Archive for the ‘International Aid’ Category

Asahi Shimbun: China provided North Korea with substantial amounts of food and fertilizer this year

Wednesday, November 4th, 2020

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

In a piece of news that should surprise no one, Asahi Shimbun reports that South Korean government sources say China provided North Korea with 5-600,000 tons of food aid and fertilizer this year. Although it wouldn’t entirely make up for the estimated shortfall, it is still a highly significant contribution:

But several South Korean government sources said China has provided North Korea with between 500,000 and 600,000 tons of food along with the fertilizer this year.

It also sent about 600,000 tons of corn and other types of grain between June and August, according to Chinese sources with inside knowledge of ties with North Korea.

Pyongyang requested more assistance in the aftermath of the summer typhoon damage and Beijing is considering sending an additional 200,000 tons of food, the sources said.

The South Korean sources focused on the volume of fertilizer shipped to North Korea as such assistance is considered highly unusual.

North Korean authorities equate one ton of fertilizer to 10 tons of food assistance, a former high-ranking North Korean government official said.

“Due to chronic shortages, fertilizer is highly prized in North Korea,” the official added. “The amount sent this year is equivalent to 5.5 million tons of food, which exceeds the yearly production of food. It was a very unusual level of assistance.”

Although North Korea is no longer in the grips of famine that raged in the late 1990s and claimed countless lives, the U.N. World Food Program has estimated that between 2018 and 2019 about 10 million North Koreans did not have enough to eat.

The situation is believed to be worse this year.

North Korea was plagued by flooding and other damage due to typhoons and torrential rain in summer after near-drought conditions in spring.

A source at a Chinese government-affiliated agency who is well-versed in issues involving North Korean agriculture said that the harvest estimate at planting time was between 3.5 million and 3.8 million tons for a shortfall of about 1.5 million tons.

Rice prices were kept stable through the release of grain stockpiled for emergencies, but the situation without China’s assistance was expected to be dire from next spring.

China’s decision to bail out its unpredictable neighbor may reflect a strategy to keep North Korea in its corner as Beijing’s confrontation with Washington worsens. In this regard, Beijing made a big fuss of its involvement in joining fighting in the Korean War on the 70th anniversary of China’s participation.

“China and North Korea have always shared interests in terms of their view of the United States, but that has strengthened recently,” said a North Korean source. “China is sending a message to the United States through its appeal of a honeymoon period with North Korea.”

With no signs of progress in denuclearization talks with the United States, the easing of economic sanctions against North Korea appears unlikely in the short term.

That suggests North Korea will continue to lean on China for support, analysts said.

“If North Korea receives support from abroad, it will no longer be able to say it is getting by with its own efforts,” said a South Korean expert on the North Korean economy. “But North Korea can continue to save face because China does not announce the assistance levels.”

(Article source: Takeshi Kamiya in Seoul and Yoshikazu Hirai in Shenyang, “China bailout to North Korea: massive food and fertilizer aid,” Asahi Shimbun, November 3rd, 2020.)

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North Korea’s disaster management: a comment about a comment

Wednesday, November 4th, 2020

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

It might seem a strange topic to post about on the day after the US elections, but perhaps some readers might like a break from the incessant commentary for something completely different.

If so, I highly recommend the article that former ambassador James Hoare published yesterday on 38 North, partially as a comment to my earlier article about North Korean disaster management. Ambassador Hoare gives a highly interesting historical perspective partially based on his own experiences in the country, noting that deforestation is a problem on the Korean peninsula much older than North Korea itself. He also notes that North Korea is far from the only country where homes constructed near riverbeds are regularly flooded, and argues that North Korea’s flooding problems are, after all, not so unusual in an international context.

I fully agree with all of these points, and the historical context is very valuable and crucial for understanding the current situation. If anything, there are perhaps two points of minor disagreement that I have with Hoare’s text.

