North Korean Economy Watch

Yonhap
7/29/2007

South Korea on Sunday sent 22,590 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, its last oil shipment to the communist neighbor under the first stage of a landmark nuclear disarmament deal.

Under a Feb. 13 deal signed with five other regional powers, North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon in return for 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil aid from South Korea.

The oil shipment, the fifth of its kind, left this southeast port at 1 a.m. and is to arrive at Sonbong Port in northeastern North Korea at 7 a.m. on Monday, South Korean officials said.

North Korea shut down the Yongbyon reactor after South Korea sent the first shipment on July 12. The February deal also calls for North Korea to disclose and disable all its nuclear programs in return for an additional 950,000 tons of oil or equivalent aid.

The six nations — the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan — met in Beijing earlier this month but the talks ended without setting a date to meet again.

Bloomberg
Bradley K. Martin
7/26/2007

To make painkillers and antibiotics in his factory in Pyongyang, Swiss businessman Felix Abt needs reagents, chemicals used to test for toxic impurities. Abt can’t get them now — because the world refuses to sell North Korea a product that is also used to manufacture biological weapons.

Such sanctions on trade with the regime of Kim Jong Il — some dating back to the Korean War — may be the next diplomatic battleground after North Korea bowed to pressure last week and shut down five nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

North Korea said July 16 that ending sanctions, and its removal from a U.S. list of countries that sponsor terrorism, are prerequisites for further progress in the negotiations to end its nuclear weapons program. The U.S., meanwhile, says the next step is for North Korea to disclose all its nuclear capabilities, followed by a permanent dismantling of Yongbyon.

North Korea is playing a “tactical game,” said David Straub, a Korea specialist at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. After shutting down Yongbyon and receiving a pledge of 950,000 tons of oil, the reclusive nation will try to “force the U.S. and others to lift sanctions,” Straub said in an e-mail exchange.

While many of the post-Korean war sanctions were lifted between 1994 and 2000 by President Bill Clinton, Americans are prohibited from exporting “dual-use” products or technologies, a wide range of items that might have military as well as civilian applications — including reagents and even aluminum bicycle tubing, which might be used to make rockets.

UN Sanctions

Much of the world joined the sanctions regime after North Korea tested an atomic device last October. The United Nations called on member states to stop trade in weapons, “dual-use” items and luxury goods. Japan went further, stopping used-car exports and banning port calls by North Korean vessels.

Now that North Korea has shut its facilities at Yongbyon and allowed in international inspectors, the haggling will begin on the next steps. If its demands aren’t met, North Korea could kick out the inspectors and restart the plants, as it did in 2002.

“The Bush administration must choose between settling for a temporary closure of the nuclear sites and taking a strategic decision to coexist” with North Korea, said Kim Myong Chol, Tokyo-based president of the Center for Korean-American Peace, who for three decades has encouraged foreign reporters to consider him an informal North Korean spokesman. “Otherwise, the agreement will break up, leaving the U.S. with little to show.”

‘Contentious Issue’

Sanctions represent “a multiplicity of issues that could become contentious,” said economist Marcus Noland, North Korea specialist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, in an e-mail exchange. China has already called for the lifting of the UN sanctions imposed Oct. 14.

North Korea agreed with the U.S., South Korea, Russia, China and Japan on Feb. 13 to close its Yongbyon reactor, which produced weapons-grade plutonium, and to eventually declare and disable all of its atomic programs. Working groups will meet in August before another round of talks in September.

If the U.S. insists on a list of all the country’s nuclear facilities without starting to negotiate on sanctions, North Korea might consider that “a spoiler” for the talks ahead, Kim Myong Chol said.

Swiss businessman Abt said that in the past he could get around U.S. sanctions for his North Korean pharmaceutical factory by buying supplies from other countries. The UN sanctions shut off those sources.

Using Old Stocks

“Luckily, we have enough stock of reagents, but when it runs out we would not be able to guarantee the safety of our pharmaceuticals any longer,” he said.

