North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
12/10/2008

The North Korean authorities recently announced the intention to sell all industrial products in state-operated stores, soon after announcing the revised “10th-day farmers markets,” which open only on the 1st, 11th and 21st of every month, starting from next year.

According to an inside source in North Hamkyung Province, a new instruction on the sale of industrial products in state-operated stores was introduced during the latest cadres’ lectures. As rumors of the large-scale entry of Chinese goods onto the market due to Chinese loans circulate among people, there has been in a flutter in the market.

The source stated that the idea of industrial product sales was introduced during a cadres’ lecture on the 29th of November under the title, “measures to improve the current situation and people’s lives,” which also explained the transformation of the current market system into the “10th-day farmers market” system.

In the source’s opinion, “It signifies the government’s attempt to monopolize the industrial-product market, which was actively and spontaneously established by the people after the ‘march of tribulation’ in the late 1990s. Industrial goods to be sold in the state-operated stores would include both Chinese and North Korean products.

During the lecture, it was stated that “All industrial goods that have been passing through the jangmadang (markets) must now be sold in the state-operated stores and only vegetables or certain agricultural products can be sold within the farmers markets,” which suggests the prohibition of individuals selling food-related products and industrial goods.

With regard to the backdrop of this policy, the authorities explained that, “The current market was a temporary measure taken by the state considering the difficult situations caused by the march of tribulation. However, the markets after some time deviated from the state’s intention and socialist economic principles and have become a hotbed of crimes generating capitalist and anti-socialist trends. Therefore, we are ridding ourselves of all markets and reviving the farmers market.”

The source explained that this measure does not seem to “simply control the markets. But if they begin selling industrial products in the state-operated stores, they would be able to circulate money within the regime that has been circulating within private markets and among individuals by tying purchase profits to national banks.

He said, “Due to the jangmadang, the gap between the rich and the poor has widened. And, because money is not flowing within the regime, the authorities are getting rid of private sales to revive the banks so as to recover the regime economy… It seems the state-controlled economy will become better next year” he added.

However, the source also relayed that “Although they announced the selling of industrial goods only in the state-operated stores from next year, nothing, regarding exactly when and how, was mentioned during the lecture.”

“There is also another rumor that even ‘procurement stores’ would have to sell products on the same price level with the state-operated stores, or they would have to close down. It basically signifies that the regime will not permit any form of private sales, by selling all products that had been sold by individuals” he added.

The source reported that there have been heated debates on this decision among North Koreans.

“Famers gladly took this decision that industrial goods will sell in state-operated stores because they have been complaining that they sold agricultural products at next to nothing while buying industrial goods at such a high price. They are expecting that industrial goods will cost less than now” the source reported.

“However, workers in urban areas are extremely concerned that they cannot sell anything in the jangmadang. An average workers’ salary is 1,500 North Korean Won and if individuals are not permitted to sell, workers’ families will be harshly affected” he forecasted.

The source continued on and said, “Even though they say workers get paid well, how are they expected to live when a pair of military boots costs 9,000 North Korean won. One month’s salary is not even half a kilo of rice.”

The source in the end expressed concern because workers began “explicitly complaining about cadres who only fill themselves up. I personally think that there will begin a massive war within the markets starting from New Year’s Day”.

Although many would assume that North Korea’s economic isolation would insulate it from recent global financial instability, this does not appear to be the case.  According to the Wall Street Journal:

North Korea does little trade with the rest of the world — about $2 billion annually — and now it’s being hurt by lower prices paid by its biggest trading partner, China, according to report from a South Korean institute that specializes in North Korea research.

In recent weeks, the Chinese companies that buy North Korean ores and minerals like zinc, which are some of its biggest exports, have slashed the prices they’re willing to pay. That’s forced some North Korean mining firms to halt production and even produced a drop in the smuggling of ore and scrap, trade that’s illegal in the North but is believed to play an important role in supporting the impoverished country.

Lim Eul-chul, a professor at the Seoul-based Institute for Far Eastern Studies who wrote the report issued Thursday, said he learned about the commodity-trade problems from North Koreans doing business in China

“Chinese companies that are affected by global trends don’t want to pay as much as they used to for North Korean raw materials or resources,” Mr. Lim said. “Thus, North Korean merchants can’t make profits from trade.”

The price pressure exerted by Chinese traders on North Korean companies is in line with the broader drop in commodity prices in recent months. But it has imposed new burdens on North Korea in what is shaping up to be a terrible year there.

