North Korean Economy Watch

Unification Ministry says assistance should continue ‘if possible,’ regardless of the actions the country takes
Joong Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja
2/21/2007

Humanitarian aid will keep flowing to North Korea “if possible,” no matter what the country does politically, the Ministry of Unification announced yesterday.

Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung said yesterday that the 2007 operational plan had been submitted to President Roh Moo-hyun on Feb. 6, before the recent agreement in the six-party talks designed to eventually eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

The Unification Ministry released the abstracts of the plan yesterday, and critics quickly denounced it.

“I cannot understand why the administration is voluntarily giving up its leverage,” Nam Sung-wook, a professor of North Korean studies at Korea University, said yesterday. “If the government wanted to separate humanitarian aid from politics, it should have linked the aid provision to other developments in humanitarian programs, such as separated family issues or the repatriation of POWs.”

The administration has shown a tendency to try to change its policy toward North Korea whenever inter-Korean relations have frozen, rather than trying to push North Korea to change, Mr. Nam said.

After the North test-fired missiles in July of last year, South Korea withheld its promised 500,000 tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer aid. Inter-Korean ministerial talks are scheduled to take place from Feb. 28 to March 2 and resuming the humanitarian aid is expected to be discussed.

In its plan for this year, the Unification Ministry set forth six goals for inter-Korean relations, saying “humanitarian assistance will be provided separately from political situations if possible.”

Among the goals were releasing tension and building trust between the two Koreas, expanding inter-Korean economic projects, the construction of infrastructure such as roads and train tracks in North Korea and adding more businesses to the Kaesong Industrial Complex program.

The ministry also said it will seek progress in humanitarian projects, such as reuniting separated families and repatriating South Korean prisoners of war and kidnap victims alive in the North.

Mr. Lee also stressed the importance of the inter-Korean summit to resolving the nuclear crisis and to bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula, but added, “Right now, the government is not engaged in any specific efforts for an inter-Korean summit.”

He said new applications will be accepted by South Korean firms for locations in Kaesong by late as mid-April.

The South will also resume flood relief aid to the North, withheld after the North’s nuclear test in October, Mr. Lee said.

Daily NK
Kang Jae Hyok
2/20/2006

Every year when spring arrives, North Korea faces yet another food crisis. 10 years after the “march of suffering,” North Korea has still made little change.

The greatest change that has occurred is by the North Korean people. The most of North Koreans have surpassed the ‘march of suffering’ and have survived by relying on themselves

In comparison to last year, the Korea Rural Development Administration (RDA) estimated that North Korea had experienced a loss of 1.8% (60 thousands tons) in agricultural production at 4.48 million tons of cereal. The World Food Program (WFP) also predicted similar figures at 4.3 million tons.

On the other hand, a national North Korea aid organization Good Friends reported that only 2.8 million tons of agricultural production had been made and that if any less than 1.5 million tons of food aid was supported, North Korea would be faced with another severe food crisis.

In the 90’s foreign aid could block mass starvation

During the “march of suffering” that began in the mid-90’s, food distributions were suddenly terminated. Nonetheless, people went on working, starving, believing that food distributions would begin once again.

However, one month passed then two, and still the distributions did not resume. In the end, the number of deaths from starvation began to arise. Yet, North Korean authorities did not respond with any countermeasures. As a result, in 3~4 years, 3mn North Korean citizens died of starvation.

Nonetheless, the tragic mass starvation that occurred at the time could have been stooped if it weren’t for the irresponsible acts of North Korean authorities. We can view this by analyzing the figures denoting the amount of aid supplied from 1995~1999.

Year   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999
Production of food
         3490   2500   2680   2830   4280
Aid from FAO
           980   1070   1440   1490   1190
Aid from S.Korea
           960   1050   1630   1030   1070
Food distributions in North Korea
         4450   3550   4120   3860   4450
       ~4470 ~3570 ~4310 ~4320 ~5476
Death rate 
               615    1704     549 
         (Unit: 1,000 tons, million persons)
 
Table of North Korea’s food production and foreign aid in the 90’s in comparison to the death rate. (Good Friends 06.12.22)

According to the table above, South Korea and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) aided North Korea with 2mn tons of food annually from 1995~1999.

