North Korean Economy Watch

Ruediger Frank, “Money in Socialist Economies: The Case of North Korea,” The Asia Pacific Journal, 8-2-10, February 22, 2010.

Introduction
Dated January 29, 2010, the Foreign Trade Bank of the DPRK (North Korea) issued document No. DC033 10-004 to diplomatic missions and international organizations present in North Korea. They were informed that the use of foreign currency was to be stopped, payments were to be made in the form of non-cash cheques, and that the official exchange rate of the Euro to the North Korean Won was changed from 188.2 KPW to 140 KPW, effective January 2, 2010.

Foreign institutions and organizations now have to obtain non-cash cheques from the Foreign Trade Bank, denominated in KPW, in order to pay for accommodations, meals and service fees in hotels, fares for transport services like railways and airlines, communication charges, inspection fees, registration fees and commissions paid to institutions and enterprises in the DPRK, fuel, office materials, spare parts for vehicles, electricity, water, heating charges and rent. Bank transfers are now mandatory for any transfers between international organizations and all money paid to institutions and organizations of the DPRK (including the salary of DPRK citizens working in embassies or international organizations).

A recent visitor to Pyongyang confirmed in a talk with the author that individuals are subject to a cumbersome process if they wish to purchase anything. Rather than using a standard hard currency or exchanging it into the new Won, they now have to obtain a receipt stating the price of the good they want to buy, then present this at a desk where they exchange their money into exactly the needed amount of North Korean money, and finally return to the shop assistant, hand over the exact amount, and receive the product.

In the preceding weeks, North Korea had made international headlines related to what seems to be a concerted economic policy initiative. The domestic currency was reformed in a way that obviously aimed at reducing the amount of money in circulation (link). A few weeks later news emerged that the use of foreign currencies was banned (link).

This is no doubt a dramatic move with far-reaching consequences. Money matters for personal lives and for society, so when a country initiates a currency reform, it has significant repercussions.

But what are these consequences for the specific case of North Korea in early 2010? Are people in various sectors of society better off now, or worse? Will the economy benefit or suffer? Do the reforms promote or impede foreign trade and investment? Will the domestic political situation become more stable, or will it deteriorate? Are the economic reforms of 2002 reversed, or were they intended to be a temporary measure from the outset? Should we even interpret the currency reforms as part of the process of power succession?

(more…)

Nicholas Eberstadt has some interesting statistics in a Wall Street Journal op-ed this week:

For a variety of reasons—possibly including unintended reverberations from the past decade’s nuclear drama—the remonetization [of 2002] did not work well. Too much new money was chasing too few goods, sparking significant inflation. By November 2009, the North Korean won’s black-market value in dollars was barely 5% of the level when the 2002 measures were implemented, a depreciation averaging over 3% per month.

…

The speed and depth of the won’s resulting plunge has been dizzying. The nominal market price of rice is reportedly higher today than it was in November 2009, before currency reform. This would imply 100-fold inflation and then some in just over one month. The won-yuan exchange rate along the North Korea-China border has reportedly dropped by almost 50% over the past month, even after discounting for the 100-to-1 currency conversion. The government apparently has no confidence in its own currency move, and is now betting against it. News reports indicate that Pyongyang this month is issuing soldiers in its public security forces twice their nominal monthly pre-reform wages (a 20,000% raise in light of the currency conversion). If the government finances more wage hikes like this by running the printing presses, it will turn the currency into a toxic asset no one wants to hold.

…

The botched currency reform also has revealed how little North Korean decision-makers understand their own economy, much less the outside world. On a related note, the regime’s supposed heir apparent, Kim Jong Eun, was the mastermind behind the North Korean currency reform, according to South Korean intelligence. This may just be bad intelligence or disinformation. But if accurate, it raises disturbing questions about the judgment of the rising generation of North Korean leadership.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Money Troubles
Wall Street Journal
Nicholas Ebererstadt
1/11/10

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
12/24/2009

The North Korean authorities apparently started paying farmers as of the 16th, starting with Migok Collective Farm in Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province.

In North Korea, the amount of work each farmer does is calculated and expressed in a numerical value, which is called “labor grade (노력공수).” After the harvest has been gathered, the state’s requirement is handed over, and then farmers are distributed food according to their labor grade, while surplus cash is also supposed to be distributed dependent upon a farmer’s labor grade and the profits of the farm as a whole.

