North Korean Economy Watch

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
6/5/2007

It is clear that the current Western approach to dealing with North Korea is not working. Some people in Washington obviously still believe that financial or other sanctions will push the North Korean regime to the corner and press Pyongyang into relinquishing its nuclear program. But this is very unlikely.

First, neither China nor Russia is willing to participate in the sanctions regime wholeheartedly. Neither country is happy about a nuclear North Korea, but they see its collapse as an even greater evil. However, without their participation, no sanctions regime can succeed. More important, South Korea, still technically an ally of the United States, is even less willing to drive Pyongyang to the corner. And finally, even if sanctions have some effect, the only palpable results will be more dead farmers. The regime survived far greater challenges a decade ago when it had no backers whatsoever.

So what can be done? In the short run, not much. Like it or not, Pyongyang will remain nuclear. There might be some compromises, such as freezing existing nuclear facilities, but in general there is no way to press North Korean leaders into abandoning their nuclear weapons.

This is not good news, since it means that the threat will remain. Earlier experience has clearly demonstrated that every time North Korean leaders run into trouble, they use blackmail tactics, and they usually work. In all probability, there will be more provocations in the future. Since Pyongyang’s leaders believe (perhaps with good reason) that Chinese-style economic reforms might bring about the collapse of their regime, they have not the slightest inclination to start reforming themselves.

This leaves them with few options other a policy aimed at extracting aid from the outside world, and regular blackmail is one of the usual tools of this approach. Thus the threat persists unless the regime or, at least, its nature is changed, but how can this goal be achieved if pressure from outside is so patently inefficient? The answer is pressure from within, by nurturing pro-democracy and pro-reform forces within North Korean society (and also pro-reform thoughts within the brains of individuals).

Of all assorted “rogue regimes”, North Korea is probably most vulnerable to this soft approach. On one hand, unlike the bosses of the assorted fundamentalist regimes, North Korea’s leaders have never claimed that their followers will be rewarded in the afterlife; they do not talk, for example, about the pleasures of otherworldly sex with 72 virgins.

Their claim to legitimacy is based on their alleged ability to deliver better lives to Koreans here and now, and Pyongyang’s rulers have failed in this regard in the most spectacular way. The existence of another Korea makes the use of nationalistic slogans somewhat problematic as well.

North Korea’s leaders cannot really say, “We have to be poor to protect our independence from those encroaching foreigners,” since the existence of the dirty-rich South vividly demonstrates that under a reasonably rational government, Koreans can be both rich and independent (and also free).

This leaves Pyongyang with no choice but to seal the borders as tight as no other communist regime has ever done before, on assumption that the common folk should not know that they live a complete lie. This self-imposed information isolation is the major condition for the regime’s survival, and breaking such a wall of ignorance should be seen as the major target for any long-term efforts directed at bringing change to North Korea.

The power of soft measures is often underestimated, not least because such policies are cheap, slow and not as spectacular as commando raids or even economic embargoes. However, their efficiency is remarkable.

In this regard, it makes sense to remember a story from the relatively recent past. In 1958, an academic-exchange agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Back then the diehard enemies of the Soviet system were not exactly happy about this step, which, they insisted, was yet another sign of shameful appeasement.

They said this agreement would merely provide the Soviets with another opportunity to send spies to steal US secrets. Alternatively, the skeptics insisted, the Soviets would send diehard ideologues who would use their US experience as a tool in the propaganda war. And, the critics continued, this would be done on American taxpayers’ money.

The first group of exchange students was small and included, as skeptics feared, exactly the people they did not want to welcome on to US soil. There were merely four Soviet students who were selected by Moscow to enter Columbia University for one year of studies in 1958. One of them, as we know now, was a promising KGB operative whose job was indeed to spy on the Americans. He was good at his job and later made a brilliant career in Soviet foreign intelligence.

His fellow student was a young but promising veteran of the then-still-recent World War II. After studies in the US, he moved to the Communist Party central bureaucracy, where in a decade he became the first deputy head of the propaganda department – in essence, a second in command among Soviet professional ideologues.

Well, skeptics seemed to have been proved right – until the 1980s, that is. The KGB operative’s name was Oleg Kalugin, and he was to become the first KGB officer openly to challenge the organization from within. His fellow student, Alexandr Yakovlev, a Communist Party Central Committee secretary, became the closest associate of Mikhail Gorbachev and made a remarkable contribution to the collapse of the communist regime in Moscow (some people even insist that it was Yakovlev rather than Gorbachev himself who could be described as the real architect of perestroika.)

Eventually, both men said it was their experiences in the United States that changed the way they saw the world, even if they were prudent enough to keep their mouths shut and say what they were expected to say. So two of the four carefully selected Soviet students of 1958 eventually became the top leaders of perestroika.