If we consider that only 10,000 tons of food is needed to provide the whole of North Korea a day, then there would be no reason for a shortage in food distributions with a total of 3.7mn tons of food aid being supplied. According to the table above, annual aid provided to North Korea was 3.55mn tons at the minimum and 4.45mn tons maximum. This equates on average at 4.09mn tons of supplies.

However, during this period 3mn people died of starvation and 30mn people defected from North Korea. Contrary, there has never been a time where so much foreign aid was supplied to North Korea. Why then at a time where greatest aid was given to North Korea, was there the greatest number of deaths?

One of the essential reasons behind this occurrence was the fact that foreign aid never reached the provinces of North Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jakang where food was most needed. If food aid had been distributed to the areas most dire of starvation, then at the least, this incident would not have occurred.

At the time, most of the aid was distributed preferentially to soldiers, authorities and powerful ministers in Pyongyang. On the whole, aid to North Korea had been sent via ship through Nampo, Haeju and Wonsan harbor, then supplied to Pyongyang and South Pyongan province.

During the 90’s, transportation of cargo was practically immobilized due to the shortage of electricity and lack of fuel which ultimately led to the suspension of locomotives. On the whole, goods are transported via railroad, however, in the 90’s, both passenger and freight trains had come to a halt.

Basically, it takes about a fortnight to travel return, from Wonsan, Gangwon province to Najin, North Hamkyung on train 21. The Pyongyang-Tumen River train which departs from Pyongyang to Sunbong, North Hamkyung on train 1, also takes more than 10 days travel return.

Back then, it took twice as long to for a freight train to reach its destination in comparison to a passenger train. 10,000 tons of foreign aid that arrived at Wonsan harbor took 2~3 months to transport from North Hamkyung to Chongjin. In other words, it would take more than 2 years to distribute 100,000 tons of food to Wonsan in Gangwon province to Chongjin in North Hamkyung province. Hence, it is pointless to rely on railroad to distribute goods.

Losses incurred while transporting aid

Further, 30~40% of goods go missing while being transported. Every time a cargo train stops, guards responsible for the goods sell rice to traders at wholesale prices so they can use the profits to live. Also, street kids and thieves often steal the goods so that the intial 1,000 ton of rice is often depleted to 600~700 tons upon arriving at its destination.

The problem is that North Korean authorities well aware of this fact that are unwilling to modify the routes or assert change. Ultimately, foreign aid is distributed throughout the regions of Pyongan province where the situation of food is relatively good in comparison to the rest of North Korea.

As rice only lands in the hands of people living in Pyongyang and Pyonan where influential ministers and Kim Jong Il’s elite reside, it can only be analyzed that this situation is occurring under specific motives. In the end, the majority of deaths occurred in Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jakang, and the situation has remained the same until today.

Following the missile launch and nuclear experiment, last year South Korea and the international community suspended food aid to North Korea, and in Feb 13th, the third phase of 5th round 6 Party talks ended with the South Korean government confirming that food aid would resume.

Undoubtedly international food aid is important but unless rice is distributed to the areas in most need, a similar situation to the 90’s will occur once again.

More importantly and urgently, aid must be delivered directly to the provinces of Yangkang, Hamkyung and Jangang. Thinking that North Korean authorities will wisely distribute food aid throughout the country is merely a South Korean fallacy.

http://www.northkoreanrefugees.com/2007-02-supply.htm
2/15/2007

The operation to distribute emergency supplies in Hamgyong-bukto, North Korea was a success. Through one of our clandestine local networks, we were able to provide extremely needy people with a total of one ton of rice, as well as clothing and antibiotics. The value of all items supplied equaled 300,000 yen (about US$2,500). The extra supplies were financed by recent donations. Late November of last year, five members of LFNKR’s local group JYO entered Hoeryong-si, North Korea from China, carrying several boxes filled with winter clothing, antibiotics and penicillin.

To avoid indefinite delays at customs, bribes had to be paid to the North Korean customs personnel. Beyond the customs gate, many hungry day workers waited, hoping to earn money by carrying boxes. The JYO members had to keep a firm grip on their supplies so they wouldn’t be snatched away. The rescue team stayed in Hoeryong-si 10 days completing the mission.

They found that the people in the area are cut off from aid from abroad. Local prices are soaring, which adds to the people’s frustration. Although Hoeryong-si has open marketplaces, business hours are restricted. They may only stay open for the 9 hours from 8:00am to 5:00pm. Transactions earlier or later than the specified hours are strictly prohibited. One of the merchants who owns a small market stall (1m x 2m) complained that the restrictions are so severe, he hardly makes enough to survive.