Official North Korean media have published reports saying the global financial crisis will ruin the U.S. and other industrial powers. But in the report, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies said “North Korean people are becoming very anxious over the possibility of the international economic crisis having a long-term impact.”

Below is the IFES report mentioned in the Wall Street Journal:

Global Financial Crisis hits DPRK economy by way of China 
NK Brief No. 08-10-29-1
10/29/2008

Contacts within North Korea are reporting that the North Korean people are becoming very anxious over the possibility of the international economic crisis having a long term impact as not only exports have dropped, but even cross-border smuggling is taking a hit.

Recently, as Chinese traders have more than halved the price of North Korea’s main export goods such as minerals and scrap iron, North Korea’s markets and even construction industry have felt the blow.

As North Korean state-run media outlets report the current financial crisis as the ruin of the United States and other capitalist world powers, they report as if North Korea were completed unaffected by it. On the 20th, the Rodong Sinmun emphasized that the the U.S.’ financial management system was ‘like a candle in the wind.’

However, it has been leaked that since last week, businesses in North Korea have been shutting their doors as a result of the financial crisis. In particular, the value of the North Korean Won has dropped sharply against the Chinese Yuan, and combined with Chinese traders’ reluctance to purchase North Korean goods and calls to lower prices, very little business is being conducted. This has led mines in Hyesan to halt exports of lead and zinc, and with the drop in legitimate exports, of course smuggling has dropped of, as well.

Furthermore, as raw materials from China are not being supplied, construction projects in the North are also grinding to a halt. 

(UPDATE) Barbara Demick reports in the Los Angeles Times:

Despite efforts to keep North Korea’s extreme poverty out of view, a glance around the countryside shows a population in distress. At the root of the problem is a chronic food shortage, the result of inflation, strained relations with neighboring countries and flooding in previous years.

Aid agencies say the level of hunger is not at the point it was in the 1990s, when it was defined as a famine, although they have found a few cases of children suffering from kwashiorkor, the swollen belly syndrome associated with malnutrition. Mostly what they are seeing is a kind of collective listlessness — the kind shown by the people on the streets of Nampo.

“Teachers report that children lack energy and are lagging in social and cognitive development,” reported a group of five U.S. humanitarian agencies in a summer assessment of the food situation. “Workers are unable to put in full days and take longer to complete tasks — which has implications for the success of the early and main harvests.”

Hospitals complained to aid workers of rising infant mortality and declining birth weights. They also said they were seeing 20% to 40% more patients with digestive disorders caused largely by poor nutrition.

The U.N. World Food Program reached similar conclusions. In a recent survey of 375 households, more than 70% were found to be supplementing their diet with weeds and grasses foraged from the countryside. Such wild foods are difficult to digest, especially for children and the elderly. The survey also determined that most adults had started skipping lunch, reducing their diet to two meals a day.

These are some of the same signs that augured the mid-1990s famine, which killed as many as 2 million people, 10% of the population.

“The current situation hasn’t reached the famine proportions that it did during the 1990s. Our hope and goal is to keep it from going over the precipice,” said Nancy Lindborg, president of Mercy Corps, one of the U.S. aid organizations working in North Korea. “You have a number of factors that have conspired to create a really tough food situation.”

In Pyongyang, the capital, residence in which is reserved for the most politically loyal North Koreans, plenty of food is available on sale. A grocery inside the Rakwon Department Store carries Froot Loops and frozen beef. At open-air markets, you can find mangoes, kiwis and pineapples

But the products are far too expensive for most North Koreans, whose official salaries are less than $1 a month — 60 to 75 cents monthly for the workers surveyed by the World Food Program. And the farther you get from Pyongyang, the poorer are the people.

Nampo is 25 miles southwest of the capital, on the Yellow Sea. It used to be a thriving port city, but nowadays its harbor is used mostly for shipments of humanitarian aid. On a weekday morning, many people sit along the sidewalk watching the few cars pass by. They appear to be unemployed or homeless.

North Koreans say that the food situation is improving and that a good harvest is expected this autumn, as a result of improved weather conditions. The last two years were disastrous because of heavy flooding.

“There was a problem before, but it is getting better. We expect a bumper harvest,” said Choe Jong Hun, an official of the Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries.