Abt, 52, is president of Pyongsu Pharma Joint Venture Co., an enterprise with ties to the Ministry of Public Health that makes painkillers and antibiotics for humanitarian organizations in North Korea. He is also president of Pyongyang’s European Business Association.

“The same is true in many other civilian industries,” said Abt, who moved to North Korea from Vietnam five years ago. Gold mines are affected too, he said: “If they cannot import cyanide, they can’t extract the gold.” Cyanide is another “dual-use” product, part of the process for making some chemical weapons, he said.

All this has “a highly negative impact” on the economy at a time when the regime has announced it wants to focus on development, Abt said. Foreigners are showing “more and more interest in doing business here,” Abt said, predicting that North Korea will eventually be regarded as a successor to Vietnam as “the newest emerging market.”

Yonhap
7/21/2007

A U.N. relief official said North Korea currently receives only a small portion of the food aid it needs and his agency is considering stepping up aid to feed almost 2 million more people, a U.S. government-funded radio station reported Saturday.

In an interview reaching here Saturday through the Korean version of the VOA’s Web site, Robin Lodge, a spokesperson for the World Food Program (WFP), said international relief agencies, including the Office of Food for Peace, recently gathered in Rome, Italy and discussed the possibility of sending the communist state additional food that could feed 1.9 million people there.

Lodge was also quoted by the U.S.-funded broadcaster as saying North Korea currently receives from his agency only about 10 percent of what it needs to feed the 7 million believed to be suffering from starvation.

North Korea does not release any official data on its food situation but many outsiders believe that more than 2 million people died when famine swept through the country in the late 1990s.

Good Friends, a Seoul-based relief group dedicated to North Korea, said in its latest weekly newsletter on Wednesday that a growing number of North Koreans died of starvation or hunger-caused diseases recently, especially in remote areas.

“Famine-driven deaths began to occur across North Korea in late June,” the report said. “In some cities and counties in the provinces of North Pyongan, Ryanggang, Jagang and South and North Hamkyong, the number of deaths is on the increase daily.”

The reports contradict widespread reports that the North’s food situation has improved significantly in recent years.

On Friday, Seoul started sending 50,000 tons of rice aid to North Korea overland as part of its promised loan of 400,000 tons of rice aid.

Over the next five weeks, the South is to deliver 30,000 tons of rice to the North via a road passing through the border town of Kaesong, while another 20,000 tons will be transported across a paved road on the east coast. South Korea is delivering 350,000 tons of rice to the communist country by sea.

South Korea resumed shipping rice aid to North Korea in late June after more than a one-year hiatus, as the North shut down its nuclear facilities in the first step toward eventual nuclear dismantlement.

Wall Street Journal
Melanie Kirkpatrick
7/20/2007

Of all the evidence turned up by the U.S. concerning irregularities in the United Nations Development Program’s operations in North Korea, some of the most disturbing concerns the transfer of dual-use technology.

As reported last month, the U.S. has uncovered documents showing the UNDP procured and delivered to North Korea in May 2006 technology that could be used for military purposes: global positioning system (GPS) equipment, a portable high-end spectrometer and a large quantity of high-specification computer hardware. According to packing lists and confirmation receipts, the items were intended for a “GIS” — geographic information system — project.

The equipment “is the type of technology subject to (U.S.) export controls,” says a spokesman for the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which is responsible for issuing export licenses. So how did it end up in Pyongyang? It would seem more than passing strange that Commerce would have issued the requisite export licenses. The answer is: It didn’t.

U.S. officials, led by Ambassador Mark Wallace at the U.S. mission to the U.N., have spent a year looking into the UNDP’s operations in North Korea. Now, at the request of the State Department, Commerce searched its archives and found no record of any application for export licenses for the GPS, spectrometer or other equipment for the GIS project in North Korea.

