. Such a determination requires not only confidence in predicting who KCI will choose, but also mandates determining who will be powerful enough to supplant the successor. Following is the even trickier task of currying favor with KCI, the individual they believe KCI will choose to succeed him, and the individual who they believe will actually take power.

At the top of the elite and the pinnacle of the succession issue is Kim Chong-il. Almost all of the analysis of the succession issue assumes that Kim will choose a successor and that it will be one of his sons. However, Kim has surprised us in the past and will likely do so again. Before moving on to consider a range of options available to KCI in terms of choosing a successor, it would help to more specifically consider the context and circumstances of Kim Chong-il.

KIM’S CONTEXT AND CIRCUMSTANCES. Even though we are not really able to understand how KCI views the world, we can roughly understand the context and circumstances in which KCI exists. Kim presides over a failed, if not collapsed, state. While North Korea’s military remains intact, it is not the existential threat to South Korea that it once was. Kim’s security services are effective, perhaps too effective. Kim must have multiple security services, not to produce the best intelligence or efficiently secure the state, but to watch one another.

China, North Korea’s one remaining ally of any significance, supports the DPRK for negative reasons. China doesn’t want to deal with the humanitarian consequences of a complete DRPK collapse. KCI and other DPRK elites must consider that China has significant potential to play an active role in the DPRK’s succession dilemma, and has ample motive to do so. Still, China is unlikely to be overt and direct in the application of its influence, knowing that doing so could prompt a backlash. However, China can indirectly bring its influence to bear on who KCI chooses as successor by providing access to resources and senior Chinese leaders to select North Korean elites. It is also likely not lost on DPRK elites that China has the capability to more directly intervene in North Korean politics should its vital interests be threatened.

South Korea is in much the same position as China in that it does not wish to deal with the humanitarian consequences of a complete DPRK collapse. However, South Korea has a significant financial stake and also a much more “personal” stake in the DPRK’s future. Collapse or violent military spasm on the part of the DPRK will be hugely costly to the South both in financial and human terms. Due to North Korea’s desperate situation, one cannot rule out that the DPRK could lash out, but truly North Korea’s only effective remaining leverage is the gun it holds to its own head (collapse) and the nuclear tipped missiles it claims to point elsewhere.

Although other countries disagree with US policy toward the DPRK, this does not mean they support the DPRK. Unfortunately for Kim, Japan, the one country that is most able to help the DPRK in the short term with cash and resources, is not inclined to do so for a variety of reasons, including the DPRK nuclear and missile threat to Japan, DPRK international criminal activity, and past DPRK abductions of Japanese citizens. About the only thing that may motivate Japan to reconsider its stance is the prospect of normalizing relations in the near-term to pay out its World War II reparations prior to a collapse of the DPRK to avoid potentially more responsibility in the event of a collapse and absorption of the North by the South.

KCI likely understands the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean perspective. Thus KCI likely appreciates not only the dire domestic straights of the DPRK, but also its grim international position.

NOT HIS FATHERS SON. Though Kim Il-sung (KIS) is not the man that DPRK propaganda portrays him to be, and though he is guilty of horrible crimes against humanity, Kim Il-sung did fight the Japanese and suffered in doing so. Through cunning and calculation, as well as brutality, KIS led the DPRK into existence. For much of the first half of its existence, the north outperformed the south. After the Korean War, life improved for many North Koreans under KIS and there was relative peace and the possibility of future prosperity. Still in spite of his power and the genuine love and respect of many in the DPRK, Kim Il-sung spent the better part of 20 years preparing to transfer power to KCI.

Kim Chong-il lacks the credibility and stature of his father. KCI never served in the military, much less fight in a war. Though he has displayed cunning and brutality, he did not overcome challenges on par with those faced by his father. Instead, whether it was completely his fault or not, since KCI assumed power in 1994, the DPRK has suffered military decline, economic failure, famine, and even in at least one case, organized resistance from the segment of society it most relies on, the military.

KCI faces significant challenges with respect not only to the succession issue, but generally with respect to running the DPRK. Conventional analysis assesses that KCI will choose a successor and that he will choose his second son Kim Chong-ch’ol. There is nothing that starkly contradicts the conventional wisdom, however, there is nothing that boldly confirms it either.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM. There are three acknowledged sons of Kim Chong-il. In order from oldest to youngest, KCI’s sons are Kim Chong-nam, Kim Chong-Ch’ol, and Kim Chong-un. The conventional wisdom holds that KCI will opt for one of his sons to succeed him, probably Kim Chong-ch’ol (KCC).

Until embarrassing his father in 2001 by being arrested in an attempt to visit Tokyo Disneyland, KCI appeared to favor Kim Chong-nam, even though there were few outward signs that a formal succession process had begun. Kim Chong-un is not considered a serious contender, if for no other reason than his age and the presence of two older brothers.

In the past year or so Kim Chong-ch’ol (KCC) has emerged as the front-runner. Indicators include Workers Party of Korea Central Committee Secretariat Instruction No. 0101 (Reported in South Korean Weekly Chosun magazine March 2006). According to this instruction, Kim Chong-ch’ol is the party’s nerve center.

