North Korean Economy Watch

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is the research branch of the US Congress and the number one information source for congressional staff.  CRS is responsible for maintining updated research publications on numerous policy concerns and they recently published a report on the death of Kim Jong-il.

Download the full report here (PDF).

Here is the summary of the report:

North Korea represents one of the United States’ biggest foreign policy challenges due to its production and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, the threat of attacks against South Korea, its record of human rights abuses, and the possibility that its internal problems could destabilize Northeast Asia. The North Korean government’s December 19, 2011, announcement of the death of the country’s Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il, has the potential to be a watershed moment in the history of the Korean Peninsula and the region.1 Ever since the death of his father, the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1994, Kim Jong-il had sat at the apex of a highly centralized, brutal regime. During his tenure, his regime subjected North Korea’s people to profound impoverishment and massive food shortages, developed nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and sold technology related to both programs abroad.

The effect of Kim Jong-il’s death on North Korea’s stability is uncertain. Many experts doubt that his anointed successor, his third son Kim Jong-un, will over the course of time be able to maintain effective control over his country due to his relative inexperience and the mounting internal and external pressures confronting North Korea. Yet, the North Korean regime under the elder Kim proved to be remarkably resilient, and many of the forces that held it together will continue to operate even if the young Kim himself remains weak. A key to the Kim Jong-un regime’s stability will be its ability to continue obtaining and distributing funds, mostly from external sources. Of particular importance will be China’s willingness to provide commercial, financial, and other support for the regime. Over the years, China reportedly has resisted repeated U.S. and South Korean attempts to discuss North Korea contingency plans. It is unclear whether Kim Jong-il’s death will change this situation, though there have been calls to redouble outreach to Beijing. A possible opportunity for high-level dialogue could come in January 2012, when Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visits Washington, DC. Xi is widely expected to be chosen as China’s top leader over the coming year.

Very little is known about the inner workings of the North Korean elite, as evidenced by the U.S. and South Korean intelligence services apparent surprise at the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death. Even less is known about Kim Jong-un, who is believed to be in his late 20s and to have attended primary school in Switzerland in the 1990s. Kim Jong-un was being groomed to be the successor since his father’s August 2008 stroke that put a spotlight on the succession question.

In the days after the announcement, U.S. and South Korean officials issued statements that expressed support for the North Korean people, hope that the new leadership will continue recent diplomatic initiatives with Washington and Seoul, and a desire for a smooth transition in Pyongyang. (For the text of these statements as well as a joint message from several Chinese state and communist party organs, see the Appendix. U.S. and South Korean influence over events in North Korea is widely believed to be limited. In the coming weeks, the Obama Administration will be confronted with a decision of whether to persist with two proposed new agreements that reportedly were in the process of being concluded with the Kim Jong-il government in mid-December: a resumption of U.S. food assistance, and in return, a reported agreement by North Korea to shut down key sites of its nuclear program and open them to international monitoring. Members of Congress will have the opportunity to support or oppose these moves, as well as to propose new pressure and engagement tactics of their own.

I have kept an archive of all recent CRS reports on the DPRK.  You can see them here.

Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

This year, President Lee Myung-bak’s New Year address paid much attention to North Korea issues. The South Korean President warned the North against fresh provocations but the general tone of his speech was conciliatory.

Lee said that now is the time to put aside past problems and start to rebuild relations anew. Tellingly, he did not repeat that Seoul expects Pyongyang to apologize for the two military incidents of 2010 ― the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island.

Are there chances that Pyongyang will react to this charm offensive and rush to resume talks with Seoul? Don’t hold your breath ― such chances are very remote. Pyongyang decision makers understand perfectly well that an immediate detente is not in their long-term interests.

Pyongyang’s foreign policy goals are surprisingly easy to describe: They are regime security and obtaining unconditional aid (the former is an absolute priority with the latter a rather distant but still significant second). In other words, North Korea’s foreign policy makers want to squeeze as much aid as possible from the outside world but only so long as this aid comes without too many conditions which might have impact on regime security.