Over the past 10 years, Commerce has received more than 200 license applications to export U.S. technology for U.N. projects in North Korea. Of those applications, the UNDP was named in a grand total of two, including one for software for the same GIS project that was equipped last year. That application was rejected.

Previously undisclosed documents show that the UNDP had been trying to equip the GIS project since at least 1999, when the application for an export license for mapping software was denied. Commerce cited concerns over the lack of safeguards in the project that could result in the software being diverted to the North Korean government and used for military purposes.

Yet seven years later, the UNDP procured and transferred sensitive technology to the same, unsafeguarded project — this time without bothering to apply for a license. And while there’s no evidence the UNDP went ahead and purchased the software for which it had been denied a license, that possibility must be considered, since GPS equipment is useless in such a project without mapping software.

The denial notice for “Case Number: Z177037” is dated Sept. 18, 1999. The “consignee in country of ultimate destination” is listed as the UNDP in Pyongyang. The one-page notice is written in prose that is clear and unambiguous: “The Department of Commerce has concluded that this export would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests.”

The 14 items on the UNDP’s wish list were all classified “EAR99,” which means they are subject to Commerce jurisdiction but didn’t specifically appear on the Commerce Control List of items restricted for export. In discussions over the past several weeks with State Department officials, Commerce officials who examined the archives explained their agency’s decision to deny the export license. During the interagency review of the UNDP request, they say, questions were raised about whether the software would stay in North Korea after the UNDP international staff left and whether North Koreans would have access to the software.

Supporting documents show that the answer to both questions was yes. A letter dated April 5, 1999, from the software manufacturer that was seeking the export license on behalf of the UNDP, explains: “The project is supposed to be completed in three (3) years and the software will be left with the state agencies.”

Emails from the UNDP to Commerce offer further information about the UNDP’s security controls — or lack thereof. An Aug. 3, 1999 email from the UNDP’s Shankar Manandhar, in response to a Commerce query, says, “We would like to inform you that the North Korean nationals will have access to the computer in the project office in [the] presence of UNDP staff.” In another email, Mr. Manandhar notes that the software will be “utilized in the project office.”

The Defense Department recommended to Commerce that the application be denied. In a memo dated July 20, 1999, Defense explains that “These items could pose both national security and proliferation issues for the US and allies if diverted to the North Korean military.” Among the list of potential military applications cited are “planning a nuclear weapons infrastructure or missile launch sites.” And, “it could also be used for targeting.” In the end, as one Commerce official explained, since this type of mapping software can be used for military purposes, it was deemed to be “too great a risk of diversion.”

The Commerce official also says the case notes for the denial specify that several earlier licenses granted to the UNDP in North Korea had been conditioned in such a way that no North Korean nationals were to have access to the licensed items. Oh, really? Based on the UNDP’s replies to Commerce’s questions regarding the 1999 application, the official says that the licensing officer at the time believed it was “highly likely” that the UNDP was violating the terms of its previous licenses by allowing North Koreans access to licensed items. We now know — as confirmed by the U.N.’s preliminary audit of the UNDP’s North Korea operations — that the agency’s local staff were Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees assigned to the UNDP by the government.

It’s also worth noting the year these events took place: 1999. That is, the denial notice originated in Bill Clinton’s Commerce Department, part of an administration that was “conducting a one-sided love affair with North Korea,” in the felicitous phrase of Christopher Cox, then a Republican congressman closely monitoring Asian issues. On Sept. 17, 1999, the day before the issuance of the denial notice, the administration announced it would ease economic sanctions on North Korea. But approving the sale of sophisticated mapping software was a bridge too far even for the Clinton administration.

Since the U.S. went public in January with evidence of the UNDP’s lack of oversight of its programs in North Korea, the agency hasn’t exactly been forthcoming. At first, the UNDP denied that it had purchased dual-use equipment for North Korea, referring instead to “rice husk removers” and “plotters to help the [Korean] authorities more accurately produce maps for environmental monitoring.”

