North Korean Economy Watch

D.P.R. Korea Export and Import 2007
Price JPY39,900.-(tax included)
Date of issue October  2007
Size B5/Page 514
Publisher WTS
ISBN Code ISBN978-4-9903339-2-8-C3033

This book summarizes foreign trade statistics in fiscal year 2006 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  Since DPRK does not publish the trade statistics, it is not even certain whether or not statistical data on trade are systematically collected.  Therefore, WTS drew up this book by investigating foreign trade with DPRK, based on customhouse statistics of 190 or so countries (and regions) which are trade partners of DPRK.

The statistical format applied in this book was created, based on the HS code (the commodity classification list based on “International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System”) which is the international standard.
Amounts in various currency units were all converted into the U.S. dollar on the basis of the annual total.

We would be delighted if this book could serve as reference for concerned parties.

Contents of “D.P.R.Korea Export and Import 2007”
1. Overview
2. Statistics by country
3. Statistics by product group
4. Statistics by country and product group (20 high rank countries = China, South Korea, India, Thailand, Yemen, Russia, Brazil, Qatar, Japan, South Africa, Singapore, Mexico, Greece, Germany, Hong Kong, Netherland, Chile, Taiwan, Peru, Paraguay)
5. Topics:
1) Oil import
2) Export of gold and silver
3) Export of rare metals
4) Export of other subterranean resources
5) Import of luxury items
6) Export of apparels
7) Export of fishery products
8) Data on imports to DPRK after the nuclear test
9) Partial confusion of the statistics of DPRK with those of South Korea
6. Statistics by product group and country (HS6ST)- EXPORT 3,161 all articles
7. Statistics by product group and country (HS6ST)- IMPORT 4,294 all articles

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tel/ fax +81-3-5283-6100,
miyagawa@rainbow-trading.co.jp

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
10/21/2007

When I was preparing for a trip to Yanbian, people told me that I would not have any difficulties in communicating with the locals: “They all speak Korean there.” It seems like an exaggeration, but it was not.

Every time my poor and broken Chinese was not up to the task, I asked if somebody around could speak Korean and such a person was found in seconds. Indeed, Yanbian is officially known as the Korean Autonomous Prefecture.

From the 1880s the Koreans began to move to the area in large numbers, and by 1949 when the Communists took power in China, they formed a majority in the borderland areas. In 1945 about 1.7 million Koreans lived in China. About 500,000 of those chose to move back to Korea in the late 1940s, but a million or so decided to stay.

Nowadays, the Korean population has reached two million, so some Korean nationalists even describe this part of China as “Third Korea,” together with the North and South Communist China emulated the Soviet approach to ethnic minorities. Ideally, each minority had to be given some kind of autonomous quasi-statehood.

Within such statehood, the ethnic minority would be provided with the education in their native language, the media in this language and some token representation of the minority in the government agencies. This scheme was applied to Yanbian as well, and in spite of all problems this policy has worked so far. On the one hand, Koreans of the area, unlike Koreans in the former USSR, Japan or U.S., have managed to keep their language.

On the other hand, their loyalties seem to remain firmly with Beijing. The Korean language is widely used in the area. Lively talks in Korean can be overheard during walks through the city of Yanji, the capital of the Prefecture. It is remarkable that the language is used not only by elderly people, but often by youngsters as well.

As stipulated by the law, all shops and government agencies have to display signs in two languages, and it is explicitly stated that the Korean text should not be smaller than its Chinese equivalent. The local newsstands sell a number of Korean language publications, ranging from pulp fiction periodicals with semi-nude beauties on the cover to a solid quarterly which publishes the work of local Korean-language writers (such a quarterly seems to be run on a government subsidy).

The ethnic flavor has even become a tourist attraction. The dog meat restaurants are everywhere, and unlike South Korea, they are not hidden but openly advertise themselves. The images of the hanbok-clad ladies are another feature of local advertisements. The promotion of ethnic features seemingly targets both South Koreans and visitors from other parts of China. It is remarkable that until recently the local Koreans overwhelmingly sent their kids to Korean language schools.

