North Korean Economy Watch

Pictured above: North Korean visitors to Kumgangsan wave to the camera in this video posted to Uriminzokkiri’s YouTube page.  The Video is dated 2011-8-20.

According to the Donga Ilbo:

North Korea has reportedly opened the Mount Kumgang resort to its nationals since April after having allowed only a select few to visit the scenic area before with permission.

Pyongyang apparently intends to pressure Seoul by opening the door to the mountain to the North Korean people after failing to attract foreign investment and tourists to the resort.

A Chinese source on North Korea said Tuesday, “North Korea effectively allowed all North Koreans from April to visit the entire Mount Kumgang area, including major rivers in the region.”

North Korea, however, allows only group tourists and not individual visits. North Korean authorities have ordered companies and businesses to visit the site for company picnics or events, and the mountain has 4,000 to 5,000 visitors per month.

A business unit that wants to visit files an application with the provincial government, which then reports to the international tourist authorities of Mount Kumgang. After screening candidates, authorities issue a tourist certificate that allows holders to pass checkpoints on the way to the mountain.

Two days are generally needed to travel the region, and visitors use the accommodation facility called Kumgangsan that can handle 500 people per day. The source said rooms are in short supply because of many visitors.

Each visitor should cover his or her own expenses. The estimated cost is around 1,700 North Korean won (1.43 U.S. dollars) for entry and 19 cents per night, so the combined expense amount is 2,500 to 3,000 North Korean won (2.10 to 2.53 dollars).

The source said, “The expenses almost equal a month`s salary but the popularity (of going to Mount Kumgang) has surprised everyone.”

Speculation is rising over whether the North will use South Korean real estate and equipment belonging to Hyundai Asan Corp., the South Korean operator of the tour, and others. Pyongyang announced Monday that it will dispose of South Korean assets and properties in the resort area.

“North Korea has not yet used any South Korean facilities but has apparently used them for local tourists,” the source said.

Also, according to KCNA, at least one Chinese tour group has visited the resort since July 30:

Pyongyang, July 30 (KCNA) — A Chinese tourist group led by Zhuang Jun, general manager of the Chinese Kanghui Xi’an International Tourist Agency, visited the Tower of the Juche Idea, Party Founding Memorial Tower, Pyongyang Students and Children’s Palace and Mangyongdae, President Kim Il Sung’s native place, in Pyongyang on Friday and Saturday.

The tourist group came to Pyongyang by the Pyongyang-Xi’an international air service.

Yang Rui, manager of the agency, told KCNA:

I was pleased to see an excellent performance of Korean schoolchildren. I hope they will perform in Xi’an. I have long looked forward to visiting Mt. Kumgang. In the afternoon we are leaving for the mountain. I will be happy to enjoy the beautiful scenery of the mountain.

Read about the continuing troubles at Kumgang from the shooting to the present day here.

Read the full story here:
N.Korea allowed its people to visit Mount Kumgang from April
Donga Ilbo
2011-8-24

According to the Choson Ilbo:

According to the Unification Ministry, 123 firms were operating in the industrial park as of July, with combined production output amounting to US$34.87 million in May, up 25 percent from $27.79 million year-on-year.

The total volume of inter-Korean trade through the industrial park reached $825.88 million in the first half of this year, up 19.5 percent from last year and a whopping 135.8 percent from 2009.

South Korean staff dwindled from 1,461 in 2008, when inter-Korean trade was at its height, to 801 in May this year, but the number of North Korean workers rose from 36,650 to 47,172. And some 3,700 more North Korean workers were hired even since May last year when the South banned new investments there after the North sank the Navy corvette Cheonon in March.

At the moment, the regime is unlikely to shut down the industrial park, since nearly 50,000 North Koreans are working there. But experts stress that the government should take the seizure of the properties in the resort as a warning and be prepared for anything that the regime could do.