There is no reason to believe that measures that worked in the Soviet case would be less effective in North Korea. Academic exchanges are especially important, since the policy toward North Korea should pursue two different but interconnected purposes. The first is to promote transformation of the regime or perhaps even to bring down one of the world’s most murderous dictatorships. However, it is also time to start thinking about what will happen next, after Kim Jong-il and his cohorts vanish from the scene.

The post-Kim reconstruction of North Korean will be painful, expensive and probably lengthy. Right now North Korea is some 20 times a poor as the South, and the gap in education between two countries is yawning. With the exception of a handful of military engineers, a typical North Korean technician has never used a computer.

North Korean economists learn a grossly simplified version of 1950s Soviet official economics, and North Korean doctors have never heard about even the most common drugs used elsewhere. This means that in the case of a regime collapse, the North Koreans would be merely cheap labor for the South Korean conglomerates – a situation bound to produce tensions and hostility between the two societies. A North Korean who in 20 years’ time will look for a decent job should be made employable, and the best way to ensure this is to start thinking about his or her education right now.

Academic exchanges with North Korea would have dual or even triple purposes. First, they would bring explosive information into the country, hastening domestic changes (probably, but not necessary, changes of a revolutionary nature). Second, they would assist North Korean economic development, thus beginning to bridge the gap between the two Koreas even while the North was still under Kim Jong-il’s regime. Third, they would contribute to more efficient and less painful reconstruction of post-Kim North Korea.

Of course, all these scholarship programs should be paid for by the recipient countries. North Koreans have no money for such exchanges (and to paraphrase a remark by North Korea expert Aidan Foster-Carter, North Korean leaders are people who never do anything as vulgar as paying). But all three targets are clearly in the interest of the world community, and anyway the monies involved would be quite small.

North Korea’s leaders are no fools. They understand that such exchanges are dangerous, and they do not want future Korean Yakovlevs and Kalugins to emerge. Back in 1959-60 they even decided to recall their students from the Soviet Union and other countries of the Communist Bloc and did not send their young people to study anywhere but in Mao Zedong’s China until the late 1970s. In other words, for two decades Pyongyang’s leaders believed that those countries were way too liberal as an environment for their students.

However, they also understand that without exchanges they cannot survive in the longer run. Even now, Pyongyang is doing its best to increase exchanges with China, sending numerous students there.

Another important factor is endemic corruption. There is no doubt that nearly all students who will go overseas will be scions of the Pyongyang aristocrats, the hereditary elite that has been ruling the country for decades. A high-level official might understand that sending a young North Korean overseas is potentially dangerous. But if the person in question is likely to be his nephew, he will probably choose to forget about the ideological threats.

Of course, no sane North Korean leader would ever agree to send students to the US or to South Korea. However, there are many countries that are far more acceptable for them. The Australian National University a few years ago had a course for North Korean postgraduate students who studied modern economics and financial management. Australia or Canada or New Zealand might be good places for such programs.

While English-language education is preferable, since English is the language of international communication in East Asia, there is a place for European countries as well, especially smaller ones, whose names do not sound too offensive to the Pyongyang bureaucrats – such as Switzerland or Hungary or Austria.

Such programs should be sponsored by those countries whose stakes are the highest, such as the US, Japan and South Korea, but smaller and more distant countries also should consider sponsoring such an undertaking. This is not a waste of money, nor even a good-looking humanitarian gesture for its own sake. As history has shown many times, former students tend to be sympathetic to the country where they once studied, and they normally keep some connections there.

North Korea has great potential, and when things start moving, those graduates are likely to be catapulted to high places, since people with modern education are so few in North Korea. This means countries that consider small investments in scholarships for North Koreans will eventually get large benefits through important connections and sympathies that their business people, engineers and scholars will find in some important offices of post-Kim North Korea.

Scholarships for North Korean students are not the only form of academic exchanges. North Korean scientists and scholars should be invited to Western universities, and books and digital materials should be donated to major North Korean libraries in large numbers. Of course, only selected people with special clearances are allowed to read non-technical Western publications in North Korea, but they are exactly the people who will matter when things start moving.

It is well known that students and academics who come back from longtime overseas trips are routinely submitted to rigorous ideological retraining upon their return to North Korea. But does it help? Unlikely. If anything, heavy doses of obviously nonsensical propaganda make a great contrast with what they have learned and seen, thus putting North Korean society in an even less favorable light.

Of course, they will not say anything improper when they come back home, but they will see that there are other ways of life, they will see how impoverished, bleak and hyper-controlled their lives are, and they will think how to change this. Sooner or later, these people will become a catalyst for transformation – and their skills will help to ease the pains of the post-Kim revival of North Korea.