Around the time of the July 1st Economic Management Reform Measure in 2002, cash was distributed in this way, but between 2005 and 2008 there was nothing.

For office and factory workers, payment began on the 17th at approximately the level of the July 1st Economic Management Reform Measure.

A source from South Pyongan Province reported to The Daily NK on the 23rd, “From the 16th, they started delivering cash to those farms which fulfilled the state’s grain production plan. For other farms, which could not accomplish the state’s plan, the authorities gave a subsidy.”

Since some collective farms have received an unusual amount of cash, it has become the talk of the town. In the case of the Migok Collective Farm in Sariwon, an average of 150,000 won per farmer was paid in cash.

Kim Jong Il conducted an onsite inspection of Migok Collective Farm in October, and it is considered a model case because it exceeded its state production target. Hence the unusually generous payments.

Farmers working for the Ryongyeon Collective Farm, which also achieved the state’s plan, got around 100,000 won each.

Despite this apparent state generosity, the source pointed out, “This cash distribution covered only those farms which accomplished state production targets. Since this year’s farming went sour, there are less than ten farms that achieved their targets across the whole country.”

Collective farms which failed to achieve the state’s goals got just 5,000 won per worker.

“This cash distribution seems to be just a one-off measure to straighten out the confusion after the redenomination and to soothe farmers,” the source also asserted.

Regardless, the cash will slow the entry of food into the markets, the source pointed out, saying, “This cash distribution and subsidies will make food circulation difficult in the short term.”

“When farmers do not hold any cash in their hands, their grain flows into the markets. For the time being farmers will not sell rice and food in the market because they have enough pocket money. It causes rising food prices.”

Additionally, the North Korean authorities still have not announced state prices since the redenomination, and they continue to heavily regulate the market. Therefore, food traders are watching the market situation without selling any food.

The logical market principle, that when harvested grain circulates in the market food prices go down, may therefore not hold true this year, and vulnerable classes’ will become more food insecure as a result.

However, the authorities are trying to assure farmers that there will be continuous measures to give them further benefits.

According to the source, “more benefits for farmers” implies a revised grain procurement policy.

He explained, “Until now, the authorities purchased rice for 20 won per kilogram from the farm and sold it for 45 won to the people. However, from now on, the procurement price will be 44 won and supply price to workers and the people will be 18-20 won.“

I thank a reader for pointing out an interesting article in the Korean Political Science Association Journal which contains a plethora of qualitative data on the North Korean labor Market–survey data from a cross section of defectors.

Here is the citation:

Park, Young-ja, “‘Marginal Work’ and ‘Labor Market’ in North Korea after the 2003 General Market System”, Korean Political Science Association Journal Vol. 43, No. 3, September 2009

Read the full article here, or here.

Peterson Institute Working Paper (Sept 2009)
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland

(Download PDF here)

Abstract: The state is often conceptualized as playing an enabling role in a country’s economic development—providing public goods, such as the legal protection of property rights, while the political economy of reform is conceived in terms of bargaining over policy among elites or special interest groups. We document a case that turns this perspective on its head: efficiency-enhancing institutional and behavioral changes arising not out of a conscious, top-down program of reform, but rather as unintended (and in some respects, unwanted) by-products of state failure. Responses from a survey of North Korean refugees demonstrate that the North Korean economy marketized in response to state failure with the onset of famine in the 1990s, and subsequent reforms and retrenchments appear to have had remarkably little impact on some significant share of the population. There is strong evidence of powerful social changes, including increasing inequality, corruption, and changed attitudes about the most effective pathways to higher social status and income. These assessments appear to be remarkably uniform across demographic groups. While the survey sample marginally overweights demographic groups with less favorable assessments of the regime, even counterfactually recalibrating the sample to match the underlying resident population suggests widespread dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime.

JEL Codes: P2, P3, F22
Keywords: failed states, transition, reform, North Korea, refugees

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-9-4-1
9/4/2009

The latest issue of the Kim Il Sung University newspaper (2009, no. 2, April) acknowledged the international society’s sanctions against North Korea, and in a bid to encourage a self-determinant resolution to the country’s economic problems, the paper called for “the utmost circulation of dormant cash,” emphasizing the role of the bank.