Next it look the line that the GPS equipment, portable spectrometer and computers delivered in May 2006 “do not represent state-of-the-art technology,” as Ad Melkert, the No. 2 UNDP official, put it in a June 28 letter to Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. An annex to Mr. Melkert’s letter describes the technology as “not high-end or sophisticated” — an assessment at odds with the representations of the manufacturers. Trimble, for example, maker of the GPS GeoXT Handheld sent to North Korea, describes its product as having “a powerful 416 MHz processor running the most-advanced operating system available.” Mr. Melkert says in the annex that the UNDP is investigating “whether the vendors [in the Netherlands and Singapore] were required to obtain export permits for these items” — which sure sounds like an effort to shift responsibility.

Since January, when the U.S. concerns were made public, the UNDP has pulled out of North Korea and the U.N. audit has confirmed extensive violations of U.N. rules regarding hiring practices, the use of foreign currency and site inspections. The latest U.S. revelations raise far more serious questions about the UNDP’s oversight. Under the most generous interpretation, the agency was negligent of its legal responsibilities to keep dual-use technology out of a country that is on the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring states. At worst, it deliberately transferred the technology, knowing it was breaking U.S. law and helping to strengthen Kim Jong Il’s military dictatorship.

These questions — and many more concerning the UNDP’s record in North Korea — highlight the need for an independent, external inquiry of the UNDP’s programs world-wide. The U.S. first went public with its concerns in January, after months of pressing the UNDP for more transparency. If anything, as the latest U.S. evidence shows, things are worse than anyone thought.

Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal’s editorial page.

Korea Herald
7/19/2007

The international Red Cross will continue to help North Korea in treating measles-related illnesses, including medicine aid, the organization said Wednesday in its program update, Yonhan News Agency reported.

In the first phase of a joint immunization plan, the International Federation of Red Cross and North Korea campaigned to vaccinate 6 million children between 6 months and 15 years old.

“The DPRK Red Cross and the federation are contributing 10.2 million doses of vitamin A. The federation is also contributing 262,000 doses of ampicillin to health facilities in four provinces for the treatment of measels-related complications,” the update said.

DPRK stands for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, an official name of North Korea.

Washington Post Foreign Service
Edward Cody
7/15/2007; Page A01

Move Follows Delivery of Oil; U.N. Team to Verify Shutdown

After four years of off-and-on negotiations, North Korea said it began closing down its main nuclear reactor Saturday, shortly after receiving a first boatload of fuel oil aid.

The closure, if confirmed by U.N. inspectors, would mark the first concrete step in a carefully orchestrated denuclearization schedule that was agreed on in February, with the ultimate goal of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in exchange for fuel and other economic aid, and increased diplomatic recognition.

More broadly, it constituted the first on-the-ground accomplishment of six-nation negotiations that have been grinding away with little progress since 2003 under Chinese sponsorship. The talks — including North and South Korea, Russia, Japan, the United States and China — are likely to resume next week in Beijing to emphasize the parties’ resolve to carry out the rest of the February agreement and eventually create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

“We welcome this development and look forward to the verification and monitoring of this shutdown by the International Atomic Energy Agency team,” said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, referring to a 10-member team of U.N. inspectors who flew into North Korea earlier Saturday.

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator, warned reporters in Japan, where he was visiting in anticipation of the new talks, that moving forward into further denuclearization would probably prove as difficult as the previous four years of discussions. Given the track record, which includes several North Korean walkouts and long standoffs, some Asian and U.S. analysts have questioned whether North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Il, has genuinely made the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons after so many years devoted to developing them.

The next steps, as outlined in the accord, would be for North Korea to permanently disable the reactor, a plutonium facility at Yongbyon, 60 miles northeast of Pyongyang, the capital, and to reveal the full extent of the nuclear weapons, nuclear processing plants and stored nuclear material it has accumulated. That would include an accounting of any uranium enrichment efforts, which North Korea denies it has undertaken but which the Bush administration says have been part of the country’s nuclear research.

