North Korean Economy Watch

There are a bunch of Kim Jong-un stories in the media recently so I thought I would just post them here.

First of all, the Donga Ilbo reports that staff at North Korean missions have been told to pledge their loyalty to Kim Jong-un.

North Korea is known to have ordered its overseas missions to send written pledges of loyalty to heir apparent Kim Jong Un following his appointment as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the ruling Workers’ Party.

Pyongyang also told them to send congratulatory letters to leader Kim Jong Il on his reappointment as the party’s general secretary.

A source on North Korea based in China said Tuesday, “Since last week, North Korean diplomats and traders in China have been sending loyalty letters to Kim Jong Un and congratulatory letters to Kim Jong Il. It is highly probable that Pyongyang ordered those residing elsewhere to do the same.”

This signals that the North is building up hype over Kim Jong Un and will introduce him as its next leader. A propaganda campaign is known to have begun on raising his profile.

Pyongyang is preparing a massive festival to celebrate the 65th anniversary of the Workers` Party, and will also make some 10 million portraits of Kim Jong Un for distribution.

“I heard that North Koreans in Beijing recently received education, possibly on the plan for the succession of the third generation of the Kim family,” the source said.

In August, North Korean authorities are known to have told overseas diplomats and traders to pledge their loyalty to Kim Jong Un, according to another source. “In August, they were ordered to send letters and gifts ahead of the party convention in September. Since Kim Jong Un’s name had to remain secret, the letters called Jong Un ‘Young Gen. Kim,’” the source said.

Daily NK, a South Korea-based Web site on news on the North, said Wednesday that “loyalty resolve gatherings” are being held by the North Korean military.

Quoting a source from North Hamkyong Province in the communist country, the site said, “Official events have been held by border guard brigades, including the 25th Brigade in Ryanggang Province and the 27th Brigade in North Hamkyong Province, to praise and celebrate Kim Jong Il as the party’s general secretary and Kim Jong Un as his successor.”

The source said soldiers shouted slogans such as “With respect for young Gen. Kim Jong Un, we will complete our revolutionary achievements to the end!”

Though such gatherings have not yet been held outside the military, the source predicted that all sections, departments and workplaces will have to hold them soon.

Surprisingly, Kim Jong-nam has expresses his opposition (and loyalty) to the succession and North Korean system.  According to the Daily NK:

Kim Jong Nam, the outspoken first son of Kim Jong Il, has made a surprise revelation to a Japanese media outlet in Beijing, saying, “Personally, I am opposed to the third generation succession.”

In the interview with TV Asahi on the 9th, the day before the founding day of the Chosun Workers’ Party, Kim appeared to ward off the possible aftermath of his comments by appending, “However, I believe there must have been good reasons for it internally,” and adding, “And as long as there are reasons, I think we have to follow them.”

Regarding Kim Jong Eun’s appointment as successor, he went on, “It is my father’s decision,” and added, “There is nothing to regret. I have not taken any interest in it and I don’t care about it at all.”

However, Kim took the chance to extend the hand of assistance to his younger half-brother, saying, “I am prepared to assist my brother from abroad whenever he needs it. I will help him anytime.”

Asked to send a message to Kim Jong Eun, he said, “I hope my brother will do his best for the good life of North Korea and for the North Korean people.”

Kim Jong Nam’s occasional cameo appearances in the international media look like an effort to limit the tension that exists between himself and Kim Jong Eun through indirect channels.

One anonymous South Korean expert on international relations and strategy also alleges that Kim Jong Nam may be under the protection of Beijing, citing the fact that he was nowhere to be seen when the succession issue was at the forefront late last month and early in October, appearing to have gone into hiding.

An official with South Korean intelligence authorities explained the backdrop, saying, “We know that Kim Jong Nam left Macau and is living in China and another third country. Since he was born to a different mother (Sung Hye Rim) from Jong Eun and Jong Cheol (Ko Young Hee), Kim Jong Nam has lost influence.”

Since the early 2000s when he attempted to enter Japan on a fake Dominican Republic passport, Kim Jong Nam has been excluded from the heart of North Korean politics, living in Macau.

Perhaps Kim Jong-nam feels he may speak so openly because China has guaranteed his safety.  According to the Choson Ilbo:

Close aides to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s third son Jong-un planned to attack his older brother Kim Jong-nam when Jong-un was named as the successor to the leadership in January last year but China told them to leave him alone, officials here said Tuesday.

The North Korean leader’s reform-minded oldest son has been living in virtual exile in Beijing and Macau since he fell out of favor with his father.

A South Korean official said Jong-un’s aides tried “to do something to Kim Jong-nam, who has a loose tongue abroad,” but it seems China warned them not to lay a hand on him on Chinese soil.

Kim Jong-nam reportedly has close ties with China’s powerful “princelings,” an elite group of the children of senior Chinese officials. The plan was apparently fuelled by rumors that China would attempt to march into the North and install Kim Jong-nam as the ruler in case the regime collapses.

“Kim Jong-nam won’t go back to the North but stay in China,” the official added.

On Saturday, the 38-year old told Japanese TV he is against the hereditary succession in the North.

The Telegraph has more:

Since then Jong-nam has lead a fairly “ordinary” life with his wife and two children, flitting between the gambling hub of Macau and Beijing where he maintains a second property on a reported £500,000-a-year allowance.

Ruediger Frank writes in 38 North:

“Finally,” one is tempted to say. The years of speculation and half-baked news from dubious sources are over. The leadership issue in North Korea has been officially resolved. Or has it?

The third delegate’s meeting[1] of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) on September 28, 2010 answered a few questions. Still, it left some unanswered and posed quite a few new ones as well. In the end, Kim Jong Il emerged the undisputed leader. But has his legitimacy become more independent of his father than it used to be? Kim Jong Un has been introduced to the people. Does this mean he is going to succeed Kim Jong Il? Or will he succeed Kim Il Sung? Kim Jong Il’s sister Kim Kyong Hui has been promoted to the rank of general and is part of the party leadership. Is she supposed to support her nephew, or is this part of a strategy to more broadly enhance the family’s power? Her husband Jang Song Thaek is also on board. Will he share the caretaking job with his wife? Are there any other members of the extended Kim family on the team?

The Hard Facts

(1) On Monday, September 27, 2010, Kim Jong Un was mentioned for the first time in official North Korean media when he was promoted to the rank of general. Now, at last, we know for sure how to write his name (we use the official North Korean version for English; it would be Kim Jong-ùn according to McCune/Reischauer).

(2) On the same day, Kim Jong Il’s sister was promoted to the same military rank as her nephew.

(3) On September 28, 2010, one day later, the first delegate’s meeting of the WPK in 44 years and the biggest gathering since the last (Sixth) Party congress in 1980 opened after a mysterious delay. It had originally been announced for “early September.”

(4) Contrary to western media speculation, Kim Jong Il did not step down nor did he hand over any of his powers to his son. Rather, he was confirmed as the current leader of the party, the military, and the country.

(5) From 1945 until 1980, the WPK held six Party Congresses and two conferences or delegate’s meetings. This means that on average, the WPK had one major Party event every 4.4 years. However, over the next 30 years, it had none. The 21st and so far last plenum of the WPK was held in December 1993. Now, the defunct leadership structure of the WPK has been restored and the delegates elected 124 members of the Central Committee (CC) and 105 alternates. From among the members, 17 were named to the Politburo (PB) of the CC, and 15 as alternates.

(6) The Politburo is headed by a Presidium or Standing Committee of five people, with Kim Jong Il at the top as the general secretary of the WPK.[2] It also consists of Kim Yong Nam (82 years old),[3] Choe Yong Rim (80 years old),[4] Jo Myong Rok (82 years old)[5] and Ri Yong Ho (68 years old).[6] The latter was promoted the day before the delegate’s meeting to the post of vice marshal. He ranks above Kim Jong Un and his aunt and is rumored to be a member of the Kim family, which if true, implies a particularly strong base for loyalty. Given the advanced age of most of its members, if the Presidium is not newly elected in a few years, who will remain? This makes Mr. Ri particularly interesting.