There are several reports, conflicting in detail, but consistent in stating that KCC occupied a formal government position and that he has advanced to a more senior position. Pins and portraits of KCC have appeared, and the KWP has issued instructions on their wear and display. Additionally, some of KCC’s associates accompanied KCI on trip to China to observe economic development, and KCC himself has been in Europe on official business.

Even if KCI has resolved to anoint KCC as successor, that is not a guarantee that the succession itself will go smoothly or that KCC will be able to consolidate power. Many segments of the power elite will view KCC as weak. So long as Kim Chong-il remains a force to be reckoned with, opposition to KCC as successor would be controllable. However, as Kim becomes infirm or dies, challenges to KCC will mount. This will force KCC to share power or do the bidding of factions whose support he requires, presumably the security services or military.

Knowing that KCC may or will not be able to go it alone, KCI may opt to install KCC as ruler of the DPRK, but only as a front man for others who will actually wield power. There may be liberal elements of the power elite who favor Chinese like reform. Should they support KCC, they might be able to begin reviving the DPRK, particularly if they are willing to take steps to gain legitimacy in the international community. On the other hand, factions of the DPRK elite pessimistic about their status in a reformed DPRK, concerned that KCC is too weak to control factions hostile to them, or critical as to KCC’s ability to control the country as could seek to overthrow KCC or force him to keep the DPRK on its present course.

There are other mo[r]e Machiavellian possibilities. KCI may be using KCC to flush out dissent, in effect using KCC as a lightening rod. Due to Kim’s advancing age, questionable health, and the poor condition of the DPRK, many elites are likely questioning their future prospects in terms of not only prosperity, but also basic stability and even survival. At some point, for example if KCI should become infirm or seriously ill, the concerns of the DPRK elite could reach a tipping point. It would be prudent to flush out the most disaffected among the North Korean elite now, rather than later. To this end KCC could serve as a useful target and distraction.

ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS. KCI in his switch from Kim Chong-nam to Kim Chong-ch’ol demonstrated that he is flexible with respect to his choice of successor and has not taken any irreversible steps in designating KCC as successor. However, this will be the 2nd succession in the DPRK and thus there is little ground to talk about patterns or precedent. Conventional wisdom has often not held when analyzing the DPRK, making alternative analysis imperative.

It is important to remember that Kim Il-sung (KIS) spent 20 years preparing for KCI to assume power, and still upon Kim Il-sung’s sudden death in 1994 it took several more years for KCI to consolidate power. Between KCI’s health and the challenges faced by the DPRK it is not at all certain that KCI has 20 years to lay the foundation for one of his sons to assume power, assuming that this is what KCI actually intends and that it is possible to accomplish another hereditary transfer of power.

If not Kim Chong-Ch’ol then who? What other options are there for KCI? Is the choice entirely Kim Chong-il’s to make? KCI lacks the stature of Kim Il-sung and the DPRK faces significant challenges. Even Kim Il-sung faced resistance in installing his son as ruler. KCI will face challenges greater than those faced by his father, and from a weaker position in terms of his credentials, the current situation in the DPRK, and his very legitimacy.

North Korean society is still rooted in Confucian values, even though those values are distorted by North Korea’s ideology (Juche). Thus other Kim family members warrant consideration, including Kim Chong-il’s daughter Kim Sol-song, his half brother Kim P’yong-il, and Chang Song-t’aek or Chang’s children.

Kim Sol-song is Kim Chong-il’s daughter by Kim Yong-suk (Kim Chong-il’s official wife and the only one recognized by Kim Il-sung). There are reports that she currently handles important aspects of her father’s life, including his personal security. Even if not succeeding KCI she could act in a powerful supporting role, even key decision making role, to Kim Chong-ch’ol, or other successor.

Kim P’yong-il is KCI’s half brother. By some accounts, Kim P’yong-il is everything that KCI is not. P’yong-il was an active duty military officer that had genuine respect from many in the military. It is not entirely clear how KCI edged him out as successor, but it is conceivable that Kim Il-sung favored KCI, viewing P’yong-il as a threat. It is also likely that P’yong-il is not ruthless enough to rule the DPRK. Since 1988 P’yong-il has served in a series of ambassadorships, primarily in Europe.

Bearing in mind the North Koreans mindset, P’yong-il would make a good transitional figure. He carries the Kim name, and perhaps continuity with Kim Il-sung’s interrupted dreams for the DPRK. While he would certainly face opposition from segments of the elite, P’yong-il has a huge advantage in that he would likely garner the support of the military. There is a good chance based on his personal background that P’yong-il would change the course of the country. Of course KCI won’t choose P’yong-il, but in the event that Kim fails to entrench a successor, waits too long, or simply does not choose, P’yong-il becomes viable for segments of the elite concerned about their future status.

Chang Song-t’aek is married to Kim Chong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui and has powerful family ties to the military. Though recently purged and rehabilitated, Chang has been and is now again a powerful player in the DPRK. Even if he is unlikely to succeed KCI, Chang can still influence the succession issue. KCI might have purged Chang due to Chang’s view on the succession issue, but a rehabilitated Chang will likely not have changed his mind on the subject, but now knows to be more careful.