“There’s nothing we can be sure of in inter-Korean relations,” said Dong Yong-seung, a researcher at the Samsung Economic Research Institute. “Risk factors always exist because the government launched the Kaesong project without providing any safety net to protect its people and properties, as in the case of the Mt. Kumgang tour project.”

South Korean investments in the industrial park amount to W920 billion (US$1=W1,079) — W540 billion invested by the 123 firms, and W380 billion from the government and public corporations to lay the infrastructure, including electricity and communications facilities, and landscaping.

If the regime shuts down the industrial park, the South would suffer double the losses it incurred from the regime’s seizure of the properties in Mt. Kumgang, which are worth W484.1 billion.

Read the full story here:
Kaesong Firms Worry as N.Korea Seizes Mt. Kumgang Assets
Choson Ilbo
2011-8-24

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-8-11

Despite the current impasse in inter-Korean relations, the trade volume in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) continues to rise, up about 20 percent against last year.

According to the ROK Ministry of Unification, the inter-Korean trade via Kaesong totaled 825.88 million USD in the first six months of 2011. In comparison to last year’s 691.09 million USD, this is a 19.5 percent increase (134.795 million USD) and a whopping 135.8 percent climb (475.64 million USD) from 2009.

The total import reached 444.98 million USD, up 36.4 percent from last year. The total export recorded 389 million USD, a slight increase of 4.3 percent.

As of June 2011, there are about 123 companies reported to be in Kaesong. A total of 560 South Korean staffs work in the KIC, 155 of which joined since June of last year. There was also a boost in the number of North Korean workers; 3,161 new workers joined the complex from the year before, making the current number of North Korean employees 47,172.

In comparison, both commercial trade including general trade (mineral and agricultural products) and noncommercial trade such as humanitarian assistance and socio-cultural exchanges dwindled 16.2 percent (161.34 million USD) from the previous year.

The figure suggests the plunge was triggered by the sanctions imposed by the South Korean government on North Korea since May 24 of last year — a response to North Korea’s deadly provocation in March 2010 — cutting off most of the humanitarian assistance and exchanges. According to the ministry of unification, before the sanctions went into effect, general trade that comprised 30 percent fell below 1 percent and humanitarian assistance became nonexistent.

According to a recent survey conducted in the complex, economic loss engendered by the May 24 sanctions are estimated to be 3.875 billion USD. Out of the 154 total economic cooperation and trade firms in Kaesong, 104 claimed to have suffered economically, totaling over 430 million USD in losses.

The survey was conducted from January 24 to March 25 with 154 firms: 79.2 percent indicated the recent sanctions have significantly impacted their businesses; 3.2 percent answered “a little” effect; none answered “no effect at all.”

Moreover, 78.6 percent responded that the sanctions led to interruption in business operations and 12.3 percent replied that the sanctions resulted in complete shutdown.

In addition, reduction of staffs was also linked to the sanctions, in which 34.4 percent reported to have downsized by 20 percent, while 26.7 percent reported 30 to 40 percent cut backs in the number of staff.

Pictured Above (Google Earth): Tynda Logging Camp in Russia. See in Google Maps here.

According to the Daily NK:

Kim, a defector who arrived in South Korea in 2008 after working for 30 years in the North Korean forestry sector, explained to The Daily NK on the 5th, “North Korea’s operations in Russia are now just enough to send timber to North Korea on the birthdays of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il; they provide little real benefit in terms of foreign currency earning.”

In essence, Kim went on, “North Korea is just running the Forestry Mission to maintain its relationship with Russia.”

Following a 1967 agreement between the two countries, logging has at times played a key role in North Korea’s hard currency earning efforts, with more than 20,000 North Korean laborers being involved in forestry operations in Russia by the start of the 1990s.

Under the agreement, Russia agreed to provide the trees, equipment and power, while North Korea would provide the labor, and both countries shared the timber.