(7) All three known close relatives of Kim Jong Il received posts in the WPK. Kim Jong Un became vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (see below). His aunt Kim Kyong Hui became a member of the Politburo and her husband Jang Song Thaek was made an alternate. The names of regular and alternate members were not provided in alphabetical order, indicating a certain hierarchy. Kim Kyong Hui’s name was listed last out of 17 and Jang was 5th out of 15. A day later, he was 14th (out of 15) on a list of short bios of regular and alternate Politburo members. Kim Kyong Hui was the only member in addition to Kim Jong Il for whom no details were provided.

(8) Except for the Central Committee, there is not a single leadership organ where all three close relatives of Kim Jong Il hold a post. Kim Jong Un is excluded from the Politburo altogether; Kim Kyong Hui is not on the Central Military Commission; and Jang Song Thaek is only an alternate Politburo member. We could speculate that Kim Jong Il wants to prevent having too high a concentration of power in the hands of one of his relatives. He has made sure that the most crucial instruments of power are staffed with the most loyal of his followers who will be ready to walk the extra mile and fulfill his strategic decisions with all the energy of a family member and co-owner.

(9) As was expected, Kim Jong Un has not (yet) become a member or an alternate member of the Politburo, the second-highest leading organ of the party, but did receive a high-ranking post in the WPK’s Central Military Commission. As far as we know, this is essentially the organization through which the Party controls the military, and hence the most powerful of the WPK’s organs. It is no coincidence that this commission is chaired by Kim Jong Il himself. His son comes next in the hierarchy—he is the first of the commission’s two vice-chairmen. Jang Song Thaek is a member, too, but the one with the lowest rank, so it seems. His name was listed last out of 19. Kim Kyong Hui is not a member of the Central Military Commission.

(10) On September 29, 2010, an unusually long and detailed KCNA article was published with profiles of all Politburo members. In addition, a large group picture was published that showed the delegates and the complete Central Committee, including Kim Jong Un. The photo rather openly revealed the true hierarchy within the Party leadership; only 19 people were sitting in the front row, the others were standing. Kim Jong Un sat just one space away from his father, while Kim Kyong Hui sat five spaces away from the center. In a KCNA report on the taking of this picture, Kim Jong Un’s name came fourth after the Politburo Presidium members Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim and Ri Yong Ho. Kim Kyong Hui was number 18, and Jang Song Thaek was number 23 on that exclusive list of 33 leaders.

(11) A total of 14 department directors of the Central Committee were appointed, among them Jang Song Thaek and Kim Kyong Hui. However, contrary to predictions by many analysts, Kim Jong Un does not seem to have been appointed director of the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), a post his father held before he was announced as Kim Il Sung’s successor.[7] This could be due to a number of reasons. Either, Kim Jong Un already effectively held that post—we may not know since the last time such positions were given officially was 1980—or the division of labor (and power) within the party has changed, for example in the context of the Military First Policy. In that case, the OGD post may simply not be as important as it used to be. This would imply that the Central Military Commission now makes all the important appointments, and the OGD is merely an administrative unit like any human resources department.

(12) The North Korean media published a message from China’s leader Hu Jintao only a day after the delegate’s meeting. He stressed the deep and traditional friendship, close geographical relationship, and wide-ranging common interests of the two countries. Hu pledged to defend and promote the bilateral relationship, always holding fast to it in a strategic view under the long-term discernment no matter how the international situation may change (KCNA, 29.09.2010). This was a message to the North Korean people and the international community: China is going to support the new North Korean leadership (model).

What Have We Learned?

The Party meeting provided final proof of what has often been doubted since Kim Jong Il took over as leader of North Korea after 1994. All the other things one might say about him notwithstanding, Kim Il Sung undisputedly was an able politician. He did not choose his eldest son Kim Jong Il as his successor by chance. Despite his health problems, Kim Jong Il is (still) able to play the power game. He paved the way for a new leadership without turning himself into a lame duck. He did so by not leaving any important posts to somebody else—although, at the same time, he did not monopolize those positions. He distributed power among a core group of family members and his father’s loyalists, while also ensuring that none of them can be certain to be significantly higher-ranking than any of their colleagues. As in juche, where in the end everything depends on the judgment of the leader, power in North Korea remains Kim’s sole domain. At the same time, he has done what any good CEO does: delegate authority to avoid energy-consuming micro-management of each and every aspect of his job.

The most important decision regarding human resources has been the introduction of Kim Jong Un as a member of the top leadership of the Party and of the military. He will now have to quickly develop a record (at least on paper) of spectacular achievements, so that he can be quickly presented to the people as the most logical and capable candidate for the next leadership post. Since Kim Jong Un was appointed with a clear reference to the military, Kim Jong Il appears to be following the same strategy his father did after 1980. At that time, North Korea analysts noticed that the late O Jin U, the top military official, was always standing close to Kim Jong Il. It would now be logical to expect that like his father before him, Kim Jong Un will be responsible for the promotion of top military officers, thereby ensuring their loyalty.

In terms of strategic decisions, its seems that the succession from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un will be different from the last changing of the guard in 1994. As early as 2008, it seemed likely that the role of the Party would be strengthened substantially. The restoration of the WPK’s formal power organs and the many biographical details that were provided on the top leadership circle, including the group photo, indicate that the new leader will not be as autocratic as his predecessors. The new leadership will have more faces; we could observe something similar a few months ago in the case of the National Defense Commission. This is the reflection of a trend, not a spontaneous event.

What seems most notable is the renewed emphasis on Kim Il Sung as the sole source of legitimacy in North Korea. Kim Jong Il is not going to replace him, which would have been a precondition for the perpetuation of the current system of leadership. Therefore, in a sense, Kim Jong Un and all those who come after him will be, like Kim Jong Il, successors of Kim Il Sung.

Concerning the process of power transfer, as expected, a multi-stage approach is unfolding. At least one more stage will be needed. Chances are good that this will take place at the Seventh Party Congress, whose date is as of yet unannounced. 2012 would be a good time considering the health of Kim Jong Il and that year’s auspicious meaning—the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birthday. As stated above, Kim Il Sung was a capable politician. He was clearly aware of the fact that sooner or later, his son would face the succession issue. It would be a great surprise if he hadn’t talked about this with him and jointly developed a rough plan as to how create a sustainable model of power succession. The two problems Kim Il Sung could not consider, simply for technical reasons, were who exactly would show the necessary capabilities to become the next successor, and how much time Kim Jong Il would have to oversee and guide that process.

The year 2008 indeed marked a watershed when, because of his illness, Kim Jong Il realized the need for a quick solution. The last thing an autocrat wants is to create the impression of being forced to act, and of time running out. So he used the already fixed year 2012 not only as the year of the celebration of his father’s 100th birthday, but also as the year when great changes will happen and the gate to becoming a Strong and Prosperous Great Country will be opened. From this perspective, I would argue that Kim Jong Il is indeed fighting a “speed battle,” but in the form of compressing a process that was planned long ago and supposed to last longer, rather than creating such a process from scratch and hastily.

The China Factor

The message of support from Hu Jintao along with the two visits of Kim Jong Il to China before the delegate’s meeting immediately lead to the question: What type of North Korea will China support? Clearly, the last thing China wants is for North Korea to collapse. Such a situation would create a serious dilemma for Beijing. It could either do nothing and watch the U.S. sphere of influence expand right to its border, or it could actively interfere. This would instantly shatter all Chinese efforts to display itself to the carefully watching countries in the region as a peaceful giant that is a real alternative to protection by the United States. In the end, this is what North Korea is all about—competition between Beijing and Washington. Pyongyang knows this.