Chang’s children carry as much of Kim Il-sung’s blood as the children of KCI. There are not presently any signs that Chang’s children are under consideration, at least as far as KCI is concerned. However, they are out there and should KCI loose control over the process, or should other alternative scenarios play out, Chang’s children are viable alternates, particularly as a figure head for a king maker.

BEYOND FAMILY. There are other forces beside Confucianism at work in the DPRK, thus requiring consideration of other succession scenarios including king maker/power sharing, alternate successors, and even that Kim may have no intention of choosing a successor.

Realizing that any one individual is not likely to be powerful enough to rule, KCI may intend to set up a kingmaker(s) to support his successor. KCI may even prefer that his successor require behind the scenes support. If his chosen successor will be too weak to supplant him, KCI can be confident that he can continue to exercise power out front or behind the scenes until his death. Further, KCI could co-opt some of the most effective challengers to his successor and reward them for present good deeds, helping to ensure loyalty.

It is conventional wisdom that KCI desires to anoint one of his sons, or at least a relative, as the next leader of the DPRK. What if he doesn’t? There are scenarios where it is not beneficial to KCI to see one of his blood relatives assume power.

KCI is almost certainly aware that his sons might not be competent enough or ruthless enough to run the DPRK. Even if KCI is still alive and active, he may be unable to stave off his opponents once a successor is appointed or operating. This could have dire consequences for KCI.

History weighs heavily on the minds of dictators, and the fate of other dictators, such as Romanian leader Ceausescu or Cambodia’s Pol Pot likely weigh on Kim’s mind. KCI could seek a successor with the requisite competence to ensure that he doesn’t meet a similar fate. This may lead Kim to choose someone other than his sons. Such a choice, though not comporting well with Confucian values, might ultimately serve KCI well.

Moving further along the spectrum of alternative analysis, what if the most prudent move for KCI is to not name a successor at all. The mere act of naming a successor creates a focal point for opposition. Ironically, at the same time, naming a successor could also set of[f] infighting to curry favor with the chosen successor at Kim’s expense drawing from Kim’s power base. Those patient and shrewd enough could hold fast making a power play at a point in time where KCI is weakening, but the successor is not strong enough to consolidate power.

Alternative power bases might not matter if the successor is not competent enough to consolidate power. The weakened state of the DPRK and Kim’s lack of legitimacy compared to his father could lead Kim to plan to die in office or abdicate at some point to avoid empowering and facing potential adversaries while still in office; something which could lead to his own demise.

One final possibility deserves consideration. KCI could die suddenly as did his father. For the US and the DPRK’s neighbors, the key concerns remain the same and center on DPRK WMD and the possibility of extreme instability that could result in outward military spasms or complete collapse.

Under a sudden death scenario, whatever steps had been made toward anointing a successor may not matter. Opponents to KCI’s choice may likewise be neutralized. It could all boil down to which of the key players learns of KCI’s death first, and whether or not they can control the news, acting quickly to capitalize on their first mover’s advantage. A particularly ruthless individual could quickly act against the key players most threatening to them, changing the whole power dynamic, regardless of whether they are ultimately successful in assuming power. It is difficult to analyze what KCI might do in terms of a deliberate succession process. It is close to impossible to analyze how a sudden death scenario would play out.

The recent nuclear tests serve to highlight the importance of the succession issue to the US and the DPRK’s neighbors. While external reasoning may have lead KCI to test a nuclear device, it is more likely that internal considerations are driving decisions not only on WMD development, but also on the issue of leadership succession in the DPRK. It is even possible that KCI conducted the nuclear test to shore up his legitimacy by doing something his father never managed to accomplish. Possibly due to concerns over succession or just internal dynamics, KCI may also have conducted the tests to strengthen his domestic powerbase and position with the military.

No matter what KCI decides in terms of succession, the consequences could include a twenty something year old leader with nuclear weapons or a collapsed state ultimately resulting in a re-unified nuclear Korea. Regardless of how the succession issue plays out, Korea will continue to be integral to US and East Asian security and prosperity.

Aidan Foster-Carter
Nautilus Institute
1/16/2007

Everyone is famous for 15 minutes, at least according to the late American pop artist and cultural icon Andy Warhol.

For Paek Nam Sun, that was literally true. North Korea’s foreign minister since 1998, who has just died, hit the headlines just once in all his 77 years – and then only on the inside pages, mainly of the regional press in Asia.

Coffee with evil in Brunei

That was in August 2002, when for a quarter of an hour Paek sipped coffee with his rather better known US opposite number at the time, Colin Powell. The place was Brunei; the occasion, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Senior American and North Korean leaders rarely meet at the best of times, which this was not. Earlier that year, President George W Bush had famously labeled Kim Jong Il’s regime, along with Iran and Iraq, as part of an “axis of evil”. So for his Secretary of State to dally thus with the enemy, even briefly, raised eyebrows in some quarters.

We know now, as suspected at the time, that Powell was keen to engage North Korea. But vice-president Dick Cheney was dead against, and Cheney had Bush’s ear.