Uranium aside, U.S. intelligence estimates have said North Korea has extracted enough plutonium from the Yongbyon facility to build as many as a dozen bombs, although it is not known how many weapons the reclusive Stalinist nation’s military has put together. Last October, while the talks were again stalled, North Korea announced it had conducted its first underground nuclear test and henceforth should be considered a nuclear-armed state.

Kim’s government has based much of its power on the military, and possession of nuclear weapons has been described in North Korean propaganda as a matter of national pride. But the thought of nuclear weapons in the hands of Kim and his aides has unsettled his Asian neighbors, including China. As a result, they have persisted in the six-party negotiations despite repeated delays and abrupt changes of position by North Korean diplomats.

North Korea’s decision to go ahead with the Yongbyon closure, for instance, came only after nearly two years of wrangling over about $25 million in North Korean accounts blocked in a Macau bank.

The funds were frozen because of U.S. Treasury Department allegations in September 2005 that they were tainted by money laundering and counterfeiting. After months of insisting the Treasury accusations were a law enforcement matter separate from the nuclear talks, the Bush administration switched positions and promised to get the money liberated, leading to February’s milestone agreement. But several months more passed while Hill struggled to find a banking system that would handle the allegedly tainted money. Ultimately, the funds were transferred out of Macau via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York into the Russian banking system and, from there, transferred into North Korean accounts in a Russian trading bank near the border with North Korea

Diplomats from the six nations have suggested that, should they be successful, the North Korean nuclear negotiations could eventually evolve into a permanent forum for East Asian security cooperation, bringing North Korea into a closer relationship with its neighbors. But as Hill did in Japan on Saturday, they acknowledge they have a long road ahead before anything like that is possible.

Saturday’s announcement, while widely applauded, essentially returned the East Asian landscape to what it was in 2002, when operations had been suspended at the Yongbyon reactor under an earlier deal put together in 1994 under the Clinton administration.

U.S. diplomats said in 2002 that North Korean representatives acknowledged a secret uranium enrichment program — something North Korea has steadfastly denied since then — and the Bush administration stopped the oil shipments that were part of the 1994 deal. In return, North Korea expelled U.N. weapons inspectors, quit the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and restarted operations at Yongbyon.

The North Korean government had made no formal announcement by early Sunday. But a diplomat at the North Korean U.N. mission, Kim Myon Gil, told the Associated Press that the reactor was shut down Saturday and its closure would soon be verified by the U.N. inspectors. The State Department said in Washington that it got official word from North Korea shortly after a South Korean ship pulled into Sonbong, a port in northeast North Korea, with a cargo of 6,200 tons of heavy fuel oil to power generators in the rickety North Korean electricity grid.”

The delivery represented a down payment on a scheduled 50,000 tons of fuel oil aid in return for shutting down the reactor. In all, the February accord promised North Korea up to 1 million tons of oil and other economic aid as it takes further denuclearization steps over the months ahead.

The accord also held out the prospect of improved relations with the United States, which has long been a goal of North Korea. In signing the accord, for instance, the Bush administration undertook to review whether it could remove North Korea from the list of countries said to sponsor terrorism and to engage in diplomatic discussions aimed at dissipating the hostility that remains more than half a century after the Korean War.

Yonhap
Tony Chang
7/11/2007

A South Korean pharmaceutical association said Wednesday it had provided North Korea with drugs worth about 3 billion won (US$3.25 million) in May in response to a request from the impoverished country.

In February, the North Korean Red Cross Society sent a letter requesting antibiotics, tuberculosis medicine, pneumonia medications, and other basic drugs, the Korea Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (KPMA) said.

“Drugs made in the South are precious to us because medicines from China are often fake and not fitting to the North Korean constitution,” the society was quoted as saying in the letter.