A third path may be open to China. The North has realized that the economic reforms of 2002, which focused on agriculture and hence closely resembled the Chinese example of 1979, were in principle a good idea, but that conditions were so unlike those in China that the results inevitably differed. In principle, the understanding that economic reform is necessary remains but reservations against the political side effects of such reforms have grown substantially due to the chaos that emerged in the aftermath of the 2002 measures. Given North Korea’s structure as an industrialized economy, reforms need to take place in industry.

There is a well-established blueprint for this; we call it the East Asian model. In short, it consists of a strong state that controls a few big players in the economy—zaibatsu or keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in Korea, and the state owned companies in China. A core requirement for this model to succeed is a huge source of finance, coupled with a strong political partner that, for a while, is willing to turn a blind eye on protectionism. The United States played that role partly for Japan, and very strongly for South Korea. China is now willing to do this service for North Korea under certain political conditions.

Many signs point in the direction of North Korea “returning” to the path of orthodox socialism, or at least to its East Asian version. “Rule by the Party”—a collective with a first among equals at the top—is not only a key component of any socialist textbook case, it is also characteristic of the Chinese model since 1978. After two leaders of the Mao Zedong type, North Korea may now be getting ready for one similar to the position that the current Chinese President, Hu Jintao, occupies in China—that is, a strong leader who rules as the head of a collective. With some luck, Kim Jong Un might even turn out to be a Deng Xiaoping—a man who has the power and vision to use this post to initiate and execute crucial reforms.

1. Below are some photos of the conference posted on Daylife.com including the first official pictures of Kim Jong-un:

2. As mentioned in the previous post, Kim Jong-il’s sister and son were named to the KPA and various KWP offices.

3. Hu Jintao endorses the conference outcome.  According to KCNA:

I, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and on my own behalf, extend warm congratulations to you on the successful WPK Conference, your reelection as general secretary of the WPK and the election of its supreme leadership body.

The WPK headed by General Secretary Kim Jong Il has achieved great successes in the cause of building Korean-style socialism through self-reliance and strenuous efforts by leading all the Korean people for many years.

In recent years the Korean people have made a series of admirable achievements in economic development, improvement of the people’s standard of living and other fields to build a great prosperous and powerful nation.

China and the DPRK maintain deep and traditional friendship and close geographical relationship with wide-ranging common interests.

It is the steadfast policy of the Chinese party and government to consolidate and develop the Sino-DPRK friendly and cooperative relations.

We defend and promote the bilateral relationship, always holding fast to it in a strategic view under the long-term discernment no matter how the international situation may change.

We will strive together with the DPRK side to steadily put the bilateral relations on a new stage and provide greater happiness to the peoples of the two countries and make greater contribution to achieving lasting peace and common prosperity of the region.

I heartily wish you and the WPK continued and greater fresh successes in the work to build a thriving nation by leading the Korean people.

Hu Jintao repeated support a couple of days later.  According to the  AFP:

Chinese President Hu Jintao on Saturday pledged to strengthen ties with the new leadership in North Korea, during a visit to Beijing by a senior delegation from Pyongyang, state media reported.

Hu’s comments come after ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il this week offered senior posts in the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) to his son Jong-Un and promoted him to the rank of general — signs that he is the heir apparent.

China is North Korea’s sole major ally and provides an economic lifeline to impoverished Pyongyang.

“We believe that the WPK, the DPRK government and people will see new achievements in their national construction under the new WPK leadership,” Hu said, according to China’s official Xinhua news agency.

Hu, who has welcomed Kim to China twice this year, said the Communist party would work with the WPK’s new leaders to “promote and expand cooperation” and “strengthen communication” on regional and international issues, Xinhua said.

The leader of the North Korean delegation, party politburo member Choe Thae Bok, said Kim’s decision to dispatch a high-level group of envoys so soon after the WPK conference “shows the importance the DPRK attaches to the consensus reached by leaders of the two countries,” the report added.

4. KCNA recounts the conference outcomes:

WPK Conference Held
Pyongyang, September 28 (KCNA) — The Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held with success in Pyongyang on Sept. 28.

Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the WPK and chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, was present at the Conference.

Present there were delegates elected at the meeting of WPK delegates of the Korean People’s Army and provincial and political bureaus’ meetings of delegates of the WPK.

Officials of the party, armed forces and power organs, working people’s organizations, ministries and national institutions, servicepersons and officials in the fields of science, education, public health, culture and arts and media attended the Conference as observers.

All the participants observed a moment’s silence in memory of President Kim Il Sung who successfully accomplished the cause of founding the Juche-type revolutionary party for the first time in history and developed the WPK into a powerful ever-victorious staff of the revolution.

Kim Yong Nam made an opening address.

Choe Yong Rim worked as chairman at the Conference upon authorization by the consultative meeting of provincial delegates.

The Conference elected its Presidium.

The Presidium included Kim Jong Il and Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Kim Yong Chun, Jang Song Thaek, Ri Yong Ho, Kim Jong Gak, Jon Pyong Ho, Choe Thae Bok, Yang Hyong Sop, Hong Sok Hyong, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Ki Nam, Paek Se Bong, U Tong Chuk and Ju Kyu Chang.

The Conference decided on the following agenda items.

1. On the reelection of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK
2. On the revision of the WPK rules
3. Election of the central leadership body of the WPK

The Conference discussed the first agenda item.

Kim Yong Nam delivered a speech proposing Kim Jong Il’s reelection as general secretary of the WPK.

He said in his speech that Kim Jong Il has devoted his all to the prosperity of the country and the nation and the victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche only for decades since he embarked upon the road of the revolution.

The half a century-long history of Kim Jong Il’s revolutionary activities was a history of heroic struggles in which he blazed the path with his ceaseless thinking and pursuit and extraordinary energy and a history of victories in which he made gigantic creation and innovations with his iron will and pluck, the speaker said, and continued:

The recent meeting of WPK delegates of the KPA and meetings of provincial and political bureaus elected Kim Jong Il as a delegate of the WPK Conference reflecting the unanimous will of the army and people of the DPRK to invariably hold Kim Jong Il in high esteem as general secretary of the WPK.

Having Kim Jong Il at the top post of the WPK, organizer and guide of all victories of the Korean people, is the greatest happiness and highest honor of all the party members, servicepersons and people.

Kim Yong Nam courteously proposed to the Conference the reelection of Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK reflecting the unanimous will and wishes of all the party members, servicepersons and people of the country.

Then followed speeches by Chief of the KPA General Staff Ri Yong Ho who is a delegate of the KPA party organization, First Secretary of the C.C., the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League Ri Yong Chol who is a delegate of the Pyongyang City party organization, Chairman of the C.C., the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea Hyon Sang Ju who is a delegate of the Jagang Provincial party organization, Chairman of the C.C., the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea Ri Myong Gil who is a delegate of the North Phyongan Provincial party organization and President of Kim Il Sung University and concurrently Minister of Higher Education Song Ja Rip who is a delegate of the Pyongyang City party organization.

The speakers fully supported and approved in unison the proposal of the Conference on reelecting Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK.

A resolution of the WPK Conference on reelecting Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK was read out there.

The Conference discussed the second agenda item.

A resolution on the revision of the WPK rules was adopted.

The Conference discussed the third agenda item.

The Conference declared that Kim Il Sung, founder of the WPK and outstanding leader who led the party and the revolution to victories only, would be always held in esteem at the supreme leadership organ of the WPK reflecting the unanimous will and wishes of all the party members, servicepersons and people.

It also declared that Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the WPK, was reelected as member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK, member of the C.C., the WPK and chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK according to the WPK rules and the detailed regulations for the election of the supreme leadership body of the WPK.