Secretive Kingdom
MSNBC
Christian Caryl
6/4/2007

If you’re confused by the reports coming out of North Korea, you’re probably not alone. Take the recent slew of conflicting reports about the health of the nation’s Dear Leader. U.S. Calls Kim Jong Il’s Health a ‘Concern,’ ran one headline. The body of the story, quoting a senior U.S. official who was himself referring to reports from other unnamed officials in Seoul, alluded to a “monthlong disappearance” by Kim and noted that the North Korean dictator suffers “from advanced diabetes and heart disease as well as high blood pressure.” Around the same time, another analysis claimed that Kim had recovered from these “chronic diseases.” The report, which based its account on the usual anonymous senior officials in Seoul and obscure North Korea wonks, also asserted confidently, that “intelligence” in the hands of the South Korean government indicates that Kim will choose his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor.

So what are we to think? Does that mean that everything we read about North Korea is garbage pretending to be authoritative truth? This sort of conundrum is par for the course for anyone who has spent time studying the goings-on at the top of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the North prefers to call itself. The ironic fact of the matter is that we know far more about North Korea than ever before. China and South Korea have both deepened their ties with the Hermit Kingdom in recent years, and that means that much more information is flowing out as well as in. A steady stream of defectors has provided us with often-elaborate detail about the country in general. And there’s even a small—exceedingly small—population of foreigners who deal with the North on a regular basis. All of this helps us to build up our picture of what’s going on in the country.

Yet when it comes to the most important part of the story—the motives and intentions of North Korea’s government—it’s always best to be skeptical. Andrei Lankov, a Seoul-based Russian academic who has studied the North for decades, says that he refuses to comment when asked by journalists about government reshuffles or coup rumors in Pyongyang. Such reports occasionally do end up getting confirmed by events, he concedes, but estimates that they are successful less than 20 percent of the time. (In other words, you’d usually be much better off judging the account’s veracity by flipping a coin.) Lankov notes that the Kim regime won’t even publish the precise number of members in the ruling communist party, much less basic stats on the economy. He describes it as by far the world’s most secretive state—far more so than even the old U.S.S.R., where it was common for intellectuals to discuss political topics when they knew they were in like-minded company. In North Korea, by contrast, “People are terrified to death to discuss anything political.” And that, he says, is because everything political ultimately comes down to the Kim family, which holds the power of instant life or death over every North Korean—and isn’t afraid to use it, as countless tales of the regime’s brutality attest. For that reason, Lankov argues, “The most explosive topic, the one that is never discussed, is the topic of succession.”

The result is a level of mystery that seems almost calculated to drive journalists into a frenzy. Confronted with such opacity, it’s hard to resist the temptation to show off even the slightest scrap of seemingly revelatory information garnered from some super-secret privileged source. In November 2004, the Russian news agency Tass reported that official portraits of Kim Jong Il were being taken down in North Korean diplomatic representations and official buildings. Could it be that Kim was on the way out? Respected news outlets jumped on the story, in some cases adding details culled from Chinese or Korean newspapers suggesting that the Dear Leader’s days were numbered. It hardly needs adding that he— and his portraits—remain firmly in place today.

Applying a bit more common sense might not be a bad thing. But the fact is that that’s far easier said than done. In April 2004, for example, a tremendous explosion took place in the train station in the North Korean city of Ryongchon, killing hundreds of people and rendering thousands more homeless. It happened just hours after Kim’s personal train had passed through the same station, spawning fervid speculation about a possible assassination attempt. According to one version the blast was triggered by a mobile phone—a detail that gained credibility a few months later, when the North Korean authorities pulled the plug on the country’s 18-month-old cell phone program. Service has never been restored.

Sounds convincing. Yet consider for a moment the important questions left unanswered by this version of events. If the explosion was being triggered remotely, why did the presumed conspirators wait for hours after Kim’s passage to send the signal? And why did they decide to kill hundreds of innocents in the process? In retrospect, virtually everything about this incident is still up for grabs. The fact that the North Korean government released casualty figures was actually hailed by some commentators as evidence of North Korea-style glasnost. Suffice it to say that we are still waiting for CNN to open its first Pyongyang bureau. (Skeptics note that the city’s proximity to the Chinese border meant that news of the explosion was bound to get out anyway.) In the wake of the disaster one British journalist confidently asserted that North Korea was becoming “more open to international help”—not that that stopped Pyongyang from announcing that it was about to start expelling international aid organizations a year later. And so it goes.

Western intelligence agencies also have a strikingly poor record when it comes to the country. No one in Washington or London predicted the North’s invasion of the South in 1950. The Clinton administration signed an agreement that would have supposedly rid the North of its plutonium-based nuclear-weapons program back in 1994—and then delayed fulfilling its own part of the deal because the CIA was assuring it of the North’s imminent collapse. (The experts are still sparring over whether the resulting failure of the Agreed Framework led inexorably to the North’s first nuclear test last autumn.) In 2002 the Bush administration announced that North Korea had suddenly admitted, in negotiations, its pursuit of a hitherto secret parallel nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium—leading Washington to break off talks in indignation. In recent months, though, administration officials—their reputation already severely tarnished by the Iraq WMD intelligence scandal—have been forced to acknowledge that they can’t tell for sure whether the North Koreans still have such a program under way.

