North Korean Economy Watch

According to the Korea Herald:

The trade volume between China and North Korea jumped from $1.97 billion in 2007 to $5.62 billion in 2011 with the North suffering a deficit of about $700 million, according to figures compiled by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. In contrast, the volume of South-North commerce showed a slight decrease from $1.79 billion to $1.71 billion over the cited period, with the North recording a surplus of about $114 million.

China’s share in North Korea’s total trade rose from 42.7 percent in 2007 to 56.9 percent in 2010, while South Korea’s proportion declined to 31.4 percent from 38.9 percent.

Excluding inter-Korean commerce, China accounted for a whopping 83 percent of North Korea’s external trade in 2010, up from 67.1 percent in 2007. China’s investment in the North rose from a mere $1.1 million in 2003 to $41 million, or 94.1 percent of the total foreign investment, in 2008 before decreasing to $12.1 million in 2010, according to figures from the Chinese Commerce Ministry.

Experts here are concerned that the North Korean economy will be further absorbed into the circle of China’s economic influence to the point of making it difficult for the South to expand its economic presence in the North after shifting its policy toward inter-Korean businesses.

“North Korea has imported most of machinery and other industrial equipment from China, which may lead to cementing the structure of its long-term economic dependence on China,” said Cho.

Observers say it goes too far to say North Korea will become a Chinese province, but China has been pushing the North toward reform and openness as part of a larger scheme to develop its three northeastern provinces, which lag behind the east coastal zones.

Some North Korea watchers say Kim Jong-il might have been pressed by Beijing to visit China four times in the last two years before his death.

China has been the main developer of the Raseon special economic zone, the combined towns of Rajin and Seonbong, in the northeastern coast of North Korea, which also provides it with access to an ice-free port for shipping abroad manufactured goods and other products from its northeastern provinces.

China also agreed with North Korea to jointly develop another special economic zone on the border islands across the Yalu River from the city of Dandong, its main gate into the North.

Jang Song-thaek, the uncle and key mentor of the young Kim, has been in charge of the economic projects with China.

You can see a picture of some of the data here.

Read the full story here:
Concerns mount over China’s grip on N.K. economy
Korea Herald
Kim Kyung-ho
2012-2-1

According to Yonhap:

The joint South-North Korean industrial complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong saw its production expand 14.4 percent in 2011 from a year earlier, Seoul’s unification ministry said Monday.

The total production at the Kaesong Industrial Complex reached US$369.9 million during the January-November period last year, up from $323.3 million worth of production for all of 2010, according to the Ministry of Unification.

The output during the last month of 2011 has not been tallied yet, the ministry said, adding the on-year growth rate may be far greater.

Production for the first 11 months of 2011 marks a 25.7-percent growth from the same period in the previous year, the ministry also noted.

Monthly production hit $31.1 million in January last year and hovered near the $30-million mark every month last year, except in February, according to the ministry.

The ministry attributed last year’s output growth to an increasing number of workers at Kaesong.

North Korean laborers working at the complex reached a peak of 48,708 as of November last year, the ministry said. The comparable figure at the end of 2010 was 46,284, it said.

Yonhap also reports the following:

The provision of new laborers is seen as a signal of the new North Korean leadership attempting to maintain the joint industrial complex, the symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation, despite the North’s repeated denunciations of the Lee Myung-bak administration for allowing only a former South Korean first lady and a businesswoman to visit Pyongyang to mourn Kim’s death.

“North Korea will provide about 400 more laborers to the Kaesong Industrial Complex on the 26th (of January) immediately after the Lunar Yew Year’s holiday,” a source at the Kaesong complex said.

A Unification Ministry official also said that he “heard that North Korea will soon increase the laborers at the Kaesong Industrial Park.”

The North had planned to increase the number of North Korean laborers late last month but suspended the plan due to the sudden death of Kim on Dec. 19.

Hundreds of South Korean factories in the industrial park employ 48,708 North Koreans as of the end of November last year, up 2,400 from a year earlier.

Read the full stories here:
Production at joint industrial Kaesong park expands 14.4 pct in 2011
Yonhap
2012-1-23

N. Korea to provide 400 new laborers to S. Korean firms in Kaesong: sources
Yonhap
2012-1-24

Radio Free Asia posted the following information:

The latest UN statistics showed that in 2010, North Korea imported 430,000 mobile phones from China, its primary ally and biggest trading partner, a six-fold jump from imports the previous year.