Any hopes of renewed dialogue were dashed later in 2002. Accused by Washington of a second, covert nuclear programme, North Korea restarted its first one precipitating a crisis that continues, climaxing (so far) in its testing a nuclear device on October 9.

Paek low in the pecking order

With the nuclear crisis ongoing, we might have expected to see more of Paek Nam Sun. But they do things differently in North Korea.

A senior diplomat (and sometime ambassador to Poland) who had also been active in early contacts with South Korea since the 1970s, as foreign minister the genial Paek was a largely ceremonial figure: trundled out for occasions like the ARF. As such he was in Kuala Lumpur last July, where he reportedly also had medical treatment.

Serious negotiations, on the other hand, were and are the province of Paek’s nominal deputies: two above all. The better known is deputy foreign minister Kim Kye Gwan, who heads Pyongyang’s delegation to the on-off six party nuclear talks. A skilled and confident negotiator, Kim even gave an unscripted if brief press conference after the latest round of talks, held in Beijing last month, ended inconclusively.

But the real heavy hitter is first vice foreign minister Kang Sok Ju. He it was who negotiated the October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework (AF); defusing an earlier North Korean nuclear crisis (plus ca change), back in the Bill Clinton era, which in mid-1994 had come perilously close to unleashing a second Korean War. If the six-party process ever gets anywhere, which is doubtful, Kang will be wheeled on again. For now, the more junior Kim Kye Gwan does the honours.

Puzzling pseudonymy

So Paek Nam Sun’s passing will hardly send a tremor through North Korea’s foreign policy. But it does shed light on the curious way they order matters in Pyongyang.

For one thing, what was his real name? The man who first showed up in the 1970s for Red Cross talks with South Korea was known as Paek Nam Jun. But after he became foreign minister, the J mysteriously morphed into an S.

Peculiar, but not unique. Ri Jong Hyok, Pyongyang’s current point man for ties with Seoul, was Ri Dong Hyok in the 1980s when he headed North Korea’s quasi-embassy in Paris. There are several other such cases. It’s hardly a disguise, so what gives?

(En passant, the French connection is intriguing. Nominally the last EU state to resist full recognition of the DPRK, in practice France has hosted a North Korean legation since the 1970s. And both Kang Sok Ju and Kim Kye Gwan majored in French: the traditional language of international diplomacy.)

Dying off

Another oddity: North Korean elites hardly ever retire. Like Paek, they mostly die in post, often at an advanced age. Communist regimes tend to gerontocracy: think China, at least until recently. But North Korea has taken this, like most things, to extremes.

Since Kim Jong Il succeeded his father Kim Il Sung as leader in 1994, the nominally ruling communist party, the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK), seems to be frozen – at least at the top. No new appointments to the Politburo have been announced in over a decade. Instead its ranks have been thinned by the remorseless march of mortality.

Latest to go was Kye Ung Tae, who as KWP secretary for national security wielded far more power than Paek Nam Sun. Kye died of lung cancer on November 23, aged 81. That leaves just six full Politburo members. One anti-Japanese guerilla veteran and honorary vice president Pak Song Chol passed 93 last September. Three others are over 80. Titular head of state Kim Yong Nam turns 79 on February 4, just before the “dear leader” Kim Jong Il a mere lad by comparison reaches his 65th birthday.

That would be retiring age in most normal countries. But Kim Jong Il has yet to name a successor, among several competing sons and other contenders. His health is said to be not of the best although such rumors have proved premature in the past.

A nuclear North Korea is indeed a worry, but it is not the only one. The world, and even Pyongyang, will take the death of Paek Nam Sun (who?) in its stride. But Kim Jong Il could go just as suddenly. In that case all bets for North Korea would be off.

Joon Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja
1/4/2007

Since its founder Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, North Korea’s political landscape has been transformed dramatically, and military officials have solidified their standing in the power elite of the communist country.

They have elbowed aside civilian politicians and bureaucrats, a new analysis shows, and the data confirm that the North’s “Military first” political slogan is much more than rhetoric.

In 1994, North Korea published a list of 273 people making up a committee to plan the founder’s funeral. That list also contained the seating order for those dignitaries at the funeral ― an accurate reflection of the pecking order in the North’s hierarchy at the time.

A JoongAng Ilbo special reporting team, its Unification Research Institute and Cyram, a research firm specializing in social network analyses, compared that 1994 rank order with data drawn from profiles of 324 North Korean figures provided by the Unification Ministry and the National Intelligence Service. The researchers ranked the top 50 North Korean figures after Kim Jong-il, the current leader and son of the late president, and compared that new list to the data from 12 years ago. The 2006 rankings took account of the officials’ titles and their roles, how often they have accompanied Mr. Kim on his frequent “site inspection” tours, seating charts and ranks announced by Pyongyang last year for several political events and evaluations by specialists in North Korean affairs.

“Kim Yong-nam is the official head of state in North Korea, but he acts as a subordinate to Kim Jong-il at public events,” said Chon Hyun-joon, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification. “In order to find out who actually is capable of controlling people, money and policies in North Korea, we have to use a special approach.”

