North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
6/25/2007

It was known that Kim Jong Il received Percuteneous Transarterial Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA), a heart malady treatment by German doctors.

Early last May, Japanese weekly “Shukan Gendai” reported that Kim Jong Il suffered from a myocardial infraction and received a “percutaneous transluminal coronary recanalization bypass” surgery at the Kim Man Yoo Hospital in Pyongyang. “Bonghwa Treatment Center, through the Kim Jong Il family, is in charge of treating top North Korean officials and of course, the Kim Jong Il family, but due to the lack of surgical equipment in the ancient city, surgeries related to heart diseases are treated at the Kim Man Yoo Hospital, which has the top of the line materials and technology from Germany,” reported ” Shukan Gendai.”

However, upon inspecting the hospital system where the ranking system is actively used, there is possibility that he received treatment from the Bongwa Treatment Center, not at the Kim Man Yoo hospital. At the Bongwa Treatment center, “the top treatment facility,” for use by Kim Jong Il, can be found.

Lee Young Kook’s (45), a former guard of Kim Jong Il who defected to South Korea, memoir “I was Kim Jong Il’s guard” (Zeitgeist) introduces in detail North Korea’s hospital ranking system. According to the book, North Korea divides the civilians into 10 ranks by class and implements a “hospital ranking system” which treats members of each rank separately.

The place where North Korea’s top-level officials, including Kim Jong Il, receive treatment is the Bongwa Treatment Center, located in Shinwon-dong in Botong River-district. It is a hospital where heads of government (general-level) and the Party Committee chiefs’ immediate family members are treated. The Bongwa Treatment Center has a general department and a special department. The general department treats the medical needs of chief-level leaders and the special department treats Party Political National Committee Members, committee member candidates, Central Party Committee Secretary, and Vice-Premier of the Cabinet and above.

The reason for the high possibility of Kim Jong Il receiving treatment at the Bongwa Treatment Center is that this hospital has a “Number 1 treatment center,” which treats Kim Jong Il and his relatives. It is known that the treatment center is known to be overseen 24 hours by the Ministry of Security, which is in charge of Kim Jong Il’s security.

The hospital, which is ranked second, is the Namsan Treatment Center, which is adjacent to the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital in Daedong River-district, Munsu-dong in Pyongyang. It also oversees the Assistant-Chief (Vice Minister) of the Cabinet and the Central Party Committee’s Vice-Head, Lieutenants General of the People’s Army, and the immediate family of Foreign Ambassadorial Talks’ dispatched delegates. The resident diplomat in Pyongyang also receives treatment at this hospital

The third-ranked hospital is the Pyongyang Medical College Hospital and the Chosun (North Korea) Red Cross Central Hospital. The treatment departments of this hospital are in charge of Central Party Committee’s Department Head, Assistant Department Head, and the immediate family of the Cabinet’s middle management.

Hospitals ranked immediately below are the Kim Man Yoo Hospital and Pyongyang’s No. 1 Hospital. The members of the Central Party Committee and superintendents, the department chiefs, and their families can be seen at this hospital. If the rank of Kim Man Yoo Hospital, which “Shukan Gendai” reported as the place where Kim Jong Il received his surgery, is to be classified, then it would fall into the 4th rank.

Besides this, there is the No. 2 Treatment Center and the Staff Treatment Center, which treats the members of the People’s Army and their families. Average laborers and farmers receive treatment at the factory treatment centers or at the dong (neighborhood) or li (village) treatment centers.

North Korea is a society, which absolutely protects the safety of Kim Jong Il. It has not clearly revealed whether or not Kim Jong Il received surgery, what kind of a surgery he had, and where he received it. Subsequently, one cannot exclude the possibility of him having received surgery, not at a hospital, but at the Workers’ Party’s office building, which is located at Kim Jong Il’s oval office, at a mansion located in Pyongyang City, or at a third location.

Washington Post, Page A18
Colum Lynch
6/24/2007

Over the past six months, the Bush administration has repeatedly criticized the U.N. Development Program for channeling millions of dollars in hard currency into North Korea to finance the agency’s programs, warning that the money might be diverted to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

But the United States also has funneled dollars to Kim Jong Il’s regime over the past decade, financing travel for North Korean diplomats and paying more than $20 million in cash for the remains of 229 U.S. soldiers from the Korean War. And in a bid to advance nuclear talks, the Bush administration recently transferred back to North Korea about $25 million in cash that the Treasury Department had frozen at Banco Delta Asia, a Macao-based bank that the United States had accused of laundering counterfeit U.S. currency on behalf of North Korea.

Such transactions emphasize philosophical differences in the administration over the wisdom of engaging with North Korea and highlight the compromises that the United States, the United Nations and others face in dealing with Pyongyang.

“The U.S. has no moral high ground,” said Michael Green, a former special assistant to President Bush who served as senior director for Asian affairs in the National Security Council. “In terms of bribing Kim Jong Il, UNDP is a minor offender.”

North Korea’s regime has skillfully extracted hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes from foreign companies and governments, and has persuaded South Korea and China to supply billions of dollars’ worth of food and fuel with virtually no oversight. South Korea reportedly paid hundreds of millions to bribe the North Korean leader to attend a 2000 summit, and China agreed in 2005 to build a $50 million glass factory for North Korea in exchange for its participation in six-nation nuclear talks.

Such payments are “part and parcel of doing business in North Korea,” said L. Gordon Flake, executive director of the Mansfield Foundation, a nonprofit organization that promotes U.S. relations with Asian countries.

Since 1995, the United States has provided the North Korean regime with more than $1 billion worth of food and fuel in the hopes of forestalling famine — and of restraining Kim’s nuclear ambitions. In an effort to promote diplomatic contacts between the two countries, the Energy Department has channeled money to U.S. nonprofit agencies and universities, including a $1 million grant to the Atlantic Council to cover travel costs for informal talks between U.S. and North Korean diplomats.

U.S. military officials routinely traveled to North Korea’s demilitarized zone between 1996 and 2005 to give cash to North Korean army officers for the recovery of the remains of 229 of the more than 7,000 U.S. troops missing in North Korea since the Korean War. “There was a painstaking transfer process: cold, hard cash, counted carefully, turned over carefully,” said Larry Greer, spokesman for the Pentagon’s Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office.