North Koreans forked out U.S. $35 million to buy these mobile phones, six times more than the money spent in 2009, according to the UN figures.

At the same time, Koryolink, North Korea’s only 3G mobile phone network operator, saw a rapid increase in subscribers—from about 90,000 at the end of 2009 to 430,000 a year later and more than 800,000 in the third quarter of 2011, according to majority owner Egypt’s Orascom Telecom.

While the rapid increase in mobile phone users is allowing greater communications within and outside the country, there are various restrictions in usage and it does not signal any major opening up of North Korea, experts told RFA.

Read the full story here:
Cellphones No Signal Of Reforms
RFA
2012-1-19

Since the New York Times just published an interesting account of the Pyongyang Restaurant in Siem Reap, I thought I would write a quick post about my recent trip to the North Korean Restaurant in Vientiane, Laos (평양식당)–my first North Korean restaurant experience outside of the DPRK.

The restaurant is located just a couple of blocks from one of Vientiane’s most popular landmarks, Wat Pha That Luang:

I arrived at the restaurant on December 28, 2011, the date of Kim Jong-il’s funeral.  I was eager to see if the restaurant would be doing anything special to mark the occasion…and they did: they were closed for the week.  A sign on the door read in English and Lao something close to “Apologies, but we are closed for five days”.

As I stood at the front door reading the “closed” sign, one of the waitresses walked out and offered to serve me a drink in the adjacent outdoor seating area (where the grills are located). I accepted.

In what I believe was perfect Korean (sarcasm here), I asked if they served Taedonggang Beer.  But they only served “Beer Lao” (Which is just about the only beer you can get in the country—fortunately it is a tasty one). As I enjoyed my drink, I asked the waitress if the restaurant was closed because of the General’s death, and she made a sad face and nodded her head. So I finished my drink, paid, and continued on with my vacation.

On January 9, 2012, I returned to the restaurant for a proper meal. When I walked into the restaurant I felt like I was back in the DPRK. The decorations and smell came rushing back to memory.

There were no overt signs of propaganda in the restaurant—likely because the bulk of the customers are South Koreans.  The only subtle symbol that could be construed as propaganda would be the pictures of Mt. Paektu.  These, however, would likely be interpreted as just a symbol of Korea to the South Korean patrons. Mt. Paekdu was featured outside on a big sign posted to the front of the building and inside on a smaller painting…right next to the restaurant’s Christmas tree. The wall decoration and paintings primarily featured pictures of Korean landscapes, crashing waves, women in hanboks and of course Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper and Mona Lisa.

Surprisingly the menu featured several Tangogi (“Sweet” Dog meat) dishes. It was surprising to me because the Laotians  do not eat dog. But they probably do not eat here much either if only because of the prices. I ordered a Tofu and kimchi dish as a starter and topped it off with some Pyongyang cold noodles and Ryongthongsul (령통술) Soju (from Kaesong).

Of course there was dancing and karaoke as well:

The waitress/performers opened with Arirang, but then sang a couple of songs that the Chinese and South Koreans seemed to know.  I was also able to recognize “Pangap Sunmida” and “Whiperan”.  I requested a song but they just laughed and said no. I guess my tastes are out of date–even in North Korea.

Eventually I was invited to sing a karaoke song as well.  In tribute to Shane Smith, I thought about singing the Sex Piltols’ “Anarchy in the UK”, but I was just too tired and not interested in making a scene.

Before I left, I asked the waitresses where they went to university. They attended the Pyongyang University of Music and Dance (평양음악무용대학)–which was rencetly refurbished:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
1. I have marked many of the DPRK’s restaurants on Google Earth, but not all of them. If you visit one, or know where one is, please let me know.

2. I have posted many articles on the DPRK’s domestic, joint venture,  and international restaurants.  You can read them here.

According to the Korea Herald:

North Korea imported six times more mobile phones in 2010 than in 2009, a media report said Wednesday, indicating growing mobile penetration in the reclusive country.

North Korea bought 430,000 mobile phones from China in 2010, up from 68,000 phones the previous year, according to Washington-based Radio Free Asia (RFA). In 2010, the country spent US$35 million on importing mobile phones, seven times more than the $5 million outlay in 2009, the report said, citing recent data from the United Nations.