However, the deal is no longer beneficial to the North Korean state, as Kim explained in more detail, saying, “At the moment, Russia takes 72% and North Korea 28% of what is felled by these North Korean laborers, but most of the money North Korea earns from selling it on to Chinese trade companies goes on the laborers’ wages, accommodation, food and administration of the Forestry Mission. Now that Russia is a market economy with constantly rising prices, there is hardly any hard currency left to send back to the North Korean authorities.”

“Recently, China has been offering the Russians more money for these felling operations, so the North Korean laborers have no choice but to go home,” Kim added, continuing, “In addition, the scale of the workforce and operations has been decreasing recently partly because those groups of workers who protest about wage delays and whatever else are all dispatched back to North Korea.”

“In the past there used to be trade missions in Tynda and Khabarovsk, but now they is only the one in Tynda, with seven logging businesses underneath it,” he said. “The Khabarovsk trade mission has recently been closed down, and there are now a total of just nine logging operations underway in all of Russia.”

The numbers of loggers has shrunk to “4,000 in Khabarovsk and 2,000 in other remote areas; a total that does not exceed 6,000,” Kim stated.

Even the remaining forestry mission in Tynda is not large, with a president, chief engineer and vice-director working in parallel with a Party chief secretary, organizational secretary and propaganda secretary. Although each secretary has two or three workers under him, even with the National Security Agency staff that keeps tabs on the activities of the workers included in the total, the mission remains small.

Elsewhere, however, there are actually tens of thousands of North Korean laborers in Russia working in fields including construction, agriculture and mining, including around 30% of the 6,000 nominally said to be involved in logging.

The activities of military-run enterprises are on the increase, too. Kim explained, “Following cooperation between the Russian Air Force and the North Korean Air Force Command, there are now farming operations going on around air fields. If you include the General Reconnaissance Bureau, North Korea has sent at least a few tens of thousands of people to Russia.”

Given the ever increasing number of laborers running away from their assigned workplaces, Kim speculated there could also be as many as 600 or more defectors residing in Russia.

“In 2006 the Ministry of Forestry sent some cadres all over Russia to try and lure defectors back home, but these people had grown accustomed to living in Russia and nobody listened. There were 598 at that time, so it’s probably even higher by now,” Kim said.

One other key reason why North Korea has been unsuccessful in its attempts to retrieve the defectors is that the Russian authorities take a sympathetic view of their plight. According to Kim, “Russia does not forcibly repatriate defectors in the same way as China, so they are able to marry and work there. The Russian police have been treating defectors as humanitarian refugees since 2005, aware that forcibly repatriated defectors risk public execution and that their families face punishment, too.”

Naturally though, surveillance and control of the laborers is as severe as it has always been at the logging sites. Every week the workers are forced to participate in Party-led activities including mutual criticism sessions. The authorities are trying to limit the number of defectors by encouraging them to spy on one another, and the NSA has an intricate system of investigation to maintain order. Nevertheless, workers are sufficiently unhappy with their situation that defections continue to occur.

According to the Russians, there were 32,000 North Koreans working in the country in 2010. Here is a link to the source of this number and previous posts on North Koreans logging in Russia.

Read the full story here:
Logging in Russia: Not What It Used to Be
Daily NK
Kim Yoinh-hun
2011-8-8

According to Yonhap:

Trade volume between South and North Korea reached US$825 million in the first six months of the year, up 19.5 percent compared to the same period last year, the Unification Ministry said Wednesday.

The cross-border trade volume jumped more than 135 percent compared to the January-June period in 2009, the ministry said.

The figure suggests that a joint industrial complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong, a key source of inter-Korean trade, has not been affected by South Korea’s sanctions imposed on the North for its two deadly attacks on the South last year.

The industrial complex, an achievement of the first-ever inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in 2000, combines South Korea’s capital and technology with the North’s cheap labor.

More than 47,000 North Koreans work at about 120 South Korean firms operating in the industrial zone to produce clothes, utensils, watches and other goods.