First, the current North Korean situation is in large part a result of changes that could have been avoided. Deforestation was acutely exacerbated during the Arduous March, because people had few other alternatives than to cut down trees for firewood and to clear the ground for farming. Deforestation and flooding, therefore, are not phenomena entirely endemic or “natural” neither to the Korean peninsula nor to North Korea in particular, because things were not always this way. There is nothing natural or inherently necessary about North Korea’s economic system, as the many former communist states who have adopted programs of systemic overhaul have shown. Natural disasters may be natural, but each state has a choice in how to meet them.

Second, ambassador Hoare rightly points out that one should perhaps applaud the progress being made rather than to note that improvements have a long way to go. My article neither sought to decry nor applaud any improvements, but simply to show where things stand, based partially on conversations with several people who have themselves worked in natural disaster mitigation in the country.

And despite the improvements that have been made, there is a real and substantive risks that North Korea’s disaster management improvement plans and ambitions will stop at being just that. In this realm, there should be little doubt that the government’s ambitions are high and praiseworthy. The problem is that we have seen too many examples of ambitions without implementation to conclude that they will in fact be realized. Oftentimes, the policy process, opaque as it is, often appears to stall, and political interest and attention may wane. In this, too, North Korea is not alone in the world.

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North Korea’s summer floods, 2020

Monday, August 17th, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Flooding has been sweeping across North Korea for the past few weeks. As has been usual for the past few years, state media has been very forthcoming in reporting the damage. At least partially, one might suspect this forthrightness is directed to an international audience, not least in China, to signal that North Korea hopes for aid. (Quietly, of course, behind the scenes, because officially, the country doesn’t want it.)

First and foremost, however, the target audience is – as usual – domestic, and the state seeks to reassure the people that the leadership is always watching out for them. Here’s the Rodong coverage of Kim Jong-un’s trip to a flood-damaged area:

Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, inspected Taechong-ri Area of Unpha County, North Hwanghae Province hit by flood.

Due to several consecutive days of torrential rain and rainstorm recently caused by the seasonal rainy front, the waterway levee gave way in the area of Taechong-ri of Unpha County, leaving more than 730 single-floored houses and 600-odd hectares of rice field inundated and 179 blocks of dwelling houses destroyed.

After hearing the report on the situation of the Taechong-ri area of Unpha County where lots of dwelling houses and a large area of arable land were submerged, the Supreme Leader personally went to the spot to learn about the situation and clarified tasks and ways in detail for the recovery of the damaged area.

Saying that he was really relieved to learn that there was no casualty as all the residents of Unpha County were evacuated to the safe area in advance, he called on leading organs in the county including Party and power organs, working people’s organizations and public security organs to responsibly conduct the work of putting up the residents who lost their homes at offices including those at the Party committee and people’s committee of the county, public buildings and separate houses, to stabilize their living and comfort them.

He ordered the relevant field to submit a document on supplying every household in the afflicted area with the reserve food grain of the chairman of the State Affairs Commission.

It is of priority importance to quickly supply sleeping materials, daily commodities, medicines and other necessities to the flood-affected people to stabilize their living as early as possible, he said, entrusting this task entirely to the departments of the Party Central Committee and families of its officials.

He gave an order to organize the flood damage rehabilitation headquarters with cadres of the relevant departments of the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, and instructed the headquarters to report to him after correctly calculating the materials and forces needed for the rehabilitation, while sizing up the flood damage on the spot for starters.

The central designing force should be sent to newly build 800 model houses in the farm village of Unpha County hit by the flood and the project be completed at an earliest date possible and on the highest level, he said.

Saying he decided to mobilize the people’s army for the rehabilitation again, he ordered the people’s army to form a necessary force and urgently deploy it and to give precedence to the arrangement of the wrecked houses, roads and the zones with the people of the county.

Stressing the importance to take measures to ensure materials such as cement necessary for the rehabilitation, he gave an instruction to use the strategic reserve supplies of the chairman of the State Affairs Commission to meet the calculated amount.

He appealed to the Cabinet, the State Planning Commission, ministries and national institutions to actively cooperate in the rehabilitation of the flood-hit Unpha County, well aware of the Party’s intention.

(Source: Political News Team, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Inspects Flood-Damaged Area in North Hwanghae Province,” Rodong Sinmun, August 7th, 2020.) 