The number of mobile phone users in the communist country has grown rapidly in recent years, from about 90,000 at the end of 2009 to 430,000 a year later and more than 800,000 in the third quarter of last year, the report added, referring to data from Egypt’s Orascom Telecom.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean imports of mobile phones jumped 6 times from 2009-2010: RFA
Korea Herald
2012-1-11

NOTE: I have not seen this report yet, so I cannot directly comment.  If you see a copy, please send it to me.

Here is the story in the Daily NK:

If 1995 represented a baseline level of 100 for the North Korean economy, then by 2009 it had declined to 86.5 following sharp reductions in inter-Korean aid over the preceding year, according to newly released economic analysis.

The analysis, ‘Research into the State of Inter-Korean Change Seen through Statistics,’ was produced by the Sejong Institute pursuant to a request from Statistics Korea, the South Korean state statistics body.

The report incorporated ten different statistical variables, including North Korea’s estimated food and electricity production, trade and finance volumes and levels of international aid.

During the March of Tribulation, the mid-1990s famine that killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans, the economy declined to a nadir of 70.3 (in 1998), according to the report’s findings; conversely, at the very peak of ‘Sunshine Policy’ aid deliveries in 2007, it reached a level of 104.7.

Elsewhere, North Korea’s food production had risen to 119 by 2009, while coal and electricity production had reached 107.6 and 102.2 respectively, it also reports. Conversely, steel production declined to 81.8, marine production to 63, and oil imports to 47.1.

Analyzing the situation, it goes on, “Steel and electricity production, the core of the North Korean command economy, did not change much so they could not have much of an effect. The decline of industrial facilities is serious, and due to this worn out equipment mineral production is slumping and there is never enough electrical power for smelting.”

The report notes pessimistically that current difficulties are set to continue, adding that even if North Korea embarked on root and branch reform tomorrow, in many cases it would already be too late for recovery without massive and sustained investment.

“In a society like North Korea where politics dominates everything else and the biggest impediments to state development, dictatorship and the 3rd generation succession, normal economic development is impossible,” it concludes.

The Donga Ilbo also reported on the study:

North Korea`s economic prowess has deteriorated due to stalled inter-Korean relations since peaking in 2007 due to expanded aid from South Korea and trade with China, a report released Monday in Seoul said.

The North`s economic ability peaked to 104.7 in 2007, up from the benchmark score of 100 in 1995, but plunged afterward to as low as 86.5 in 2009, the Sejong Institute said in the report prepared at the request of Statistics Korea. The Stalinist country`s economic prowess was based on 10 indicators including steel and electricity production, trade volume, state budget and the value of the South’s assistance to the North.

The North Korean economy began to deteriorate from the mid-1990s, when millions of people starved to death due to famine, and the economic ability figure fell to as low as 70.3 in 1998. It rose again, however, and reached 104.7 in 2007.

South Korean assistance to the North surged to raise the indicator to a high of 236.9 in 2007, a huge leap from the baseline score of 100 in 1995. The communist country`s trade volume also jumped 43.4 percent due to the expansion of trade with China.

The North`s economy began to shrink from 2008, when the South halted aid. Notably, the indicator fell to as low as 86.5 in 2009 to tie the record-low set in 2000. Due to deterioration of inter-Korean relations, the volume of South Korean government assistance to the North tumbled over the period to 36.2 in 2009, down 84.7 percent from that in 2007.

A decline in external trade except with China due to tougher international sanctions against Pyongyang also hastened the deterioration of the North Korean economy. Due to the participation by Singapore, one of the North`s top five trading partners, in the sanctions, the combined volume of the North`s trade fell about 10.7 percent, resulting in the indicator falling from 186.3 in 2008 to 166.3 in 2009.

The think tank said,“Considering that production of steel and electricity, the cornerstone of the centrally planned North Korean economy, remained largely unchanged, the recent deterioration of the North Korean economy stems from reduction of South Korean aid and contraction of the North`s overall trade volume.”

Here is a link to the Statistics Korea page on North Korea.

Read the full stories here:
NK Economy Lagging Heavy in 2009
Daily NK
Cho Jong Ik
2012-01-09

N.Korean economy plunges after hitting high in 2007: report
Donga Ilbo
2012-1-9

Picture above via Wall Street Journal.  Click image for larger version.

Quoting from the article:

An examination of U.N. and Chinese trade data reveals that exports to North Korea of products including cars, tobacco, laptops, cellphones and domestic electrical appliances all increased significantly over the past five years. Most items crossed the border from China.