Greer insisted that the payments, which covered labor, material and other expenses, were in line with recovery operations in other parts of the world. But he and other officials said North Korea frequently tried to inflate the costs and once requested that the U.S. military build a baby-clothing factory. The United States demurred, he said.

The Bush administration dramatically scaled back U.S. assistance to North Korea in 2002, but it continued to finance the effort to recover remains of Korean War veterans until 2005, when the U.S. military said it could no longer ensure the safety of U.S. recovery teams. Between 2002 and 2005, the United States flew a seven-member North Korean team, at a cost of $25,000 a year, to Bangkok for discussions about future recovery missions, according to the Congressional Research Service.

“It’s pretty close to a ransom of remains,” said James A. Kelly, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, adding he had little confidence that Washington could account for how the money was spent. “I personally didn’t like it, but I didn’t feel it was enough to get into a big squabble with the veterans organizations that felt strongly about it.”

Mark D. Wallace, the U.S. representative to the United Nations for administration and reform, lambasted the U.N. Development Program earlier this year for engaging in similar practices. For instance, he faulted the UNDP for flying a North Korean official in business class to New York at a cost of $12,000 to attend a meeting of the U.N. agency’s board of directors.

His complaints triggered a preliminary U.N. audit this month that confirmed that the UNDP had failed to abide by its rules by hiring workers handpicked by the North Korean government and paying them in foreign currency.

The UNDP operated for years “in blatant violation of U.N. rules [and] served as a steady and large source of hard currency” for the North Korean government, Wallace said. The UNDP’s efforts, he added, have been “systematically perverted for the benefit of the Kim Jong Il regime, rather than the people of North Korea.”

The controversy led the UNDP to suspend its North Korean operations in March after the government refused to allow it to independently hire staff members. The World Food Program and the U.N. Children’s Fund — which also pay government-supplied workers in foreign currency — remain active in North Korea.

Wallace has expanded his inquiry, alleging in congressional briefings that North Korea diverted nearly $3 million in UNDP cash to purchase real estate in France, Britain and Canada. He also contended that the UNDP received tens of thousands of dollars in counterfeit U.S. currency and imported sensitive “dual use” equipment into North Korea that could be used for a weapons program. The United States claims to possess internal UNDP documents to back up the claims but has refused to turn them over.

UNDP spokesman David Morrison said that the allegations “don’t seem to add up” and that the United States has not substantiated its assertions. He said the agency can account for the $2 million to $3 million it spends each year on its North Korea programs. UNDP officials said the dual-use equipment — which included Global Positioning System devices and a portable Tristan 5 spectrometer available on eBay for $5,100 — was part of a weather forecasting system for flood- and drought-prone regions.

“We have been subject to all manner of wild allegations about wide-scale funding diversion,” Morrison said.

U.S. officials said there is no link between criticism of the UNDP and U.S. efforts to restrain North Korean nuclear ambitions. “If I were a conspiracy theorist, I would think that way, but there is really no connection,” said a senior U.S. official who tracks the issue.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/24/2007

The recent refugee crisis in China attracted much attention to the situation around the border between the two countries. Indeed, in recent decades the porous border with China has provided the major exit opportunities for both would-be defectors to the South and refugees escaping the food shortages and poverty of the North.

Most Communist countries guarded their borders against both intruders who tried to get in, and against defectors who wanted to run away from the not-so-perfect Communist paradises. From this point of view, the border with China constitutes a serious challenge. It follows two rivers _ the Amnok and the Tuman (Chinese read the same characters as Yalu and Tumen). Both are shallow in the upper streams, and completely freeze every winter. Thus, a determined defector or smuggler can always find his or her way across the border. At least until the late 1950s _ despite of the persistent efforts of both Korean and Chinese security agencies _ smugglers systematically crossed into China and back.

In the 1950s it was not only smugglers who moved across the border. Some of that human traffic included a number of North Korean dignitaries who chose to run away to China instead of being purged. One of the most famous incidents of this kind took place in early September 1956. On August 31 of that year a group of prominent North Korean leaders openly challenged Kim Il-sung’s policy at the plenary meeting of the KWP Central Committee. They wanted to replace him with a more moderate leader, but their proposal was voted down and they were immediately put under house arrest. They appeared to be doomed, but their ingenuity helped them to find a way out (they were former underground activists, after all!). In the middle of the night the rebels managed to secretly leave the house and then drove away in a car provided by a sympathetic friend. They easily reached the border and then proceeded to China where they were eventually granted asylum. Their example was later followed by other dissenting officials.

There was a movement from China as well. At the end of the 1960s, when the “cultural revolution” was at its height, some ethnic Koreans from China fled to the DPRK which in those years was a more stable and prosperous society. Since the relations with China were quite bad in the late 1960s, these refugees were not extradited and stayed in the North.

The ethnic composition of the region is favourable for those who, for whatever reason, want to make a clandestine border crossing. There are two million ethnic Koreans in China, and most of them live close to the border. Many ethnic Koreans have relatives in North Korea, and a small number of them are even technically DPRK citizens _ the so-called chogyo (in 1997 the number of chogyo was estimated at 6,000 or some 0.3 percent of the Korean population in the region).

On the other hand, in the DPRK there are a small number of ethnic Chinese or huaqiao. The ethnic Chinese from the DPRK and ethnic Koreans from the People’s Republic were allowed to visit their relatives throughout the 1970s and 1980s, when the governments of both countries tried to minimize the foreign contacts of their citizens. Their status was unique _ and widely used for commercial purposes. This trade, however, seldom if ever required illegal border crossings. In most cases, the traders arrived with proper visitor’s visas and large sacks of merchandise.

Generally speaking, the border with China was never protected well, especially when compared with the DMZ, arguably the world’s most heavily protected border. This was deemed unnecessary. The North Korean authorities believed that the runaways would be, in all probability, apprehended by the Chinese police and then extradited back to the North. Of course, occasionally the Chinese might have made a political decision about granting asylum to a disgruntled cadre, but it was too unusual a circumstance to warrant an expensive upgrade of the border protection system. In essence, the Chinese police served as a better deterrent to those with defection in mind than North Korean guards.