Since 2008, the North Korean state has found itself in a rather unpleasant situation: U.S. aid stopped almost completely while the amount coming from South Korea has dramatically decreased. In this new situation, North Korea has been left with just one aid provider ― that is, China. This is not a situation that Pyongyang’s elite is happy about.

Since the 1960s, North Korean diplomats have worked hard to ensure that their country would always have at last two overseas sponsors. It was preferable if the two sponsors had uneasy, if not hostile, relations, so that their rivalry could be used to ensure that only limited concessions would be given in exchange for aid.

For the early 1960s until the late 1980s, China and the Soviet Union were the sponsors. From the early 1990s, the Chinese continued and the Soviet Union was replaced by South Korea and the United States.

In order to decrease their dangerously high dependence on China, North Korean diplomats now want South Korea to resume large-scale aid ― in other words, to re-implement a version of the “Sunshine Policy,” the North Korean-directed policy of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun when they were president in 1998-2007.

North Korean leaders are careful observers of the ever-changing South Korean political scene. They have to be, since milking the South has long since become their major source of revenue. They hope that the coming parliamentary and presidential elections will be won by the Korean nationalist left.

This is understandable, since left-leaning politicians in South Korea have always been more willing to provide the North with aid, without asking too many awkward questions. In recent years, it seems that the left has lost part of its earlier enthusiasm for such a policy, but one should still reasonably expect that a left-leaning (or as it would proudly style itself, “progressive”) administration will indeed be more receptive to Pyongyang’s demands.

So what should North Korea do to increase the chances of the South Korean left-leaning parties? Pretty much the only thing they can do is to “not” help the right, and this is exactly the reason why the recent conciliatory remarks by President Lee are likely to fall on deaf ears.

While the North Korea issue is marginal in South Korean politics, the left-leaning opposition can blame the Lee administration for its real (or alleged) mishandling of the North and the resulting instability on the Korean Peninsula (admittedly, this type of electoral rhetoric has a kernel of truth to it). Therefore, if the North agrees to play according to Lee’s rules, it will help the South Korean “conservatives” in presenting themselves as people who, at the end of the day, know how to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Of course North Korea would be rewarded if it were to talk right now. But from Pyongyang’s point of view it makes a great deal of sense to wait another year, in anticipation of the electoral success of the South Korean left. If the left is not successful in the end, then they can still easily make a deal with the next right-leaning administration. It is telling that in recent months the presidential contenders of the right have also indicated that they would be softer in their approach towards the North.

Therefore we should not expect a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough anytime soon. Fortunately though, we also do not have to be that afraid of fresh North Korean provocations. Consideration of South Korean electoral politics will probably mean that the North will try to avoid clashes with the South.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s political calculations
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2012-1-15

I thought I would post a few satellite images to correct the Yonahp account of Kim Jong-il’s funeral procession (it is a tad incorrect).

First, here is the map that Yonhap published:

Click the image above to see a larger version

Here is the actual funeral procession route which I mapped out on Google Earth while watching this two-hour documentary on the event (it is amazing what you will watch when jet lagged!):

Here is some clarification on specific parts of the route:

1. It started and ended at Kumsusan Memorial Palace.

2. The motorcade turned at Jonsung Square across the street from the Fatherland Liberation War Museum:

3. The procession passed by the Monument to the Party Founding:

4. The procession entered Kim Il-sung square from the North, circled it, then continued south for appx four more blocks before turning around and again passing Kim Il-sung square on its way to the Arch of Triumph:

Have a good weekend!

Reudiger frank has written a couple of related articles on political legitimacy in the DPRK.  Here are links to both of them:

1. North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Risks of Improvisation (38 North)

2. North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Kim Jong Un era and its challenges (Japan Focus)

According to the Daily NK:

Since Kim Jong Eun arrived in public life, North Korea has been handing out preferential promotions to the children of high cadres in the Party and military to secure the loyalty of the elite to Kim Jong Eun by creating a shared sense of destiny.

