North Korean Economy Watch

Choson Ilbo
3/10/2010

Curbing North Korea’s illicit arms trade is difficult since the renegade country launders containers carrying weapons three or four times, a defector who was in charge of illicit arms deals told the Chosun Ilbo on Monday.

The defector revealed that a factory in Jagang Province, which is believed to produce tractors, is the center of the communist country’s weapons production, including chemical warheads. The defector, who is under police protection, did not want his identity to be revealed fearing reprisal attacks against family members still in the North.

Foreign Forwarders Transport Weapons
Five departments of the North Korean government are involved in arms exports: the military arms production wing of the Workers’ Party, the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, the Surveillance Division of the People’s Armed Forces, Operational Department of the Workers’ Party and the Second Economic Committee. He said the Economic Committee, which is directly under the control of the powerful National Defense Commission, is the biggest.

The military arms production wing procures materials for the Yongbyon nuclear plant and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. “The General Bureau of Atomic Energy only produces yellow cake [the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment], while the arms production wing is in charge of the Yongbyon facility,” the defector said. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences exports missiles and also provides after-sales service for exported products by upgrading performance and exchanging components.

“The main client is the research center of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, while experiments are conducted in unison,” he said. Iran successfully test-fired a rocket on Feb. 3 which is believed to have been powered by the same engine as North Korean Rodong missiles.

But international sanctions against North Korea make it difficult to export weapons by conventional means. “This is where the Surveillance Division of the People’s Armed Forces comes in,” the defector said. Its “traders,” who studied at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, are fluent in English and Chinese and sign deals with “forwarders” from other countries. Through this process, North Korea sends containers across the Apnok (or Yalu) River to China one third or half filled with weapons. “The forwarder who received this cargo enters a port in a third country, where the containers are filled with freight unrelated to weapons and the paperwork is completed,” he said.

These “laundered” containers are laundered again in Hong Kong, Singapore or other ports. “The containers are mixed with other cargo in those transit points. They are searched, but not thoroughly,” the defector added. “Even if customs or other officials roll their sleeves up and search for weapons, how can they possibly find the arms among the mountains of other containers headed to other countries?”

‘Tractor Factory’ Is Weapons Production Base
North Korea’s main weapons production base is Kanggye General Tractor Plant No. 26. Before the Korean War, the plant was based in Pyongyang and made Soviet-designed PPSh 41 submachine guns but has since been relocated. Over 10,000 workers there manufacture ammunition and even chemical weapons. The People’s Armed Forces is in charge of chemical weapons production. “The Bio-chemical research center affiliated with the military is located next to the Kanggye plant,” the defector said. “The toxic gases produced at the research center are loaded onto warheads manufactured at the plant.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il makes a point of visiting the factory two to three times a year. He last paid a visit on Dec. 9, 2009.

AK-47 Rifles and Ammunition Are Top Sellers
“Small arms ammunition are hot export items and the Second Economic Committee even built a factory in Ethiopia,” the defector said. The rugged AK-47s, which can operate flawlessly even in the sand-filled battlefields of the Middle East, are extremely popular, he said.

Anti-tank missiles are more complicated to manufacture, so the blueprints are in Russia, while North Korean factories are merely subcontractors. North Korean arms are believed to be exported to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines. “North Korean weapons with engines [such as tanks] are extremely poor quality, but those carrying warheads are not bad,” the defector said. Around 20 percent of the parts used to make export versions of missiles are imported. But missiles for domestic use are made using mostly North Korean-made parts, so there is a difference in performance. “North Korea tried to import Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Taiwan,” he added. “This probably has something to do with the South Korean Navy’s use of the Harpoon missiles.”

Dear Choson Ilbo: We have very good satellite imagery of Kanggye. Please tell us where the Kanggye General Tractor Plant is!  Here are three guesses as to where the plant is: guess 1, guess 2, guess 3.  Kim Jong Il has a villa in Kanggye here.  Here is his private train station near Kanggye.

According to the Washington Post:

The Obama administration, concerned that Burma is expanding its military relationship with North Korea, has launched an aggressive campaign to persuade Burma’s junta to stop buying North Korean military technology, U.S. officials said.