And there was not much incentive to run away _ at least for commoners. North-East China was one of the poorest parts of the PRC, and until the late 1980s North Koreans enjoyed much higher standards of living than their brethren across the border.

Things changed dramatically in the early 1990s. From that time, the movement across the border _ both legal and illegal _ began to increase until it developed into a full-scale refugee crisis soon after 1995.

Asia Times
John Feffer
6/15/2007

The North Korean film projectionist is thinking back on her earlier life. When she was younger, she tells the camera, she dreamed of acting. She wanted to play a heroic role on the screen. Her eyes take on a wistful look. And there is a hint of pain in her voice. In any other country, this would be an ordinary show of emotion. In North Korea, however, the ordinary is extraordinary, for outsiders catch a glimpse of it so very rarely.

The North Korean woman, Han Yong-sil, is one of four film projectionists featured in a new documentary, Comrades in Dreams. Directed by Ulli Gaulke, a young German filmmaker, the documentary ties together the lives of cinema lovers from four countries: the United States, Burkino Faso, India and North Korea.

While all the footage is fascinating, the material from North Korea is unique. Films from and about North Korea rarely pierce the carefully constructed surface that the country and its citizens present to the outside world. Yet here, captured by Gaulke, Comrade Han reveals an individual personality behind the ritualized propaganda that she initially offers the camera.

Film has played an unusually prominent role in North Korean culture and history. Although it opens an important window on to a closed society, North Korean film has been a singularly overlooked subject. North Korean films are almost never shown in the United States. They rarely appear in international film festivals. Few articles have been written on the subject.

That all may change soon, however. A French company has just bought the rights to show the North Korean film A Schoolgirl’s Diary, reportedly seen by 8 million North Koreans, more than one-third of the population. Scholars are beginning to comb through North Korean films for clues about how the system ticks. And documentaries like Comrades in Dreams and the latest effort from Dan Gordon and Nicholas Bonner, Crossing the Line, are attracting attention at film festivals around the world.

The US and North Korea are inching closer together as a result of ongoing nuclear negotiations. With normalized relations on the agenda, information about North Korean society becomes ever more valuable. But do North Korean films ultimately reveal or conceal the reality of the country?

Bring up the subject of North Korean film and most people would be hard pressed to name a single title. But nearly every article about North Korean leader Kim Jong-il mentions that he’s a film buff with one of the largest film collections in the world. In fact, Kim started out in the cinema world. The rise of the “Dear Leader” to political leadership is linked inextricably to his film career.

“Kim Jong-il used film to prove that he was the legitimate guardian of his father Kim Il-sung’s legacy,” explained Kim Suk-young (Speaking at the Library of Congress Next Week), a specialist on North Korean theater and film at the University of California-Santa Barbara. “Kim Il-sung was very keen on protecting his legacy as a national father. So Kim Jong-il in the 1970s used film to prove that he was the legitimate heir.”

These films helped solidify his father’s personality cult and demonstrated that Kim Il-sung’s successor, unlike Deng Xiaoping in China or Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, would avoid any iconoclastic reforms.

Kim Jong-il was not the first person in North Korea to recognize the political uses of film. The regime early on realized the revolutionary potential of the medium. When it took control over the northern half of the Korean Peninsula at the end of World War II, the North Korean Workers’ Party under Kim Il-sung relied heavily on Soviet assistance. The Soviets, having pioneered film technique in the early days of the Russian Revolution, offered cinematic help as well.

From the very start, however, North Korea showed its independent streak by not following the Soviet model. “Even at its very beginning,” writes historian Charles Armstrong, North Korean cinema “was diverging from its Soviet sponsors’ aims by creating a distinctive cinema rooted in melodramatic emotionalism, a sentimental attachment to the Korean countryside, and the alleged values of peasant life, and a nationalist politics centered around the person of Kim Il-sung”.

To merge Soviet communism with North Korean nationalism – all rolled into the package of Kim Il-sung’s personality cult – film was the ideal medium. As Kim Suk-young explains, it is much easier to send films throughout the country as a propaganda tool than, for instance, relying on traveling theater groups. More important, Pyongyang could control the form and content from beginning to end. Political speakers sent to deliver propaganda to the masses might succumb to improvisation. Theater actors might give an unintended interpretative spin to their lines of dialogue. But movies allow for total control – or as close as the regime could get to total control in the cultural sphere.

Re-imaging history
Unlike Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung often clothed his political instruction in narrative form. His multi-volume autobiography, for instance, is full of stories and parables. But nothing could compare to the power of film to create resonant images and stirring nationalist messages.

For instance, in the 1960s film On the Railway, set during the Korean War, the train-engineer hero infiltrates the territory held by US and South Korean forces and pretends to be a defector driving his train over to the other side. He is, like Kim Il-sung, a trickster who achieves victory despite overwhelming odds. He doesn’t do so on behalf of the workers of the world, however. He is fighting for the Korean fatherland and against the foreign aggressor.

Other movies, such as An Jung Gun Shoots Ito Hirobumi and Star of Chosun, dramatize moments of Korean history such as the 1909 assassination of a Japanese colonial official and the life of Kim Il-sung. Like the 1915 US film The Birth of a Nation, these films present a rewritten history that can replace authentic memory and balanced scholarship. A government can censor books. But film has the appearance of reality and can more seductively change how a citizenry understands its past.

Kim Jong-il put his stamp on North Korean filmmaking with his involvement in productions such as Sea of Blood and Flower Girl. These films, adapted from revolutionary operas credited to his father Kim Il-sung, established a cultural vocabulary similar to the opera productions that Madame Mao (Jiang Qing) unleashed on the Chinese population during the Cultural Revolution (so memorably described in Anchee Min’s memoir Red Azalea).

The language of these operas-turned-films, which both describe the atrocities of the Japanese colonial period, defined the parameters of acceptable cultural discourse. The images became iconic, like the Biblical tableaux that appeared in classical painting and formed the visual vocabulary of pre-modern European culture.