The paper stressed that strengthening the role of the bank was a crucial part of ensuring the country’s socialist system continued to operate. It also stated that elevating the position of the bank and circulating currency were essential elements of ensuring that North Koreans were not reliant on foreign assistance, and that they were able to solve their problems independently.

In the article encouraging currency circulation, it was stated that “the oppressive isolation policy of the imperialists grows worse every day,” but that by maximizing capital circulation, domestic economic problems could be resolved and the North could complete its bid to create an economically strong nation even more quickly.

The article reflects the DPRK government’s attempt to encourage spending of Won, Dollars, and Euros by institutions, enterprises and even individuals in an attempt to ease economic woes even in the face of international sanctions. Jung Yeon-ho, a researcher with the Korea Development Institute (KDI), reported in 2003 that North Koreans were sitting on as much as 600,000-1,000,000 USD. Since 2003, North Korean authorities have been trading US dollars for Euros due to sanctions from Washington, so now many in the North also have considerable amounts of Euros stashed away, as well.

Kim Il Sung University, through its paper, insisted that banks needed to strengthen their role in currency circulation and lending, and to ensure that their services were in line with the demands of the times. It noted that banks were taking note of the needs of individuals and enterprises, and catering to their demands in order to more appropriately respond to their issues and not only meet their needs, but to encourage their continued use.

Some North Koreans have had bad experiences with banks, not being able to withdraw previously deposited funds or not earning expected interest. This has led some to avoid banks in order to guarantee their savings.

After the North’s July 1st (2002) Economic Management Reform Measure, an attempt to make policy reflect reality in the North, the government began selling 10-year ‘People’s Lifestyle Bonds’. In early 2006, North Korea’s banks began offering savings accounts, loans, and other services to individuals and enterprises in order to encourage spending.

Andrei Lankov
Asia Policy 8, July 2009
The National Bureau of Asian Research

Download the article (PDF) here. 

Executive Summary
This article explains why the North Korean government has attempted to reassert state control over society—which had been eroding from 1994–2002—and offers predictions regarding the impact that this shift will likely have on North Korean society.

Main Argument
From 1994 to 2002 North Korean society changed tremendously: state-run industry collapsed, the rationing system ceased to function, and free-market activity, though still technically illegal or semi-legal, became most citizen’s major source of income. Although not initiated by the government, in 2002 some of these spontaneous changes won the belated and conditional approval of the regime.

The evidence emerging in the last three to four years demonstrates, however, that the North Korean government has chosen not to tolerate those changes. This policy of recrudescence, while economically self-destructive, makes political sense because the existence of an affluent and free South Korea makes North Korea far more insecure. The leadership in Pyongyang has reason to believe that any domestic liberal reform in North Korea would lead to a regime collapse.

Policy Implications
1. Pyongyang’s decision to reject reformist policies is based on a rational and well-informed assessment of North Korea’s domestic and international situation. Therefore, the outside world can do very little to influence the regime’s position, and thus there is no chance of meaningful reform in North Korea in the foreseeable future as long as the current regime remains in power.

2. Because the current policy makes sustainable economic growth impossible, the North Korean government will need to rely on stratagems to secure vital foreign aid, with the U.S. being one of the main (but not only) targets of these maneuvers. The “North Korean problem” will remain a part of the international landscape in the foreseeable future.

3. If the current attempt by the government at counter-reform fails, this failure will create additional avenues for influencing the North Korean government from within.

Download the article (PDF) here. 

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-7-8-1
7/8/2009

North Korea’s main wholesale market, in Pyongysong, was temporarily closed for just over a week during mid-April, but it has reportedly been open and operating normally since then. It was rumored, and reported [previously (see below)], that the Pyongysong Wholesale Market was shut down in mid-June. There was a report that officials felt the market had grown too large, and there was a plan to divide it into East and West Markets. However, reports of these plans have now been deemed nothing more than rumor.

A source in Kangdong-gun stated that there has been much talk of closing markets since the beginning of the year, but that no measures have been enforced and everything is operating normally. Another source reported that many traders are traveling to and from Sinuiju and Pyongysong, and that their numbers have been growing since the onset of summer. While rumors still abound regarding market closures, the source noted that there is significantly less talk of such measures compared to earlier in the year.