The North even requested drugs that have outlived their shelf life, underscoring its urgent need for basic drugs, the KPMA said, adding that it had rejected the request for safety reasons.

In late 2006, the North was hit by an outbreak of scarlet fever, which led to travel bans and school closings, according to reports. The country’s east coast was also reported to have been struck by a series of infectious diseases in January, affecting up to 4,000 people.

North seeks medicine, even if expired for a year
Joong Ang Daily
Kim Young-hoon
7/11/2007

A letter from a Red Cross hospital official in North Korea did not mince words. “We welcome any donation of medicine, even if its expiration date has passed,” the official said.

Moon Kyung-tae, vice chairman of the Seoul-based Korea Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, said yesterday the official sent the letter through a civic group, Unification Affairs Research Institute, in February.

The North is willing to take medicine that has expired for up to a year, Moon said, and also was willing to accept responsibility for any problems that might arise.

However, Moon said, “We just cannot do that.”

The association sends about 5 billion won ($5.4 million) worth of medical aid packages to the North every year, but the amount is not nearly enough for what is needed.

In 2005, the South provided support to build pharmaceutical factories in the North, but the facilities could not operate properly due to water and electricity shortages.

The country is extremely vulnerable to epidemics. In October, scarlet fever, which can be treated by taking three pills a day for 10 days, broke out in the North. A significant number of children and the elderly died because they lacked the proper medicine, sources well-informed about the North’s situation said.

Donga
7/11/2007

When natural hazards like floods occur in North Korea, the South Korean government sends “humanitarian assistance.” But it has turned out that the government failed to monitor whether the emergency relief aid was being used appropriately.

The government spent 221 billion won (229 million dollars) from August last year to June this year to help North Korea repair damage from last July’s flood. But the Ministry of Unification said on July 10 that the after-monitoring of its use has not yet started.

After a massive flood hit North Korea last year, the ministry announced a plan to send relief aid to the North. At that time, the ministry pledged to visit the affected areas from time to time and see whether the sent items are used for the right purposes. The pledge has not yet been delivered.

The items that the government sent to Pyongyang via the Korean Red Cross include: 100,000 tons of rice, 100,000 tons of cement, 5,000 tons of iron reinforcing rods, 210 relief machines, 80,000 blankets, 10,000 emergency kits, and medicines.

“While sending the relief aid, Pyongyang conducted the nuclear test, so we had to stop; assistance was resumed this year. Due to this change in schedule, it was difficult for us to monitor the use of the aid. We will continue to negotiate with the North regarding field monitoring and access to their rationing lists,” said one official at the unification ministry.

However, many think that the monitoring, in effect, will be of no use, since the rationing of the relief aid might have already been finished.

After a railway station explosion had occurred in Ryongchon in North Pyongan Province in April 2004, the ministry also sent relief aid such as rice and cement. But the monitoring was done one year after the delivery, drawing criticism from the public.

Some point out that we should strengthen the monitoring of our rice aid, which is provided in return for Pyongyang’s scrapping of its nuclear program.

Seoul and Pyongyang made an agreement to visit three places on the east coast and two places on the west coast to oversee the allocation of aid whenever Seoul sends 100,000 tons of rice. The World Food Program, however, has an office in Pyongyang and monitors whether North Korean officials are making disproportionate allocations to the military.

In the meantime, the government sent 10 billion won (10.87 million dollars) worth of road paving materials to help proceed with the Mt. Baekdu tour project planned by Hyundai Asan and the Korea Tourism Organization. However, its usage has not yet been confirmed.

A total of 16,000 tons of materials were sent to the North in August 2005 and March 2006, but Pyongyang has not responded since July last year. Currently, the project is on hold.

“To push the project forward, we are contacting the North via several channels. But because there has not been any response from the North, we are having difficulties,” said one unification ministry official.

Joong Ang Daily
7/10/2007

South Korea will start sending 50,000 tons of rice aid to North Korea by road next week, as part of its promised loan of 400,000 tons of rice, officials said yesterday.