Indeed, damage has been quite bad, as Washington Post reports here, but it’s not clear as of yet how it will add up in comparison with previous years:

The International Federation of the Red Cross said the floods have left at least 22 people dead and four missing, citing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Red Cross and the country’s State Committee for Emergency and Disaster Management.

The disaster adds to a troubling humanitarian situation in North Korea, whose weak economy has been further battered by the coronavirus pandemic.

The official Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) said at least 16,680 houses and 630 public buildings have been destroyed or flooded during the monsoon, with nearly 100,000 acres of crops damaged and many roads, bridges and railway tracks broken. A dam at a power station also gave way, it said.

(Source: Simon Denyer, “North Korea floods kill 22, approach nuclear reactor — but Kim doesn’t want help,” Washington Post, August 14th, 2020.)

Daily NK cites internal documents claiming that over 40 percent of terraced corn fields in North Hamgyong have flooded away. They also report, unsurprisingly, that the county visited by Kim personally is getting a disproportionate amount of attention and help:

Monsoon rains and strong winds have led to substantial damage in the grain-producing regions of North Korea’s west coast, leading to predictions that the country will face a poor harvest this year, Daily NK has learned.

“North Hamgyong Province is the center of the country’s corn production, but an [internal] statistical report on Aug. 3 said that 42% of terraced cornfields and farmland near rivers had been either washed away or flooded,” a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Monday. “The report did not include data about farms tilled by individual farmers. Including those farms would mean that the actual damage [to farmland] is even greater.”

Regarding the situation in nearby South Hamgyong Province, the source told Daily NK that “South Hamgyong Province is the home of rice [production], but midway through the monsoon season approximately 30% of farmland has already been flooded.”

According to the source, the harvest this year in the region was actually better than last year until the start of the monsoon season. He pointed out, however, that “rice plants became inundated with water just as they were being fertilized, so there is talk that farmers will barely be able to meet the government’s autumn quota for military rice [rice going to the military].”

Farms in the coastal areas of South Pyongan Province have also suffered from flooding and crop damage, a source in the region said.

“There has been substantial damage to crops, with monsoon rains flooding fields in several areas near the central west coast and strong winds blowing over corn plants that were just beginning to mature,” the source said. “Farmland stretching across thousands of jongbo in Jungsan and Pyongwon have been damaged by salt water, which means we can’t expect normal harvest levels this year.”

One jongbo is equivalent to around 9,917 square meters.

Areas near Nampo, including Onchon and Gangso, were hit by monsoon rains and strong gales that felled telephone poles and roadside trees, according to the source, who also reported that dozens of farm houses have collapsed and their now-homeless former occupants have been evacuated to other structures on farms, including cultural halls and rooms used by work units.

RAPID CLEAN UP EFFORTS IN UNPA COUNTY

After North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited North Hamgyong Province’s Unpa County to see the devastation wrought by a dyke that burst open, efforts to cleanup the damage are rapidly underway, a source in the area told Daily NK.

“The Supreme Leader came to inspect [the damage] in Unpa County personally, and the province has dispatched a storm trooper contingent made up of 300 party members along with another storm trooper unit made up of around 500 Kimsungilist-Kimjongilist Youth League members,” the source said.

“The authorities have also mobilized workers from various businesses in the province while [Unpa County] farmers, along with village and district-level inminban [North Korea’s lowest administrative unit], are working to process barren soil, build embankments, restore farmland and repair people’s homes,” he added.

People who have lost their homes in the area have been housed in cultural halls, guest houses, local inns or the houses of friends; however, county authorities have forced many to engage in the cleanup efforts, according to the source.

The military has mobilized soldiers to the area, including 280 soldiers selected from units under the “August 15 Training Center” along with two battalions from the 25th Brigade under Bureau 7 (a military engineers unit). The battalions have reportedly brought along mechanized equipment for the cleanup efforts. The soldiers have set up waterproof tents and are living in the area while cleaning up the damage.