The curriculum at those schools was identical to the schools attended by the Han Chinese, but Korean was the major language of tuition. After graduating from high school, young Koreans can proceed to the local university where they are officially granted preferential treatment at the entrance exams, sort of “affirmative action,” Chinese style. Of course, the life of Koreans was not always easy.

There were periods of restrictions and even open persecution, especially in the crazy decade of Mao’s Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. At those days, the relations between Beijing and Pyongyang went sour, and this influenced the local Korean community to some extent. A middle-aged ethnic-Korean businessman told me, “Back in the late 1960s, I seldom saw my parents. Because they were members of an ethnic minority, they had to go to ideologicalstruggle sessions every day and had to stay until very late.

”However, that period was an exception. The same person, who is buy no means a fan of the current Chinese system, still admitted when I asked him about discrimination: “Discrimination? Well, almost none, to be frank. They appoint some Han Chinese officials to supervise the administration, but basically I don’t think Korean people here have problems with promotions or business because of their ethnicity.

Sometimes being a minority even helps a bit — it’s easier to get to a university if you come from a minority group.” However, in recent years the situation in the area began top change fast. The Koreans began to switch from their native language to the Chinese (or, to be more precise, Chinese is increasingly seen as a native language by the children born in Korean-speaking families). Schooling in Korea faces a major crisis.

According to statistics, widely known and discussed, the number of children enrolled in Korean schools in 2000 was merely45.2 percent of the 1996 level. In the 1990-2000 period, 4,200 Korean teachers, or some 53 percent of the total, left their jobs because of school closures. It is remarkable that younger people with whom I could talk often have obvious problems with communicating in Korea, and whenever possible prefer to switch to Chinese. In families they still talk Korean to the elders, but Chinese is a natural choice between themselves.

In short, the assimilation began, and it might be unstoppable. Koreans leave their villages and go to the cities where they work and cooperate with Chinese. They often intermarry, and Chinese becomes the sole language of their kids. Like it or not, but the days of the “Third Korea” seems to be over.

Financial Times
Anna Fifield
Richard McGregor
10/18/2007

China suspended key rail freight services into North Korea last week after 1,800 wagons carrying food aid and tradeable goods crossed into Kim Jong-il’s hermit state but were never returned.

Absconding with Chinese wagons would be a strange move for North Korea because Beijing is Pyongyang’s closest political ally and biggest provider of food, goods and oil. Analysts monitoring North Korea said Chinese officials had privately complained to them that the North Koreans were dismantling Chinese wagons and selling them back as scrap metal.

The Chinese railway ministry suspended a number of rail freight services into North Korea on October 11, humanitarian agencies operating in North Korea told the Financial Times. The ministry told international aid agencies that it would not send any more wagons into North Korea until Pyongyang returned the 1,800 Chinese wagons.

Tony Banbury, Asia director for the UN World Food Programme, said that the curtailed service had held up the delivery of 8,000 tonnes of maize and wheat already stockpiled in Dandong, a Chinese border town. “We now have significant amounts of food but we can’t deliver it,” Mr Banbury said.

Reliefweb, a United Nations website for aid agencies, reported that the delivery of food stocks into North Korea had been “critically affected by the cessation of movement of railway wagons from China”.

An official with China’s railway ministry said yesterday that it was not aware of any suspension of freight services into North Korea.

But Fu Xue, of the Dandong Tianda International Freight and Forwarding Company, said there had been delays in the return of wagons but that North Korea had asked for permission from China.

North Korea has frequently failed to pay for goods or to pay back debt. It has also long been accused of relying on currency counterfeiting and drug smuggling to stay afloat.

But purloining Chinese wagons would be a brazen move. China is already thought to be disillusioned by Pyongyang’s refusal to embrace economic reform. It was also angered by North Korea’s decision last year to conduct a nuclear test despite Beijing’s objections.