By the late 1970s, having established his bona fides with his father, Kim Jong-il perceived that North Korean film had hit a dead end. At that time, he already possessed an extraordinary collection of world cinema. He understood the widening gap between the international and the national. To bridge the gap, Kim Jong-il sought help from outside.

Revolution lite
One of the most popular films in Bulgaria in the late 1980s was North Korea’s Hong Kil Dong (1986). A classic tale of a Korean Robin Hood, the film introduced Hong Kong-style action to the Soviet bloc. The ninja moves and soaring kicks dazzled East European audiences. “Hong Kil Dong attracted hundreds of thousands of people to the cinemas across Bulgaria,” writes Todor Nenov. “It was almost impossible to get tickets for it, unless you booked them two or three days earlier!”

Borrowing from Hong Kong action movies was only one of the ways that the North Korean film industry revived itself in the 1980s. Kim Jong-il borrowed more directly from outside when he arranged for the abduction of South Korean actress Choi Eun-hee in 1978. Six months later, Kim abducted her estranged husband, famous South Korean director Shin Sang-ok.

Before the pair managed to escape in 1986 during a stopover in Vienna, Shin Sang-ok introduced many new innovations into North Korean film. His most famous films during this period – a North Korean version of Godzilla called Pulgasari and a retelling of the famous Korean folk tale of Chunhyang called Love, Love, My Love – added science fiction and musical romance to the North Korean repertoire.

It is difficult to know whether the entertaining aspects of Hong Kil-Dong and Shin Sang-ok’s movies distracted North Korean moviegoers from the political messages or made those messages easier to absorb. The historical and fantastical settings allowed for greater leeway in presenting stories. Although the screenplays nod in the direction of the People, the writers needn’t lard the narrative with adoring references to the country’s leader or address the tasks facing contemporary North Korean society.

The contemporary love story in Traces of Life (1989) is by contrast entirely subordinate to the political message of building a utopian society. The movie tells the story of a grieving widow. Her husband has died in a suicide mission that blows up an invading South Korean ship. Guilty about arguing with him on the night he left to make the sacrifice, she exiles herself to the countryside, where she becomes a farmer and eventually raises rice production to unprecedented levels.

She thus transforms her love of husband into love of country. When Kim Il-sung himself comes to her farm and praises the collective’s success, her love achieves its apotheosis. The love of the hero leader has absolved her of the guilt she felt about not living up to the ideal of her hero husband.

Romance in North Korean films tends to be of the revolutionary not the bourgeois variety. As Ri Hyang, the character in Urban Girl Comes to Get Married (1993), explains to her friend, she wants “a man with perfume”. Her friend, surprised, replies that “a man is not a flower”. Ri Hyang continues: she is looking for “a man who creates his life with great ambition, a man who is respected by people”.

Although Urban Girl has a much lighter touch than Traces of Life, the message is the same: love should be reserved for those who want and can build “paradise on earth”. If that means partnering with the fellow on the farm who spends night and day working on a better breed of duck, as urban girl Ri Hyang ultimately does in the film, so be it.

Utopian dreams
Films in North Korea do not simply carry messages. They model behavior. Han Yong-sil, the projectionist in Comrades in Dreams, explains that the audiences for her films learn about new agricultural advances. And indeed, Urban Girl features information about livestock breeding and rice transplanting, and Traces of Life provides information on microbial fertilizer.

But the films don’t just supply technical content. They model revolutionary virtues. Kim Suk-young points to the popularity of amateur contests in which average North Koreans learn the lines of famous movie parts and then compete for the honor to present their monologues at the finals in Pyongyang. “It sounds very oppressive to us,” she says, “but there’s comfort in identifying with those heroes.” In this way we see that North Korean films don’t simply reveal or conceal reality. They actively construct North Korean society.

As a projectionist on a model farm, Han Yong-sil also struggles to live up to the examples set in the films she shows. Her husband is far away on an assignment to beautify Mount Paektu, the reputed birthplace of the Dear Leader. This is an important mission and, like the heroine of Traces of Life, she knows that she should subordinate her personal loneliness to the good of the nation. Still, it is clear that she finds this task very difficult.

Her display of emotions reveals the normalcy of North Koreans. Ironically, it is this very normalcy, because it falls short of the revolutionary ideal, that the North Korean government is loath to reveal to the world. And so the outside world tends to perceive North Koreans as slightly unreal, as mere mouthpieces for government propaganda.

In the 1960s and even into the 1970s, the utopian themes in North Korean cinema went hand in hand with the rising expectations of the population. After the devastation of World War II and then the Korean War, North Korea rapidly rebuilt itself. The government prided itself on the various industrial and agricultural advances that put it on par with and even ahead of South Korea. By the 1980s, however, North Korea was stagnant. It had fallen behind not only South Korea but even its own previous standards.

It is interesting that Kim Jong-il perceived that North Korean film, too, was stagnant at this time. A kind of cognitive dissonance must have begun to emerge among the North Korean population. The government and the films were portraying an ever-improving society and yet the population must have been noticing that reality was stubbornly not keeping pace. In the Soviet Union, during the years under Leonid Brezhnev, people could get their entertainment elsewhere – foreign films, books, samizdat publications. But North Koreans, until very recently, did not have any alternatives. And so the North Korean film industry turned to escapism, like romance stories.

But even escapism has its limits, for there is a utopian quality to Urban Girl and Pulgasari as well. Perhaps in response to the growing cognitive dissonance, the North Korean entertainment industry has begun to address new themes: divorce, love triangles, the double and triple shifts of women. “These dramas dealing with failure suggest that people are craving something different,” observes Kim Suk-young.

Reaching out?
The North Korean government boasts of its world-class film industry. But since a devastating loss in an international film festival in Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s, North Korea hasn’t tried very hard to promote its films abroad.

Pyongyang has, however, hosted its own international film festival since 1987 and allows visitors to its film studio. “North Korea has never been shy about propagandizing its grand achievements, and the film industry is not something secretive,” said journalist Ron Gluckman. “You can visit the studios as part of a tourist itinerary.