The data reveal glaring loopholes in the sanctions regime, demonstrating how China has stepped in as North Korea’s main supplier of goods considered luxuries as other countries have clamped down on such exports.

But the figures also hint at the emergence of a new entrepreneurial class in North Korea rich enough to buy imported goods. Some analysts say this group could represent the strongest impetus for economic reform, and potentially undermine the totalitarian grip of the Kim family dynasty.

Since 2007, North Korea’s imports of cars, laptops and air conditioners have each more than quadrupled, while imports of cellphones have risen by more than 4,200%, with the vast majority of items coming from China, according to the U.N. data. Chinese customs data show those trends continuing in 2011.

…

“The sanctions don’t work because as long as China allows the export of luxury goods, the North Korea elite will be paid with them to support the regime,” said Jiyoung Song, an associate fellow at London-based think tank Chatham House, who has studied North Korea since 1999.

At the same time, she added, “Things like DVDs and mobile devices will help to change North Korean society in a gradual manner by teaching them about the outside world, and showing them these things don’t just come through the benevolence of their leaders.” She said last year she interviewed a North Korean defector—the daughter of a trade official—who claimed she had been given an iPad and two laptops by the “Dear Leader,” as Kim Jong Il was known.

The growing demand for Chinese consumer goods is no longer confined to the political elite, according to Andrei Lankov, a leading expert on North Korea at Kookmin University in Seoul.

He estimated that the political elite consists of a few thousand key decision-makers and about a million people with midlevel or senior positions in the bureaucracy. Most of the rest of the population of 24 million receive an official monthly salary of $2 to $3 which they can top up to about $15 by selling things in private markets, he said.

More recently, though, a new entrepreneurial class of up to 1% of the population, or about 240,000 people, has emerged that is earning at least a few hundred dollars a month, said Prof. Lankov.

“This growing demand for luxury goods is being driven by the new bourgeoisie,” he said. He said he had met a defector who as early as 2008 claimed to have been earning $1,000 a month by importing tobacco from China and selling it in North Korea in fake packaging.

It is impossible to verify who precisely is driving the demand for Chinese consumer goods. North Korea does not publicize any kind of trade data, let alone allow independent market research. But other countries do report their exports to North Korea, and figures through the end of 2010 are compiled in the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, or UN Comtrade. China’s customs authorities provide data for its exports to North Korea through last November.

Among the exports of liquor to North Korea from Hong Kong in 2010 were 839 bottles of unidentified spirits, worth an average of $159 each, and 17 bottles of “spirits obtained by distilling grape wine or grape marc” worth $145 each, according to the U.N. figures.

In 2010, North Korea also imported 14 color video screens from the Netherlands—worth an average $8,147 each—and about 50,000 bottles of wine from Chile, France, South Africa and other countries, as well as 3,559 sets of videogames from China, the U.N. data show.

Some of this might have been to cater to the small number of tourists, diplomats and foreign businesspeople in the country. Many items, however, were clearly destined for North Koreans. Cars, for example, are one of the highest status symbols, and are often given as gifts by the state to loyal senior officials.

In 2010 alone, North Korea imported 3,191 cars, the vast majority from China—although one, valued at $59,976, placing it in the luxury category. came from Germany.

One of the most striking figures is a dramatic increase in imports of mobile telephones—ownership of which was once considered a crime. In 2010 alone, the country imported 433,183 mobile phones, almost all from China, and with an average value of $81 each. Egyptian telecoms company Orascom, which launched North Korea’s first and only mobile network in 2008, said that its North Korean network had 809,000 subscribers at the end of the third quarter of 2011.

Read the full story here:
Luxuries Flow Into North Korea
Wall Street Journal
Jeremy Page
2012-1-7

The Financial Times indirectly brings up the impact of a basic economic lesson, the tragedy of the commons, in a recent story on the DPRK’s fisheries. According to the article:

Supply disruptions are a fact of life in doing business with North Korea. “They are always stopping work for different reasons, for the anniversaries of leaders’ birthdays or whatever,” said Sha Zhibiao, manager of a fish shop in Yanji, the biggest Chinese city near the north-eastern tip of North Korea.

The main transit point for the crabs is Hunchun, a bustling Chinese border town that is a few hours from the North Korean port of Rajin.