North Korea has a history of not returning vehicles. In 1998, the late Chung Ju-yung, founder of South Korea’s Hyundai Group, donated 1,001 cows to North Korea to make amends for stealing a cow as he escaped from the north as a boy.

Pyongyang said the cows should be transported on Hyundai trucks. The trucks were never seen again.

Institute for Far Easter Studies
NK Brief No. 07-10-16-1

The Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee reported on October 10 that after two years and nine months of operation, the total value of goods manufactured in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) surpassed 200,000,000 USD. In 2005, production by companies in the KIC totaled 15,000,000 USD; in 2006, 74,000,000 USD; and in the first 9 months of 2007, 124,000,000 USD, for a total since 2005 until last September of 213,000,000 USD.

There are currently a total of 45 companies operating in the complex, employing 19,433 North Korean workers and 800 workers from South Korea, for a total of over twenty thousand employees. The Committee’s report further detailed that the production output of the North Korean workers averaged 1,275 USD per person during the first half of 2007, up 28 percent over last year’s per-capita output of 989 USD.

After overall production surpassed 100,000,000 USD at the end of last January, the 200,000,000 USD barrier was broken in only eight months. This expansion of production is a result of a stable business environment, the increase in the number of companies entering the complex and the number of North Korean workers employed, and overall productivity growth.

The 1,275 USD per-capita production output for the first half of the year shows a 28 percent increase over the 989 USD per-capita recorded in 2006, and 15 percent higher than the 1,108 USD per-capita average of the first two quarters of last year. Despite employment regulations calling for continually increasing numbers of workers, which tend to lower productivity statistics, overall North Korean workers’ average per-capita production numbers did not fall, and the increase shown is significant.

The increase in productivity is not unrelated to the level of education of the workers. Currently, the majority of workers in the KIC have at least a high-school education, and more than 20 percent have completed some form of technical college or higher. A technical training center scheduled for completion in October of this year will provide even more formal technical training for the workers, further increasing productivity.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
10/14/2007

When I was looking at the narrow and shallow Tumen River which delineates the eastern part of border between China and Korea, I can not help but think that this area is very conducive for smuggling.

Indeed, the river can be waded over at many spots, the area is sparsely populated (by the Chinese standard, that is), the border is almost unguarded from the Chinese side and a large number of the locals have families on the other side of the border.

Indeed the area is frequented by North Korean traders, who until few years ago were mostly illegal border-crossers, essentially smugglers. In most cases they did not cross the river by stealth, hiding under the cover of darkness, but preferred to bribe the border guards instead.

North Korea is a very corrupt place these days, so the guards are ready to receive a hundred dollars, an equivalent of their small annual salaries, from a professional smuggler and then allow him or her to move bulky merchandise almost openly.

From around 2003 North Koreans could also apply for special permission, which allows them to visit China regularly and come back with merchandise. Only people with politically sound background are issued such permits, and in most cases the procedure includes heavy bribing.

Nonetheless, legal travel has become possible. On the other hand, all ethnic Korean residents of the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture, an ethnic home of Chinese Koreans, can visit North Korea. There are no problems with obtaining a special travel pass from the Chinese authorities even it involves some payments (official, in this case).

In most cases the travel is of purely commercial nature: the visitors bring with them sacks of merchandise. Needless to say, customs officials expect their fair share of both legal fees and bribes. A local Korean, who occasionally goes to visit his relatives, described his usual experience.

“They are so greedy. Officials take bribes in China, too. But perhaps nowhere in the world are the officials so hungry for bribes as they are in North Korea. At the customs, they slowly go through the luggage and sometimes put aside a few things they like, and then they say that those things are not allowed into North Korea.

This is the hint, and I have no choice but to tell them to take those things, some dress or small items. And it is a tradition that everybody who checks you should be given some foreign cigarettes. Last time I took five cartons of cigarettes with me, and only one reached my relatives.

All others I had to give away to the officials.” A particular role is played by the so-called “chogyo,” those North Korean citizens, who permanently reside in China. This is a small group, numbering from 5,000-10,000 people, but their economic and social role is out of proportion to their modest numbers.