On the new list, Mr. Kim, whose official title is chairman of the National Defense Commission, sits atop the hierarchy. Jo Myong-rok, the first vice chairman of the defense commission, was ranked second and Kim Yong-nam, head of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, was ranked third. The Supreme People’s Assembly is the North’s legislative body, but it normally delegates most of its power to the Presidium, a core group of elected members.

Jon Byong-ho, a Workers’ Party secretary, and Kim Il-chol, minister of the People’s Armed Forces, are ranked fourth and fifth. The Workers’ Party has been the only party in the North since 1948, except for a few parties that exist on paper as counterparts for foreign social democrats, for example. The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces is responsible for the management and operational control of the North’s military. It is directly controlled by the National Defense Commission, which Kim Jong-il heads.

Kim Yong-chun, the Army chief of staff, was ranked seventh on the new list, followed by Pak Pong-ju, the premier.

Comparing the new rankings with the 1994 list, only two people ― Kim Jong-il and Kim Yong-nam ― kept their top-10 posts in 2006. Among the top 51, only 16 still remain in power.

The comparison showed a clear shift in the job titles represented in the elite. During the Kim Il Sung era, members of the politburo and Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, the cabinet, the military, the Supreme People’s Assembly and some other organizations were all represented in the power elite. With the party at the center, the officials were balanced, presumably in an effort to avoid concentrations of political power and possible threats to Kim Il Sung’s leadership.

But North Korea under his son is dominated by the “Dear Leader,” as North Koreans refer to him, and the National Defense Commission members.

Military officials surged to the top over the 12 years. On the 2006 list, the top 50 North Koreans after Kim Jong-il include 12 military men, up from five in 1994. Ri Yong-mu, the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, was ranked ninth in 2006, climbing from 55th on the 1994 list. Mr. Kim’s three favorite generals, Hyon Chol-hae, Pak Jae-gyong and Ri Myong-su, were added to the new top-50 list. They have appeared frequently at Mr. Kim’s side on his inspection tours throughout the past year. In addition to the 12 flag officers, five other men in the top 50 are also involved in military matters.

In 1994, 25 Workers’ Party members were ranked among the top 50 leaders; that number increased to 27 in 2006. People in charge of party organization and propaganda were prominent on the list. North Korea appeared to have put lesser value on bureaucrats and economists as the Kim Jong-il regime has progressed. Eighteen bureaucrats and economic officials were on the 1994 roster, but the number dropped to six in the new list. In 1998, the North revised its Constitution, dropping vice presidents and the prime minister’s staff. That change could be one of the reasons for the relative scarcity of administrative officials on the new list.

Some analysts had a different interpretation: The lack of bureaucratic power officials in the list, they suggested, reflected Kim Jong-il’s priority of defending his regime rather than rebuilding the nation’s shattered economy.

North Korea watchers also said Mr. Kim runs the communist country by directly controlling the military, the party and the cabinet by stacking those institutions with people personally loyal to him. “Since 1998, Mr. Kim has issued orders under the title of the National Defense Commission, but Pyongyang-watchers were unable to confirm that he was actually presiding at the commission meetings,” said Chon Hyun-joon of the Korea Institute for National Unification. “The North’s power is concentrated in Mr. Kim alone, and there is a limit on how much authority he can exercise directly. In recent times, Mr. Kim appears to have handed over some of his powers to his closest confidants.”

The research also showed that a complex network of blood, school and career ties weaves the top 50 leaders together. Of the 50, at least 30 are members of that network; no information was available on the family, schools and careers of 11 of the other 20; at least some are probably bound up in that web.

“During the Kim Il Sung era, the official ranking showed the strength of each individual’s power,” said Hyon Song-il, a former North Korean diplomat who is now a researcher at the National Security and Unification Policy Research Institute. “In the era of Kim Jong-il, becoming his confidant means power.”

The North’s top 50 people include six of Mr. Kim’s family members. School ties among Kim Il Sung University graduates were also visible; 22 are alumni of the North’s prestigious school.

The 35 vacancies on the list between 1994 and 2006 were all filled by Kim Jong-il loyalists. Among the absentees, 16 either died of natural causes or were executed. Oh Jin-wu, known as Kim Il Sung’s right arm, and Ri Jong-ok, the North’s vice president, died naturally; So Kwan-hi, the party’s agriculture secretary, was reportedly executed in 1997, along with other officials, to appease anger over the famine of the late 1990s.

Hwang Jang-yop, who was ranked 26th on the 1994 list, defected to South Korea. Kim Chol-su, the 22nd most influential person in the North in 1994, was later identified as Song Du-yul, a scholar who is now a German citizen, by intelligence authorities and prosecutors in Seoul.

There is little room for women in the North’s elite, both in 1994 and 2006. In 1994, two women were among the top 50 officials, but the number fell to one in 2006. Kim Kyong-hee, the light industry department head of the Workers’ Party, is Mr. Kim’s younger sister.

Christian Science Monitor
Robert Marquand
1/3/2007

North Koreans are taught to worship Kim Jong Il as a god. In a manner unique among nations, the North exerts extraordinary control through deification – a cult ideology of complete subservience – that goes beyond the “Stalinist” label often used to describe the newly nuclear North.