While the North Koreans queue for meagre state hand-outs of grain, the Chinese traders in Rajin eat at Chinese-run restaurants or cook for themselves with supplies they bring in.

Doing business with North Koreans is fraught with uncertainty, according to Lu Zhentie, Mr Gao’s partner. “We agree on a price and then at the last second if they find someone who will pay more they cancel the entire deal. We cannot trust them.”

Mr Lu said the North Korean fishermen operate individually – a sliver of private-sector enterprise in the state-run economy – and their crabs are sold in a grey market that local officials allow to exist. “We give them sometimes Rmb10,000 ($1,580) for a catch. Some have become rich, but I have no idea what they do with their money. Even those who are rich still wear clothes like this,” Mr Lu said, pointing at a tear in his trousers.

All three said that Chinese demand for North Korean crabs had boomed in recent years – and that the North Koreans were flirting with trouble in trying to satisfy it. Mr Lu pointed to small crabs in his tanks, saying that the North Koreans should have thrown these back into the sea to sustain their fishery. “If they keep taking all these out, I don’t know how much longer their resource will last,” Mr Lu said.

Although the bulk of the article deals with challenges to the DPRK business environment that result from a poor institutional environment  (unannounced policy changes and unenforceable contracts) towards the end of the article another important idea is indirectly introduced: The tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons occurs when multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally, will ultimately deplete a common-pool resource, even when everyone knows that it is not in anyone’s long-term interest for this to happen.

In the past, over-fishing was probably not a problem in the DPRK as all activity was coordinated through the Ministry of Fisheries. If anything, incentives in the socialist economic system probably resulted in fishing at levels below the sustainability threshold.  Today, however, de-facto independent fishermen are able (and encouraged) to over-fish the DPRK’s waters so they can export their catch to earn hard currency. Over-fishing is probably not an outcome that anybody wants, however, in the absence of a credibly enforced fishing quota or private property rights in fisheries, rational individual fishermen (who are competing with each other) will be financially rewarded for catching more and increasingly smaller fish and crabs, because if they do not, the next guy (a competitor) will.

Read the full story here:
Crabs offer lifeline for North’s economy
Financial Times
2011-12-23

Andray Abrahamin and John Kim worte a comprehensive summary of the current state of Rason. The article appears in The Diplomat:

In 1991, the North Korean government dubbed Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) a free trade zone to attract foreign capital. However, less than a decade later, the zone lost its free trade status. According to local businessmen, the party secretary of Rason, a relative of the late Kim Jong-il himself, was charged with corruption and eventually executed, a harbinger for the long period of isolation ahead. Since the end of 2009, signs of renewed commitment to Rason have sprouted. While it may be too early to say whether the region will succeed in drawing investment and reform, our recent trips to Rason lead us to believe that developments on the ground may eventually warrant a shift in foreign policy by governments around the globe.

China has long eyed Rason as a potential import/export center for the landlocked provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang. However, from Rason’s inception, the Middle Kingdom held little influence or interest in the region’s success. In 2002, North Korea establishedanother special economic zone in Shinuiju and instated businessman Yang Bin, then China’s second richest man, as the SEZ’s Chief Executive. The Chinese authorities promptly placed Yang Bin under house arrest. Perhaps as a lesson learned from this episode, the North Koreans have made the Chinese government a major stakeholder in Rason’s development.

The Chinese have moved 80,000 metric tons of coal this year through a pier they leased at the Rajin port.They are also reportedly sending regular delegations of senior officials, including the Chairman of the China Development Bank, and they have invested $30 million to repave the road from the border town of Wonjong to the Rajin Port. This road was 60 percent paved during a visit in October, and recent reports from businessmen inside the region confirm that the road is now 95 percent paved, allowing for large trucks to pass through. The Chinese have also constructed a new road on their side of the border, part of the support this area has received after the Chinese central government designated it “The Changjitu Development Region” in November of 2009.Officials from the North explained that the Chinese will have a say in everything from zoning of real estate to port customs and investment policies.

Though Russia’s involvement doesn’t run as deep, it also maintains a keen interest in Rason’s ice-free port and has pledged an investment of $200 million to refurbish a railway from the border town of Khasan and to upgrade pier three at the Rajin port, which it has leased for 49 years. Rason’s third port at Oongsang was once a major exporter of lumber from the Soviet Union, and though Oongsang looks far from reviving the Soviet involvement of its heyday, Russia clearly has an interest in Rason’s success as well.