On Aug. 7, Rodong Sinmun and other state-run media reported that Kim Jong Un visited Unpa County and ordered the construction of a new farming village to accommodate 800 families, as well as the release of grain reserves and emergency supplies for victims and those performing relief work.

The source confirmed that the authorities had ordered the completion of housing blocks accommodating two families each by Nov. 10.

“Military units along with the storm trooper units made up of provincial party members and members of the Youth League will build the houses,” the source said. “Overall responsibility for the project is held by both the Cabinet’s vice premier and the North Hwanghae Province Party Committee Director, and progress reports will be sent to the Supreme Leader.”

AN UNPA COUNTY-FOCUSED RELIEF EFFORT

North Korea is also holding a nationwide campaign to raise funds for the relief work and the construction of new houses in Unpa County, according to the source.

“Even though the damage [by the monsoon rains] is not limited to Unpa County, inminban around the country have been told that they must offer assistance to the area by sending support packages for affected residents and soldiers engaged in construction work by Aug. 13,” the source told Daily NK.

While the required contribution differs by region, the figure is believed to be KPW 20,000 for each household in Pyongyang’s Mangyongdae District and KPW 10,000 or 2.5 kilograms of rice for each family in Kaechon, South Pyongan Province. Families in Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province, have been told to either contribute KPW 15,000 per household or provide labor in lieu of a monetary payment.

On Monday, Korea Central News Agency and other state-run media reported that vehicles carrying the reserve grain sent by Kim Jong Un had arrived in Unpa County. The article was accompanied by photos of residents welcoming the delivery.

“This [kind of delivery] happened once before during the General [Kim Jong Il]’s reign, but people were deeply moved because it is the first time they have been provided with such a gift under Kim Jong Un,” the source said, adding, “Those in other regions are envious.”

(Source: Ha Yoon Ah, “N. Korea moves to cleanup monsoon damage across grain-producing regions,” Daily NK, August 12th, 2020.)

Resources for relief efforts are scarce. As Radio Free Asia reports here (in Korean), enterprises as well as private citizens are being ordered to contribute.

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Did North Korea really see its best harvest “on record last year?

Friday, January 17th, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

As I and Peter Ward discovered some weeks ago, the claim by Kim Jong-un that North Korea had its “best harvest on record” did not make it into the English-language summary of Kim’s plenum speech put out by KCNA. Several media outlets have picked up on this claim, and that is not surprising. Not even a year ago, last spring and summer, both the North Korean government and UN organs sounded the alarm bells that North Korea’s harvest was so disastrous as to suggest a famine might be looming.

So what happened?

First of all, it should be noted, as always, that one must be extremely cautious in studying data on anything related to the North Korean economy. Most people who follow North Korea are well aware of this but especially when it comes to an issue like this, one cannot be cautious enough.

I focus here on the claim by Kim that the harvest was the best “on record”. It may well have been a good harvest, or at least a much better one than anticipated. This seems to be the case. The only attempt I’ve seen at a numerical estimate comes from South Korea’s Rural Development Administration. They estimate that North Korea’s harvest grew by around two percent in 2019 over 2018. This sounds fairly plausible and could perhaps be explained by weather conditions unexpectedly improving, or fertilizer donations from China, and the like. Or the government and FAO’s projections were simply wrong from the beginning.

To understand why it is so unlikely that this year’s harvest would be the best on record, we have to look at what ‘the record” really says. The following graph shows North Korean harvest figures between 1990 and 2017, as recorded by the FAO. These figures are not independently recorded or verified but, to the best of my knowledge, generated by FAO in cooperation with the North Korean government, or provided directly by the government. Usually, that would be a problem, but here, it’s actually quite helpful since it helps us analyze the claim about the “record”.

Graph by NK Econ Watch/Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein. Data source: FAOSTAT.

I downloaded these numbers from the FAO database some months ago. For whatever reason, I’m unable to access the data at their website at this time of writing, and therefore, can’t fill in the data further back. This data also differs somewhat from other data on North Korean harvests from the World Food Program and FAO. Still, they match quite closely with other data the two organizations have published in recent years about North Korean food production. Again, keep in mind that this data is produced and published in concert with the North Korean government. In that sense, these numbers are the “record”.