While outsiders can see film clips of huge festivals honoring Mr. Kim, the extraordinary degree of cult worship is not well known, nor that programs promoting the ideology of Kim are growing, according to refugees, diplomats, and others who have visited the Hermit Kingdom.

In fact, in a time of famine and poverty, government spending on Kim-family deification – now nearly 40 percent of the visible budget – is the only category in the North’s budget to increase, according to a new white paper by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy in Seoul. It is rising even as defense, welfare, and bureaucracy spending have decreased. The increase pays for ideology schools, some 30,000 Kim monuments, gymnastic festivals, films and books, billboards and murals, 40,000 “research institutes,” historical sites, rock carvings, circus theaters, training programs, and other worship events.

In 1990, ideology was 19 percent of North Korea’s budget; by 2004 it doubled to at least 38.5 percent of state spending, according to the white paper. This extra financing may come from recent budget offsets caused by the shutting down of older state funding categories, says Alexander Mansourov of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu.

It has long been axiomatic that the main danger to the Kim regime is internal unrest. That is, Koreans will discover the freedoms, glitter, and diversity of the modern outside world, and stop believing the story of idolatry they are awash in. “It isn’t quite realized [in the West] how much a threat the penetration of ideas means. They [Kim’s regime] see it as a social problem that could bring down the state,” says Brian Myers, a North Korean expert at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea.

Since the poverty and famine of the late 1990s, everything from CDs and videos, South Korean radio, and cellphone signals from China, new styles and products, and new commercial habits have seeped in, mostly across the Chinese border, in a way that might be called “soft globalization.” Such flows feed a new underground system of private business, information, bribery, and trade that exists outside the strict party-state discipline and rules.

Yet rather than accept such penetration as an inexorable threat, Kim is putting up a serious fight to slow and counter it – by increasing his program of cult-worship.

Kim Worship 2.0

Like a computer software firm updating program versions, the North is steadily updating its ideology to make it relevant. This practice of mass control by in-your-face ideology has been laughed off in much of the world, including China. But North Korea is increasing its ideological cult worship. The scope of the current project outdoes even the cult of personality during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, according to a 2005 doctoral dissertation by Lee Jong Heon at Chung-Ang University in Seoul. Mr. Lee visited North Korea several times for his research.

After the Oct. 9 nuclear test, for example, banners sprang up over North Korea stating “We are a country with a nuclear deterrent.” Kim’s test feeds a national pride that is part of the propaganda drilled into Koreans from birth: that Kim alone can fend off the US and Japanese enemies. A US diplomat in Asia says such pride may prohibit Kim from giving up his nuclear program in the current “six party talks” – and those talks stalled again in late December in Beijing.

“The cult of personality campaign is more extensive today than in 1985,” says former South Korean foreign minister Han Sung Joo, who visited Pyongyang this past October, and in 1985. “Unlike the Stalin and Mao personality cults, there is a deification and a religious emotional element in the North. The twinned photos of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are everywhere. Every speech says Kim Il Sung is still alive. I think if I stayed another two weeks, I might even see Kim Il Sung. The country worships someone who is deceased, as if he is alive.”

Kim Jong Il has upgraded his deification strategies to strengthen the family cult system. Western reports often detail Korea’s unique “juche ideology” – a theology of Kim worship, repeated hourly and daily, reminding Koreans they are insolubly bound to the Kim family and must erase foreign influence from their minds.

Yet juche is a subcategory of a far more encompassing umbrella of deification known as woo sang hwa, or idol worship. In North Korea, woo sang hwa contains all the aspects of cult worship. Kim broke away from orthodox communism, for example, in a program called “our style socialism.” While Marxism-Leninism demands fealty to “nation,” “party,” and “serving the people” – Kim’s “our style [Korean] socialism” does no such thing. It makes “family loyalty,” with Kim at the head, the supreme good – a major deflection from communism.

During the late 1990s famine, a “Red Banner” campaign for unconditional loyalty and harder toil began. Then came “Kangsong Taeguk” in the late 1990s – a project to push economic and military ideology. This project culminated in the 1998 Taepodong-1 rocket launches, which thrilled North Koreans, frightened Japan, and started a whole new military mindset in Tokyo.

The North uses “ideology rather than physical control,” Lee says, whenever possible. The current variation of the program is called “military first.” It is intended to bolster North Korea’s nuclear efforts. Military First started as a campaign to support juche, and as a slogan designed to remind Koreans that the nation is at war. It came packaged with a rallying cry called “dare to die,” say refugees and Kim experts. (There’s a dare-to-die pop song, and a dare-to-die movie. Recent internal memos brought by defectors indicate “dare to die” is urged on local officials due to a feeling in Pyongyang that young people aren’t showing enough zeal to make such a dare.)

A new military focus

Yet Military First may now be a tool for evolving a significant structural change – a new ruling elite in day-to-day affairs. For years, the North Korean state was ruled by the workers’ party. Under Kim Il Sung the party was the driving force in Korea – the main route to achievement and pay. Everyone wanted to join. (Party members in China and Vietnam are 5 percent of the population; a 1998 Korean Central report put Korea’s membership at 5 million, or 22 percent, though it may be lower.)