Grounds for despair? No, just for a measure of humility. Journalists—and governments—need to do a better job of admitting to the public that any information about North Korea’s leadership is to be regarded with profound skepticism. To be sure, a few privileged insiders—former Kim employees, a kidnapped film director—have come forth to tell their stories. That’s how we know, for example, details of the Dear Leader’s luxury-loving ways. Yet there have been almost no defectors from the upper ranks of the leadership who have been willing to reveal significant details about what makes the regime tick—presumably for fear of retribution against them or their families. Perhaps it’s just hard for many of us, wallowing in an age of instant messaging and tell-all blogs, to believe that there are limits to what we can know about other human beings. Consider, for example, this revealing incident involving a North Korean worker (who thus almost certainly doubles as an employee of the North Korean security service) at a European embassy in Pyongyang. The worker was shocked when her brother showed up one day to apply for a visa, because she had no idea that her brother had the right to travel abroad. He, by contrast, had no idea that his sister worked in a foreign embassy. In that respect, perhaps, North  Korea can serve as a useful cautionary tale. Is it hard to know what’s going on at the top? “It’s not just hard,” says Andrei Lankov. “It’s impossible.”

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/3/2007

Kim Il Sung’s North Korea has always been a tough customer, and nobody knows who was more irritated by its constant antics: its foes or its friends. It has been a tough ally, ready to cheat and manipulate its sponsors. Since the 1950s most of its patrons have had to put up with its style _ largely because of their grand strategy, of course.

In the long run, it was probably the Soviets who were subject to Pyongyang’s diplomatic frolics most frequently, but China has the dubious honor of being the first country to enjoy such an experience in the early 1950s. Somewhat surprisingly, this happened during the Korean War when only a massive Chinese intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s regime from a sorry end.

Recent document-based research by Chinese scholars, especially by the formidable Shen Zhihua, has provided us with new insights into the early history of relations between the two supposedly “fraternal” countries. Now it is clear that the picture was anything but rosy.

When the North Korean troops invaded the South, it was implied that the Chinese forces would step in if the situation took a dangerous turn. Nonetheless, until late September, Pyongyang ignored Chinese advice and kept Beijing in the dark about the frontline situation. This drove the Chinese military attache and ambassador mad, but they could not do much about it.

The situation changed in October when Kim Il Sung had lost the war: by late October 1950, there was hardly one battle-ready battalion in the North Korean armed forces. The Chinese rushed in a large expeditionary force, but soon a question arose: who was to be in charge of the united armed forces?

Kim Il Sung clearly assumed that he would stay in command, and would have operational control over the Chinese units. This was unacceptable to the Chinese. To an extent, this was a clash of two nationalisms (and nationalisms of East Asia are notorious for being particularly virulent). However, there were real considerations involved as well.

First of all, the Chinese force far outnumbered the North Korean army. Second, the Chinese generals did not have much trust in the military competence of their North Korean colleagues. Peng Dehuai, whose task was to save the North, did not hide his outrage about Pyongyang’s style of operations. He was especially angry about the meaningless defense of a doomed Seoul, where about 30,000 North Korean soldiers were killed in late September. In late 1950, he sent a telegram to Beijing in which he labeled the North Korean style “childish”.

However, Kim Il Sung and other North Korean leaders avoided the issue, so the two armies (or, to be more precise, the Chinese army and the remains of the North Korean army) for a while acted independently–often, with sorry results. On November 4, for instance, the lack of coordination even led to a battle in which the North Korean tanks mistakenly attacked Chinese infantry, and thus unwittingly helped a semi-circled American unit escape.

At the same time, the Chinese attempts to incorporate the North Korean units into their own forces were met with resistance on the part of Kim Il Sung. He needed an army of his own, and was not ready for concessions.

It took more than a month to solve the question of joint command. Perhaps, the problems would have last longer, had Stalin not sent a cable demanding an immediate rectification of the situation. Stalin’s advice had to be taken seriously, and his intervention put an end to delays. The Joint Command was headed by Peng Dehuai, with two Chinese-speaking Korean generals acting as his deputies (incidentally, both generals were purged by Kim Il Sung a few years after the war).

However, new tensions arose in December 1950 when the railways came to be discussed. The Chinese forces could be supplied only by rail, and those lines were subjected to intense bombing. The railways had to be managed carefully, but the Chinese commanders discovered that Korean administration gave preference to cargo related to the economic needs of Korean reconstruction, rather than to military supplies. As a result, the Chinese and Koreans ran two different railway administrations, operating on the same railway network. It’s easy to imagine how this influenced the efficiency of the transportation system.