Over the past few years, estimated harvests have gravitated between four and five million tons in milled rice equivalent.  (You can read more here about what that actually means.) In 1993, North Korea’s record of harvests notes 7.5 million tons. Harvests hovered around 8 million tons in the 1980s – again, to the best of my recollection, as I can’t access the FAO statistics database numbers of North Korea at this time of writing.

Graph by NK Econ Watch/Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein. Data source: WFP/FAO. 2019 is a projected figure.

For Kim’s claim to be true, therefore, this past year’s harvest would have had to go from around five million tons in 2018, to surpassing eight million tons in 2019. I am no agricultural economist, but Kim would likely need something like a miracle of nature for this to happen. I am not aware of North Korea’s landmass suddenly doubling, for example, or the amount of arable land increasing by one third overnight. Therefore, Kim’s claim is most likely, beyond reasonable doubt, simply not true. Note also that outlets such as Daily NK have reported that the government has taken predatory measures against grain trade as a result of what the outlet describes as “poor agricultural yields”.

In other words, there is very little to back up the claim made by Kim (and subsequently by North Korea-affiliated Choson Sinbo). This claim is a break with a pattern over the past few years, where North Korean media has been very frank – often, probably exaggerating – in describing difficulties and damage caused by flooding and inclement weather. There are several reasons why this may have changed with regards to the harvest. For one, food security a very basic need for any country. With bad food security, North Korea appears weak in the face of sanctions. It would hardly be the first time the North Korean government lied for strategic, propaganda purposes. It is also possible that harvests were much better than anticipated, and that Kim’s claim is merely a strong exaggeration. Perhaps “best on record” should be read as a superlative, rhetorical claim rather than a literal one. At the end of the day, we simply don’t know, and the ways of the inefficient North Korean bureaucracy are mysterious.

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Seoul wires $8 million to North Korea in humanitarian aid

Tuesday, June 11th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Note: this is not a lot of money in context. It covers only a small part of what WFP and others estimate as the funding need.

Yonhap:

South Korea on Tuesday sent a pledged donation of US$8 million to U.N. agencies to support their efforts to provide assistance to North Korean women and children in need, the unification ministry said.

Last week, the Seoul government endorsed the donation plan for the World Food Programme (WFP) and the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for their projects to support the nutrition of children and pregnant women in North Korea and address their health problems.

Of the total, $4.5 million was allocated to the WFP and the remainder to UNICEF.

The money was remitted to the agencies Tuesday afternoon, according to the unification ministry.

A ministry official said earlier in the day that it will take more time before the money will be actually spent on the agencies’ projects in North Korea, adding that they are working on reducing the time before its implementation in consideration of the urgent need of many North Korean people.

Article source:
Seoul wires promised money to U.N. agencies for N.K. projects
Yonhap News
2019-06-11

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North Korean media reports drought impacts on rice harvest

Wednesday, June 5th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Yonhap:

North Korean state media highlighted worsening water shortages in one of the country’s major rice-producing regions on Wednesday, raising worries about possible harm to this year’s harvest.

“Not a few areas in the South Hwanghae Province are now facing serious water shortage caused by a combination of various factors,” the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the North’s ruling party, said in an article.

The paper said that the water reservoirs in some areas of the province are falling below normal levels, making it hard for farmers to plant rice in their paddies as scheduled.

The North’s official Korean Central News Agency also reported that the drought is hindering rice-planting efforts in South Hwanghae Province, expecting that precipitation will likely stay low until mid-June.

Hwanghae Province is known as one of the largest rice-producing areas for North Korea. The apparently ongoing drought in North Korea is feared to aggravate the already strained food supply in the impoverished state.