South and North Korea have recently raised the minimum monthly wage for the North Korean workers by 5 percent this year to US$63.814, according to the ministry.

Previous posts on the Kaesong Industrial Zone can be found here.

Read the full story here:
Inter-Korean trade via joint industrial zone increases 19 pct in H1
Yonhap
Kim Kwang-tae
2011-8-3

(2011-7-14) The International Crisis Group published a report on DPRK defectors living in South Korea.  Here is the executive summary.  Here is the full report (PDF).  Below are some statistics that others might like to know for future reference (Footnotes can be found in the original document):

There were only 86 defectors from 1990 to 1994, and the numbers remained under 100 each year until 1999. North Korea’s deteriorating economy and a subsequent famine in the mid-1990s, along with an erosion of border controls that opened an escape route into China, began to push the numbers higher by 2000. In 2001, 583 North Koreans arrived in South Korea. The following year the figure nearly doubled to 1,138. By 2007, about 10,000 North Korean defectors had arrived in the South, and by December 2010, the number reached 20,360. The number is expected to remain steady at about 2,500-3,000 per year or even to increase, although slightly fewer defectors arrived in 2010 due to tightened restrictions in North Korea, including greater punishment for attempting to defect.

…

In 1998, only 12 per cent of the 947 defectors in the South were female. But they surpassed males in 2002, and in 2010 they accounted for 76 per cent of the 2,376 defectors who arrived in the South. By January 2011, the cumulative total of defectors nineteen years of age and younger was 3,174 – 15.4 per cent of all defectors in the South.

About 70 per cent of the defectors arriving recently have graduated from middle school or high school, about 9 per cent have graduated from junior colleges, and about 8 per cent are college graduates. About 50 per cent were unemployed or dependents before they left the North, and about 39 per cent were workers.

…

According to Pak Chŏn-ran [Park Jeon-ran], a specialist on defectors at Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification Studies, “the health status of defectors who left their families in the North is five times worse than that of defectors who escaped North Korea with relatives or friends”.107 She also found in a study that 20 per cent of ailments afflicting defectors were psychosomatic. The medical staff at a government reintegration centre reported that about 70 per cent of their patients exhibited symptoms of depression or other stress-related disorders.

…

In 2007, researchers from Seoul National University disclosed that in interviews conducted with over 200 defectors, 80 per cent indicated they had contracted at least one ailment since arriving in the South. In April of the same year, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs released a study on the health of 6,500 defectors who had arrived in the South between 2000 and 2005. Some 1.8 per cent were infected with syphilis in 2004 and 2.1 per cent in 2005. About 20 per cent of 700 women aged twenty to 49 suffered from some type of gynaecological disorder.

The Korea Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) reports that the average height and weight of defectors is much lower than their South Korean counterparts. The average North Korean male defector is 164.4cm tall and weighs 60.2kg, compared to the average South Korean man, who stands 171.4cm tall and weighs 72kg. The figures for North Korean female defectors and South Korean women are: 154.2cm and 158.4cm; 52.8kg and 57.1kg. The average teenage male defector’s height is 155.7cm, 13.5cm less than the average South Korean counterpart; the average weight is 47.3kg, 13.5kg less than that of the South Korean. The average heights and weights for teenage female defectors and South Korean teenage females are: 151.1cm and 159.4cm; 46.9kg and 52.3kg.

…

In January 2011, only 50 per cent of defectors were employed (10,248 of 20,539), and most of these were in unskilled manual labour jobs (7,901, or 77 per cent of those employed). Only 439 defectors (4 per cent) were working in skilled jobs, and 381 were working in administrative positions.

…

Those who do find work earn on average W1.27 million (about $1,170) per month, which is just above the minimum subsistence level for a family of three.

These levels of unemployment persist despite subsidies for employers who hire defectors; the government provides up to W500,000 of monthly salaries for the first year and up to W700,000 of monthly salaries for the second year.