The Conference elected the central leadership body of the WPK.

Then followed the election of members and alternate members of the C.C., the WPK.

Candidates for the members and alternate members of the C.C., the WPK were elected as members and alternate members of the C.C., the WPK.

The members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK were elected.

Candidates for the members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK were elected as members of the commission.

The Conference notified its participants of the decisions of the September 2010 Plenary Meeting of the C.C., the WPK.

The results of the election of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK and the secretaries of the C.C., the WPK and organization of the Secretariat were made public there.

The results of organization of the Central Military Commission of the WPK were released.

The appointment of the department directors of the C.C., the WPK and the editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the C.C., the WPK, and the results of election of the Control Commission of the C.C., the WPK were made public.

The Conference notified its participants of the decisions made at the First Plenary Meeting of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK.

Kim Yong Nam made a closing speech.

The Conference marked a significant occasion that demonstrated the revolutionary faith and will of all the party members, servicepersons and people to glorify the WPK as the glorious party of Kim Il Sung for all ages and accomplish the Songun revolutionary cause of Juche started on Mt. Paektu by invariably having Kim Jong Il, peerless political elder and illustrious Songun commander, at the top post of the party and the revolution.

5. According to  KCNA the WPK rules were changed, but I am unsure how.

6. Official Report on Plenum of WPK Central Committee:

The meeting discussed the following agenda items:

1. Election of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee

2. Election of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee

3. Election of Secretaries of the WPK Central Committee and on Organization of the Secretariat

4. On Organization of the WPK Central Military Commission

5. On Appointment of Department Directors of the WPK Central Committee and the Editor-in-Chief of Rodong Sinmun, an Organ of the WPK Central Committee

6. Election of the Control Commission of the WPK Central Committee

The meeting elected the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee.

It elected secretaries of the WPK Central Committee and organized the Secretariat.

It organized the WPK Central Military Commission.

It appointed department directors of the WPK Central Committee and the editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the WPK Central Committee.

It elected chairman, vice-chairmen and members of the Control Commission of the WPK Central Committee.

7. According to KCNA: The Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee is made up of Kim Jong Il, Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Jo Myong Rok and Ri Yong Ho.

8. According to KCNA:  Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea are Kim Jong Il, Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Jo Myong Rok, Ri Yong Ho, Kim Yong Chun, Jon Pyong Ho, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Ki Nam, Choe Thae Bok, Yang Hyong Sop, Kang Sok Ju, Pyon Yong Rip, Ri Yong Mu, Ju Sang Song, Hong Sok Hyong and Kim Kyong Hui. Alternate members of the Political Bureau are Kim Yang Gon, Kim Yong Il, Pak To Chun, Choe Ryong Hae, Jang Song Thaek, Ju Kyu Chang, Ri Thae Nam, Kim Rak Hui, Thae Jong Su, Kim Phyong Hae, U Tong Chuk, Kim Jong Gak, Pak Jong Sun, Kim Chang Sop and Mun Kyong Dok.

9. According to KCNA: The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea is as follows: Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Secretaries of the C.C., WPK Kim Ki Nam, Choe Thae Bok, Choe Ryong Hae, Mun Kyong Dok, Pak To Chun, Kim Yong Il, Kim Yang Gon, Kim Phyong Hae, Thae Jong Su and Hong Sok Hyong

10. According to KCNA: The Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea is as follows: Chairman Kim Jong Il, Vice-Chairmen Kim Jong Un and Ri Yong Ho and Members Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Won Hong, Jong Myong Do, Ri Pyong Chol, Choe Pu Il, Kim Yong Chol, Yun Jong Rin, Ju Kyu Chang, Choe Sang Ryo, Choe Kyong Song, U Tong Chuk, Choe Ryong Hae and Jang Song Thaek.

11. According to KCNA: Department directors of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea:  Kim Ki Nam, Jang Song Thaek, Kim Yong Il, Kim Phyong Hae, Ri Yong Su, Ju Kyu Chang, Hong Sok Hyong, Kim Kyong Hui, Choe Hui Jong, O Il Jong, Kim Yang Gon, Kim Jong Im, Chae Hui Jong and Thae Jong Su.  Kim Ki Ryong was nominated to be editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the WPK Central Committee.

12. According to KCNA:  Members and Alternate Members of WPK Central Committee:The following are members of the WPK Central Committee: Kim Jong Il, Kang Nung Su, Kang Tong Yun, Kang Sok Ju, Kang Phyo Yong, Kang Yang Mo, Ko Pyong Hyon, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Ki Nam, Kim Ki Ryong, Kim Rak Hui, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Pyong Ryul, Kim Pyong Ho, Kim Song Dok, Kim Song Chol, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Im, Kim Chang Sop, Kim Chol Man, Kim Chun Sam, Kim Thae Bong, Kim Phyong Hae, Kim Hyong Ryong, Kim Hyong Sik, Kim Hi Thaek, Kim Yang Gon, Kim Yong Nam, Kim Yong Chun, Kim Yong Il, Kim Yong Chol, Kim Yong Jin, Kim In Sik, Kim Won Hong, Kwak Pom Gi, Ryang Man Gil, Ryo Chun Sok, Ro Tu Chol, Ro Pae Gwon, Ryu Yong Sop, Ri Ryong Nam, Ri Man Gon, Ri Myong Su, Ri Mu Yong, Ri Pyong Sam, Ri Pyong Chol, Ri Pong Dok, Ri Pong Juk, Ri Thae Nam, Ri Hyong Gun, Ri Hi Hon, Ri Yong Gil, Ri Yong Su, Ri Yong Ho, Ri Yong Mu, Ri Yong Hwan, Ri Yong Chol, Ri Ul Sol, Rim Kyong Man, Mun Kyong Dok, Pak Kwang Chol, Pak To Chun, Pak Myong Chol, Pak Su Gil, Pak Sung Won, Pak Jong Sun, Pak Jong Gun, Pak Jae Gyong, Pak Thae Dok, Pak Ui Chun, Pyon Yong Rip, Pyon In Son, Paek Se Bong, Song Ja Rip, Jang Pyong Gyu, Jang Song Thaek, Jang Chol, Jon Kil Su, Jon Ryong Guk, Jon Pyong Ho, Jon Jin Su, Jon Chang Bok, Jon Ha Chol, Jon Hui Jong, Jong Myong Do, Jong Ho Gyun, Jong In Guk, Jo Kyong Chol, Jo Myong Rok, Jo Pyong Ju, Ju Kyu Chang, Ju Sang Song, Ju Yong Sik, Cha Sung Su, Chae Hui Jong, Choe Kyong Song, Choe Ryong Hae, Choe Pu Il, Choe Sang Ryo, Choe Thae Bok, Choe Hui Jong, Choe Yong Dok, Choe Yong Rim, Thae Jong Su, Han Kwang Bok, Han Tong Gun, Hyon Chol Hae, Hyon Yong Chol, Hong Sok Hyong, Hong In Bom, An Jong Su, Yang Tong Hun, Yang Hyong Sop, O Kuk Ryol, O Kum Chol, O Su Yong, O Il Jong, U Tong Chuk, Yun Tong Hyon and Yun Jong RinThe alternate members are: Kang Ki Sop, Kang Kwan Ju, Kang Kwan Il, Kang Min Chol, Kang Hyong Bong, Ko Su Il, Kim Kyok Sik, Kim Kye Gwan, Kim Tong Un, Kim Tong Il, Kim Tong I, Kim Tong Il, Kim Myong Sik, Kim Pyong Hun, Kim Pong Ryong, Kim Chang Myong, Kim Chon Ho, Kim Chung Gol, Kim Thae Mun, Kim Hui Yong, Kim Yong Suk, Kim Yong Jae, Kim Yong Ho, Kim Yong Gwang, Kim U Ho, Kwon Hyok Bong, No Kwang Chol, Tong Jong Ho, Tong Yong Il, Ryom In Yun, Ro Kyong Jun, Ro Song Sil, Ryu Kyong, Ri Kuk Jun, Ri Ki Su, Ri Myong Gil, Ri Min Chol, Ri Sang Gun, Ri Song Gwon, Ri Su Yong, Ri Jong Sik, Ri Jae Il, Ri Je Son, Ri Chan Hwa, Ri Chang Han, Ri Chol, Ri Chun Il, Ri Thae Sop, Ri Thae Chol, Ri Hong Sop, Ri Hi Su, Ri Yong Ju, Ri Yong Ho, Ri Il Nam, Pak Ri Sun, Pak Pong Ju, Pak Chang Bom, Paek Kye Ryong, Paek Ryong Chon, So Tong Myong, Son Chong Nam, Song Kwang Chol, Sin Sung Hun, Jang Myong Hak, Jang Yong Gol, Jang Ho Chan, Jon Kyong Son, Jon Kwang Rok, Jon Song Ung, Jon Chang Rim, Jong Myong Hak, Jong Pong Phil, Jong Pong Gun, Jong Un Hak, Jo Song Hwan, Jo Jae Yong, Jo Yong Chol, Ji Jae Ryong, Cha Kyong Il, Cha Jin Sun, Cha Yong Myong, Choe Ki Ryong, Choe Kwan Jun, Choe Tae Il, Choe Pong Ho, Choe Chan Gon, Choe Chun Sik, Choe Hyon, Choe Yong Do, Choe Yong, Thae Hyong Chol, Han Chang Nam, Han Chang Sun, Han Hung Phyo, Ho Song Gil, Hyon Sang Ju, Hong Kwang Sun, Hong So Hon, Hong Sung Mu, Hwang Pyong So, Hwang Sun Hui, Hwang Hak Won, An Tong Chun, Yang In Guk and O Chol San.