Article source:
N. Korean media highlight drought in major rice-producing province
Yonhap News
2019-06-05

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Famine, Amartya Sen, and the Markets of North Korea

Monday, May 20th, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The market factor in North Korea’s current food crisis* sometimes seems unclear. Some have talked about the market compensating for what the state doesn’t provide in the event of a food shortage. But the WFP’s methodology should cover for that. They don’t only calculate collective farms yields specifically, but arable land and production in general. Their estimates may (it’s not entirely clear) be based on data for total farmland available provided by the state, and there are some types of plots that wouldn’t be covered in that case. But WFP uses satellite imagery to verify official information on production figures (see p. 5 of their rapid food security assessment for North Korea).

We don’t know how big a proportion of the total amount of food produced in North Korea is sold on the markets, and how much is distributed through state and semi-state channels such as enterprises and factories, which are sometimes partially operated privately. In any case, when they measure total harvests, this likely, at the very least, includes most sources for the food that’s sold on markets. So a drop in total production still means lower market supply.

So why are markets still so important to understand food security, and why is it a problem that WFP cannot access them freely? Rest assured, this is not for a lack of trying. From pp. 6–8 (my emphasis added):

The assessment team also experienced challenges in accessing markets and acquiring market-related data. However, the team was not able to visit farmers’ markets during the field visit. While authorization was granted at national level to visit farmer’s markets, county authorities informed that they were not able to receive any foreign delegation on the day. Market visits are highly recommended to fill this information gap in future assessments. Finally, the team could only gather limited information on people’s incomes and expenditures during the household surveys.

Again, WFP’s conclusions are still highly relevant and meaningful. But as they themselves recognize, markets are crucial for understanding the microeconomic conditions on the ground in North Korea.

The most important reason, perhaps, is that distribution of food is just as important as food production for food security. As Amartya Sen has shown, food security is often more about who has an “entitlement” to food than about precisely how much food is around. This is where North Korea’s markets come in. Total production is an important metric to be sure, but to really understand how food is distributed, and who gets to eat, we have to also understand precisely how the markets work. We need to understand who uses them and how much they’re able to buy. Prices tell us something about overall supply (though as I have argued, probably not the full story).

Especially in a country like North Korea, where access to food and sustenance is a political matter, distribution (or entitlements) is more than total food production for food security. The markets are a crucial mechanism for distribution in North Korea. As long as WFP isn’t allowed to survey them, and to do more extensive household surveys freely in the country, we won’t truly know what food security looks like.

 

*We still don’t know that there is a crisis at hand, although the food situation appears very poor.

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Food crisis looming in South Pyongan, according to Daily NK

Thursday, May 16th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Following the recent publication of a UN report stating that North Korea’s food situation is critical and is set to worsen, sources in the country say that efforts for agricultural preparation are facing obstacles in some regional areas.

The DPRK Rapid Food Security Assessment was published by the World Food Program and Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations on May 3, and expressed concern that North Korea could face severe food shortages within the next ten years due to climate change, sanctions and other issues.

“May is the most important month because it is the period that determines whether the year’s harvest will end in success or failure. There’s a lack of workers for planting and this has led to alarm amongst officials,”a South Pyongan Province-based source told Daily NK. “Officials in the major west coast farming areas of Pyongwon, Sukchon and Mundok are concerned about labor shortages.”

North Korea conducts national agricultural support campaigns every spring and mobilizes students, office workers and housewives into the fields. This year, however, the country is facing a labor shortage of more than 50%, according to the source.

“Mobilization orders state that people have to prepare their own food to eat out in the fields,” he said. “Concerns have been raised that there’s a lot of people who can’t do that because there’s no food.”

The North Korean authorities are emphasizing the need to increase rice production and the importance of agriculture through state-run media as the planting season begins, but mobilizing workers into the fields will be difficult due to the country’s poor economic situation.

Concerns have also been raised that laborers will refuse to work in the fields because they are already involved in manure collection activities, construction projects and other labor-intensive work for the state.

Daily NK recently reported that even one of Kim Jong Un’s banner projects, the Samjiyon modernization effort, is facing labor-related difficulties.

The authorities have even created “emergency measures committees” to identify ways to forcibly mobilize residents onto the fields.

“Labor departments in provincial agriculture business committees have formed emergency measures committees to deal with the lack of workers recruited from factories and schools,” said a separate source in South Pyongan Province. “Schools and factories are being investigated and will face legal action if they fail to provide the proper quotas of labor.”