“I did so on my first visit to North Korea back in 1992. I visited again in 2004, and the equipment shown off was definitely ancient. I suspect they have been unable to keep up to date due to the economic situation, and film has suffered as a consequence.”

More recently, the government has allowed outside directors to make films inside the country. Pyongyang Crescendo (2005) follows the story of a German conductor who spent 10 days in the North Korean capital teaching music students. Dan Gordon and Nicholas Bonner have produced three documentary films: on the North Korean soccer team that made it to the World Cup quarterfinals in 1966, on two girls training for the mass games in Pyongyang, and most recently on the US soldier James Dresnok, who defected to North Korea in 1962.

The Game of Their Lives, the 2002 soccer documentary, showed that films could be made in North Korea, said Nick Bonner. However, the country isn’t exactly issuing a general invitation to the film world. “It is still very difficult to film in [North Korea] and is certainly a case-by-case situation,” Bonner added.

With A Schoolgirl’s Diary, the North Korean film industry will try once again to break into the international market. In this 2006 release, a teenager complains that her scientist father is too busy to pay attention to her. It is, according to reviews, a “humorous drama about a rebellious teenage girl”. It offers a picture of the North Korean elite that, in the film, uses computers, carries Mickey Mouse schoolbags, and eats good food.

It shows a few flaws in the system, such as deteriorating housing stock. But these are, according to Bonner, the “day-to-day flaws that fit the story line of struggle during this time when great sacrifice is needed to build a strong country”.

Regardless of whether A Schoolgirl’s Diary attracts an international audience on the merits of its story and its filmmaking, it will be an important document of North Korea’s evolving society. It will also show what kind of model behavior the government now wants to inculcate in its citizens.

“We might have to imagine the world with North Korea for another 25 or 50 years,” Kim Suk-young concludes. “We should look at film in order to understand and co-exist and to have a glimpse of North Korea instead of reducing it to a one-dimensional propaganda tool.”

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
6/19/2007

“North Korean government has employed movies to propagate superiority of the regime and Su-Ryeong (supreme leader) absolutism. However, North Korean movies have seen a new wave recently.” John Feffer, co- director at Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF), an Institute for politics & diplomacy in the U.S, declared through his article on the web on 12th.

Feffer remarked “North Korea was quickly recovered from World War∥ and Korean War. From the 60s to 70s, North Korean had had a great expectation on Utopia” “However, it has been stagnated since then.”

He was interested in the fact that even Kim Jong Il himself perceived that North Korean film was stagnant the same time of North Korean stagnation. Additionally, “The government and the films were portraying an ever-improving society and yet the population must have been noticing that reality was stubbornly not keeping pace” he explained.

◆ People noticed North Korean reality

He appraised “During the reign of Brezhnev (1965 ~1983), people in the former Soviet Union could get their entertainment from foreign movies, books and samizdat publications. On the other hand, the North Korean had no other alternatives” Thereafter, North Korean film industry has gone for a romance for escapism, he explained.

The most representative film is “the family” series. This series of short film, 9 episodes in all, pictured a struggle of the family caused by the couple’s divorce and their troubled children.

Feffer also said that North Korean movies, which haven’t opened to the public, have released to the world audience one after another.

Currently a film titled “A Schoolgirl’s Diary” portraying a story of a North Korean girl, has been expected to be released in Europe by a French distributor. Also, Daniel Gordon British director, have produced documentary films “A State of Mind (2005)” and “The Game of Their Lives (2002)” gaining permission from North Korean government.

Feffer pointed out “Since Film has played an prominent role in North Korean culture and history, scholars are beginning to comb through North Korean films for clues about how the system ticks.” However, he doubted whether North Korean films ultimately reveal the reality of the country or not.

He continued “We should look at film in order to understand and coexist and to have a glimpse of North Korea instead of reducing it to a one-dimensional propaganda tool.” “Besides, Kim Jong Il made most of movies to manage his political agenda.” He added.

He said that media have often said Kim Jong Il is a huge film buff.” “Therefore, the rise of the “Dear Leader” to political leadership is linked inextricably to his film career.” He explained.

• Bulgarian audience fascinated by “Hong Kil Dong”

He continued to observe “North Korean movies would play a role to idolize Kim Il Sung. And Kim Jong Il, unlike Deng Xiaoping in China and Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union, was able to escape from criticism against the hereditary succession of power.”

Feffer noted. “In the 70s, Kim Jong Il, having established idolatry cult on his father, Kim Il Sung with movies, realized North Korean film hit the dead end.“ At that time, Kim, who is a remarkable film collector, had clearly understood the widening gap between national and overseas films.”

” ‘Hong Kil Dong’ was the most popular movie in the late 80s in Bulgaria and this classic tale, Korean version of Robin Hood, introduced Hong Kong style action to the East European for the first time.” “The brilliant action footage of the film dazzled the East European audience. It was part of the plan to revive North Korean film adopting Hong Kong style action.” he specified.

Kim’s passion on film reached the peak as abducting Choi Eun Hee , South Korean actress, in 1978.

Feffer mentioned “He also abducted Shin Sang Ok, the estranged husband of Choi Eun Hee, and made him to produce movies. This couple had brought a new wave on North Korean film industry until their escape in 1986.”

”The most renowned movie among Shin’s production is “ Pulgasari,” North Korean version of “Godzilla” and “Love, Love, Oh my Love,” revived Chunhyang, classic romance in Korea. Shin Sang Ok adapted Romance and SF to Korean style story line,” he assessed.
However, he pointed out “It’s difficult to know whether entertaining aspect on “Hong Kil Dong” and the new wave on Shin Sang Ok distracted the North Korean audience from political messages or made those messages easily absorbed.”

Indeed, Feffer appraised Kim Jong Il is not the first individual who recognize the political uses of film.

He explained that North Korean regime have recognised the evolutional potential of the media. Korea Workers’ Party, under the Kim Il Sung’s lead, was able to occupy Northern Korean Peninsula after the World War ∥ relying on the support from the former Soviet Union. The Soviets had already pioneered film technique in the early days of the Russian revolution.