After a few months of discussion the North Koreans agreed to have a joint railroad command, but on the conditions that they would exercise overall control. By that time, most of the rolling stock had been provided by China, and the Chinese soldiers were also doing most of the maintenance work, hence the Chinese generals assumed that they should have the upper hand. But the Koreans did not agree. For them, this was an issue of their territorial rights, sovereignty, and other important symbols. For the Chinese, this was a question of their soldiers’ lives.

Once again, direct Soviet involvement was necessary to put an end to the squabbling. Stalin had no patience for the petty ambitions of his not very efficient satellite, and he was still in position to control the North. Hence, Stalin himself cabled Pyongyang demanding they agree to the Chinese conditions. In May 1951, after his august intervention, Pyongyang gave in.

These early squabbles were a sign of things to come. Over the years, North Korea has developed a peculiar diplomatic style, harsh and unbending but remarkably successful. It used to be applied to Moscow and Beijing. Nowadays the same tricks work wonders in dealing with the current sponsors of the regime, Beijing and Seoul as well as with Washington. But that is another story…

Korea Times
Lee Jin-Woo
5/30/2007

U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Alexander Vershbow said on Wednesday Washington is prepared to move forward toward the establishment of normal relations with North Korea.

“We are ready to begin the process of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and from the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act,” Vershbow said at a symposium in Seoul.

But progress on all these tracks depends on achieving the complete elimination of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs, he said.

“We’re not ready to settle for a partial solution. It is only with complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization that we can contemplate the full normalization of relations,’’ he said.

Under the Feb. 13 accord in the six-party talks, the United States agreed to begin talks with the communist North over normalizing diplomatic relations. The two countries have had no diplomatic relations since the 1950-53 Korean War, which divided the Korean Peninsula into the two Koreas. The conflict ended in a cease-fire, but no peace treaty was signed.

The ambassador also hinted that the United States might urge the Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau where the North funds have been frozen, to replace its management, who they hold responsible for helping the North with counterfeiting and money laundering.

Meanwhile, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said in Beijing North Korea is appeared ready to follow through on the February agreement.

“Once they have their funds from the bank, they are prepared to do their part of the bargain, which is to shut down the Yongbyon plant,’’ Hill was quoted as saying by the Associated Press. The U.S. envoy was referring to the BDA issue.

Hill rejected suggestions that the six-party disarmament negotiations, which have been stalled since February, were dead.

Hill exchanged ideas with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei on ways to resolve the stalled nuclear issue but did not give specific details, the AP reported.

Korea Herald
Jin Dae-woong
5/28/2007

North Korea appears to have embarked on preparations to pick a successor to leader Kim Jong-il from among his sons, as the communist leader’s health has declined recently, South Korean intelligence sources said yesterday.

According to the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, Kim Jong-il has been frequently accompanied by his two sons, Kim Jong-chul (26) and Kim Jong-woon (23) in his recent official activities, such as inspections of military bases and the so-called “on-site guidance” tours.

“Kim has yet to decide whom will be his successor, but he appears to have it in mind to select one of his two sons,” one source said. “He is now looking at who would be better for the position while they accompany him on military inspections.”

The open appearance of Kim’s second and third sons at the official events resumed with Kim’s worsening health, stemming from chronic diabetes and heart disease, the sources said. Due to health concerns, Kim, 65, halved official public activities between January and May this year, compared to the activities made in the same period last year, they said.

Jong-chul and Jong-woon, both born to deceased Ko Young-hee, the reclusive leader’s purported third wife, had frequently accompanied Kim on such activities, but halted their attendance after the death of Ko in 2004, they added.

The reemergence of Kim’s two sons indicates that North Korea is gearing up for a third generation of hereditary power succession, another source said.

In late 2005, Kim Jong-il banned any debate on a succession nomination in fear of a rapid erosion of his power in the Stalinist country.

Kim Jong-il took over from his father, Kim Il-sung in 1994. It was the North’s first hereditary power transfer.

The two “princes” have recently completed special military studies courses at Kim Il-sung Military University, one of North Korea’s top schools, named after the North Korean founder, he said. Jong-chul and Jong-woon respectively began the secret courses in 2001 and 2002, specializing in leadership and military theories based on Kim Jong-il’s military first policy, he said.

The special education was made in response to calls from Ko that the two sons should succeed the leadership of their father, he added.

Sources said that the moves are expected to reignite a fierce power struggle between Kim’s sons and their advocates over who would take over the helm of the communist country.

Before Kim issued a ban on any discussion in 2005 concerning his successor, it had been reported that Kim’s three sons, including the oldest, Kim Jong-nam, and their advocates had been engaged in a fierce power struggle in recent years.