While 350,000 tons of rice will be delivered by sea, 30,000 tons will be delivered via rail in the west of the Korean Peninsula, and another 20,000 tons will be delivered via an east coast rail line, a Unification Ministry official said.

The two Koreas conducted a historic test of the reconnected railways across the border in mid-May.

South Korea resumed shipping rice aid to North Korea in late June after more than a year’s hiatus, as the North took steps toward nuclear dismantlement. The aid, which consists of 250,000 tons of imported rice and 150,000 tons of domestic rice, will be made over the next five months.

“The rice aid to North Korea via the overland route will be made over five weeks starting next Friday,” the official said.

North Korea is supposed to pay back the $152-million rice loan over 20 years after a 10-year grace period at an annual interest rate of 1 percent.

South Korea resumed shipments of fertilizer and other emergency aid to the North in late March, but withheld the loan of 400,000 tons of rice as an inducement for North Korea to start implementing a landmark agreement reached in the six-nation talks in February.

In early June, inter-Korean ministerial talks ended without tangible results after North Korea protested the South’s decision to withhold rice aid until the North took steps toward nuclear dismantlement.

South Korea suspended all food and fertilizer aid to North Korea after the North conducted missile tests in July.

Resumption of aid was stymied due to the North’s nuclear bomb test last October, but the two sides agreed to put inter-Korean projects back on track in early March. The last rice shipment was made in early 2006.

A poor harvest in 2006, disastrous summer flooding and a 75 percent fall in donor assistance from abroad have dealt severe blows to the impoverished North, according to World Food Program officials.

A recent think tank report said North Korea could run short of up to one-third of the food it needs this year if South Korea and other countries withhold aid. Data from the WFP and the Unification Ministry show that the North will need between 5.24 million tons and 6.47 million tons of food this year.

Yonhap
Sohn Suk-joo
7/10/2007

South Korea has signed a contract with a local refinery to provide heavy fuel oil to North Korea for shipment next week as part of a multilateral aid-for-disarmament deal, the Unification Ministry said Tuesday.

The contract comes on the heels of international nuclear watchdog monitors preparing for entry into the North next week for verification of the North’s shutdown of its nuclear facilities. Reports also said China is planning to host a fresh round of six-party talks on the North’s denuclearization next Wednesday.

“On Monday, the government signed a contract with SK Energy to provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea valued at 22.2 billion won (US$22 million),” Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Nam-sik said. The contract includes transportation fees and insurance premiums.

The first shipment of 6,200 tons will be sent to North Korea next Thursday as part of a six-party deal calling for the communist state to take steps to denuclearize in exchange for economic rewards and other incentives.

The date of delivery, originally set for July 14, has been advanced as North Korea is moving to shut down its main nuclear reactor under the Feb. 13 agreement with South Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia. The five regional players have engaged North Korea in the six-party nuclear disarmament talks since 2003.

With the earlier than expected oil delivery, South Korea expects that North Korea will accelerate its process of shutting down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, about 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang.

North Korea is entitled to one million tons of heavy fuel oil as a reward for a series of steps to shut down and disable its key nuclear facilities. South Korea is responsible for the first shipment of 50,000 tons.

In late June, working-level officials from the two Koreas agreed on the shipping arrangements. The South Korean portion of the aid should be sent within two weeks. The remaining 950,000 tons, to be split equally between the five parties involved in the six-way talks, will be given when the North takes further steps to disarm.

The cost of the aid is to be shouldered equally by the other nations in the six-party talks. But Japan has vowed not to provide any assistance to the North until the decades-old issue of Japanese citizens abducted by Pyongyang is resolved.

Implementation of the February deal had been delayed pending resolution of a banking dispute over US$25 million of the North’s funds that were frozen in a Macau bank. The issue was resolved in June after the money was transferred to Pyongyang with the help of the U.S. and Russian central banks.