According to a well-informed source in Seoul, the children of former senior cadres continue to emerge into top leadership positions while the children of current cadres arrive at the core of Party affairs.

Many of the most recently appointed Party secretaries and departmental vice directors are the sons and son-in-laws of former or current high officials.

For example, International Secretary Kim Young Il and Tae Jong Su, the General Affairs Secretary in the Department of Administration, are sons-in-law to former State Inspection Committee Chairman Jeon Moon Seob and former Deputy Prime Minister Jeong Il Ryong respectively. Also, Oh Il Jung, who was made Vice Director of the Chosun Workers’ Party at just 50 or so years of age, is the son of former Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Vice Director Oh Jin Woo.

Elsewhere, Choi Yong Hae, the son of former Vice Director of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Choi Hyun, as well as being a Party secretary has also been made a military general and elevated to the Party Central Military Commission.

In the cabinet, Baek Yong Chun, who presides over Chosun Central Bank, is the son of former Foreign Minister Baek Nam Sun, and Trade Minister Lee Yong Nam is the nephew of People’s Safety Agency Vice Director Lee Myung Soo. Both have advanced to the Party Central Committee under the watchful eye of Kim Jong Eun. The brother of Kim Ok, Kim Jong Il’s fourth and final partner, has also been elevated on the younger Kim’s watch.

There are many more examples, the source said, going on, “The reason behind these high-speed promotions is that their parents or father-in-laws are in high positions,” before noting one more good example, “Lee Yong Ho’s father Lee Myung Jae was a close confidante of Kim Jong Il, having served as Vice Director of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation and Guidance Departments, and in Kim’s secretarial office.”

◆ Current high speed promotions for relatives a dangerous game

However, while the close relationship between family history and promotion will serve these young leaders well, it could turn into a double-edged sword.

The source pointed out, “The special treatment these children get is not because their performance or skills are better than anyone else but because their high official parents have or had special relationships with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In recent years, this tendency to ‘pass down’ has expanded due to Kim Jong Eun’s succession using it as a way to ensure loyalty by tying them together as a ‘group sharing a common destiny’.”

However, he commented, “Forming these special privilege groups will increase the complaints from the people and of course from other officials, and in the end weaken the cohesiveness of the entire system.”

The Korea Times also reports some similar information:

North Korea has handed out decent jobs to children of former and current North Korean elite in what could be an attempt to help ensure the dynastic power succession goes smoothly, a source familiar with the isolated country said Tuesday.

Jang Yong-chol, a nephew of Jang Song-thaek, became North Korea’s ambassador to Malaysia in 2010 before fully serving out his term as Pyongyang’s top envoy to Nepal, the source said.

Jang Song-thaek, a four-star general and brother-in-law of late leader Kim Jong-il, has long been considered a key official in helping Kim’s son, Kim Jong-un, consolidate power.

Kim Jong-un has recently become the supreme commander of the country’s 1.1 million-strong military as part of his moves to strengthen his power base following his father’s sudden death last month.

Top North Korean officials repeatedly swore their loyalty to the young leader, calling him “the brilliant commander” and “another peerless patriot.”

Children of Workers’ Party secretary Kim Yong-il and Vice Premier Kang Sok-ju, a veteran negotiator and key foreign policy advisor to the late leader, have been dispatched to North Korea’s overseas diplomatic missions, the source said.

Meanwhile, Ri Son-il, son of Ri Yong-ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, and Cha Dong-sup, son-in-law of the People’s Armed Forces Minister Kim Yong-chun, are engaged in works to either earn foreign currency or attract foreign investment, the source said.

The nepotism appears to be the North’s attempt to secure the loyalty of the elite to make sure the third-generation power transition goes smoothly, the source said.

The late leader also assumed power in 1994 when his father, the North’s founding leader Kim Il-sung, died of heart failure at the age of 82. (Yonhap)

Read the full stories here:
Nepotism Running Riot in Kim’s NK
Daily NK
Kim Yong-hun
2012-1-11

Children of NK officials receive job favors
Korea Times 
2012-1-11

UPDATE 3 (2012-2-9): ICNK reports that the amnesty was put into motion before Kim Jong-il’s death:

On January 10, KCNA announced a prisoner amnesty be conducted in February. Within North Korea, the move is being propagandized as a sign of the benevolence of their new leader, Kim Jong Un, in a bid to popularize him, bolstering his position as his father’s replacement.