13. According to KCNA: The plenum elected chairman, vice-chairmen and members of the Control Commission of the WPK Central Committee. Kim Kuk Thae was elected chairman, Jong Myong Hak first vice-chairman, Ri Tuk Nam vice-chairman and Cha Kwan Sok, Pak Tok Man, Cha Sun Gil and Kim Yong Son members of the commission.

14. According to KCNA: The First Plenary Meeting of the Central Auditing Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held here on Sept. 28.  Present there were Kim Chang Su, Pak Myong Sun, Choe Pae Jin, Kim Chol, Sim Chol Ho, O Ryong Il, Kye Yong Sam, Ryu Hyon Sik, Ko Myong Hui, Pang Yong Uk, Jang Jong Ju, Ho Kwang Uk, Ji Tong Sik, Jong Pong Sok and Choe Kwon Su, members of the commission elected at the Conference of the WPK. The meeting elected chairman and vice-chairperson of the commission. Kim Chang Su was elected chairman and Pak Myong Sun vice-chairperson.

15. The Daily NK offers a summary of the conference.

16. Mike has a summary at NK Leadership Watch.

17. The Choson Ilbo reports that the conference was scaled down:

The extraordinary congress of the North Korean Workers Party which convened Tuesday was apparently held at a smaller venue than previously expected. The Mansudae Assembly Hall (The Supreme People’s Assembly building), where it took place, seats 1,000, whereas previous guesses had put it at the 6,000-seater April 25 Cultural Hall or the People’s Cultural Palace, which has 2,000 seats.

That suggests only 500 to 700 delegates attended the congress since a half of the seats at a party congress are normally filled with audience members. In comparison, some 1, 323 delegates attended the second party congress in October 1966.

A high-ranking North Korean defector who saw photos of the latest party congress said it is clear that the event was considerably scaled down, in sharp contrast to the past event that had been held in a festive mood involving some 6,000 people.

A senior source in North Korea also put the number of delegates at about 500, saying even some very senior officials had not been selected as delegates.

The North seems to have downscaled the event due to anxiety over the leadership succession and a volatile mood in the country including signs of public unrest as food rations in Pyongyang were suspended, the source added.

Many people who were unable to fit into the main conference hall reportedly watched the congress on video screens installed at the April 25 Cultural Hall and the People’s Cultural Palace.

18. Previous posts on the conference can be found here in chronological order: here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here,  here.

UPDATE 4: Photos of the aspiring leader have been made public. Daylife.com has all of them here.

UPDATE 3: Just for fun…there appears to be at least one other “Kim Jong-un” in North Korea.  It will be interesting to see if he has to change his name (if he is still alive)!  Here is a KCNA story from April 23, 1997:

Press review
Pyongyang, April 23 (KCNA) — Papers here today frontpage reports that Secretary Kim Jong Il sent thanks and gifts to workteam members of the no. 7 excavator operating in Kumsan pit in Ryongyang mine for their collective innovation and thanks to servicemen and their families for setting examples in army-people relations. Reported in the press is the news that a monument to on-site guidance of Secretary Kim Jong Il, Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, was erected at the unit that defends Cho Islet, a forward military post on the West Sea of Korea. Rodong Sinmun carries a letter sent to Secretary Kim Jong Il by participants in the meeting of senior officials of progressive parties of different countries held in Moscow to mark the 85th birth anniversary of President Kim Il Sung as well as a statement adopted at the meeting. Minju Joson comes out with an article headlined “Our General always stands on Height 1211”. Conspicuous in Rodong Sinmun is an article titled “devotedly defending headquarters of revolution is foremost mission of people’s army”. The paper gives nearly one whole page to the lyric epic “Supreme Commander and his vanguard soldiers” which is dedicated to heroic soldiers. The Swedish Government decided to take a humanitarian measure for Korea, the press reports. Rodong Sinmun runs an article “Korean-style socialism is the best”, written by Kim Jong Un, who came over to the northern half of Korea while serving in the south Korean puppet army. Papers comment on the disclosure of Kim Young Sam’s bid to conceal the truth as regards the “investigation” into the Hanbo incident. An article of Rodong Sinmun says that the south Korea-stationed U.S. forces’ possession of depleted uranium bullets proves that their moves for war reached an extremely grave phase. Seen in Minju Joson is an article on the triangular military tieup of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries and the south Korean puppets.

UPDATE 2: Kim Jong-un was also named to the Central Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party.  According to KCNA:

Members and Alternate Members of WPK Central Committee
Pyongyang, September 28 (KCNA) — The following are members of the WPK Central Committee: Kim Jong Il, Kang Nung Su, Kang Tong Yun, Kang Sok Ju, Kang Phyo Yong, Kang Yang Mo, Ko Pyong Hyon, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Ki Nam, Kim Ki Ryong, Kim Rak Hui, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Pyong Ryul, Kim Pyong Ho, Kim Song Dok, Kim Song Chol, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Un, …

Mike has a good summary here.

UPDATE 1: Kim Jong-un has been named to the KWP Central Military Comission.  Kim Kyong-hui has joined th  According to Bloomberg:

Kim Jong Un was elected one of two Central Military Commission vice chairmen at a Worker’s Party of Korea meeting yesterday, a day after he was made a four-star general, the official Korean Central News Agency said. He also joined the party’s Central Committee, though not the more elite Politburo, at a meeting yesterday. His father’s sister, Kim Kyong Hui, was given several high-ranking posts, including politburo membership, KCNA reported.

The Kim family’s tightening grip on the military and party hierarchy underscores the challenge of transferring power to a son who had never before been mentioned in a KCNA dispatch. Kim Jong Un faces an increasingly disgruntled public in an economy squeezed by United Nations sanctions targeted at its weapons programs and a bungled currency revaluation.