However, North Korea already showed its independent streak not following the Soviet model .

Feffer said “Film was ideal means to adapt Russian Communism to North Korean Nationalism, which is solely manipulated for idolatry on Kim Il Sung.” “Leaders in Pyongyang was able to control over all the context. Government can manipulate publications. Still, film can be more powerful maneuvers of the past for it reflects reality.”

Choson Ilbo (Hat Tip DPRK Studies)
6/18/2007

North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who is in responsible for Pyongyang’s diplomatic affairs including the nuclear issue, was in May made a member of the ruling National Defense Commission (NDC) led by dictator Kim Jong-il, Russian sources said Sunday.

The sources said Kim appointed Kang to the leadership body to strengthen his power base, with the move seen as ensuring the NDC holds sway over the military as well as domestic and foreign affairs.

Kang has served as the First Vice Foreign Minister since 1986 and is known as the only foreign ministry official who can directly advise Kim. He was a signer of the 1994 Geneva Accords between the U.S. and North Korea and the leader of Pyongyang’s representatives in the six-nation talks. Kang recently visited Moscow for treatment of a cataract.

The sources also said that General Lee Myung-soo, who was the North Korean military’s director of operations, has been made an organizer in the NDC.

The NDC currently consists of the country’s nine most powerful leaders, including Kim who serves as the body’s head, Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, who is Kim’s special envoy, Vice Marshal Kim Young-choon, General Rhee Yong-mu, General Kim Il-cheol and Secretary Chun Byung-ho.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/17/2007

Keeping up appearances: this is how the official North Korean policy in regard to the city of Pyongyang, the cradle of revolution, can be best summed up. Being a Pyongyang dweller is a great privilege in itself. Until things began to fall apart in the mid-1990s, this meant that your food rations would consist largely of rice (not barley and corn, as in the countryside) and that your children would be entitled to a small glass of milk in school. But you also had to follow the rules, and participate in the grandiose symbolic performance that Pyongyang actually was _ and to an extent still is.

Many laws which dealt with the daily life of Pyongyang’s residents essentially served the purposes of presentation. Take, for example, the case of Pyongyang bikes. East Asia has a well-deserved reputation as a cyclists’ paradise. Nonetheless, North Korea used to be different. Until the early 1990s bicycles were outlawed in Pyongyang. Obviously, the North Korean authorities saw bicycles as decisively low-tech _ and hence inappropriate for the “capital of revolution.’’

Foreigners were not exempt from this charade. When in the mid-1970s a visiting Norwegian diplomat brought his bike to Pyongyang, he stirred up a diplomatic controversy. After painful negotiations he was granted permission to ride his bike… on weekends only.

Another example is a strict dress code imposed on the female dwellers of Pyongyang and some other cities. Women are not supposed to wear trousers outside their work. Actually, police turn a blind eye to such inappropriately dressed women in winter. Older halmoni also can walk in trousers with impunity _ at least if they do not stray outside their neighborhood. But for other women in summer time, skirts are obligatory, and until the late 1990s an attempt to walk the street in trousers would result in a fine and a probable report to police.

There are other restrictions as well: a certain tradition or institution may not be outlawed but should not be mentioned in the press. A phenomenon could exist in the real world, but it is not permitted to enter the world carefully constructed by Pyongyang propaganda.

My favorite example is the pram. North Korean women carry their children like women in East Asia have done for centuries: on their backs. This is probably a very good way: at least, Russian Koreans, arguably the most de-Koreanized of all overseas Korean communities, still sometimes follow this custom after some 150 years of their life in Russia. Perhaps, it makes sense: a baby feels so comfortable on a mother’s back!

But the North Korean authorities decided that this age-old habit of carrying children on the back should not be too widely advertised. Hence, you cannot find pictures of women carrying kids on their back. Instead, on the glossy pages of the North Korean propaganda monthlies, readers frequently encounter pictures of impossibly happy mothers who are moving their children about in prams. In real life one has to spend several weeks in Pyongyang before chancing on a pram-pushing lady. The politically incorrect tradition of carrying children on the back should not be mentioned in official publications or depicted in visual arts (unless they employed as a reference to the bad old days before the coming of the Kim dynasty).

Nowadays, the rules have been somewhat relaxed, but back in the 1970s or 1980s a foreigner took some risk by taking a picture of a mother with a baby on her back. There were chances that, if spotted, the film would be removed from the camera and exposed to the light.

The same fate could easily befall somebody who dared take pictures of Korean women moving heavy loads on their heads. Such scenes are increasingly rare in Seoul these days, but in Pyongyang this is still a commonplace sight. Nonetheless, in the ideal world of the official propaganda, Korean women do not carry large weight in such an archaic way, and no media is allowed to break the censorship of such subversive information.

Actually, I think that there are good reasons why the North Korean officials are afraid of such scenes. They likely know little about Edward Said’s writings on “Orientalism’’: after all, Leninist regimes were always very suspicious about non-Leninist brands of leftist ideology, so people like Gramsci, Althusser, or Said were never much loved in Moscow, Beijing, or Pyongyang. But they obviously grasped some of Said’s “Orientalist’’ ideas instinctively. For most Western readers, pictures of women with children on their backs or of old ladies moving heavy loads on the top of their heads do hint at “exoticism’’ and also, by implication, “underdevelopment’’. And the North Korean state does not want to present itself as underdeveloped.

But all these efforts to impress the world appear quite strange when we remember how small the target audience actually was. North Koreans knew the truth anyway, and foreigners in Pyongyang were very few in number. In most cases their positions and experiences made them very skeptical of all these propaganda exercises. But the North Korean officials tried hard nonetheless.

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
6/21/2007

Kim Jong Il underwent a Percuteneous Transarterial Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) performed by German doctors in mid-May.

An inside Japanese source well acquainted with North Korea reported by telephone on the 20th that Kim Jong Il received medical treatment from doctors of the Berlin Heart Center in mid-May and was back at work a day later.

This source said that North Korean authority asked the German doctors to closely examine Kim Jong Il’s health and perform surgery if necessary. The examination revealed a myocardial infarction, but no other serious heart condition.