However, the amnesty was clearly being planned long before Kim’s succession, originally to commemorate the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, the 70th birthday of Kim Jong Il and to mark 2012 as the year of the “Strong and Prosperous State”.

The amnesty is also seen as an attempt to pacify discontent citizens within the North, temporarily placating the population while also alleviating international pressure on the regime for its human rights abuses. The amnesty will also benefit authorities in that it will ease some of the burden on the camps’ overpopulation and food supply.

In early February, an ORNK source from Hyesan, Yangkang Province said, “Some elites and upper class people laugh at this amnesty, saying that since the authorities will not be able to meet the promise to make a ‘Strong and Prosperous State’, they did it instead of achieving the strong state so as to cover up their failure.” Meanwhile, others have claimed that, “They carried it out only because they didn’t have any space in prisons, but the authorities try to show off their benevolent policies.”

…

Previous amnesties have been held in 2002, 2005 and 2010 to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s birthday and anniversaries of the establishment of the Workers’ Party. In 2005, North Korean authorities said “The amnesty is to realize the generosity and magnanimity of our Party, which establishes the will and achievements of Suryeong (Kim Il Sung) and brightens the 60th liberation of the country and founding day of the Chosun Worker’s Party.”

UPDATE 2 (2012-2-7): As of today there has been no further information released about the amnesty–either in terms of numbers released, the crimes they are alleged to have committed, or the areas from which they originate or were incarcerated, or the type of facilities in which they were held.

UPDATE 1 (2012-1-11): Accordign to Xinhua, the pardons will be the first in more than six years.

ORIGINAL POST (2012-1-10): According to KCNA (2012-1-10):

Pyongyang, January 10 (KCNA) — The DPRK will apply amnesty to convicts from February 1 on the occasion of the centenary of birth of President Kim Il Sung and the 70th birth anniversary of leader Kim Jong Il, according to a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK on Jan. 5.

The Cabinet and relevant organs will take working measures for those to be released thanks to the amnesty to work and live under stable conditions.

It is the steadfast will of the Workers’ Party of Korea and state to embody generation after generation the noble benevolent and all-embracing politics of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il who energetically worked till the last moments of their great lives, undergoing all sufferings for the people’s happiness throughout them, always finding themselves among them, the decree said.

This story was also covered by the Daily NK, and the BBC.

This may not be Kim Jong-un’s first amnesty. The Daily NK reports that a number of criminals judged to have committed their crimes due to poverty were granted an amnesty in commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party founding in September 2010.

Some thought it was possible that Kim Jong-un might deliver a new year’s address (as Kim Il-sung always did), but instead the leadership has chosen to follow the practice of the Kim Jong-il era by issuing a “joint editorial” by Rodong Sinmun, Joson Inmingun, and Chongnyon Jonwi.

Since I am writing this post well after the joint editorial has already been published, numerous commentators have already weighed in: Choson Exchange, Daily NK, Washington Post, CNN, Business Week, Hankyoreh, IFES, Xinhua.

Below is the full text of the Joint New Year Editorial c/o North East Asia Matters. My hat off to anyone who actually reads the whole thing:

(more…)

According to the Daily NK:

A Hamkyung Province source has informed Daily NK this afternoon of a directive completely forbidding the use of foreign currency in markets, saying he was informed that “As part of the last instructions of Kim Jong Il, those who circulate foreign currency including Yuan and Dollars will be punished more severely than those who deal in drugs.”

“They said it is part of General Kim Jong Il’s last instructions and didn’t say what the reason is, so it is being strictly enforced,” the source added.

In North Korea’s markets, foreign currency is ordinarily preferred to the North Korean Won, and most transactions are conducted accordingly in Chinese Yuan. Therefore, if the new measure is actually enforced it has the potential to cause chaos.