North Korea experts, however, are skeptical. “One good harvest is not really going to alter the picture,” said Stephan Haggard, a UC San Diego professor who has written widely on the North Korean famine.

The World Food Program and the U.S. aid organizations are providing food for the most vulnerable, including children and pregnant women. A U.S. ship carrying more than 27,000 tons of bulk corn and soy is slated to arrive in Nampo within days.

International agencies have been trying to raise money to expand their food aid to the general population. Many urban North Koreans are dependent on food rations, which have dwindled to 150 grams a day, or a little more than 5 ounces.

Even in Pyongyang, one can see signs of scarcity behind the facade of what is supposed to be a showcase capital. Foreign residents say they have seen homeless children in the last few months — a notable sight in a totalitarian country where nobody is supposed to wander away from their legal residence. (Los Angeles Times)

Read the full Wall Street Journal articles below:
North Korea Feels Effects of the Crisis
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad and Sungha Park
10/31/2008

North Korean facade of self-sufficiency can’t hide signs of hunger
Los Angeles Times
Barbara Demick
11/2/2008

According to Yonhap:

North Korea has begun to more harshly censor South Korean newspapers subscribed to by firms operating in the inter-Korean Kaesong industrial complex, apparently to prevent workers there from reading reports on their leader Kim Jong-il’s health, officials said Monday.

“The North began to allow South Korean dailies to pass through customs only after cutting out articles critical of the country as of Oct. 20,” a Unification Ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

About 30 copies of nine different papers cross the inter-Korean border every day for delivery to the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee in the complex, a civilian administrative body of South Korean firms there, according to the official.

The North is strictly enforcing customs regulations barring the entry of overseas publications critical of Pyongyang, the official said.

It is not known exactly what types of articles have been censored by the North, but officials say the measure could be related to recent reports that Kim is ailing.

South Koreans are forbidden to carry the newspapers when they leave the office, but some have received warnings from North Korean authorities for violating the rule, according to the Unification Ministry official.

Read the full article here:
N. Korea intensifies control of S. Korean dailies sent to Kaesong
Yonhap
Shim Sun-ah
10/27/2008

The South Korean Ministry of Unification has reports on economic output at the Kaesong Industrial Zone.  Below are the highlights from Yonhap:

The total output by South Korean factories operating in North Korea has exceeded US$400 million, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said Monday.

Companies at the Kaesong industrial complex produced goods worth a total of US$410 million between January 2005, when the compound was opened, and July this year. One-fifth of all goods produced were exported, according to the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs.

The output in the first seven months of this year amounted to $140 million, up 51 percent from the same period last year.

As of August, 79 firms operated in the area, employing more than 32,000 North Korean workers, mostly women.

Read the full article here:
Production in inter-Korean business town tops $400 million
Yonhap
9/15/2008

On this page, I will keep a list of DPRK statutes and summaries:

1. Foreign Investment Law
2. Free Economic and Trade Zone Law
3. Equity Joint Venture Law
4. Contractual Joint Venture Law
5. Foreign Enterprises Law
6. Taxation of Foreign Invested Enterprises
7. Relevant Labor Laws
8. Leasing Land 
9. Dispute Resolution
10. Domestic Sales Tax Regulations
11. Manufacturing & Export Operations
12. External Economic Arbitration Law
13. Commercial Joint Venture Law
14. Constitutions (x2)
15. Customs Law
16. Law on Economic Plans
17. Fisheries Law
18. Foreigners in FEZs
19. Intellectual Property

Click “read the rest of this entry” below to see summaries and statute text.

(more…)

Although the article did not offer much new or probing analysis, there were a few data points that I thought it was important to highlight: 

Despite its isolation and prisonlike feel, the Kaesong Industrial Park is booming with construction. The park’s operator, a South Korean developer, Hyundai Asan, hopes to expand it into a minicity over the next 12 years, with high-rise apartments and hotels, an artificial lake and three golf courses.

By that time, the company hopes there will be about 2,000 factories here employing 350,000 North Koreans and producing $20 billion worth of goods a year.

That compares with a manufacturing output of only $366 million in the first half of this year, according to South Korea’s unification ministry.