Their unusual legal standing allows movement between China and North Korea almost at will, and this means that they have great opportunities for very profitable trade. In the past, chogyo were often feared and distrusted since they were widely believed to be North Korean espionage agents.

This might have been the case, since their families in North Korea were indeed hostages to the Pyongyang authorities. Nowadays, however, these people came to understand that they are unlikely to earn much by serving as loyal soldiers of the “Dear Leader,” and switched to business instead.

They still are said to maintain special relations with North Korean secret agencies, but these agencies are also being increasingly driven by profit-seeking. A similar group, known as “hwagyo,” consists of Chinese citizens who are allowed to live permanently in North Korea.

The hwagyo also number just a few thousands, and in North Korea they enjoy a number of privileges, including the right to go overseas with relative ease. Nowadays, as my interlocutors never fail to stress, the hwagyo have become the most prosperous social group in North Korea.

From the Chinese side, the consumption goods are largely sold. The trade items include home appliances, footwear and garments. Used fridges are often sold, being seen in North Korea as an important status symbol. The VCRs and DVD players are also highly demanded, as well as tapes and DVDs of South Korean movies, dramas and shows.

Such items are prohibited, but bribes and ingenuity help to smuggle the subversive material across the border. The North Korean traders sell a rather limited number of items, since North Korea is not capable of producing a large array of products. The North Korean private export seems to be dominated by seafood. Dried squid, pollack and the like sell well in landlocked parts of China.

Some traders dare to deal in more dangerous items, such as gold or antiquities, secretly (and illegally) dug up by North Korean grave robbers. The recent decade was a time when capitalism began to spread to the North, and most of the capital, ideas and markets which made this quiet transformation possible, came from China.

In a sense, the North Korean grassroots capitalism of black markets, old trucks, female traders with huge and unwieldy sacks on their back was conceived in China, in the vast mountainous areas of Yanbian or on the plains of Southern Manchuria which stretch along the Yalu.

BBC
10/9/2007

Japan has extended economic sanctions on North Korea, citing a lack of progress in a row over Japanese nationals abducted by Pyongyang.

The measures – which ban imports from North Korea and visits by its ships – will continue for another six months.

A top official said Japan was seeking advances on both the abduction and nuclear issues.

The move comes exactly a year after North Korea carried out its first nuclear test, on 9 October 2006.

Since then, Pyongyang has agreed to end its nuclear programme in return for millions of dollars worth of aid.

It has closed its main Yongbyon reactor and last week committed to a timetable for disclosing and dismantling all its nuclear facilities by the end of the year.

Later this week, a US-led team of experts are due to visit North Korea, where they will begin supervising the process of dismantling its nuclear installations.

‘No progress’

Japan is one of the five countries involved in the nuclear deal with North Korea.

But a major sticking point in the bilateral relationship has been the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by Pyongyang in the late 1970s and early 1980s to train spies.

“We saw the need to extend the sanctions because there has been no progress over the abduction issue,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura told journalists after the move was agreed at a Cabinet meeting.

North Korea admitted in 2002 that it had kidnapped 13 Japanese nationals. It has returned five of them and says the remaining eight are dead. It says the issue has now been resolved.

But Japan wants concrete proof of the deaths and believes that several more of its citizens were taken. There is huge public concern over the issue in Japan.

Talks in Mongolia last month aimed at resolving the dispute came to nothing.

The abduction row was not the only factor behind the decision, Mr Machimura said.

“We also took into comprehensive consideration the overall situation involving North Korea, including the nuclear issue,” he said.

A foreign ministry official told the Associated Press news agency that Japan wanted to see concrete steps from Pyongyang towards disabling its nuclear programme.

The sanctions – imposed last October after North Korea’s nuclear test – prevent visits by the Mangyongbong-92 ferry, the only direct link between the two countries, and ban imports from the impoverished nation.

They have now been extended until 13 April, officials said. The decision needs the endorsement of parliament, but the opposition have already agreed to the step.