In early September, the marketplace managers were repeatedly confronted by merchants protesting the strict business rules, including the tight business hours. During one protest, the national security guards in Hoeryong-si were called out to suppress the crowd of protesting merchants because one of the protesters had been trampled to death and several others were injured during the demonstration. But the severe restrictions on market activities continued, and that provoked another large demonstration in November. At this protest, 20 to 30 people were reportedly arrested.

The reason for the ongoing protests is simple. A majority of people in North Korea are still starving, and their only option is to engage in trade. Meanwhile, the authorities place unreasonably tight controls on merchandise and free trade at the marketplaces.

According to our local members, the authorities have been strictly limiting the number of people they allow to travel into China. Even with people bribing the authorities, only 2 or 3 out of every hundred applicants are issued permits.

Recently, Chinese people seeking to visit relatives are no longer allowed to enter North Korea unless they are properly registered and can prove they are related. Even tighter restrictions have been placed on North Koreans wishing to visit relatives living in China. In addition, no one is allowed to invite relatives from China without submitting beforehand a set of registration documents showing detailed descriptions of the relatives for identification. The documents are minutely scrutinized by all relevant agents, including the local foreign affairs office, the national security department, and the customs house. Incidentally, the fee for this process is 6,000 won.

Here are a few typical prices of food items in Hoeryong-si in December 2006 (unit: NK won):

Rice (1kg): 1300W
Corn (1kg): 550
Sugar (1kg): 1800
Wheat flour (1kg) 750
Pork (1kg): 3300 

Our JYO rescue team handed out winter clothing to people who could not afford to buy warm garments, and also distributed antibiotics to those needing them. The shortage of medicines in the market places is obvious. A single package of antibiotics was selling for at least 12,000 to 16,000 won, while in China it is sold for less than half that, or 15RMB (about 6,000 won).

After the JYO team’s return from North Korea, they received news that the marketplace closing time had finally been extended to 7:00pm as a result of the two large protest demonstrations. The authorities were forced to accept the fact that the merchants can barely survive unless they work extra hours, even if they have to use kerosene lamps to continue business after dark.

Korea Times
2/13/2007

Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement

The third session of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Wu Dawei, vice minister of foreign affairs of the PRC, Kim Gye-gwan, vice minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK; Kenichiro Sasae, director-general for Asian and Oceanian affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Chun Yung-woo, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Alexander Losyukov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation; and Christopher Hill, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

I. The parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitment in the Joint Statement. The parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of action for action.

II. The parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear program as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.

3. The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The U.S. will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil will commence within next 60 days.

The parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

   1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

   2. Normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations

   3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations

   4. Economy and energy cooperation

   5. Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase _ which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant _ economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

Korea Times
2/13/2007

1. Within 60 days, the North must shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, north of the capital Pyongyang. International inspectors should be allowed to verify the process. For the initial steps, North Korea will get energy, food and other aid worth 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

2. The United States will begin bilateral talks with North Korea to normalize their relations and will begin the processes of removing North Korea from its designation as a terror-sponsoring state and also ending U.S. trade sanctions. No deadline was set.

3. Japan will begin bilateral talks with North Korea to normalize their relations.

4. After 60 days, foreign ministers of all the countries will meet to confirm the implementation of the agreement and talk about security cooperation in northeast Asia. Some countries will hold a separate forum on negotiations for a permanent peace settlement to replace the 1953 cease-fire that ended the Korean War.

5. The North must provide a complete list of its nuclear programs and disable all existing nuclear facilities. In return, the North will get aid in corresponding steps worth 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil _ details of which will be addressed in later working group discussions.

6. Five working groups will be created: denuclearization, U.S.-North Korea relations, Japan-North Korea relations, economic cooperation and on a peace and security mechanism in northeast Asia.

7. The six-nation talks will meet again March 19.

Yonhap
2/13/2007

The following is a chronology of major events surrounding the dispute over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and six-party talks aimed at ending the crisis.

List below the fold:
(more…)

Korea Times
Park Song-wu
2/11/2007

South Korea is thinking of chairing a working group for energy aid to North Korea as the United States is trying to differentiate this round of the six-party talks from a 1994 process, a Seoul official said on Sunday.