“The outcome of the Military First policy replaces the workers as a main force,” says Haiksoon Paik, a North Korean specialist at the Sejong Institute outside Seoul. “North Korea’s party has not been functioning as well as it is supposed to … several positions in the Politburo have not been reappointed. Kim is not depending on the party, but a smaller more streamlined military apparatus. This is due to his politics as a result of the nuclear crisis brought by the Americans.”

“Military First is not aimed at building up the military, which is already quite built up and strong,” says Lee, whose dissertation is titled, “A Political Economic Analysis of the North Korean Regime.” “It is about replacing the old party – First Rice – structure of senior Kim. If the party is unwieldy, the military will control the people on behalf of the leader.”

Tellingly, on New Year’s Day, Kim Jong Il visited the shrine where his father was interred. He has gone there only four times since he came to power in 1995. Each visit has taken place in a year following major accomplishments. According to South Korean media, for the first time, Kim visited the shrine without party or government officials. This time, only key military officials were in attendance. On Tuesday, North Korean papers heralded the visit, and the Oct. 9 nuclear tests as “an auspicious event in the national history.”

Kim-worship in the North is a vivid – and inescapable – spectacle to behold, say visitors. Thousands of giant “towers of eternality” to Kim scatter the landscape. Special “Kimjongilia” crimson begonias are tended in family gardens. Kim’s media calls him variously the “Guardian Deity of the Planet,” and “Lodestar of the 21st Century.” In 2002, Korean mass dances known as Arirang, featured 100,000 flag wavers (and was described in state media as the “greatest event of humankind.”) Many loyal Koreans bow twice daily to Kim pictures that sit alone on the most prominent wall of their homes.

Perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of the Korean cult project is its recent veering toward race and ethnic solidarity, say Kim watchers. His main appeal to his people today, a push that rarely gets attention outside the North, is to the racial superiority of a people whose isolation and stubborn xenophobia supposedly makes their bloodlines purer. Mr. Myers notes that festivals of 100,000 flag wavers is not a Stalinist exercise, but a celebration of “ethnic homogeneity.” Since the 1990s Kim has more fervently claimed lineage to the first ancient rulers of Korea, a move intended to place him in a position of historical, if not divine, destiny as leader of the peninsula.

Joong Ang Ilbo
1/8/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has maintained his power since the death in 1994 of his father, Kim Il Sung, the communist country’s founder. A recent study showed that following in the footsteps and shadow of Kim Jong-il is the key to becoming a member of the reclusive regime’s elite. It pays to be a general as well, and being a member of Mr. Kim’s family by birth or marriage doesn’t hurt either.

The JoongAng Ilbo and Cyram, a specialist institute in social network analysis, studied the career backgrounds of the North’s 50 most influential figures after Mr. Kim and compared what took to become a member of that elite in 1994 and in 2006. The earlier ranking of the elite was based on the seating chart for Kim Il Sung’s funeral in 1994, a de facto ranking of its official hierarchy. That list was compared to a new 2006 list created as a result of the study.

For the new list, profiles of North Korean officials from the National Intelligence Service and the Unification Ministry were analyzed. The study also took account of seating charts and other rankings announced by Pyongyang last year to compile a list of the top 50 officials after Mr. Kim.

The study showed that in 1994, 29 of the 51 top leaders were members of the politburo, or executive organization, of the Workers’ Party. By last year, however, only eight of the 50 top officials were members.

“Since 1993, vacancies in the politburo after officials there died, were executed or defected have not been filled,” a South Korean intelligence official said. “Since then, the politburo has lost some of its power and the secretariat of the party has gained in influence.”

If a career with the party’s politburo no longer is a fast track to the elite group, it has been replaced by a military background as a way to the top. Among the top 50 figures on the 2006 list, 33 had career military experience, up from 21 in 1994. Of the 33 people, 14 worked with the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces and 10 were from the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A clear reflection of Mr. Kim’s “military first” policy, that favoritism toward the generals was also reflected in the number of visits he made to military units to boost their morale. Of the 192 site inspections by Mr. Kim in 2002, 34 were visits to military units. Last year, he conducted 104 inspections, and 65 were to meet with soldiers.

“Mr. Kim has emphasized a military-style governance in which the chain of command is clear, and military figures have been favored in his regime,” said Chon Hyun-joon, a senior researcher with the Korea Institute for National Unification.

Working on the National Defense Commission, headed by Mr. Kim, is probably the fastest way to join the power circle in the North these days, because it has taken over a lot of the influence that shifted first from the party politburo to the secretariat. The commission was established in 1972, and currently has seven members, including Mr. Kim, whose title is chairman of the group. After the North’s Constitution was revised in 1998, the commission became the nation’s highest governing body and the office of president, from whence Kim Il Sung governed, was retired.

Jon Byong-ho, for example, is ranked No. 5 on the new elite list (the ranking begins with Kim Jong-il in position No. 1. He is a member of the commission and the party’s military industry department director. He has worked there since 1990, when Kim Jong-il became the commission’s first vice chairman. “The core of the power clearly moved from the Workers Party’s politburo to the National Defense Commission, and the commission is a “must” ticket to punch for success,” said Kim Geun-sik, a North Korea-watcher at Kyungnam University.