Choson Ilbo
Song Hee-young
10/8/2007

One of the facts confirmed in the second inter-Korean summit is that North Korea is willing to push ahead with an open economic policy. Though he is reportedly averse to the terms of reform and opening, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il agreed to add Haeju, Nampo, Anbyeon and Mt. Baekdu as open areas, along with Mt. Kumgang and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. He also permitted opening infrastructure like railroads and ports.

Slow as it is, the direction of the flow can be confirmed. It resembles China’s early opening stage from the late 1970s to early 1980s when Deng Xioaping first pushed his reform policies.

Considering the pace, outsiders were pessimistic about reform in China then, and they predicted failure for companies that invested there. By the 1990s, however, it was clear that tremendous changes had taken place.

Korean entrepreneurs doing business in Kaesong and Mt. Gumgang believe that the North won’t move backwards now. Projects in those areas continued unhindered even during the nuclear test crisis, they point out. Unlike in the past, minor problems are eventually resolved through dialogue, albeit slowly, they testify.

“Now the North Koreans know the taste of money,” one businessman said, and they have begun to feel the fever for making more. A primitive sort of capitalist consciousness is growing, he said, and North Koreans are beginning to realize that making profits through a steady business is better than hoping for a windfall from the millions in aid money the Kim Dae-jung administration donated to the regime.

Having suffered through the Korean War, armed commando raids, naval skirmishes off the western coast and the nuclear crises, many South Koreans might dismiss the changes. Businessmen who were forced to hand over computers and fax machines as “entrance fees” or “meeting charges” when they visited Pyongyang may insist that nothing will change unless the regime is replaced.

But Mao Zedong’s Red Guards were also never expected to change, but they emerged as major Wall Street investors in three decades. If they truly feel the taste of money, there is no reason why the generations that follow Kim Jong-il will not change.

Now that we’ve seen the signs of such change, however small, we have to transform our formula for investing in the North. The government, above all, has to abandon its stance of controlling, coordinating and managing cross-border investment. The time has come to trust our businessmen. There should be no special treatment simply because the counterpart is North Korea; instead the government should leave investment in the North up to the investors, as it does with Vietnam and Africa.

Our corporations have had plenty of experience in the North. Daewoo, Hyundai, the Peace Motors Corp. owned by the Unification Church, and not a small number of small- and medium-sized firms have invested across the border. Many have come back with bitter tales, but now they can distinguish promising projects from dubious ones. They have paid their tuition.

What’s more, South Korean entrepreneurs have accumulated experience in making money in other dictatorial socialist countries, such as China, Russia and Eastern European nations, accessing the top leaders and breaking through bureaucratic barriers. In dealing with communists, businessmen can be far more competitive than public servants.

Nevertheless, the government requires advance notification when any South Korean company wants to contact North Korea, and the Unification Ministry and National Intelligence Service often get involved with even the smallest details. As it is now, North Korea asks our government what it can request from our businesses and the president had to be accompanied by a group of conglomerate heads when he visited Pyongyang.

Businesses that are forced to deal with our close-minded public servants in addition to the North Korean regime are liable to abandon cross-border plans altogether, especially when profitability is questionable. This is why the larger businesses have in many cases been the most reluctant to invest in the North.

Now that the opening of North Korea at last seems certain, it’s time that we adopted the same formula that succeeded in China. It was our businessmen who rushed into China first, and they contributed toward reconciliation and establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries. We went through the same procedures in Russia and Vietnam.

The idea that the government should be the one to build industrial parks and conduct business and wage negotiations in North Korea is outmoded. When it comes to investing across the border, the government’s job should be to guarantee business freedoms. Then the investors should be left to negotiate with the regime and work out how to make money.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
10/7/2007

The Chinese-Korean border is easy to cross, and it is clear that numbers of the defectors are kept small only by security measures undertaken by the North Korean side. However, the story of the region is essentially the story of the cross-border movement. Technically, the narrow Tumen and relatively broad Yalu divide the territories of two different countries. However, both banks of the Tumen are inhabited by the Koreans, and for large part of the last century neither state was either willing or able to control the border completely. It has been porous for decades, and in a sense it remains porous nowadays. The cross-border migration, legal or otherwise, has never stopped completely.