…

Many defectors reach the South with the help of people known as brokers. The journey can cost anywhere from $2,500 to $15,000. Many brokers will defer payment until the government in Seoul has paid resettlement money. To prevent a developing business in bringing defectors to the South, in 2005 the government cut the payments from a W10 million (about $9,400) lump sum to W6 million (about $5,600) paid out over several years. This has left many defectors with considerable debts.

More posts on this topic below:

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UPDATE 1 (2011-8-10): Wages of North Korean workers in Kaesong Industrial Complex set to rise 5% for the fifth consecutive year. According to the Institute for Far Easter Studies (IFES):

The minimum wage for North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) has risen annually at a rate of 5 percent since 2007. The year 2011 stands to mark the fifth consecutive year that such an increase has occurred.

Recently, the steering committee for the KIC and South Korean and North Korean authorities reached an agreement to accept a 5 percent wage hike for North Korean workers at the complex. Accordingly, as of August 1, 2011, North Korean workers at the KIC should earn USD 63.814 rather than USD 60.775 in monthly wages. South Korean authorities, as an exchange for accepting the North Korean demand for a wage increase, requested that productivity be elevated via the adoption of a more efficient method of worker placement.

At the meeting, the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, representatives of companies in the complex, and the head of corporations were in attendance and reached an agreement to form a task force specifically for the improvement of productivity of workers. While the overall output of the KIC has increased, the output per worker has not improved, leading to the decision to establish the task force, with the goal of enhancing the competitiveness of the complex.

The minimum monthly income of USD 60.775, which kicked in last August, remained in effect until July 31 of this year. The Labor Law of the KIC caps the wage increase at 5 percent; a 5 percent increase to the minimum wage this year would elevate the minimum monthly wage for workers to USD 63.814.

At the meeting, North Korea mentioned international wage levels and made demands for a wage hike of more than the upper limit. However, most of the companies that operate in the KIC adamantly oppose such demands.

Despite the May 24 sanctions implemented by the South Korean government after the March 2010 sinking of the ROK navy corvette Cheonan, the growth of the KIC has continued. The trade volume has increased by 24.23 percent while the production output has increased by 26.1 percent compared to the same period last year.

Although the eight-year old Kaesong Industrial Complex boasts its competitiveness against other industrial complexes in China and Vietnam, it still has many challenges that must be resolved, including employment flexibility and incentive system.

From the institutional perspective, there are many tax benefits that Kaesong offers that industrial complexes in China and Vietnam do not. For example, the enterprise profit tax in Kaesong is at 14 percent. In contrast, China and Vietnam abolished the preferential treatment for foreign companies in 2008 and 2009, respectively; they currently apply a 25 percent of enterprise profit tax to both domestic and foreign companies. Even in terms of labor and wages, the KIC would appear to offer better quality of labor. In addition, the labor productivity of the KIC is comparable to 71 percent of South Korea, which is much higher than that of China’s Qingdao Industrial Complex (60 percent) and Vietnam’s Tanttueon Industrial Complex (40 percent).

Another advantage is the KIC’s favorable geographical proximity to South Korea, which helps reduce distribution costs and time. This advantage helps to reinforce the sales competiveness of the companies in the complex. In addition, the KIC has sufficient potential for expansion into markets in China, and domestic markets in South and North Korea.

On the other hand, Kaesong has relatively low flexibility of employment due to the principle of indirect recruitment. Difficulties in applying an incentive system are also a disadvantage of the KIC.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-7-15): Kaesong wages set to increase. According to Yonhap:

The minimum wage for workers at the inter-Korean industrial park in the North Korean border town of Kaesong is likely to rise 5 percent this year, the same annual rate of increase since 2007, industry sources said Friday.

More than 46,000 North Koreans work at about 120 South Korean firms operating in the complex, despite the South’s suspension of all other economic ties with the North over the deadly sinking of a South Korean warship last year. The local workers currently earn a minimum monthly income of US$60.775 following a 5 percent increase that took effect last August.