However, it may be just a part of an ongoing competition to display loyalty to Kim Jong Eun, and given that the use of foreign currency is so ubiquitous in North Korea that it would be extremely hard to strictly enforce such a measure, may not last long.

Dong Yong Seung, a researcher with Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul commented after hearing the news from Daily NK, “They could be trying to increase the value of the North Korean Won by stopping use of other currencies.”

Read the full story here:
Authorities Move to Block Currency Usage
Daily NK
Choi Cheong Ho and Cho Jong Ik
2012-1-2

Pictured above are two plaques commemorating the visit of Kim Jong-il (L) and Kim Jong-un (R) at the Taean Friendship Glass Factory in Nampho on 2010-11-24. Read about the visit in KCNA here. This visit took place shortly after Kim Jong-un’s public unveiling at the Workers’ Party Conference on 2010-9-28 (see here, here, and here).

On July 22, 2011, the Daily NK posted pictures of a similar monument at the Wonsan University of Agriculture that was built to commemorate a visit to the university by Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un on 2009-4-26.  Of course the report of this visit in KCNA did not mention Kim Jong-un’s attendance (he had yet to be publicly unveiled) .

According to the Taean Glass Factory plaque, 존경하는 (Jon-gyong-ha-nun) is KJU’s honorific title. Google translates this as, “With all due respect”, which I don’t believe is the best interpretation. Fortunately the Daily NK, again, has some interesting history of Kim Jong-un’s honorific titles, which is helpfully informative (though lacking any Hangul):

North Korea is currently using the prefix ‘respected Comrade General’ to describe successor Kim Jong Eun. The new, elevated name was used in an internal Chosun People’s Army document received by The Daily NK on November 10th.

One defector who held a senior post in North Korea before escaping earlier this year told Daily NK, “The title of ‘youthful Young General’ was used in internal Party documents from 2008, and from 2010 the word ‘respected’ was first added by the military authorities.”

On October 17, Chosun Central TV used the phrase “respected Comrade General Kim Jong Eun” while reporting on a visit to Yongseong Machinery Complex in Hamheung, seemingly reflecting a commemorative plaque with the same caption positioned above a door there. This report may have triggered the nationwide use of Kim’s new official title.

North Korea currently uses the prefix ‘Great’ for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, while Kim Jong Il also receives the second prefix of ‘Dear’.

According to defectors and experts on North Korea, the prefix ‘respected’ was given to Kim Jong Il in 1973. Still a year before he was identified as the successor, Kim, who was at the time both the KWP Central Committee point man for guidance and propaganda, was referred to internally as ‘respected superior’.

In 1974, the year Kim Jong Il officially became the successor, the term ‘Dear Leader’ was first used in an essay, supposedly written by Kim Jong Il himself, entitled ‘On the Number of Tasks Facing Party Ideological Operations for the Spreading of Kim-il-sungism in Society.’

At that time, Rodong Shinmun was using the term ‘Party Center’ as a euphemism, but from that point on the term ‘Dear’ was used when invoking praise for the successor alongside the word “respected”.

The titles ‘great General’ and ‘Supreme Leader’ began then to be used officially after Kim Jong Il rose to the position of Supreme Commander of the Chosun People’s Army in 1991. Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Il’s mother and still praised alongside Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as one of the ‘Three Mt. Baekdu Generals’, is also referred to as ‘Respected’.

Despite his elevated nomenclature, it nevertheless appears likely that Kim Jong Eun will have to wait until he has risen to the position of Supreme Leader and has complete control over the army before he can be called ‘Dear’. When he made his first public address at the Party Delegates’ Conference in September, his titles were simply ‘Vice-Chairman of the Chosun Workers’ Party Central Military Committee’ and ‘General of the Chosun People’s Army’.

However, it does appear that the younger Kim is already effectively wielding power over the military. In the seized military document there is a reference to “the People’s Army, which is under the direct instruction of the Respected Comrade General.”