In addition to neighboring countries’ newfound interest in the zone’s success, the North Korean leadership has also shown a renewed desire in luring investment into the region. In December 2009, Kim Jong-il made a visit to the area, sent his former trade minister to run the region as party secretary, and reinstated Rason’s status as a special city, wresting it out of provincial control. Any potential investor who visits the SEZ would experience the thirst of the local government to develop the region, as reflected by the words of an official with the Rason Economic Cooperation Bureau, Rhee Sung Hye: “The future of my career depends on how much investment I can bring.”

At the national level there are also signs that the regime is increasing its focus on economic development as a source of legitimacy. In 2009, the Joint Venture Investment Commission was formed as a one stop shop for foreign investors, while the Taepung Group and State Development Bank were created to attract foreign investment. In the first half of 2011, Kim Jong-il made more appearances related to the economy and less related to defense than in prior years, and a focus on improving lives through focus on light industry and agriculture was emphasized in joint editorials that signaled policy direction at the beginning of 2010 and 2011.

The alignment of simultaneous commitment from North Korea, China, and Russia sets the scene for a North Korean special economic zone with higher chances of success than perhaps ever before. However, interest and desire may not necessarily translate into results without knowledge of markets and how to create a stable investment environment. After a recent tour of his 200MW fuel oil powered generation facility, the President of Songbong Power, Rhee Kang Chul, expressed that the reason for his plant’s inactivity and the subsequent blackouts in the region was the rise in feedstock costs. When asked about mechanisms for electricity pricing, Rhee responded that the government had set power prices at 6.5 euro cents/kwh, but he couldn’t provide further details on how the number was arrived at and when it might change again. Though Rhee was clearly an expert on the technical aspects of power generation, he hadn’t had the chance to consider that potential investors, after getting comfortable with country risk, would have little clarity on the revenue side of their equation. When this was expressed to the Vice Mayor of Rason, he replied, “We can change the price of electricity here. Rason is not under the same restrictions as the rest of the country.”

North Korea could theoretically piggyback off the market knowledge that their Chinese partners have gained over the last 30 years, but Rason’s neighbors are only likely to share when it suits their interests. In the case of Sonbong Power, Kang told us that every Chinese official who has visited stated that the most effective solution would be to pipe in power from the Chinese grid. “We plan to have a power line installed from the border by the end of 2013.” As power is as strategic asset like food or water, dependence on Chinese power clearly leaves the North Koreans in a vulnerable position.

China is clearly North Korea’s closest ally, but their relationship has a thorny history and Pyongyang is acutely aware of its reliance on big brother Beijing. With China’s rise, many other countries in the region are increasingly dependent on trade but increasingly cautious of dependence, welcoming a stronger presence from the United States, which is in the midst of a strategic pivot towards Asia.

In December 2009, the Asia Society and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation published a report arguing that economic engagement of Pyongyang by the United States would result in creation of vested interests in continued reform, a changed perception of self-interest and a less confrontational foreign policy from North Korea. Against the backdrop of a more uncertain domestic environment after the death of Kim Jong-il, and the shifting dynamics in Asia generally, a North Korea that trades more and engages with the outside world may necessitate a change in foreign policy of governments around the world, most specifically the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

The Rajin-Sonbong SEZ has a checkered past and it would be naïve to say that North Korea is embarking on late 1970’s style Chinese economic reforms. However, we believe that the unprecedented alignment of interests in the region make it a likely starting point for any lasting directional change, which is why the world should watch Rason.

Read the full story here:
Why World Should Watch Rason
The Diplomat
John Kim & Andray Abrahamian
2011-12-22

According to Yonhap:

Trade between the United States and North Korea reached US$2.45 million in October, a U.S. report showed Saturday.

The bilateral trade volume was comprised completely of aid goods offered by the U.S. to the communist state, the Voice of America (VOA) reported citing data compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

The VOA said the Department of Commerce did not give specifics on what kinds of goods were shipped to North Korea, but the goods traded are considered humanitarian aid products as the two countries are not engaged in commercial trade.

In the first 10 months of the year, the bilateral trade reached $6.24 million, compared with $1.90 million a year earlier, the report said.

Here is a list of DPRK/US engagement stories in 2011.

Read the full story here:
U.S.-N. Korea trade reaches US$2.45 mln in Oct.
Yonhap
2011-12-10