In January, North Korean authorities released a statement indicating that general markets would be transformed into farmers’ markets, and only open once every ten days. However, six months has already passed, and there has been no action taken. There have been no measures to transform even some of the largest markets, in Hyeryong, Hyesan, Musan and Sinuiju. That said, it is always possible that the North Korean authorities proceed with plans to close or transform the markets.

The majority of North Koreans trading in the markets do not believe the authorities could easily carry out market-closing measures. Due to the likelihood of large-scale civil revolts, the regime must come up with an alternative to the markets if it intends to close or transform them. The current food issues faced by the North make it impossible to close markets. In addition, transforming general markets into farmers’ markets would force residents to buy daily necessities and other manufactured products at department stores or government-run shops, but these shops have nothing in stock. Furthermore, preventing residents from selling in the markets makes it more difficult for them to acquire the food necessary to sustain themselves and their families. The number of empty stalls in markets appears to be slowing increasing, but a complete shutdown of the market would likely lead to protests.

Original Post:
North Korea begins closing general markets
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-26-1
6/26/2009

It has been reported that North Korea’s market closing measure is slowly beginning to be enforced. The June 23 27* issue of North Korea Today, a newsletter from the South Korean group Good Friends, announced that the Pyongsong general market has now been shut down, in what some call the most prominent omen that all general markets will be shut down throughout the country. As the Pyongsong general market served as the central wholesale market for the entire North, some believe it was shut down first in order to encourage the use of smaller, more local traditional markets. In addition, central Party authorities have ordered department stores and general stores in Pyongyang to stock up on Chinese goods. The North Korean government has announced, on a number of occasions since last year, that general markets would be closed and turned into farmers’ markets, but for a variety of reasons, the measure has been on hold for over six months.

Regional authorities were also ordered to import various goods from China, in accordance with the demands of local citizens and regional conditions, in order to head off any concerns that daily necessities might not be available after the markets are closed. This series of measures indicates that the government is concerned that attempts to forcefully close the markets may lead to citizen revolts, as clashes between traders and police occurred previously when the North attempted to enforce market restrictions.

One official in Pyongyang stated that this measure put citizen’s concerns and inconveniences first, stating, “[The Party] must unconditionally get rid of markets. But on the inside, they see that there will be huge opposition from the citizens if they only use force, so this time they decided to combine it with conciliatory policies.” The source added, however, that authorities plan to continue to operate restricted markets while at the same time, completely changing the market system before the end of this year.

Currently, as the 150-day ‘battle’ campaign to improve the economy is underway, more and more lectures are also being given. One week after the North’s second nuclear test, propaganda speeches were given in each factory and business in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, stating, “Now there is no one in the world that can face off with our military might,” and, “If the United States and those countries that kowtow to it carry out an economic blockade against our country, we will see it as an act of war and stand against it with military power. If only we carry out the 150-day battle well this year, we will completely attain a Strong and Prosperous Nation. [All the people] must follow after the revolutionary military spirit of the People’s Army and open the door to a strong and prosperous nation without one day’s delay.”

UPDATE: According to the Daily NK, the closing of the Pyongsong Market was not successful:

Despite North Korean official attempts to shift general markets onto an agricultural format, the general markets are operating as normal because of popular resistance to change.

A source residing in Kangdong-gun, Pyongyang told Daily NK, “In mid-April, a wholesale market in Pyongsung was shut down for around ten days, but after that it reopened and continues to operate.” He added that, “I’ve heard that the existing market was supposed to close early this year and be changed into an agricultural market, but there have actually been no shutdowns at all.”

He continued, “I don’t know the exact reason for the closure of Pyongsung market in April, but I’ve heard that there was an investigation of the individuals who manage the big wholesale businesses there. Traders strongly opposed it, so the closure of the market could not be completed.”

The source added, “In Kangdong-gun and other districts of Pyongyang, there have been many rumors about market closures, but there have not been any so far. Markets are operating normally.”

A source from Shinuiju confirmed it. “Many rumors of market closure have circulated, but they are working as usual,” the source said, “Markets in Pyongsung are operating as well, so there are still many traders coming and going between Shinuiju and Pyongsung. Especially, as summer approaches, trade is increasing.”