The document further says that “It is necessary to establish a strong system of discipline whereby all issues that emerge within the operations of the People’s Army are reported as is to the Respected Comrade General, and operations thereby executed in line with his decisions.”

Andrei Lankov also mentions these plaques in his Asia Times article, “The rise of Kim Il-sung’s mini-me”.

Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

In October last year, media worldwide reported that Kim Jong-eun, Kim Jong-il’s third son, had been made a four-star general and promoted to the position of vice chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Military Commission.

It was taken as evidence that at long last, the Dear Leader had decided on his successor. At the time, it was often overlooked that Kim Jong-eun had not yet been officially described as “successor”. Officially, he is merely a top dignitary, even though few would cast doubt on the actual meaning of the promotion of a 28-year-old to a top circle of decisions makers whose average age is well above 70.

Over the following year though, the media – at least, the English-language media – have not paid much attention to the succession process underway in the North. This lack of attention is easy toexplain. The media usually report unusual developments while the North Korean dynastic succession has so far progressed without many surprises.

It seems that North Korea’s decision makers do not want to be too creative. So far, they have generally followed the script which was developed 40 years ago, in the 1970s, when Kim Jong-il was promoted to succeed his father, Kim Il-sung.

From late 2010, Kim Jong-eun began to appear in the pages of the North Korean press and in news broadcasts on North Korean television. He is shown mimicking the public activities of his father (and earlier activities of his grandfather). Kim Jong-eun goes to factories where he explains to the managers how they should run their enterprises and extols workers to labor with even greater enthusiasm.

He is shown touring newly built apartments and inspecting military units, providing artists with moral guidance and mixing with exemplary soldiers.

At least in one case, such a visit was commemorated in stone. In 2009, Kim Jong-eun, then still unknown to most, accompanied his father on a visit to Wonsan Agricultural College. Soon afterwards, a commemorative stone feature was erected to celebrate this great historical event.

One should not be too surprised about this, the present author, when walking through Pyongyang, once came across a wooden bench that was fenced off and had a large commemorative stone placed next to it. The bench’s claim to fame was that in the 1950s, Kim Il-sung, founder of the dynasty, had once placed his buttocks on its wooden planks. Until this year though, such commemorative stones could only mark the activities of the two elder Kims. Now it seems that the successor has joined the top league.

Kim Jong-eun has been introduced to foreign embassies in Pyongyang and now frequently meets with visiting foreign officials and delegations. Recently, during a meeting with a Chinese dignitary, he was pictured sitting on the right hand side of the guest while his father, Marshal Kim Jong-il, sat on the left.

Jong-eun’s attire is worth noting. He wears a navy blue Mao Zedong suit. This dress is rather anachronistic, but it clearly has been chosen for its symbolism: his grandfather wore exactly the same daily uniform in the 1950s and 1960s. Kim Jong-eun resembles his grandfather indeed, and the likeness is further emphasized by his choice of haircut. This exercise in political image-making delivers a clear message: Kim Jong-eun is the next incarnation of his grandfather, the legitimate heir to the Kim dynasty.

Kim Jong-eun’s connection with his still-ruling father is also emphasized in clothing selection. In winter, he appears clad in a grey parka that is an exact copy of Kim Jong-il’s winter dress. In other words, the successor is made to look like a young clone of his two predecessors.

One should probably not overstate the significance of these facts too much, but nonetheless, this does not encourage the idea that Kim Jong-eun will break with the current line and become a radical reformer.

Every ruler of the Kim family has had his own, clearly defined, set of titles. Nowadays Kim Il-sung is usually referred to as the “Leader” (suryong in Korean) and Kim Jong-il is usually referred to as the “General” (changun). Kim Jong-eun, unremarkably, has also acquired a title: he supposed to be referred to as the “Four-star General” (taejang) – in Korean, this is a technical term for a military rank, different from the generic “General”, which is Kim Jong-il’s title.

Recently, North Koreans saw the emergence of a new type of personality cult-related object: three plaques or stones, identical in size and shape, each containing a short three character inscription. Such triple plaques or stones are increasingly common in public places in North Korea.