Some parts of the country are faced with issues in agricultural planting stemming from insufficient supplies of farming materials and fertilizer.

“Farmers should have ensured the soil didn’t freeze by creating special seedbeds and covering them with vinyl film. They failed to do so because there was a lack of vinyl film available this year and seeds didn’t grow properly because of the cold,” she said, adding that “they also lacked manure and fertilizer.”

Source:
South Pyongan Province faces severe food security crisis
Mun Dong Hui
Daily NK
2019-05-16

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Washington Post on sanctions and North Korea’s food crisis

Wednesday, May 8th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A few interesting snippets from this Washington Post report:

Analysts say there is no doubt that the ultimate blame for the humanitarian crisis rests with Pyongyang, which has spent hugely on nuclear advances and other military projects while neglecting the welfare of ordinary citizens.

[…]

“Other than the most basic of subsistence agriculture, there is no agricultural sector in the world that can survive without oil-based inputs,” said Hazel Smith, a professor in Korean studies at the SOAS University of London.

Smith argues North Korea can feed its citizens only if it can access oil and natural gas — to fuel farm machinery, power processing and storage facilities, used in irrigation and to transport crops and food.

United Nations report issued Friday showed more than 10 million people do not have enough food to last until the next harvest. Last year’s crop was the worst in a decade, it said, and was buffeted by dry spells, heat waves and flooding.

But it also found that “limited supplies of agricultural inputs, such as fuel, fertilizer and spare parts have had significant adverse impact.”

The Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program spelled out “the unintended impact of sanctions on agricultural production,” most obviously “the importation of certain items that are necessary for agricultural production.”

Article source:

North Korea is facing a food crisis. ‘Maximum pressure’ by the U.S. may make it worse.
Simon Denyer
Washington Post
2019-05-08

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North Korea’s harvest numbers: what “food production” really means

Monday, March 11th, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

I wrote about the confusing harvest numbers this past Friday, and I’ve been able to find little new information to make things clearer. Basically, the problem is that talking about “food production” is too vague, since that can mean a lot of different things. In the standard World Food Program/FAO crop assessments, there are usually two numbers quoted: one estimate for total production of food,  and one for “milled cereal equivalent”, a standardized measurement used to translate the varying nutritional contents of different crops into a standardized weight measure.* (See below for a more detailed explanation.) Basically, the “milled cereal equivalent” figure tends to be significantly smaller, by about 20 percent or so, than the original, total food production figure.

Since we don’t actually know exactly which number is being thrown around in analyses of the current harvest, I’ve calculated a possible milled-equivalent harvest figure, using the average difference between milled and unmilled for the years where I have the two different numbers from the WFP/FAO crop assessments. None of the historical estimates I’ve found correspond with the harvest numbers for previous years in the 2019 UN Needs and Priorities Plan. Crop production figures are usually given in terms of “marketing years”, not in calendar years. For simplicity’s sake, I denote each year by the second half of the marketing year, when most consumption will occur. So “2019” is the 2018/2019 marketing year, “2018” is the 2017/2018 marketing year, et cetera.

The following shows the scenario where the 4.95 million tonnes production figure is the “unmilled” cereal equivalent measure. Based on the average difference between milled and unmilled for the years where I’ve had data available from UN institutions (0.85 million tonnes), I’ve added and subtracted to complete the figures where necessary. This is not an exact, scientific way of looking at the harvest numbers. For exact accuracy, I’d need to calculate the milled cereal equivalent of each crop, something I don’t have time to do right now. This may well make the figure even lower. (Hazel Smith’s figure, for reference, is 3.2 million tonnes.) But the following does, at the very least, give a sense of the proportions at hand. And it makes the numbers look different from my initial assessment.