Following the footsteps of Kim Jong-il can certainly help an ambitious North Korean’s career. Mr. Kim joined the organization and guidance department of the Workers’ Party in 1964, and worked in the propaganda and agitation bureau, the secretariat and the politburo on his way to the top. In the 1990s, he became the commander-in-chief of the North’s military and the chairman of the National Defense Commission, cementing his control over the military and the party.

According to the study, many people who have followed Mr. Kim’s career path have joined the North’s power elite. Those who served in the party’s organization and guidance department and the propaganda and agitation department are especially prominent.

Ri Je-gang, for example, followed a career path similar to Mr. Kim’s, and ranks 35th on the list. Mr. Ri participated in a Pyongyang city redevelopment project in the 1980s led by Mr. Kim, and earned the future North Korean leader’s trust. Jang Song-thaek, Mr. Kim’s brother-in-law, worked in the party’s organization and guidance department for 13 years. Kim Kuk-tae, the Workers’ Party secretary, is Mr. Kim’s Kim Il Sung university fellow alumnus, and he also served in the propaganda bureau with Mr. Kim.

The study also showed that there was a clear generational shift in the North’s power circle. During the Kim Il Sung era, an anti-Japanese guerrilla background was a prime resume-polisher for people who wanted to join the elite group. On the 1994 list, for example, seven were partisan fighters, but time has taken its toll. The 2006 list had only one such figure, Jo Myong-rok.

But links to that revolutionary glory are still present. “The children of the partisan fighters are enjoying the status of power elites in the North in their generation,” said Kim Yong-hyun, professor of North Korea studies at Dongguk University. Part of the reason is the educational privileges they were given. Only children of “fighters for the revolution,” a title bestowed on former partisans, are allowed to study at the prestigious Mangyongdae Revolutionary School.

The number of that school’s alumni on the list of the North’s highest-ranking officials grew from 10 in 1994 to 14 last year.

Although not related directly to North Korea, The Economist has published a great article on the etiquette of bribery, which ties together low-level “rent-seeking” with big-dollar Washington lobbying.  Although the entire article is well worth reading, the excert below is the one I wanted to post for readers of NKeconWatch:

Jakob Svensson, an economist at Stockholm University, has cut through cultural stereotypes to search for hard data on corrupt economies. He has found that socialist and recently socialist economies show higher levels of corruption than others. Among the factors he has tested for correlation with corruption is the overall education level of the adult population. A second is openness to imports (measured by imports as a proportion of GDP), which is linked with opportunities for smuggling. A third is freedom of the press (as ranked by Freedom House, a civil-liberties watchdog), on the hypothesis that independent journalists will expose, and thereby curtail, corruption. The fourth is the number of days needed to start a business, a proxy for the number of permits required, and therefore red tape. Mr Svensson found clear correlations between all these variables and the overall level of corruption.

Read the entire article below:

(more…)

Donga
12/28/2006

The North Korean Regime Stability Assessment by the government-run Korea Institute for National Unification has revealed many unknown parts about North Korean society. In particular, the details of in-depth interviews of 12 North Korean defectors who held a high-ranking position in the North help us understand why the North Korean society is fundamentally shaken.

All the former top North Korean officials unanimously say that nothing is possible without paying kickbacks in the bureaucratic regime of the Stalinist country.

“It is linked like a chain because lower ranking officials give bribes to their immediate superiors and the superiors give bribes to their immediate senior officers and so on,” said a North Korean defector who asked to be identified only as K.

Bribing has become such a prevalent practice in the North that sometimes there are official price tags for some bribes. “People give about $ 10,000 of congratulatory money when they come to a wedding of a high ranking official’s child. But it could be $5,000 or $ 3,000 in some cases,” a North Korean defector who asked to be identified only as J said. “ In North Korea, prices are set on certain types of bribes as bribing has become established as part of its market. For instance, there is a certain amount required either to send their children overseas or to become a college professor,” said another North Korean defector who asked to be identified only as L.

The National Security Agency (NSA) and the People`s Safety Agency (PSA), the two major national security bodies of North Korea whose role is controlling the people, reportedly have serious conflicts with each other. “The officials of the two institutions are treated differently. As the staff of the NSA has stronger influence and earns more than the staff of the PSA, the officials of the PSA are not content,”

Although people may think that military officials enjoy the greatest power under North Korea’s military first politics, in reality, party officials have a stronger power than military officials, according to former North Korean high-ranking officials. “The party has a complete control over the personnel management of the military. Even North Korean leader Kim Jong Il said that the military is supervised by the party,” North Korean defectors K an L said.

Some of the defectors said that Kim Jung Il is less popular among women compared to his late father Kim Il Sung because he is short, ugly and has a big belly.

Some also said the Korean Wave is sweeping across North Korea as well. “Those who secretly watch South Korean videos used to be punished. But it is not the case any more. Only those who distribute them are punished and even security agents secretly watch those videos they confiscate,” said a North Korean defector who asked to be identified only as C.

A North Korean defector also said that women in their 20s and 30s earn about five dollars by prostituting. “Life in North Korea is less stressful as everyone is poor. So there are less bald people,” the defector said.