Kim Jong-nam, 36, may stage a challenge against Jong-chul and Jong-woon in the pursuit of leadership, noting that oldest sons are generally favored in North Korea, where Confucian traditions that honor seniority are still dominant, they said.

Jong-nam is believed to have fallen out of his father’s favor when he was caught trying to enter Japan in 2001 on a forged passport. He was born to Kim’s first purported wife Sung Hae-rim, a former North Korean movie star, who died in 2002. The eldest son escaped an assassination attempt in Austria in 2004, which was suspected of being conducted by advocates of Jong-chul and Jung-woon.

Kim Jong-chol was widely favored to be first in line to succeed Kim Jong-il, but he has been said to suffer from a chronic overproduction of female hormones.

In addition, the emergence of Kim Jong-il’s purported new wife, Kim Ok, is also expected to add a new twist to the power struggle between the princes, sources said.

The 43-year-old former secretary of Kim Jong-il has frequently accompanied the reclusive leader Kim on his visits to army bases and industrial complexes, and sat with him when he met visiting foreign dignitaries.

Sources think that the young lady could be behind the leader’s ban on any succession debate because Kim’s early appointment of a successor may destabilize her status as first lady. She is building up her own political force with close affiliates in crucial posts within the regime, they said.

The Internet knows…

http://kp.embassyinformation.com/?einfo

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
5/20/2007

It’s tough to serve in a foreign mission in Pyongyang. One has to survive difficult conditions, the boredom of long official gatherings, the near absence of a social life. And police surveillance, of course!

The major assumptions on which the North Korean authorities act in their dealings with diplomats and foreign officials is simple: all diplomats are spies, sent to Pyongyang to inflict harm (to a slightly lesser extent, this is applicable to all foreigners). Thus, they should be isolated from any interaction with locals, constantly monitored and fed only with the (dis)information their hosts find suitable.

Such an approach began to develop a long time ago: as early as the mid-1950s the embassies of the supposedly friendly Communist countries complained about restrictions and harassment. Initially, the victims were the likes of Hungarians and Poles, but from the late 1950s, even the Chinese and Soviet Embassies, representatives of Pyongyang’s powerful sponsors, found themselves under constant surveillance.

Every veteran of diplomatic Pyongyang is able to produce his share of anecdotes and stories _ and I think about collecting them one day. For example, Erik Cornel, a Swedish ambassador to the North, related how some diplomats discovered that the newly built embassy buildings were equipped with a network of underground tunnels which would allow the North Korean operatives to get into any compound unnoticed and unopposed. A wife of the Indonesian ambassador noted how she discovered a face staring at her from a hatch in their residence. Obviously, somebody on a covert patrol in the tunnel network lost his way…

This is a rather typical North Korean approach: to compensate for the shortage of expensive high technology with some low-tech ingenuity and resourcefulness!

Indeed, technology is often in short supply. Another story by Erik Cornel is probably worth quoting in full: “The cleaner [of the Swedish embassy] was a youngish, reserved but agreeable lady, who was treated with great respect by others. The gardener once came with a dirty lamp globe which needed cleaning. When he realized that it was she _ and not one of the foreign women _ that he had to ask for help, he crouched down and respectfully lifted up the globe towards her. She also served tables when we gave formal dinner parties and wore the traditional, wide Korean dress of beautiful silk cloth. On one of the first occasions, as ill-luck would have it, a sudden cracking noise emanated from under her skirts as she served dinner _ it sounded like someone was trying to tune into a station on an old-fashioned radio. She abruptly stopped serving and rushed back into the kitchen _ evidently, the tape recorder was malfunctioning.’’

The diplomats had to hire all their own maids, drivers, secretaries, and other local personnel via a special government agency whose main task was to plant as many police agents as possible in these not-so-numerous nests of foreign subversion. Major embassies, like those of Russia and China, avoided the problems by avoiding the local personnel altogether: every single person in the embassy, from the gardener or janitor up, was an ex-pat. This makes sense, especially because the major embassies are probably the only ones that really have secrets to keep (it’s hard to imagine what sort of apocryphal secrets might be kept in the missions of, say, Romania or Austria).

All telephone conversations are intercepted. Pyongyang does not try to deny this _ officials sometimes cite records of intercepted phone talks while dealing with foreigners. Recently, most foreign missions have come with a separate network, which allows their staff to talk to other missions, but restricts their ability to make calls to the North Korean institutions, let alone to private citizens.

On their rare outings, diplomats are frequently followed by plain-clothes police. These guys’ job is not too difficult, since foreigners are highly visible in the Pyongyang crowd.

No diplomat has ever been allowed to meet North Koreans in private. All interactions take place at official receptions, where only a handful of trusted and screened Northerners are allowed to attend.