In the six months through June, the flow of goods in and out of the industrial park accounted for 42 percent of the $881 million in trade between the two Koreas, the ministry said.

and

[…] 72 smaller South Korean companies have already built factories here, looking to tap the North’s supply of low-cost, Korean-speaking labor. So far, only one foreign company has come [–German auto parts maker Prettl Group is building a factory. Two Chinese companies will begin operations soon[, b]ut most companies here continue to be smaller South Korean firms, producing low-tech goods, from frying pans to running shoes, largely for domestic consumption.] (NKeconWatch combined two different paragraphs here)

The piecemeal brand of change is seen in the experiences of SJ Tech, a South Korean maker of car and cellphone parts that built a $4 million factory here four years ago. The company’s first North Korean employees had never even seen a keyboard, much less a computer, said Yoo Chang-geun, SJ Tech’s president. SJ Tech has spent so much time teaching them things like machinery operation and management concepts that Mr. Yoo jokingly calls his factory “North Korea’s first business school.”

But the North Koreans were eager learners, sketching keyboards on paper to teach themselves typing. Now, SJ Tech’s 430 North Korean employees have learned enough to run the factory without South Korean supervisors.

In a telling sign, they have also changed their haircuts to look more like their South Korean colleagues.

Andrei Lankov seems optimistic on the project’s political goals, stating “When North and South Koreans can interact on a daily basis, it is a chance for the North Koreans to see with their eyes that their own propaganda doesn’t make sense.”

A few described how the South Korean-run industrial park was improving lives by paying its workers the equivalent of about $60 a month, three times the average salary in the rest of Kaesong. […]

The South Korean government, which spent more than $150 million subsidizing the park, provides low-interest loans and insurance to companies to offset the risks of investing in the unstable and still hostile North.

Mr. Yoo of SJ Tech said his North Korean employees’ monthly salaries of $75, in contrast to the $2,000 he pays South Koreans, made investing in North Korea entirely worthwhile, despite any risks.

The article seems to take worker compensation claims at face value, but in reality Kaesong workers do not take home their allotted wages.  The DPRK government keeps most of them in taxes and administrative fees.  However, other non-monetary benefits make the jobs highly envied among North Korean workers.  Rumor has it that North Korean workers pay hefty bribes to get these jobs. 

Read the full article here:
Big Dreams for North Korean Industrial Park
New York Times
Martin Fackler
8/20/2008

The most authoritative map of North Korea on Google Earth
Download it here

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, markets, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the eleventh version.

Additions include: Mt. Paegun’s Ryonghung Temple and resort homes, Pyongyang’s Chongryu Restaurant, Swiss Development Agency (former UNDP office), Iranian Embassy, White Tiger Art Studio, KITC Store, Kumgangsan Store, Pyongyang Fried Chicken Restaurant, Kilju’s Pulp Factory (Paper), Kim Chaek Steel Mill, Chongjin Munitions Factory, Poogin Coal Mine, Ryongwun-ri cooperative farm, Thonggun Pavilion (Uiju), Chinju Temple (Yongbyon), Kim il Sung Revolutionary Museum (Pyongsong), Hamhung Zoo, Rajin electrified perimeter fence, Pyongsong market (North Korea’s largest), Sakju Recreation Center, Hoeryong Maternity Hospital, Sariwon Suwon reservoir (alleged site of US massacre), Sinpyong Resting Place, 700 Ridges Pavilion, Academy of Science, Hamhung Museum of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Il Sung, South Hamgyong House of Culture, Hamhung Royal Villa, Pork Chop Hill, and Pyongyang’s Olympic torch route. Additional thanks go to Martyn Williams for expanding the electricity grid, particularly in Samjiyon, and various others who have contributed time improving this project since its launch.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.  Additionally, this file is getting large and may take some time to load.

UPDATE:  (Reuters) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Japan that Washington would not remove North Korea from a US list of state sponsors of terrorism on the initial deadline of Monday, Japan’s foreign minister said.

ORGINAL POST: Marcus Noland comments in a Newsweek International op-ed how recent US policy changes towards North Korea (delisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror and exempting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act) amount to very little:

Lifting the trade restrictions will have a minimal impact. North Korea will remain one of a few countries that does not have normal trade relations with the United States, meaning its exports will continue to be subjected to punitive tariffs of up to 90 percent.

Removing North Korea from the terrorism list means that Washington can now legally support it for membership in international financial organizations such as the World Bank. But the White House is under no obligation to actually do so. North Korea also remains excluded from US government programs that encourage trade and investment.