But Seoul has a firm position that all parties should jointly pay the “tax” for peace, he said.

“Denuclearization will benefit all parties, so the burdens should be shared jointly,” he said. “But we are thinking of taking the lead in the working group for energy aid, considering the circumstances of the other parties.”

He did not elaborate. But Tokyo is not expected to raise its hand to chair the working group, considering the Japanese anger over the North’s abduction of its nationals in the past.

Russia prefers forgiving the North’s debts instead of providing it with energy.

China, host of the multilateral dialogue, is already playing the most important role of chairing the six-party meeting.

What the United States apparently has in mind, and consented to by all parties, is the necessity to differentiate the result of these on-going negotiations from the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Since it was signed by Robert Gallucci and Kang Sok-ju in Geneva on October 21, 1994, Washington provided 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to Pyongyang over the following seven years.

But the North’s promise to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors in return for two light-water reactors was not obeyed, causing the Bush administration to criticize the deal as a diplomatic failure of his predecessor, Bill Clinton. After that, U.S. diplomats even avoided meeting their North Korean counterparts bilaterally.

The U.S. policy, however, has recently reached a turning point.

“The Bush administration may have been driven to greater negotiating flexibility by a need to achieve a foreign policy victory to compensate for declining public support for the Iraq war and the loss of the Republican leadership of Congress,” Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow for the Heritage Foundation said in a recent article.

But one thing that has not changed is the U.S. hope of not repeating the “mistake” it made with the Geneva agreement.

From 1994 to 2002, Pyongyang received 3.56 million tons of heavy oil, equivalent to $500 million, from the now-defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the United States shouldered the largest share of $347 million.

To shake off that bad memory, Washington wants to use the term “shut down” instead of “freezing” and even wants to avoid providing fuel oil to the North, reportedly citing the possibility that it can be used for military purposes.

So the talks have dragged on. And, to make things worse, the North Koreans are demanding a lot.

Japan’s Kyodo news agency reported that North Korea had demanded 2 million tons of heavy oil or 2 million kilowatts of electricity in exchange for taking the initial steps towards denuclearization.

Christopher Hill, the top U.S. envoy, expressed hope on Sunday that such technical issues could be discussed at working group meetings. On the same day, the Seoul official hinted that South Korea will chair the working group.

Korea Times
Park Song-wu
2/9/2007

A draft accord, circulated by China after resuming the six-party talks on Thursday, reportedly contains the key phrase: North Korea will shut down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon within 60 days in return for energy alternatives.

Declining to confirm the report, however, a senior South Korean official indicated on Friday that there might be another key subject the North wants to include in the draft.

“I think it is inappropriate to characterize the draft simply as a nuclear freeze with energy aid,” he said, referring to initial steps to implement a 2005 deal under which the North pledged to dismantle its nuclear programs in return for economic and diplomatic benefits.

As envoys were keeping quiet, the question of what else the North wants to put into the draft needs to be identified from what Kim Gye-gwan, Pyongyang’s top envoy to the denuclearization talks, told reporters upon arriving at Beijing on Thursday.

“We are ready to discuss the initial steps, but whether the United States will give up its hostile policy against us and come out for mutual, peaceful co-existence will be the basis for our judgment,” he said.

Even though it looks like just another cliche, what he apparently made clear was that Washington’s “carrots,” such as energy, food and the lifting of sanctions, could not satisfy Pyongyang.

Two U.S. scholars recently said in a co-authored article for the Nautilus Institute that Pyongyang’s fundamental goal is to improve its relations with Washington by using the six-party framework.

“Above all, it wants, and has pursued steadily since 1991, a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States,” said John Lewis, a professor emeritus at Stanford University, and Robert Carlin, a former U.S. State Department analyst who participated in most of the U.S.-North Korea negotiations between 1993 and 2000.

A pro-Pyongyang newspaper in Japan also said on Friday that North Korea wants the United States to make an “irreversible” decision to drop its hostile policy toward the Stalinist state.

“The North holds the position that it can take corresponding steps only after it confirms the United States takes the first irreversible steps toward dropping the hostile policy,” the Chosun Sinbo reported.

Technically, it is possible to dismantle the North’s reactors irreversibly.

But political decisions can always be reversed. That is why Pyongyang may want Washington to make a big political concession during the initial stage of denuclearization so that it can gain trust in the United States.