Concerns about the relationship — which encompass the sale of small arms, missile components and technology possibly related to nuclear weapons — in part prompted the Obama administration in October to end the George W. Bush-era policy of isolating the military junta, said a senior State Department official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

Senior U.S. officials have since had four meetings with their Burmese counterparts, with a fifth expected soon. “Our most decisive interactions have been around North Korea,” the official said. “We’ve been very clear to Burma. We’ll see over time if it’s been heard.”

…

Underlining the administration’s concerns about Burma is a desire to avoid a repeat of events that unfolded in Syria in 2007. North Korea is thought to have helped Syria secretly build a nuclear reactor there capable of producing plutonium. The facility was reportedly only weeks or months away from being functional when Israeli warplanes bombed it in September of that year.

“The lesson here is the Syrian one,” said David Albright, president of the nongovernmental Institute for Science and International Security and an expert on nuclear proliferation. “That was such a massive intelligence failure. You can’t be sure that North Korea isn’t doing it someplace else. The U.S. government can’t afford to be blindsided again.”

Burma is thought to have started a military relationship with North Korea in 2007. But with the passage of a U.N. Security Council resolution last June banning all weapons exports from North Korea, Burma has emerged “as a much bigger player than it was,” the senior U.S. official said.

In a report Albright co-wrote in January, titled “Burma: A Nuclear Wannabe,” he outlined the case for concern about Burma’s relations with North Korea. First, Burma has signed a deal with Russia for the supply of a 10-megawatt thermal research reactor, although construction of the facility had not started as of September.

Second, although many claims from dissident groups about covert nuclear sites in Burma are still unverified, the report said that “there remain legitimate reasons to suspect the existence of undeclared nuclear activities in Burma, particularly in the context of North Korean cooperation.”

Previous posts about the Myanmar-DPRK relationship can be found here. 

Read the full story here:
U.S. increasingly wary as Burma deepens military relationship with North Korea
Washington Post
John Pomfret
3/4/2010

The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is an annual report by the Department of State to Congress prepared in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act. It describes the efforts of key countries to attack all aspects of the international drug trade in Calendar Year 2009. Volume I (PDF) covers drug and chemical control activities, and beginning on page 488, there is a profile on the DPRK:

North Korea

I. Summary
There is insufficient evidence to say with certainty that state-sponsored trafficking by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has stopped entirely in 2009. Nonetheless, the paucity of public reports of drug trafficking with a direct DPRK connection suggests strongly that such high-profile drug trafficking has either ceased, or has been reduced very sharply. Trafficking of methamphetamine along the DPRK-China border continues. There are indications that international drug traffickers can purchase methamphetamine in kilogram quantities in some of the major towns on the Chinese side of the DPRK-China border. Other criminality involving DPRK territory, such as counterfeit cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting/passing of U.S. currency (supernotes), continues.

II. Status of Country
No confirmed instances of large-scale drug trafficking involving the DPRK state or its nationals were reported in 2009. This is the seventh consecutive year that there were no known instances of large-scale methamphetamine or heroin trafficking to either Japan or Taiwan with direct DPRK state institution involvement. From the mid- 1990s through to 2002/2003, numerous instances of narcotics trafficking involving DPRK persons and important state assets, such as sea-going vessels and military patrol boats, were recorded in Taiwan and Japan.

Press reporting suggests that methamphetamine trafficking along the DPRK-China border continues. These reports detail the activities of organized criminal groups arranging methamphetamine shipments to destinations in Asia from the major towns near the DPRK-China border (e.g., Dandong, Yanji).

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2009
Law Enforcement Efforts. The source of relatively small quantities of methamphetamine seized elsewhere in Asia can occasionally be traced back to the China-DPRK border area. Local press reports in Asia describe apprehensions of traffickers smuggling methamphetamine and indicate that arrangements to purchase that methamphetamine were made in towns near the China-DPRK border. These reports suggest that trafficking of methamphetamine continues along the China-DPRK border and they raise the question of whether or not local DPRK officials might be aware or even complicit in the drug trade. There is no clear evidence of a central role for DPRK state institutions in selling methamphetamine or organizing the trafficking of methamphetamine. Evidence of direct DPRK state involvement in drug trafficking to
Taiwan and Japan emerged regularly in the past.