One plaque says “The blessing [of having] the leader”, the next says “The blessing [of having] the general”, while the last one says “The blessing [of having] the four-star general.” As we remember, “Leader” means Kim Il-sung, “General” stands for Kim Jong-il, and the “four-star General” is Jong-eun’s new sobriquet.

This is a way to remind North Koreans how incredibly lucky they are to be blessed by destiny, which has provided them with three geniuses of leadership, the three best leaders the world has ever seen.

As one should expect, the arts have been put to good political use as well. For the past few years, North Koreans have been encouraged to sing a song entitled Footsteps. It extols the manifold virtues of Jong-eun and especially his desire to be among the common people and take care of their needs.

Ko Yong-hui, Jong-eun’s late mother, has also begun to get her fair share of attention. Back in the 1970s, Kim Jong-il’s rise to power gave birth to personality cult for his mother, Kim Jong-suk. Jong-eun’s mother was a beautiful folk dancer who died in 2004. Nowadays she is supposed to be referred to as “Pyongyang’s mother”. Predictably, there is at least one song dedicated to her virtues and glory.

The city of Wonsan seemingly has started somewhat special standing in North Korea. Jong-eun’s mother was actually born in Japan, but she moved to North Korea with a large number of pro-Pyongyang ethnic Koreans. The major port of arrival for these people was Wonsan and it has been stated that Jong-eun described this city as “his second home town”.

According to some rumors, he was actually born in one of the Kim Jong-il’s residences in Wonsan or close by, but it is not currently clear whether these rumors should be taken seriously. Nonetheless, Wonsan is clearly a rising star of North Korea’s political geography.

What does this all mean? So far it seems that North Korea’s agitprop department is following the pattern that was developed in the 1970s. Then, they spent a few years on promoting the personality cult of the newly appointed successor whose virtues and devotion to the people were continuously extolled.

A significant part of this propaganda appeared in confidential publications that were not supposed to be seen by outsiders and often not even by common North Koreans as well. This allowed them to claim that the North Korean public suddenly experienced a burst of spontaneous love for young Kim Jong-il. His official confirmation as his father’s successor was presented as merely the corollary of this universal love and admiration.

In the case of Kim Jong-il, these preparations took eight years. Kim Jong-il was selected as successor and promoted to top positions in the government in 1972, but his standing as heir-designate remained unofficial until 1980. In 1980, the sixth congress of the Korean Workers’ Party officially declared Kim Jong-il to be the official successor of Kim Il-sung.

Recent events, especially the speedy emergence of Jong-eun’s personality cult, leaves little doubt that the decision pertaining to his future has been made and is unlikely to be changed. However, he is yet to be declared a successor, officially and unequivocally. Technically speaking, he is merely one of a dozen top military commanders, albeit very young and enjoying unparalleled admiration among the common people.

If the experiences of the 1970s are a guide as to what is likely to happen, we should expect that in due time Jong-eun’s standing will be made official. Judging by the hype North Korean propaganda makes about 2012 (meant to be a year of great events and achievements), one cannot rule out that the final promotion will happen as soon as next year – perhaps, but not necessarily, at a party congress which will be convened for this purposes.

There is one noticeable difference between Kim Jong-il’s promotion in the 1970s and Kim Jong-eun’s promotion of late. In the case of Jong-eun, North Korean agitprop has moved much faster, so it may be possible that the entire preparatory phase be compressed into two or three years.

They have a good reason to be in a hurry. Kim Il-sung was 60 when he made a decision about his son, Kim Jong-il made the same decision at the age of 68, whilst being in far worse physical shape. So nobody knows how much time North Korea has to complete the tricky dynastic succession.

At any rate, things appear to be moving smoothly right now. The succession process has yet to run into any noticeable obstacles. So the chances are that the world’s youngest four-star general will succeed Marshal Kim Jong-il, becoming the third Kim to rule the world’s only communist absolute monarchy.

Read the full story here:
The rise of Kim Il-sung’s mini-me
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
2011-11-8