According to the doctors, Kim’s health was not bad except for kidney hypertrophy and some symptoms of diabetes. After examination he received the relatively simple PTCA treatment instead of surgery.

PTCA expands a narrow artery by inflating a tiny balloon. The balloon is introduced into the artery through catheter. It is an effective treatment for coronary artery diseases without the use of thoracotomy, and results in high success rates and few complications. Patients need just a couple of days’ rest. Dr. Jung Yong Suk, a heart specialist at the Sunrin Hospital in Handong University, explained to the Daily NK that “PTCA is a medical treatment for coronary arteries supplying blood into the heart. If Kim Jong Il required the procedure, he may have some problem in his coronary arteries, but it is uncertain if it is a stricture of the heart or myocardial infarction.”

The Japanese source said that the “German doctors promised to keep Kim Jong Il’s procedure a secret and to coordinate a faked story with North Korea authority.” Therefore, the spokesperson of Berlin Heat Center revealed that 6 members of the center stayed in Pyongyang from May 11th to the 19th, treating only three laborers, a nurse, and a scientist.

A North Korea expert speculated that Kim Jong Il might be addressing health concerns prior to the year end South Korean Presidential Election and further nuclear negotiations. Many groundless reports have circulated regarding possible Kim Jong Il heart surgery. A Japanese magazine, Shukan Gendai, claimed that Kim Jong Il received coronary artery bypass surgery for myocardial infarction.

Original claim:
Kim Jong-il had artery surgery in May
Korea Herald
6/14/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il was operated on by a team of German doctors last month to open a blocked artery, a person connected to the Kim regime said.

While doctors from German Heart Institute Berlin arrived in Pyongyang prepared to perform major surgery on Kim, they found only one clogged artery, the person said. The 65-year-old Kim, who suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure, recovered well from the surgery, said the person, who asked that his name not be used because North Korea wanted the operation kept secret.

The person said while other members of North Korea’s elite go abroad for medical treatment, only Kim is important enough to have a team brought into the country. Barbara Nickolaus, a spokeswoman for the institute in Berlin, confirmed that the doctors had been in Pyongyang, and said they were there to treat three workers, a nurse and a scientist.

Kim’s health has been the subject of repeated recent speculation. Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s biggest daily newspaper, said late last month that South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies were checking reports Kim was suffering from heart, kidney or liver disease.

The Japanese weekly magazine Shukan Gendai said on June 8 a team of six doctors from Berlin was in Pyongyang from May 11 to 19 and conducted heart-bypass surgery on Kim.

The North’s official Korea Central News Agency said Kim visited factories in North Pyeongan Province near the border with China and spoke with workers on June 7, or less than three weeks after the German doctors left North Korea.

NK Daily, a Seoul online news organization staffed by defectors from North Korea, reported on June 11 it had confirmed the report with an “inside source” in North Korea who said the apparently vigorous Kim’s June 7 schedule lasted until 1 a.m.

Since the 1970s, when he was unofficially designated as successor to his father, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong-il’s health has been the subject of speculation.

“Kim does have diabetes and high blood pressure,” said C. Kenneth Quinones, a retired U.S. State Department Korea specialist who teaches at Japan’s Akita International University. “But there is no firm evidence that either has worsened recently.”

Kim, who has three sons in their 20s and 30s, hasn’t publicly said whether one of them or someone else will be his successor in the world’s only communist dynasty.

U.S. Concern

“The State Department is concerned about his health, at least until he publicly designates an heir,” Quinones said.

Kim’s failure to keep to his usual quota of appearances, such as visits to work units to deliver what the official Korea Central News Agency calls “on-the-spot guidance,” often triggers speculation.

Given North Korea’s nuclear program, all reports about Kim’s health have to be taken seriously, said Michael Breen, author of “Kim Jong-il: North Korea’s Dear Leader,” a biography.

“One day the reports will be true,” Breen said. “So we can never ignore them.”

Chosun Ilbo reported in May that Kim had been on official activities 23 times between Jan. 1 and May 27, half the number reported during the same period in 2006.

At an April 25 military parade, Kim’s eyeglass lenses were different from his usual sunglasses, leading to speculation his diabetes had worsened, making his eyes more sensitive to sunlight, the newspaper said. That was a “false alarm,” Quinones said. He said Kim was actually wearing “transition” lenses that turn darker according to the sun’s brightness.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service concluded Kim’s health probably wasn’t in serious decline, according to a person who spoke with service agents.

At the April parade in Pyongyang, South Korean agents watched Kim review troops for two hours with no signs of fatigue, a sign his health isn’t fragile, said the person, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the information.

Chain-Smoker

Kim is a former chain-smoker whose lifestyle — including a reported fondness for cognac and delicacies — may contribute to his diabetes and high blood pressure. His father died, reportedly of cardiovascular disease, at 82 in 1994.

Questions about the younger Kim’s health were heightened during a long disappearance in the late 1970s, prompting speculation he was dead or seriously incapacitated from injuries in a car accident caused by people opposed to a hereditary succession.

After his formal elevation to succeed his father in 1980, the official media portrayed him as a tireless worker for the people’s welfare even at the risk of his own health.

Kim looked pale and thin at the ceremony designating him as successor, causing North Koreans to write critical letters to officials for failing to take care of his health, official media reported at the time.

Kenji Fujimoto, a Japanese chef who served Kim at his Pyongyang palace, said in a pseudonymous book he wrote about the experience that the North Korean leader would complain about the medicine he had to take.

In the book, “The Private Life of Kim Jong-il,” Fujimoto quoted Kim as saying, “Do I have to keep taking these pills every day until I die?” (Bloomberg)

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
6/11/2007

Recently, portraits of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Sook (Kim Jong Il’s mother) wearing military clothing are being sold at North Korea’s black market, Jangmadang.

“Good Friends” a North Korea support organization, published a newsletter which informed that a portrait of the “3 Generals portrait” was being sold for 7,500 North Korean won (approx. US$2.50) at Jangmadang.