He added, “People still talk about the closure of the markets, but they don’t talk about it as much as earlier this year. In truth, if the jangmadang is closed, it will be hard for even the cadres to live, let alone ordinary residents. So cadres also have a negative opinion of the measure, and for that reason it will be difficult to shift to agricultural markets.” 

Read the full story here:
Markets Continue Despite Official Bluster
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
7/3/2009

Barbara Demick has an informative article in the Los Angeles Times.  The whole piece is worth reading but here are some themes and excerpts.

Market restictions ordered

In the markets of Kilju, a city of 100,000 near North Korea’s eastern seacoast, the ruling Korean Workers’ Party has ordered the removal of Chinese-made cookies, candies and pharmaceuticals.

Even soybeans, many articles of clothing and shoes are now forbidden.

It is all part of a great leap backward taking place in the secretive autocracy. North Koreans interviewed in China in recent weeks say that the regime of Kim Jong Il has made a concerted effort to roll back reforms that had over the last decade liberalized the most strictly controlled economy in the world.

… 

So many Chinese goods are now taboo that markets stock only about 35% of the merchandise previously available, some say.

Import substiution policy implemented?

“They want to promote our own products made in North Korea, but since everything is ‘made in China,’ there is nothing to buy,” said Kim Young Chul, a civilian working for the North Korean military who had come to China to sell wild ginseng on behalf of his employer.

Exports curtailed

Kim Chol Hee, a trader from Yanji, a Chinese city near the border with a large ethnic Korean population, said it was harder now than at any time in the 10 years he’s been in business to import from North Korea.

“I used to bring in squid, crab, steel parts from Chongjin. We can still buy seafood, but the North Korean government won’t let us buy steel,” he said Kim. “They say they need to keep all their resources for themselves.”

Restrctions inefective

Kilju residents have not dared to hold public protests against the restriction. But the Korean Workers Party nonetheless might be fighting a losing battle. Much of the trading is done by people with powerful connections in the provincial government and the military. Many state-owned enterprises do illegal trading to raise cash for their operations.

For example, trader Kim Young Chul says he is responsible for raising about $900 each year for his work unit by selling ginseng, while he and his partners keep any additional profits.

“I have a lot of freedom. They don’t dare ask me too many questions in North Korea, because I work for the ministry,” said Kim.

Just as quickly as the Korean Workers’ Party issues a decree, people find a way to circumvent it. Vendors banned from the market bring out their mothers and grandmothers, while secretly running the businesses from behind the scenes. Others sell banned good from their homes, or simply stash it behind other merchandise.

“If you want to buy cosmetics in Kilju, you still can find them, but they are usually hidden underneath the table,” Lee said.

Once a loyal member of the Workers’ Party, Lee said she had remained devoted to Kim Jong Il up to her departure from North Korea in May, vowing that she would return home as soon as she got money for her family.

“Even the day I left, I was singing songs about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in my house,” said Lee. “Now that I’ve come to China, I’m not so sure.

Read the full article here:
North Korea moves to restrict economy
Los Angeles Times
Barbara Demick
7/5/2009

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
East-West Center Working Papers
Economics Series, No. 104
Download paper here (PDF)

Abstract:
Despite North Korea’s turn away from economic reform and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, the country has in fact become more economically open. But it has emphasized closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. Yet the U.S. can still exercise economic leverage by going aggressively after third-party financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the United States Treasury has identified as money laundering or proliferation concerns.

There is some evidence that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority, but in the absence of such interest and as legitimate trade, investment, and aid dry up, the incentives to intensify proliferation activities increase.

The internal organization of the North Korean economy has important implications for any policy seeking transformation via engagement. The economy is structured in such a way that outside economic ties are still largely monopolized by stateowned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires very close scrutiny. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North Korean counterparties believe that they are ultimately political in nature, subsidized and thus vulnerable to blackmail. If economic ties are truly commercial in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a supportive policy environment.

Paper prepared for the conference on “North Korean Nuclear Politics: Constructing a New Northeast Asian Order in the 21st Century,” University of Washington, June 4-5, 2009. We would like to thank the Smith Richardson, MacArthur, and Korea Foundations for financial support and Jennifer Lee for research assistance.

UPDATE: A shorter version of this paper can be found here.