“Even Kim Jong Il must be wary of public criticism should his son fail to improve economic conditions,” Paik Hak Soon, director of inter-Korean relations at the Seongnam, South Korea- based Sejong Institute, said before the commission appointment. “Domestic political stability will be Kim Jong Un’s key focus.”

Kim Jong Il, 68, was re-elected as party chief, general secretary and chairman of the military commission, KCNA said.

…

China’s President Hu Jintao congratulated Kim Jong Il on his re-election, pledging to strengthen ties with his country’s communist neighbor “to a higher level,” the state-run Xinhua News Agency reported today, without mentioning the son. Kim Jong Il made an unprecedented two trips to China this year, prompting speculation he was seeking endorsement of the power transfer from his nation’s main political and economic ally.

Here is the original KCNA story:

Central Military Commission Organized
Pyongyang, September 28 (KCNA) — The Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea is as follows:

Chairman Kim Jong Il, Vice-Chairmen Kim Jong Un and Ri Yong Ho and Members Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Won Hong, Jong Myong Do, Ri Pyong Chol, Choe Pu Il, Kim Yong Chol, Yun Jong Rin, Ju Kyu Chang, Choe Sang Ryo, Choe Kyong Song, U Tong Chuk, Choe Ryong Hae and Jang Song Thaek.

ORIGINAL POST: Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyong Hui named 4-star generals in KPA.  According to Yonhap:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has made his third son a military general in the clearest signal yet that Kim Jong-un is on track to becoming the next leader of the nuclear-armed communist state.

The promotion was announced early Tuesday through the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), just hours before North Korea was to hold its biggest political convention in three decades.

At the conference drawing top Workers’ Party delegates from across the nation, Kim Jong-un, whose name has never been mentioned in public and believed to be no older than 28, could be given other political posts, including one with the Politburo.

The KCNA report said Kim Kyoung-hui, the 64-year-old sister of Kim Jong-il, has also been promoted to a four-star general along with Choe Ryong-hae, a long-time aide to the Kim dynasty.

Kim Kyoung-hui, who oversees the country’s light industries, has recently emerged as a possible caretaker for a hereditary power transfer because Kim Jong-un lacks experience and support.

Her name was mentioned before Kim Jong-un’s in the KCNA dispatch.

Kim Jong-il, 68, is widely believed to have suffered a stroke in the summer of 2008 and since tried to make his third son his successor in what could be the communist world’s first back-to-back father-to-son power transfer. Kim took over the regime when his father and North Korean founder Kim Il-sung died in 1994.

Kim Jong-il officially became successor to his father in a Workers’ Party gathering in 1980. In a directive numbered 0051, Kim named a total of 39 generals on Monday, the KCNA said. Six of them, including Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyoung-hui, were four-star generals.

“The appointment clears the way for Kim Jong-un to forge deeper ties with power elites,” a South Korean Unification Ministry official said on the condition of anonymity.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said in a briefing in New York that his country is “watching developments in North Korea carefully.”

“North Korea has now made it official,” Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said. “It is certain that Kim Jong-un will be named to a high-level Workers’ Party post in the upcoming convention.”

The KCNA said Kim Jong-il “firmly believes that the commanding members of the People’s Army will continue to support the leadership of the party and complete the revolutionary exploit that was first begun in Mt. Paekdu,” which symbolizes the Kim dynasty.

In a separate dispatch, the KCNA said Ri Yong-ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, was promoted to the rank of vice marshal in a possible sweetener for the military class, whose support is crucial for Kim Jong-un to solidify his power.

Kim Jong-un was educated in Switzerland during his teens and is believed to resemble his father in appearance and personality. He has been shrouded in secrecy, and photos of him are extremely rare.

It remains to be seen whether the North’s official television media will unveil Kim Jong-un in its footage of the Workers’ Party convention on Tuesday.

“For one thing, blood is stressed much more in North Korea as something that defines character,” Brian Myers, a professor of international studies at Dongseo University in Busan, said in comments e-mailed earlier. “In a culture where myth and charisma are so important, the masses need a hero figure in the ‘glorious Paekdu tradition,’ not a faceless bureaucrat or a group of army officers.”

So there are several “big” stories in KCNA today.  Kim Jong-un’s (son of KJI) and Kim Kyong Hui’s (sister of KJI) promotion to KPA general and Kim Jong-il’s “re-election” as general secretary of the Worker’s party.  Here are the stories:

Kim Jong Il Issues Order on Promoting Military Ranks

Pyongyang, September 27 (KCNA) — General Secretary Kim Jong Il on Monday issued Order No. 0051 on promoting the military ranks of commanding officers of the KPA.

He said in his order that all the servicepersons of the People’s Army and people are now significantly celebrating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea with unbounded reverence for President Kim Il Sung who made a new history of building a revolutionary party in the era of independence and strengthened and developed the WPK into vanguard ranks of revolution with high prestige and invincible might.

He stressed that the WPK born from the deep and strong roots struck in the anti-Japanese revolution has honorably discharged its mission and duty as a political staff of the Korean revolution since the very day of its founding and performed immortal exploits to shine long in the history of the country.

The KPA is demonstrating its might before the world as a powerful revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu after growing to be a strong army of the leader and the party, devotedly defending the headquarters of the revolution with arms and performing heroic feats to shine long in history in the defence of the country and building of a thriving socialist nation, he noted.

Expressing the firm belief that the commanding officers of the KPA who have grown up under the care of the party and the leader would creditably discharge their honorable missions and duties as the mainstay and main force of the revolution in accomplishing with arms the revolutionary cause of Juche which started in Mt. Paektu, remaining true to the Party’s leadership in the future, too, he issued an order on promoting the military ranks of KPA commanding officers on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the glorious Workers’ Party of Korea.

It is noted in the order that the military ranks of Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Un and Choe Ryong Hae and three others are promoted to general, the military rank of Ryu Kyong to colonel general, the military ranks of Ro Hung Se and Ri Tu Song and four others to lieutenant general and those of Jo Kyong Jun, Jang To Yong and Mun Jong Chol and 24 others to major general.

Here is the story about Kim Jong-il’s re-election as general secretary.

Additional Information:
1. Here is coverage in the Washington Post.

2. Here is coverage in the New York Times.

3. Here is an article in the Taipei Times on Kim Kyong Hui (Kim Jong-il’s sister).

4. Here is a post about the first known (in the West) official mention of Kim Jong-un’s name in the DPRK–not in the official media.

5.  Here is information from Bradley Martin and Mike (NK Leadership Watch) on Choe Hyong-rae.

6. According to the Daily NK, North Koreans were not at all surprised by the announcement.

7.  The Daily NK has information on Ri Yong-ho.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean leader names his youngest son as general
Yonhap
Sam Kim
9/28/2010

According to Bloomberg, Kim Jong Un [Eun] might have his own flower.

North Korea celebrated Kim Jong Il’s birthday today with tens of thousands of flowers. The most intriguing blossom is a new variety of begonia sent on his son’s birthday that may signify preparations for a succession.

Floral tributes arrived from China, Japan, Laos, Russia and Syria, the Korean Central News Agency reported this month. The inclusion of a new breed of begonia delivered on the Jan. 8 birthday of youngest son Kim Jong Un follows a pattern of using flowers to help legitimize the ruling family’s power, according to Paik Hak Soon, a director of inter-Korean relations at the Seongnam, South Korea-based Sejong Institute.

“North Korean leaders have used the flowers as a propaganda tool to glorify their leadership,” Paik said. “The flower is an obvious sign that Kim Jong Il is preparing a handover,” he said, adding that both Kim and his father Kim Il Sung, who founded the nation, have their own designated blossoms.

Flower symbolism?  I believe Emperor of Japan is owed some royalties!