The sale of the “3 Generals portrait” is actually prohibited. Then, how did portraits of the “3 Generals” end up on the black market? Is this a sign that the value of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Sook has plummeted to rock bottom? No way.

In the past, this portrait of “Baekdu Mountains 3 Great Heroes” or otherwise known as the “3 Generals,” was distributed to North Korea’s elite class. However, as the power of money slowly took a stance in North Korea, the “3 Generals” somehow managed to appear in the markets.

People purchasing the portraits are not the elite class. If a person visits the home and sees this portrait hung, they may get the impression that the household was closely related to the elite class. In other words, the home looks as if it has value or is important, hence the demand at the markets.

The sale of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Sook portraits in North Korea is a political offense. If a person is caught selling any portraits, they may end up in a political concentration camp.

However, as people thrive off trade and the value of money spreads throughout the nation, life continues abundantly as long as you don’t get caught. The fact that this item has appeared at Jangmadang just goes to show how much trade as prospered in North Korea.

Further, the source and owners of the portraits are the elite and with a little investigation one can unveil the corruption that is occurring amongst the upper class. As a result, as long as you do not spread rumors about the National Safety Agency and affiliated persons, authorities let you go unnoticed.

The painting is a family portrait with Kim Il Sung dressed as a Chief general on the left, Kim Jong Il dressed in a general’s outfit in the middle and then on the right, Kim Jong Sook dressed in a guerilla uniform.

The “3 Generals’ portrait” first appeared in 1997 about the time of Kim Jong Il’s 55th birthday. At first, the painting was distributed to officers of power including elite officials, generals, courts and the national security and safety agency. The portrait was not presented to average households and hence the “3 Generals” gained its elite status. “We have the 3 Generals in our home” children would say bragging to others.

Nonetheless, this portrait began to be sold on the markets illegally from 1997. This was a time where people died of starvation and Kim Jong Il went around proclaiming “Military First Politics.” Distributing the “3 Generals’ portrait” was all a part of Kim Jong Il’s propaganda for “Military First Politics.”

In the beginning, administrative officers bribed authorities with alcohol and cigarettes in exchange for the portraits. Factory managers would even exchange the goods in the factories and hang the portraits in their own homes. It was not too difficult to obtain the painting if you were closely affiliated to persons with any sort of power including the authorities, military or the government.

Since then, it was common to see the portraits in the homes of the rich. This portrait worth 3,000won in `97 has now escalade to 7,500won following the July 1st economic measure in 2002.

Sale of the portraits began at the place of manufacture Mansudae Art Institution (the national art academy, which is mainly creating works related to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il). The moment rations were suspended, workers at Mansudae Art Institution began to produce extra portraits and badges of Kim Il Sung, and as a means of survival traded these portraits in exchange for food. With ties to relatives in the country, manufacturers sold portraits of the 3 Generals through the back door.

In additional to this, it is common practice that badges of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are sold on the black market. There are many badges which vary according to class from badges in the shape of a flag (used by overseas North Koreans) to badges made for authorities and a special badge that was manufactured after Kim Il Sung’s death.

One badge, sold for 1,000won

At first the badges were distributed to elite officials and upper class and then slowly, more and more average citizens tried to obtain one. For example, in the mid-90’s it was rare to see the ‘couple badge’ in the country that it sold for 1,000~1,500won (approx. US$0.3~0.5) each. Accordingly, the cost of the badges has also been affected by market prices.

Dealers who sell the badges appear at the black markets wearing a black jacket. The portraits are hidden beneath the jacket and buyers haggle with the dealer for a good price.

However, not everyone likes the “3 Generals portraits.” A defector who recently entered South Korea said, “Only people who can afford the pictures are interested in buying the “3 Generals portraits.” Otherwise, the average commoner doesn’t care.”

Nevertheless, what would happen if Kim Jong Il found out that the portrait of the “3 Generals portraits” were being sold on the black market? Furthermore, what would happen if he found out that the portraits were being sold for a mere $2.50? He would most probably make an order to close Jangmadang.

If not for the living and trade of average commoners, it would be best for Kim Jong Il not to know this fact. It would be better for Kim Jong Il to be ignorant of this rather humiliating truth.

Korea Herald
Lee Joo-Hee
6/11/2007

Following the death of former foreign minister of North Korea Paek Nam-sun this January, eyes and ears are open to who would succeed him.

While in most countries, being named the next foreign minister would be a coveted honor, it was the opposite in North Korea.

Kang Sok-ju, the first vice foreign minister, indeed, has tried with all his means not to be named the new foreign minister, according to sources familiar with the North Korean system.

“North Korea designated Kang as the successor of late Paek, but he somehow dodged the actual appointment citing his illness, possibly arthritis,” a source was quoted as saying by Yonhap News.

Instead, former ambassador to Russia Pak Ui-chun was named to the seat on May 18 after it was vacant for four months.

Whether it was possible for Kang to “dodge” the appointment remains unconfirmed, the situation is quite understandable considering how North Korea bestows actual authority on the No. 2 man while the more public figure takes on the official top seat. Kang, seeking to remain in a position of real power, may have wanted to stay where he is.

The clearest example of this power ranking system is Kim Yong-nam, who, as head of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, is the formal president of North Korea. North Korea is, however, ruled by Kim Jong-il, whose official title is the chairman of the National Defense Commission.

“We deem that Kang believed becoming a foreign minister could mean going on all the official and open duties but being distanced from being one of the close confidantes of Kim Jong-il,” the source was quoted as saying.

Kim Jong-il, with intense interest in relations with the United States, reportedly has talked directly with Kang instead of the foreign minister to discuss pending issues since the 1990s.

A possible threat to Kang’s status could now be North Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan, according to sources quoted by Yonhap. Kim Kye-gwan was reportedly a candidate to succeed Kang if Kang was to be named the foreign minister.

Kim Kye-gwan earned the trust of the communist leader by successfully negotiating the lift of the freeze of North Korean funds at Banco Delta Asia in Macau, the sources said.

He was recently allowed to move into “the club,” a luxurious villa compound located in Pyongyang for some 30 households in which Kim Jong-il’s close confidantes reside.