The concession could include replacing the 1953 armistice with a peace treaty, as U.S. President George W. Bush indicated during his summit with President Roh Moo-hyun in Vietnam late last year. Pyongyang may also want Washington to erase its name from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

But a lingering question is whether the North will really decide to give up its nuclear programs that have served as a lifeline for the country.

Korea Times
2/9/2007

A Korean-American aid group based in the United States said Thursday it was sending its 17th shipment of medical relief goods worth $4.8 million to North Korea, according to the Yonhap News Agency.

The Institute for Strategy and Reconciliation (ISR), a think tank also active in international assistance, said the shipment this month will go to helping more than 20,000 North Korean children and the handicapped by providing antibiotics, wheelchairs and crutches.

Yonhap reported the aid will also include stethoscopes and various surgical and medical equipment.

“The latest assistance will leave from San Francisco and will reach North Korea’s Nampo Port by the end of March,” the group said in a press release.

The group will also provide individually tailored artificial limbs while the staff is in the North, the first American relief group to do so.

ISR began its North Korea program in 1998 with the approval of the U.S. Treasury. As of this month, the group has provided medical assistance valued at approximately $27.4 million.

The group is also recruiting volunteers through the end of this month to help post-surgery rehabilitation programs for children and the handicapped in North Korea.

BBC
2/7/2007

As six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme resume in Beijing, the BBC’s Penny Spiller considers whether food shortages in the secretive communist state may have an impact on progress. 

Negotiators for the US, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia are meeting in Beijing amid signs of a willingness to compromise.

While the last round of talks in December ended in deadlock, bilateral meetings since then have brought unusually positive responses from both North Korea and the US.

Such upbeat noises were unexpected, coming four months after North Korea shocked the world by testing a nuclear bomb.

The test brought international condemnation and UN sanctions, as well as a significant drop in crucial food aid.

South Korea suspended a shipment of 500,000 tonnes of food supplies, while China’s food exports last year were sharply down.

The World Food Programme has struggled to raise even 20% of the funds it requires to feed 1.9 million people it has identified as in immediate need of help.

Aid agencies warned at the time of a humanitarian disaster within months, as the North cannot produce enough food itself to supply its population. It also lost an estimated 100,000 tonnes-worth of crops because of floods in July.

‘Queues for rations’

Kathi Zellweger, of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Pyongyang, said the present food situation in the country was unclear.

No figures are yet available for last year’s harvest, and it was difficult to assess what impact the lack of food aid was having on supplies, she said.

However, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation estimated the country was short of one million tonnes of food – a fifth of the annual requirement to feed its 23 million people.

South Korea-based Father Jerry Hammond said there were signs of shortages – not only in food but also in fuel – when he visited the North with the Catholic charity Caritas in December.

He described seeing long queues for rations, and ordinary people selling goods in the street for money to buy the basics.

“You do expect to see more shortages during the winter time,” the US-born priest, who has visited North Korea dozens of times in the past decade, said.

“But I did see a noticeable difference this time.”

High malnutrition rates

Paul Risley, of the World Food Programme, said people in North Korea may still be cushioned by the November harvest and the pinch will be felt in the coming months.

“We have great concerns,” he said, pointing out that North Korea was now in its second year of food shortages.

He says “stabilising food security” in the country will be very relevant to the talks in Beijing.

“It is certainly the hope of all who are observing the situation in [North Korea] that imports of food can be resumed and returned to prior levels,” he said.

“Malnutrition rates are still the highest in Asia, and we certainly don’t want to see those rates rise any further.”

Father Hammond thinks Pyongyang may be persuaded to consider compromises in Beijing, but is unlikely to do so as a result of any pressure from the people of North Korea.

“People are very cut off from the outside world, and there is constant propaganda about national survival. Even if they go hungry, it will be considered patriotic,” he said.

There have been signs of possible compromise from both sides in the run up to the talks.

Washington has reportedly hinted at flexibility over its offer of aid and security guarantees, as well as showing a willingness to sit down and discuss North Korea’s demands to lift financial sanctions.

Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly recently told visiting US officials it would take the first steps to disband its nuclear programme in return for 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil and other benefits.

And South Korea is keen to resume its shipments of rice and fertiliser aid – if Pyongyang agrees to freeze its nuclear programme, the Choson Ilbo newspaper has reported.

As the nuclear talks resume, all sides will be looking to translate such pressures into progress.