Anyhow, I was looking forward to seeing pictures of  the new “Kimjongeunia” but it turns out the flower might not exist.  According to the same article in Bloomberg:

[Kim Il Sung] received a hybrid orchid in 1965 from Indonesian President Sukarno and named it Kimilsungia. Kim was given his begonia in 1988. It is called Kimjongilia and dubbed the “immortal flower” to glorify his leadership.

KCNA said both Kim Jong Il’s flower and the begonia delivered on Jan. 8 were sent by a Japanese botanist named Mototeru Kamo. The KCNA report didn’t mention the son.

Kamo, who said he has visited North Korea about 10 times, denied sending a new flower to commemorate Kim Jong Un. Neither had the 1988 begonia been intended for the father, Kamo said by telephone from his office in Kakegawa, Japan. “At the time, no one knew anything about Kim Jong Il,” he said. “Therefore, there’s no way I could create a flower to suit his image. Horticulture and politics should be separate.”

Read the full story here:
Birthday Flower May Be Part of Kim Jong Il Succession
Bloomberg
Bomi Lim
2/15/2010

The Economist
2/10/2010

However loathsome his neighbours find Kim Jong Il, the nuclear-armed North Korean dictator, there are few who do not also admit that beneath the big hair lurks a tactical genius with a flair for survival. At home, North Koreans are smothered by his ruthless personality cult. With the outside world, he is an adept blackmailer: act mad enough to be dangerous; then be conciliatory in exchange for cash.

Recently, however, on both counts he has made tactical mistakes. None of these are serious enough to endanger his regime, diplomats say. But they are encouraging to those who believe they can eventually push North Korea back to talks about dismantling its nuclear arsenal. And they reaffirm the benefits of what the Americans call “strategic patience”: waiting until North Korea is desperate enough to offer concessions.

Even the regime appears, in its oddball way, to have acknowledged the most recent blunder. News reports this month suggest that North Korea has reversed some elements of a crackdown on private enterprise that it unleashed with a cack-handed redenomination of the won on November 30th.

In the interim, the currency collapsed, the price of rice surged by as much as 50 times, and much of traders’ working capital for buying and selling goods was wiped out. Amid a seizing up of food distribution, there were some rare grumbles of protest.

But since early February, regulations on trading in the jangmadang, or markets, across North Korea appear to have been lifted, according to news reports. Official prices (which are not necessarily what are paid) have been posted. A kilo of rice costs 240 won ($1.80) (a bit less than a pair of socks), a toothbrush is 25 won.

Meanwhile, the Dear Leader has made what some observers believe to be an unprecedented apology to his people for feeding them “broken rice” and not providing enough white rice, bread and noodles. He was, he said, “heartbroken”, and implicitly acknowledged he had violated an oath to his godlike father, Kim Il Sung, to feed the people rice and meat soup.

Adding to the poignancy, experts say the bungled reforms were done in the name of Kim Jong Un, the dictator’s third son and potential heir. The young man’s involvement may have been part of a strategy to reassert Stalinist-style state control of the enfeebled economy ahead of 2012, the 100th anniversary of grandfather Kim’s birth.

People knowledgeable on North Korea are loth to believe that such a plan has been abandoned, not least because the small markets that have flourished since the famine of the 1990s represent such a challenge to the state’s authority. But they say the ineptitude must have been glaringly obvious, even in the hermetic state.

“The government has never said sorry to the people, especially on a topic as sensitive as rice,” says Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul, who has written a lot on North Korea and has described its leaders as brilliant Machiavellians. “Because of Kim Jong Il’s age and the age of those around him, it looks like he may be losing touch with reality.”

Mr Lankov believes there may have been a similar miscalculation in North Korea’s recent behaviour towards America, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia, the countries with whom in 2003 it started on-again, off-again denuclearisation negotiations, known as the six-party talks. Its firing of a long-range missile and explosion of a nuclear bomb in quick succession last year hardened the resolve of the five to strengthen United Nations sanctions against Pyongyang and maintain them until it gives ground on its nukes. However much Mr Kim has cajoled and coaxed in the months since, he has not yet managed to divide them.

What’s more, diplomats say he appears to be increasingly open to discussing a return to the six-party talks, something which last year he vowed “never” to do. China, which is closest to North Korea and chairs the six-party forum, sent Wang Jiarui, a senior Communist Party official, to meet Mr Kim this week and invite him to Beijing. Mr Kim made no public commitment regarding the six-party talks. But his nuclear negotiator returned with Mr Wang to the Chinese capital.

Lee Myung-bak, South Korea’s president, surprised his countrymen by saying that he, too, hoped to meet Mr Kim “within this year”. The timing was odd. His statement came at about the time North Korea was lobbing artillery shells threateningly into the Yellow Sea. But it revealed what officials say is a twin-track process in Seoul to engage North Korea: bilaterally and via the six-party framework. “My impression is that the North Koreans are moving in the direction of talks,” says Wi Sung-lac, South Korea’s special representative for peace on the peninsula.

Both North Korea and its six-party counterparts have set such tough conditions on coming together that it would be foolhardy to be optimistic. North Korea wants a lifting of the UN sanctions and a peace treaty with America to out a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War before restarting talks. Washington has resisted both. An East Asian diplomat said the other five countries are demanding that North Korea take “concrete measures” towards denuclearisation as a pre-condition for talks and the lifting of sanctions. “We’re not giving any carrots.”

Underscoring the resolve, humanitarian assistance to North Korea has slowed to a trickle. South Korea sent only $37m of public aid north last year, compared with $209m in 2007. Officials say Mr Lee is adamant no money will go to North Korea to coax it into agreeing to a summit. Talks on cross-border tourism and factories, another means for Pyongyang to extort hard currency from the south, have made no progress.

Mr Kim still has some good cards up his sleeve. Tensions between China and America over Taiwan and Tibet provide a thread of disharmony that he can tug upon. And China has a strategic eye on North Korea’s ports and minerals, which may encourage it to be overly generous to the regime.

But the mere hint of economic and diplomatic fallibility in a regime that demands almost religious devotion from its subjects may be significant. It comes at a time when North Koreans, via smuggled DVDs and telephones, have a greater idea than ever before of how far their living conditions fall short of their neighbours’. That is a rare point of vulnerability for Mr Kim’s interlocutors to exploit.

UPDATE 4:  Vice Unification Minister Hong Yang-ho chimes in on the DPRK succession issue.  According to Yonhap:

Kim, 67, who reportedly suffered a stroke in August last year, is believed to have named his third and youngest son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor and to be now grooming him for an official debut as the next leader.

“North Korean media continued to broadcast reports that appeared to indicate the legitimacy of a hereditary succession since the end of 2008, but such reports were put on hold after July 15, 2009,” Hong said at a closed-door civic forum on North Korea policy. A transcript of his remarks was released by the ministry.

North Korean media often employed phrases like “bloodline of Mount Paektu,” Kim Jong-il’s supposed birthplace, or “inheritance” when lauding the country’s leadership, something analysts here saw as a reference to the planned succession. The use of such terms also peaked around the time the senior Kim was being trained as heir, they say.

Kim Jong-un, believed to be born in 1984 to the leader’s third wife Ko Yong-hui, is said to most resemble his father in appearance and temperament among the three sons. His older brother, Jong-chol, is 28, and half-brother, Jong-nam, is 38.

While references to the succession have subsided, the vice minister said, North Korea appeared to be intensifying social control to maintain national unity around the senior Kim. Media reports of Kim’s public activities totaled 110 as of Oct. 1, compared to 74 reported during the same period last year, the vice minister noted.

Also, a statement by Kim regarding the building of a “prosperous” nation by 2012 was reported five times over the span of five days from Aug. 24 to 28, he noted.

Such intense publicity on Kim “shows he is in firm control” and “puts emphasis on traditional ideology to protect the regime,” he said.

The current leader was internally designated as successor at age 32 in 1974 during a Workers’ Party meeting and publicly declared as the heir to his father during a party convention in 1980. His father and the country’s founder, Kim Il-sung, died of a heart attack in 1994.