It might sound strange now, but until the late 1970s North Korea was seen by the Chinese as a land of relative prosperity, so the refugee flow moved from China to Korea. In the 1960s many ethnic Koreans fled the famine and the madness of the “cultural revolution,” looking for a refuge in Kim’s country. There, at least, people were certain to receive 700 grams of corn every day. Many of those early refugees eventually moved back, but only a handful were persecuted by the Chinese authorities. In most cases the returned migrants just resumed the work at the factories and people’s communes where they had worked before their escape. This movement was large, it involved few ten thousand people at least, and many of those people were saved by their sojourn in North Korea.

This episode, not widely known outside the area, is still well remembered by the Chinese. Many of my interlocutors explained their willingness to help the North Korean refugees in the following way: “When life was harsh here, they helped us. Now it is our turn.”

The Chinese border protection system has always been quite lax, but from the 1970s North Korean authorities have tried to the keep border tightly controlled. However, all their efforts could not prevent a massive exodus of the North Koreans, which began around 1995.

In those years North Korea was struck by a disastrous famine which led to massive deaths. The number of its victims has been estimated at between 250,000 and 3,000,000 with 600-900,000 being probably the most reliable figure so far. The northern parts of the country, adjacent to the border, were the hardest hit.

So it comes as no surprise that many North Koreans illegally moved across the border to find work and refuge in China. Around 1999 when the famine reached its height the number of such people reached an estimated 200-300,000.

This movement was not authorized, but from around 1996 Pyongyang authorities ceased to apply harsh penalties to the border-crossers. Until that time, an attempted escape to China would land you a prison for years. From the late 1990s, an escape to China was treated as a minor offence. It is even possible that the North Korean authorities deliberately turned a blind eye on the defectors: after all, people who moved to China were not to be fed, and also, being most active and adventurous those people would probably become trouble-makers had they been forced to stay in North Korea.

A vast majority of those refugees stayed in the borderland area where one can survive without any command of Chinese (the ethnic Koreans form some 35% of the population, and Korean villages are common). The refugees took up odd jobs, becoming construction workers, farm hands, waitresses and cooks in small restaurants. The authorities hunted them down and deported them back to North Korea, but generally without much enthusiasm, since both low-level officials and population by and large was sympathetic to the refugees’ plight. The older Chinese know only too well what it means to suffer from famine.

Most of the refugees were women, some of whom married the local farmers – usually those who would not find a wife otherwise. In most cases it means that they were paired with drunkards, drug addicts or gamblers, but in some cases their partners were merely dirt-poor farmers. These marriages were not usually recognized by Chinese law since these women, technically speaking, did not exist. In some cases, they saved enough money to bribe the officials and had a Chinese citizen ID issued. If this happened, a refugee woman changed her identity, becoming a Chinese national.

Nowadays, the refugees’ number has shrunk considerably, even though old figures are often uncritically cited by the world media. Nowadays, people in the know believed that between 30-50,000 North Koreans are hiding in China.

Why did their numbers go down recently? There are few reasons for that. To start with, a remarkable improvement of the domestic situation in North Korea played a role, but most people with whom I talked to in China in July agreed that the major reason for this change is the revival of the North Korean border security in recent few years. Until 2004 or so, North Korean authorities usually turned a blind eye to mass exodus of their people to China. Now their position has changed. They understand that the border serves as a major conduit for unauthorized information about the outside world, and now this information is becoming dangerous. They also believe that the famine is over, so people can be fed if they stay in North Korea. So, it seems that the era of large-scale illegal migration is over. Nonetheless, history of the region indicates that this movement is unlikely to ever be stopped completely.