The attempts to get any meaningful statistics or other data are frustrated by the government, which has not published any hard statistics for four decades. One of my favourite responses explaining this phenomenon is the answer given to the wife of a Cuban ambassador. When she tried to inquire about North Korean burial customs, her counterpart answered: “You know, here, in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, people do not die that much!’’ In the late 1980s North Korean diplomats briefly acquired the habit of answering potentially troublesome questions by reading in full the relevant clippings from Nodong Sinmun. If one was unreasonable enough to ask about the expected harvest, he had to spend a long time listening to a reading of a Nodong Sinmun editorial on the flourishing of Korean agriculture under the wise leadership of the “Great Leader.’’

However, some old Pyongyang hands developed techniques which helped them make sense of very subtle hints to be found in the changes of their hosts’ behaviour, or in between the lines of the seemingly meaningless grumbling of the official press.

Yonhap
5/22/2007

A lawmaker of the pro-government Uri Party has said the North Korean economy has taken a step toward economic openness.

But North Korea watchers still remained suspicious as to whether the Pyongyang regime has the genuine determination to carry out market-oriented economic reform.

“I got the strong impression that the North is striving toward economic reform during my visit to Pyongyang,” said Rep. Choi Sung of the Uri Party in a telephone interview with The Korea Times Monday.

Choi visited the North from May 14 to 18 with 130 South Korean business leaders to participate in fairs to attract external investment.

The Stalinist country is unlikely to follow in the footsteps the former Soviet Union took in the post-Cold War era, and therefore, its growth model will take a different form, Choi said.

“The North is seeking a tailored growth model by introducing an incentive-based system while maintaining its communist regime,” said the lawmaker who has visited the North 20 times.

He said the library of one of the elite universities in the North displayed a wide array of information technology related publications, and citizens were anxious to learn English.

“Clerks working at shops selling souvenirs looked very business-oriented and tried to sell as many products as possible to their customers,” he said.

Asked if he had a chance to talk to any North Korean officials if they share his view, Rep. Choi said he had not.

He said it was very evident the North was moving toward economic openness.

His view, however, is at odds with what most North Korea watchers have expressed through media reports.

The Yonhap News Agency reported on May 18 that former North Korean Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju was removed and made manager of a chemical complex because his capitalism-oriented stance fueled objections from senior North Korea officials.

Pak was named manger of the synthetic fiber complex in South Pyongan Province, the report said.

Citing unidentified sources, the report said the former premier had called on the North to introduce an incentive-based system into its economy.

The conservative Chosun Ilbo newspaper supported the observation in an article published on May 19, saying that key officials calling for introducing an incentive-based system in the North have been demoted since the 1990s.

Yonhap
5/21/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il recently made a reshuffle of his top military officials that may solidify his already firm grip on the country’s military, intelligence officials said Monday.

Ri Myong-su, former operations director of the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA), has been named a resident member of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest decision-making body under the communist nation’s constitution that was revised in 1997 to reflect its military first, or “songun,” policy, an official said while speaking anonymously.

Ri was replaced by Kim Myong-guk, who had served in the post from 1994-1997, while Jong Thae-gun, an Army lieutenant general, has been named the propaganda director of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, according to the sources.

The reshuffle first appeared to be a routine rearrangement of personnel, but the sources said it may have been aimed at expanding the role and power of the already powerful NDC.

“The NDC seems to have become, at least externally, the North’s highest decision-making body as a number of top military officials have recently been appointed to (new) permanent posts of the defense commission,” a source said.

“We believe the NDC may become an actual organization in the near future with hundreds of resident staff like the other top decision-making bodies” such as the Workers’ Party, the official added.

Headed by the North’s reclusive leader, the defense commission has been the most powerful organization in the country where the military comes before everything.

But it has mostly been regarded as a faction of a group, namely the KPA, as most of its members concurrently served in other posts of the army, according to the sources.

Kim Yong-chun, the former Chief of General Staff of the KPA, was named the first deputy chairman of the NDC in April.

The sources said it is too early to determine why the commission’s permanent staff has been increased, but they said it may be linked to Pyongyang’s ruling system after Kim Jong-il.

The 65-year-old Kim has yet to name his successor, raising questions worldwide whether the reclusive leader is considering a collective ruling system after his death.

Kim was named as successor to his father, the founder of North Korea Kim Il-sung, at the age of 32 in 1974.

He has three sons from two marriages, but his oldest son, Jong-nam, 35, has apparently fallen out of favor following a 2001 incident in which the junior Kim was thrown out of Japan after trying to enter the country with a forged passport.

His two other sons, Jong-chul and Jong-un, both in their early 20s, have not held any official posts.

N. Korea enhances Kim’s defense commission
Korea Herald
Jin Dae-woong
5/21/2007

North Korea is beefing up the National Defense Commission, a top military decision-making body directly controlled by Kim Jong-il, Seoul intelligence sources said.