This year’s new minimum rate goes into effect next month after negotiations between the factory park’s management officials from the two sides. Under the park’s labor regulations, the minimum wage can increase only up to 5 percent from the previous year.

“The North Koreans are demanding an increase of more than the upper limit (of 5 percent), citing wage levels in other parts of the world,” said an official from one of the South Korean firms in Kaesong. The person spoke on the condition of anonymity.

“In effect, this is equivalent to demanding a wage rise of 5 percent,” the official said, adding that the businesses operating in the joint industrial park had tentatively agreed to accept the demand. After the increase, the North Korean workers will earn $63.814 monthly.

Meanwhile, production at the industrial zone has continued to grow, according to recent data. The park’s output of clothes, utensils, watches and other goods rose 26.1 percent last year from 2009. Since its opening in 2004 under former liberal South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, the complex has served as a source of tens of millions of dollars for the cash-strapped North annually.

Read the full story here:
Minimum wage for N. Koreans in Kaesong likely to rise 5 pct
Yonhap
2011-7-15

Pictured above (Google Earth): Two official marketplaces in Kaesong highlighted in yellow.  South Korean treats are popular in these markets.

According to the Daily NK:

Shin Ramen (a brand of instant noodles), Choco-pies and coffee mix, the snacks offered to Kaesong Industrial Complex workers, leak out and are now very popular in the jangmadang in Kaesong, according to sources.

The news was revealed by a South Korea government official and a staff member from an enterprise in the Kaesong Complex on the 15th.

North Korean workers often ask their employers for Shin Ramen uncooked and packed so that they can sell it in the jangmadang to augment their wages, according to the Ministry of Unification.

One staff member from a company stationed in the Kaesong Industrial Complex explained, “The time when the North Korean workers are given Shin Ramen, Choco-pies and coffee mix is the time they look forward to the most.”

“I am aware that North Korean workers take the several ramen given to them at snack times or when doing evening overtime back into North Korea,” he added. “They sell the ramen they take for roughly the same price as a kilo of rice. But it is not just Shin Ramen; Choco-pies are very popular with the North Korean workers, and they also use Shin Ramen soup as a seasoning at home.”

Kaesong Industrial Complex companies are known to get assistance from domestic companies, so pay less than market price for the Shin Ramen and other snacks that they offer to workers.

The company staff member said he saw the situation in a positive light, explaining,, “There have been almost no inter-Korean exchanges of late, so in this situation the Shin Ramen and Choco-pies and other things offered by enterprises provide a link between the North Korean people and South Korea. If the workers take the Korean-made products and sell them in the jangmadang then not just the workers but also the North Korean people get to know about South Korea.”

Unfortunately, meanwhile, although workers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex receive a wage of approximately $100/month, they are not free to keep it. 30% is taken by the North Korean authorities in the form of a ‘Socialist Culture Policy Tax’, and other costs are extracted as well. Therefore, the take-home pay is around $30/month, although even this is not paid in cash but in the form of an exchange coupon.

A Ministry of Unification explained one part of that system, saying, “Most of the money and other things that come from the South go to the central North Korean authorities, but a proportion goes to Kaesong city authorities. That money which goes to Kaesong City is meant to be for the purpose of buying rice for distribution to the local people.”

There are now approximately 46,000 North Korean workers in the Kaesong Complex, and complex operations are, as such, a $4.6 million monthly subsidy for the North Korean authorities.

Despite the measures put in place by the South Korean government following last year’s Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, the number of workers earning money in Kaesong has continued to expand. According to the Ministry of Unification, at the end of February there were 46,420 workers, an 11% increase on one year previously. Earnings have also risen significantly in the same period.

Donald Kirk was the first (of whom I am aware) to write about the subversive nature of Choco Pies back in May 2009.