Asia Times
Ting-I Tsai
10/6/2007

Business in Changbai county of Jilin province in northeast China is booming. The area, which faces North Korea’s Hyesan City across the Yalu River, has seen its exports rise 28.5% year-on-year in the first eight months of this year, the beneficiary of logjams created by China’s brisk trade with North Korea further downstream to Dandong – the busiest border city in northeast China bordering North Korea’s Shinuiju across the Yalu River.

As ice is melting between North Korea and the United States, more and more Chinese businessmen have been rushing to the border with the secretive communist country, looking to cash in on its trade and investment potential.

“Traffic across the river has been so busy,” said Han Lihsin, who founded a China-Korea trade website to promote business with China’s reclusive neighbor in April last year. “It is not only trucks from China that have to line up to go through customs, North Koreans have also sent their own trucks to pick up goods.”

According to statistics from Chinese Customs, bilateral trade between North Korea and China reached US$1.7 billion in 2006, a 7.58% increase over the previous year. It has grown another 16.7% in the first eight months of this year to $1.25 billion. Chinese investment in North Korea, meanwhile, had reached $38 million by the end of 2006.

China’s main exports include agricultural products, consumer electronics, textiles and fuel, but North Korean traders are taking advantage of the Internet to diversify their purchases. On China’s business promotion websites, buyers claiming to be from North Korea are asking for items as varied as wine coolers, necklaces, leather suitcases, soybean oil, pencil cases and “plastic containers for aromas or perfume”.

Whether North Koreans now have more money and are able to consume more remains a hotly debated issue among Chinese traders. But they agree that North Korean customers are now more sensitive to product quality and brands. “It’s not just about being cheap anymore. Products are required to be affordable with guaranteed quality,” said Tang Fuyou, manager of Dandong-based Tigereye62.com.

To overcome North Korean customers’ resistance to Chinese products, Tang says suppliers now market products with brand names and descriptions printed in English on the packaging. Small “Made in China” markings are placed in unobtrusive spots. “That way, goods can be sold for good prices,” he said, adding that South Korean and Japanese products are still too expensive for North Koreans.

Used televisions, washing machines, refrigerators and air conditioners are at the top of North Korean shopping lists. Hoping to ride the wave of this new demand for big-ticket household goods, China’s leading home appliance exporter Haier has reportedly been operating across the border since January of this year.

Traders aren’t the only ones looking to profit from North Korea. Burdened by soaring labor costs and high land prices, Chinese businessmen are finding this virgin territory to be a potential paradise.

Xu You, chairman of the Changbai-based China-North Korea investment association, suggested that his joint-venture wood factory pays 10 yuan (US$1.3) per month to its North Korean workers. Trader Wang Wei, whose Hsienhe pharmaceutical manufacturing company is planning to build a new factory in North Korea’s Nanpo, suggested that monthly salaries there average about 50 yuan.

Ambitious North Korean officials might not appreciate the intricacies of capitalist operations, but they have skillfully extended their networks for soliciting investment by touting the country’s advantages of cheap land and labor. North Korean websites based in China are advertising a broad range of investment opportunities, including in the areas of energy, restaurants and hotels, agriculture, mining, manufacturing and general infrastructure.

Among the approximately 100 projects circulating on these websites, hotels and electricity generation seem to be particular targets. One calls for a $30-45 million investment in Pyongyang’s yet finished tallest building, the Ryugyong Hotel, while another requires a $50-60 million investment for the Taedong-gang Hotel. Stakes in expansions of fuel-fired power plants are being offered for $100-200 million, and, hoping to take advantage of green energy, projects to develop wind and solar power also appear but minus a price tag.

As for manufacturing, projects to make elevators, freezers, electronic watches, shoes, sewing machines and even disposable diapers all require foreign investments in the form of machines, technology and raw materials.

At the urging of North Korean officials, investors Xu and Wang are now involved in pitching investments south of the Yalu to other Chinese prospects. According to Wang, Pearl River delta-based Chinese businessmen have expressed the most interest in relocating their factories, with 30 to 50 investment projects currently under negotiation.