Pyongyang recently conducted a major reshuffle of its top military leadership, including the repositioning of Kim’s closest confidants to the committee, they said on condition of anonymity.

Chaired by Kim, the committee is an organization independent of the Cabinet and the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. It is next only to the communist country’s president, a post permanently held by the late founder and Kim’s father Kim Il-sung since his death in 1994.

The sources said that Gen. Ri Myong-su, former operation director of the Korean People’s Army, has been appointed as a standing member of the NDC. Gen. Kim Myong-kuk has been named to replace Ri as the top operations commander.

The reshuffle followed the appointment of Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-chun, former chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army, as vice chairman of the NDC during last month’s general session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the nation’s parliament.

The personnel reconfiguration, which also affected key posts in the North Korean armed forces, is seen as part of Pyongyang’s move to further enhance the NDC, a powerful state body, under North Korea’s military-first policy.

The generals have been regarded as the most influential figures in the military as they frequently accompany Kim during his field unit inspections.

The commission has the power to direct all activities of the armed forces and national defense projects, establish and disband central defense institutions, appoint and dismiss senior military officers, confer military titles and grant titles for top commanders. It also can declare a state of war and issue mobilization orders in an emergency.

The National Defense Commission, presently chaired by Kim Jong-il, consists of the first deputy chairman, two deputy chairmen and six commission members. All members are selected for a five-year term.

The reshuffles are the latest known change to the commission. Gen. Hyon Chol-hae, former vice director of the KPA General Political Bureau, moved to the post of NDC vice director in 2003.

Experts noted that the figures are taking full-time posts in the NDC and relinquishing their posts in the People’s Army.

Other current members concurrently hold posts at both organizations, sources said.

Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, the first vice-chairman of the NDC, also assumes the position of director of the KPA General Political Bureau. Vice Marshal Kim Il-chol concurrently serves as a member of the NDC and minister of the People’s Armed Forces.

“As high-ranking military officers have moved to the NDC as full-time members, the NDC may be preparing to take follow up measures to expand its role and function in the future,” the sources said.

The NDC has been known as a consultative body of top military leaders without extensive subordinate organizations comparable to the ruling party and the Cabinet.

The intelligence sources said the NDC may have more manpower and organization under its wing.

“The NDC began equipping itself with organizational apparatuses with the 2003 transfer of Hyon Chol-hae from the KPA position to the post of NDC,” another source said.

In addition, the NDC has continued recruiting personnel such as Kim Yang-gon, councilor of the NDC, from other government departments, to strengthen the NDC’s policy functions, sources said.

“It is in line with North Korea’s long-term move to concentrate the country’s decision-making power on Kim Jong-il and his close subordinates,” said Nam Sung-wook, North Korean studies professor at Korea University. “It is mainly aimed at preventing possible regime dissolution amid rising international pressures over its nuclear weapons program. Kim is also seen directly intervening in a resolution of the nuclear issue.”

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor at Dongguk Univsersity, also agreed that the enhancement of the NDC will lead to the centralization of power in North Korea, reducing the role of the Korea Workers’ Party.

“Through the organizational reform, the North’s regime seeks to further streamline decision-making procedures to more effectively tackle an array of issues,” Kim said.

The North Korean studies expert said it is an answer of North Korean leadership to continuing economic hardship. The leadership has given over a comparatively extensive amount of power to the Cabinet for dealing with economic stagnation.

Kim also said it could be interpreted as preparation for the post-Kim Jong-il system.

“After his death, a collective leadership led by core subordinates of Kim Jong-il is expected to emerge, so, the move could be one related to future changes,” he said.

Yonhap
5/18/2007

North Korea’s former Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju has been relegated to the chief administrative manager of the communist country’s largest chemical complex, informed sources said Friday.

In April, the North replaced Pak, who oversaw the country’s threadbare economy, with then Transport Minister Kim Yong-il. Pak is believed to have been in conflict with senior North Korean officials over the introduction of an incentive-based system.

Pak has since been working as the manager for the synthetic fiber complex in South Pyongan Province. The complex resumed operations in 2002. North Korea spent about US$10 billion to build the complex more than a decade ago, but it was hardly operated until recently.

“High-level North Korean economic officials staged a lobbying war not to be appointed prime minister as the premier has no real power and becomes the scapegoat for the North’s worsening economy,” a source said on condition of anonymity.

Saddled with a severe food shortage, North Korea said it will make all-out efforts to raise its people’s standard of living this year by concentrating on light industry and agriculture.

In a session of its parliament, North Korea said its major economic goal is “to improve the living standards of people on the basis of the existing foundations of agriculture and light industry.”

In a recent meeting with U.N. World Food Program officials, a North Korean vice agriculture minister acknowledged that the communist country has a shortfall of about 1 million tons of food and called for aid from the outside world.