North Korea’s declaration will trigger a reconvening of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The inadequate nature of the declaration guarantees there will be yet another round of negotiations in which North Korea will reveal a bit more in return for further concessions. It is no accident that up to 50,000 metric tons of US food aid is expected to arrive in North Korea early this month. 

Writing in 2004 (yet relevant today), Marcus Noland wrote about these issues in depth.  Below are excerpts from his op-ed on US tariffs:

US importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condition, approval is routine. US government officials report that they receive only a handful of such requests each year. Their impression is that business conditions in the DPRK pose a greater impediment to bilateral trade than the regulatory regime.

…

So, at present, with the exception of military-related products, there are few specific legal restrictions on the ability of Americans to export to or invest in the DPRK. Imports are subject to a prior approval process, but this is based on a transparent and narrowly delineated certification requirement.

Yet there is little trade between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea is among the few countries that the United States does not grant normal trade relations (NTR) status to, and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, in which North Korea is conceivably competitive. Though their incidence is an accident of history, and not an intentional slap, the column 2 tariffs represent a serious potential impediment to trade. Some countries, notably China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject to the higher column 2 tariffs (though even China eventually gained NTR status on a year-to-year basis). Most countries that have recently obtained permanent NTR, such as China, have done so through the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. The DPRK has shown no interest in joining the WTO.

This disinterest is unfortunate. The United States does not grant the DPRK quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a worldwide network of bilateral trade quotas on textiles and apparel (due to expire in 2005), and WTO accession could aid the DPRK in this regard. In the case of the similarly diplomatically problematic Burmese government, the US government found it politically easier to accept an increase in Burmese exports to the United States than to negotiate publicly a textile agreement under WTO auspices with the repressive regime. WTO membership has its privileges. In any event, the DPRK is one of the rare countries that chronically do not fill their MFA quotas in Europe, where there are no sanctions, suggesting that the problem lies in DPRK’s inability to compete, not in trade barriers.

However, should the DPRK obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify it as a nonmarket economy (NME) and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese template. The point is that improved diplomatic relations is no panacea—the United States can be protectionist on purely economic grounds, regardless of politics.

Conversely, the United States trades with some low-income countries preferentially, unilaterally granting them limited tariff-free access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), subject to standards concerning workers’ rights, intellectual property protection, and drug trafficking. Given North Korea’s disregard for internationally accepted labor standards, it is inconceivable that the United States would grant North Korea GSP privileges under current practices, even if diplomatic relations were normalized. Yet China, which has never received GSP privileges, vividly demonstrates that it is quite possible to prosper without such advantages.

Today, internal conditions and practices in North Korea, not legal restrictions, greatly impede bilateral trade. However, with sufficient reform and improvement in competitiveness, a broad range of policy issues would become increasingly relevant. In this regard, DPRK accession to the WTO would be advantageous. In the meantime, rather than complaining about US policy, North Korean officials would be better served by redoubling their reform efforts.

For more information, read the full articles below:
Partially True Confessions: How Big is the North Korea Deal?
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Newsweek (Link via the Peterson Institute)
7/7/2008

The Legal Framework of US–North Korea Trade Relations
Op-ed in JoongAng Ilbo, via the Peterson Institute web site.
Marcus Noland
4/27/2004

According to previous reports, Beijing’s border control policies have stiffened up in preparation for the 2008 Olympics.  The Daily NK reports these policies are adversely affecting North Koreans visiting family and conducting business in Jilin.

The Daily NK claims that North Koreans pay appx. US$400-500 in bribes and processing fees to obtain a passport, exit visa, and Chinese entrance visa. (The article does not explain how these prices break down, although it would be interesting to know how much Beijing charges North Koreans for various visas.)  China typically issues North Koreans family visit visas which are valid for three months, but if a North Korean visitor can secure a residence and employment, this can be easily extended for up to a year.  As a result, many North Koreans stay with family for the full year and try to earn some money to take home.

Because of the Olympics, Beijing is now apparently rejecting all family visit visa extensions and stepping up patrols for illegal “visitors.”  This means the North Koreans who paid hefty sums to be in China have to go underground if they wish to stay in the PRC.  They will also face additional hardship in recovering “travel costs.”  Additionally, many North Koreans who are married to Chinese face greater chances of being deported.

Interestingly, this policy was not ordered by local organizations but by the Jilin Provincial Communist Party.

Read the full article here:
China Rounds Up Defectors in Preparation for the Olympics
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
7/26/2008

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008