Food production, million tonnes (unmilled) Food production, million tonnes (milled)
2009.00 4.20 3.30
2010.00 5.17 4.32
2011.00 5.33 4.50
2012.00 5.50 4.66
2013.00 5.80 4.90
2014.00 5.98 5.03
2015.00 5.93 5.08
2016.00 5.92 5.07
2017.00 6.03 5.23
2018.00 5.75 5.00
2019.00 4.95 4.10

Table 1. Figures are sourced from various assessments by the WFP and FAO; contact me for exact sourcing on specific figures. 

Graphically, the trend in food production in milled terms, i.e. the lower-end, more realistic figure of how much food is available for consumption, using the above assumption for the 2019-figure, looks like this:

Graph 1. Estimate food production in North Korea, million tonnes, in milled cereal equivalent terms.

In short, this does give a rather grim and highly problematic food situation, putting the quantity of the harvest at 4.10 million tonnes. It puts North Korea back to a state of food production prior to 2010–2011, when harvest started to climb. And now, North Korea receives far less aid than it did a decade ago. Plus, its imports will only amount to 200,000 tons, the government seems to be saying, a similar amount to what it procured in imports and humanitarian aid in 2016/2017, when the harvest was much larger.

For long, this is how low North Korean harvests were. Only a few years ago, this would have looked like a rather solid harvest. Looking back in the future, it might turn out that the past few years of food production growth, since around 2011, was an abnormally good period of time. None of this means that this food situation is anything but poor.

To me, among the figures I’ve been able to find, it’s the only one that make sense in the context of the statement from UN representatives that this harvest was the worst “in a decade”. Hopefully things will become clearer over the coming days and weeks, as more information may be published, in which case I’ll update this post.

In sum, the actual food available in North Korea is, in all likelihood, much lower than the 4.95 million tonnes-figure quoted by the UN and the North Korean government. As the following graph shows, even using the North Korean government’s figures, the drop from last year doesn’t appear all that massive. But on closer inspection, the actual quantity of food available may be significantly lower than the figure the North Korean government states, as I’ve tried to show in this post.

Graph 2. Food production in North Korea, from the UN’s “2019 Needs and Priorities” report on North Korea.

Finally, a note on the issue of the markets and the public distribution system. I maintain that it’s impossible to get a sense of total food availability and circulation in North Korea as a whole, without taking the markets into account. According to most studies we have, the majority of North Korea’s population rely on these markets, rather than the public distribution system, for their sustenance.

But one has to acknowledge that just like the UN and North Korean government figures may not reflect the whole situation accurately, there may be a fair bit of bias in the data on the prevalence of the markets too. Most of this data comes from surveys done with defectors in South Korea. They overwhelmingly tend to come from the northern provinces of the country, closer to China, where market trade has traditionally been more prolific. Most sources for news from inside North Korea are based in the northern parts of the country, where one can get access to Chinese cell phone network coverage.

There’s likely another form of bias present in these surveys, too. Most people who are reliant on the PDS for their sustenance are likely underrepresented among defectors. People in state administration and security organs, for example, are less likely to leave North Korea, though that of course happens too. And in any case, we’re talking about a quite large demographic of people, whose livelihoods would be significantly impacted by cut rations. Such cuts are already happening, Daily NK reports, with some professional groups receiving only 60 percent of  what they otherwise would. The PDS may have changed shape and function quite drastically since the early 2000s, but it may also be more important to the North Korean public than the currently available survey data and reports from inside the country tells us.

Conclusion

North Korea’s food situation, though not at famine-time levels, does appear to be dire. The figures, in combination with reports from inside the country, gives serious cause for concern. Government numbers may not tell the full story since they likely underestimate the role of the markets. Nonetheless, things do look serious. The government could easily alleviate the situation by changing its spending priorities and policies. Chances are that it won’t.

Footnote:

*I’m borrowing here a footnote from a 38 North piece by the late scholar Randall Ireson, whose archive of articles remain one of the best sources for information on North Korean agriculture:

The FAO has consistently used grain equivalent (GE) values for the major crops to compensate for varying moisture and energy content. Thus, husked rice (GE) is .66 of the paddy weight, potatoes (GE) are .25 of the fresh weight, and soybean (GE) is 1.2 times the dry weight because of the high oil and thus calorie content.

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