Despite the drop in media references, watchers say the succession process is picking up pace internally. A Taiwanese photographer recently posted a photo on the Internet taken in the northern North Korean town of Wonsan last month, showing a poster that carried the heir’s name in red alongside his father’s name.

Cheong Seong-chang, an expert with the non-governmental Sejong Institute south of Seoul, said the North is now directing the succession process in a more subtle way, in contrast to its earlier nuclear and missile tests that were believed to have been aimed at supporting the power transition.

Read the full article here:
N. Korea halts media propaganda for heir apparent: Seoul official
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
10/8/2009

UPDATE 3: As I mentioned below, I am reluctant to post much on the succession issue. There is much speculation out there and not much concrete information which is ‘actionable’. Evey now and then, however, some nuggets of information come out.  Such as this…

On September 19, a tourist to the Chonsam Cooperative Farm (location here) snapped a photo of a local propaganda poster (click here for full sized version).  According to the Choson Ilbo, and confirmed by my crack translator, G, the poster reads, “Kim Jong-eun (김정은), [NOT Jong-un] a young leader who succeeds the lineage of Mangyongdae and Mt. Baekdu,” along with the full lyrics of a song related to the succession.

Read more below:
N.Korean Poster Seems to Confirm Succession
Choson Ilbo
9/30/2009

Why N.Korean Regime Succession Is a Delicate Matter
Choson Ilbo
9/30/2009

UPDATE 2: Fox News reports on a Yonhap story which claims that Pyongynag residents have heard KJU’s name mentioned via their “cable radios” (these devices are built into the homes in many Pyongyang residencies, and you can see them in the documentary A State of Mind):

North Korea has mentioned Kim Jong Un by his full name — which it had not done in the past — and his qualifications in broadcasts through speakers installed in each house, Yonhap news agency reported, citing an unidentified source on North Korean affairs.

The broadcast campaign was launched in Pyongyang about two months, but it was not clear if it had been extended to other parts of the country, Yonhap said.

North Koreans are obligated to install speakers in their homes to listen to broadcasts on policy of the ruling Workers’ Party and its propaganda, according to North Koreans who have defected to the South.

UPDATE 1: Blane Harden has added additional information in the Washington Post.

ORIGINAL POST: In general I have avoided discussion of the DPRK succession issue because much of it is based on speculation and rumor. Lankov, however, managed to chime in on the topic with some interesting facts and insight. Quoting from the article:

However, by April there were no doubts: Kim Jong-un, Kim’s youngest son, began to be frequently mentioned in the North Korean classified propaganda materials. These publications are off-limits for common North Koreans, but the message was clear: the virtues of the “brilliant comrade” Kim Jong-un were extolled in way which would be proper only for the next leader. So, Kim Jong-il finally made up his mind about succession – or at least that is what most observers came to believe.

But in August the situation took an unexpected turn; today, the prospect of a power transition to Kim Jong-un looks far less certain than a month ago.

These days, while North Korean borders are transparent enough, it takes a few weeks for the rest of the world to learn what is going on behind the closed doors of supposedly “classified” indoctrination sessions for junior officials (the situation at higher levels is far less transparent). But a few days ago, entrepreneurial journalists smuggled from North Korea classified propaganda materials which were issued in July for military indoctrinators.

The materials describe the charisma of the “Young General Kim” and call him a “genius of military affairs”. They also explained his strategy was “the strategy of shock and offense” and told their listeners that the boldness of the “young general” caught the “enemy” (obviously, the United States) by surprise.

It is hinted that the missile launch in April and nuclear test in May were manifestations of the brilliant new strategy, created by Kim Jong-un.

Meanwhile, members of the North Korea’s Communist Youth Union were instructed to sing “Footsteps”, a new song that extolled the virtues of an unnamed young general, whose surname happened to be Kim. North Koreans got the message: the titles which were used in the song are different from those which are normally applied to any of two older “General Kims”, so the person must have been a new Kim.

Functionaries of the Communist Youth were also told that the ongoing “150 days battle” (a Maoist-style shock labor campaign, quite normal for North Korea) is managed by Kim Jong-un and hence will certainly lead to a major success.

Interestingly, the North Korea material reported that Kim Jong-un was 30 years old: obviously, any idea of an heir who just turned 26 was seen as offensive in a Confucian country.

Nonetheless, no references to Kim Jong-un’s name, let alone to his promotion, have appeared in North Korea’s general access media. The propaganda campaign was conducted behind closed doors, and targeted either military personnel (largely officers) or activists of the Party Youth. The average North Korean still has no clue about who Kim Jong-un is. If he or she does, it is probably due to exposure to marketplaces where merchants actively exchange rumors that have filtered in from overseas.

However, about a month ago the entire campaign was halted abruptly. Sources inside North Korea report that since early August the name of Kim Jong-un is not heard any more. Even “Footsteps”, his “promotional song”, suddenly ceased to be performed, and people are now advised not to sing it – for the time being, at least. The “150 day battle” continues, but without references to the decisive role of Kim Jong-un’s managerial genius.

No explanations have been given – this is North Korea, after all. In a different country such turn of events would produce a tidal wave of rumors, but North Koreans are well aware that matters of succession (as well as things related to Dear Leader’s family and health) are too dangerous to be discussed or even mentioned.

The article goes on to offer reasons why the succession machinery has apparently ground to a halt and it is all well worth reading.

Find the full article here:
North Korea’s Succession gets twisted
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
9/11/2009

This web page has avoided focusing too much on the DPRK’s leadership transition because so much of the discussion is purely speculative.  But the Washington Post has published an interesting article which fills in some of the blanks on Kim Jong Un’s biography (Kim Jong il’s successor du jour) which gives us some insights into Pyongyang’s elite youth culture.

To begin with, we now know that KJU briefly went to a public school in Switzerland from 1998-2000 where he went by the name “Pak Un.” He did not attend the same Swiss school as his older brothers.  Sources from the school describe him as a swift learner who was quiet in class and uncomfortable around girls, but “fiercely competitive” on the basketball court.  Classmates also recall that he didn’t speak out against America.

Despite the short time he spent in Western Europe, however, he did show a love of American basketball, decorating his apartment with personal photos with Kobe Bryant, attending an NBA exhibition game in Paris and sporting Nike Air Jordan shoes.

The full article is worth reading below:
Who Will Succeed Kim Jong Il?
Washington Post
Andrew Higgins
7/16/2009

Further notes:
1. Basketball is popular in the DPRK–maybe the second most popular sport after football (soccer).  Is it such a stretch to assume that elite North Korean youths get together to talk about or even watch NBA games? (There is also a baseaball field in Pyongyang here)

2. Kim Jong il is/was a Michael Jordan fan.  Madeline Albright gave him a basketball signed by Michael Jordan which is probably on display in the International Friendship Exhibition.

3. Kim Jong Chol (and probably Kim Jong nam) attended the International School of Bern (locaton here).  The North Korean embassy in Bern is here. Kim Jong Un reportedly attended the Schule Liebefeld Steinhölzli (located here).  However, I am a little confused about where he lived.  The article states that KJU lived in Liebefeld (Bern suburb) at No. 10 Kirchstrasse (10 Kirch Street), not at the DPRK’s embassy which was just down the road.  I wonder why that is…

4. Kim Jong Un’s older brother, Kim Jong Chol, was photographed attending the 2006 World Cup in Germany where he also attended an Eric Clapton concert.

5. Kim Jong nam, Kim Jong il’s eldest son (and a nice guy I hear), spends most of his time in Macao.  His son (KJI’s grandson) was recently photographed with his South Korean school friends at a Rain concert.

6. Charles Jenkins claims he bought Michael Jackson tapes on the Pyongyang black market.