Read the full story here:
Shin Ramen Popular in Kaesong Jangmadang
Daily NK
Kim Yong-hun
2011-7-15

Pictured above (Google Earth) is the electrified fence around the Rason special economic zone.

Lankov writes in the East Asia Forum:

SEZs are acceptable to the North Korean government because they are relatively easy to control. North Korean SEZs have been fenced off with barbed wire and all visitors have had their IDs carefully studied at checkpoints.

The North Korean government obviously hopes that small areas of controlled capitalism will generate enough income to make a difference — or at least to keep afloat the long-decaying economy.

Similar SEZs with China to those recently declared have been attempted before. At Raseon a major problem was its isolated location and underdeveloped transport infrastructure, even by meagre North Korean standards. At Sinuiju there were numerous problems. One was North Korea’s choice of the Chinese entrepreneur Yang Bin to lead the project as he wanted to transform the city into a gambling centre, a Macau of the North. This was not welcomed by the Chinese government. Also, it did not help that the North Koreans, following their modus operandi, did not bother to liaise with the Chinese beforehand.

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The success of KIZ might seem encouraging, but it is actually a very special case. It is viable because the South Korean government is willing to go to great lengths to support it. It has subsidised industrial development and has provided adventurous developers and companies with generous subsidies and guarantees that made the entire undertaking possible. This willingness is driven by a multitude of political considerations. Frankly, it is doubtful whether the Chinese side would be equally interested in subsidising a similar undertaking by Chinese companies in Sinuiju.

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What will happen to these two planned new SEZs? The fate of Raseon seems pretty certain. Available evidence indicates it is largely about transportation links. Chinese Manchuria is landlocked, so Chinese companies will save a small fortune on transportation costs if they are given access to a seaport on the Eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula. If this is what happens in Raseon, it has a relatively bright future.

The future of the Hwanggumpyong SEZ is far less certain. Obviously Chinese businesses want to do there what their South Korean counterparts did in Kaesong, take advantage of low labour costs in North Korea. Even though Chinese labour is cheap, North Korean labour is much cheaper still, since US$15-20 a month would be seen by the average North Korean worker as a good wage. For the same labour, they would have to pay a Chinese worker between US$100 and US$150 a month.

But that said, the business reputation of North Korean managers leaves much to be desired. They are likely to intervene in operations − partially as a way to extort bribes, but largely because they will worry about excessive exposure of their population to dangerous Chinese influences. South Korean businesses in Kaesong accept such interference, but they are backed by the South Korean government. It remains to be seen whether the same situation will develop in a Chinese-led zone.

Previous posts on the Sinuiju (including Waudo and Hwangumphyong) can be fond here.

Previous posts on Rason (Rajin-Sonbong) can be found here.

Read the full story here:
North Korea-China special economic zones
East Asia Forum
Andrei Lankov
2011-7-14

Lankov writes in the Korea Times about the DPRK’s various Special Economic Zones:

In early June, the governments of China and North Korea declared that they would work to develop two new special economic zones (SEZs). One zone is to be situated in the small port city of Raseon, on the eastern coast of South Korea, just 20 kilometers from the nearest crossing to China. Another zone will be developed on the unremarkable sandy island of Hwanggumpyong, in the vicinity of Sinuiju, the largest city on the border (some three quarters of trade between the two countries pass through this city).

One cannot be surprised by this initiative as talk of new SEZs “soon to be established” has been around for over a decade. There is little doubt that the North Korean government is very interested in the idea of SEZs. Unfortunately, this interest does not necessary mean that the North Korean authorities are willing to make the concessions that would allow the SEZs to operate efficiently.

The history of North Korean SEZs is essentially the history of frequent failures and occasional partial successes. The first attempt to create a SEZ took place in 1991, when the North Korean government established a SEZ in the remote northwestern corner of the country. The Raseon SEZ, as it has now become known, is located where the borders of China, Russia and North Korea meet.

Read the remainder of the story below:
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