Among those still concerned about the high uncertainty of operating in North Korea, some have chosen to set up an office in Pyongyang and bide their time until a timely opportunity emerges.

Aware of the growing significance of the bilateral commercial relationship, China’s central government and three provinces near the North Korean border – Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang – have all made efforts to boost bilateral cooperation.

In March 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed an investment-protection agreement with his North Korean counterpart, and the two nations inked five bilateral economic cooperation agreements between 2002 and 2005. During North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s visit to China in January 2006, Wen introduced new economic-cooperation guidelines.

In July of this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi noted during his three-day visit to Pyongyang that economic cooperation was an important part of China’s relations with the North, and said China would continue to promote cooperation by following the previous agreements and guidelines.

Provincial governments, meanwhile, have been promoting cross-border trade by attending and holding trade shows and building new trade zones. Jilin’s Hunchun, Jian and Tumen are the cities along the North Korean border most aggressively pursuing free-trade zones that would allow visa-free access and offer duty-free facilities.

North Korea introduced economic reforms in 2002, but with embargoes imposed by the United States and Japan and Pyongyang’s economic conservatism, the reforms have accomplished little and the economy continues to struggle. In an acknowledgement of those problems, Dear Leader Kim Jong-il in January of reportedly vowed to make 2007 North Korea’s economic development year.

Tang, the Chinese businessman operating in Dandong, noted that his company is about to be appointed by North Korea’s trade authority to assist the operations of some 200 North Korean companies in China. He believes, however, that patience is required when dealing with the communist, reclusive nation.

“Even when North Korea and the US normalize their relationship, more time will be needed for economic reform,” he said, “Chaos would follow if the system is transformed too quickly.”

Associated Press (Via the New York Times)
10/3/2007

North Korea will provide a complete list of its nuclear programs and disable its facilities at its main reactor complex by Dec. 31, actions that will be overseen by a U.S.-led team, the six nations involved in disarmament talks said Wednesday.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei said that as part of the agreement, Washington will lead an expert group to Pyongyang ”within the next two weeks to prepare for disablement” and will fund those initial activities.

”The disablement of the five megawatt experimental reactor at Yongbyon, the reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication facility at Yongbyon will be completed by 31 December 2007,” said Wu, who read the statement from the six nations to reporters, but did not take any questions.

The Bush administration welcomed the agreement, calling it significant progress.

”These second-phase actions effectively end the DPRK’s production of plutonium — a major step towards the goal of achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” said Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for the White House’s National Security Council.

The complex at Yongbyon has been at the center of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs for decades and is believed to have produced the nuclear device Pyongyang detonated a year ago to prove its long-suspected nuclear capability.

Since then, Pyongyang rejoined the six-nation disarmament negotiations that involve the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea as well as North Korea. Under a broad agreement reached in February, North Korea pledged to disable its nuclear programs in return for 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil or other assistance.

Wednesday’s statement outlines the next steps in the February deal. Although negotiators tentatively agreed on the statement Sunday after four days of talks, it was forwarded to their capitals for approval, leading to a delay in its public release.

The statement also said the U.S. and North Korea will ”increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust” but did not set a specific timetable for when Washington will remove Pyongyang from a list of countries that sponsor terrorism — a key North Korean demand. Arrangements will be made in future meetings between the two on normalizing their relations, the statement said.

In addition, the statement reiterated the five other countries’ commitment to deliver the fuel oil and other energy and economic assistance as spelled out in the February deal.

Shortly after Wednesday’s deal was announced, however, Japan said it would not provide aid to North Korea or lift its economic sanctions against the country because of a dispute over North Korea’s past abductions of Japanese citizens.

”There will be no immediate action from Japan. We will wait to see what North Korea does next,” Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura said. ”Japan’s policy remains unchanged. We will consider aid once we see progress on the abductions issue.”

Tokyo wants Pyongyang to account for its abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s — a main sticking point for the two countries, which have no diplomatic ties.