Reports of non-narcotics related acts of criminality in the DPRK suggest that DPRK tolerance of criminal behavior may exist on a larger, organized scale, even if no large-scale narcotics trafficking incidents involving the state itself have come to light. Press, industry, and law enforcement reports of DPRK links to large-scale counterfeit cigarette trafficking in the North Korean Export Processing Zone at Rajiin (or Najin) continue. It is unclear the extent to which DPRK authorities are complicit in this illegal activity, although it is likely that they are aware of it, given the relatively high-profile media reports. In addition, counterfeit $100 U.S. notes called “supernotes” (because they are so difficult to detect), continue to turn up in various countries, including in the United States. There are reports, for example, of supernote seizures in San Francisco and a very large supernote seizure in Pusan, South Korea during 2008 and 2009. Supernotes are uniquely associated with the DPRK, but it is not clear if recent seizures are notes which have been circulating for some time, or if they are recently-counterfeited new notes.

Agreements and Treaties. The DPRK is a party to the 1988 United Nations (UN) Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

Cultivation/Production. For many years, it has been alleged that poppies are cultivated in the DPRK, with the opium converted into heroin and then trafficked by state organs for profit. However, it has not been possible to confirm such illicit cultivation, and there has not been a heroin trafficking incident with a DPRK connection for many years. There are also several known factories in the DPRK that could produce very pure heroin and methamphetamine drugs, and there have been cases of large-scale smuggling of pure methamphetamine drugs from the DPRK to Japan and Taiwan as recently as 2002.

IV. U.S. Initiatives and Programs
The Department of State has no evidence to support a clear finding that DPRK state narco-trafficking has either stopped or is continuing. The absence of any seizures linked directly to DPRK state institutions, especially after a period in which seizures of very large quantities of drugs regularly occurred, does suggest considerably less state trafficking, and perhaps a complete end to it.

On the other hand, press reports of continuing seizures of methamphetamine in Asia, which can be traced back to an apparent DPRK source, suggest continuing manufacture and sale of DPRK methamphetamine to criminal traffickers. Large-scale trafficking of counterfeit cigarettes from the DPRK territory also continues and suggests that enforcement against notorious organized criminality in the DPRK is lax.

It is likely that the North Korean government has sponsored narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities in the past. The Department of State has insufficient information to confirm that the DPRK-state is no longer involved in manufacture and trafficking of illicit drugs, but if such activity persists, it is certainly on a much smaller scale.

UPDATE 2: According to the Los Angeles Times:

In the report, obtained Thursday by The Associated Press, the South African government said the two containers are currently stored in a state-secured warehouse in Durban while its investigation continues. It estimated the value of the conventional arms at 6 million rand (about $770,000)

The shipment’s final destination, according to the bill of lading, was the port of Pointe Noire in the Republic of Congo, the small oil-rich country often overshadowed by its larger neighbor, Congo. The Republic of Congo, whose capital is Brazzaville, has reportedly experienced a wave of recent violence.
…
The report to the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions against North Korea is entitled “breach of the Security Council resolutions…”

It traced the shipment from the DGE Corporation via the “Machinery Expand Imp Corp (cq),” both established to be in North Korea, to the Chinese port of Dalian where it was put on board the CGM Musca on Oct. 20.

The bill of lading described the contents of the two containers as “spare parts of bulldozer,” according to the report.

At Port Klang, Malaysia, the shipment was transferred to another vessel, the Westerhever, which was chartered by Delmas Shipping, a subsidiary of the French shipping company, CMA-CGM, the report said. Delmas requested that CMA-CGM Shipping Agencies South Africa (Pty) Ltd. represent the Westerhever on its voyage to South Africa.

The captain was instructed to refuel in Durban on Nov. 28-29, but due to fuel shortages in Durban, the Westerhever was ordered to take on fuel in Walvis Bay, the report said.

While en route to Walvis Bay on Nov. 27, the captain “received an email instruction from Delmas to make a U-turn and discharge the two containers in Durban, the report said.

A U.N. diplomat familiar with the report, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said the email informed the captain that the ship was carrying suspicious cargo which should be turned over for inspection to South African authorities in Durban.

Martin Baxendale, a spokesman for CMA-CGM, said in Paris that the company was in contact with South African authorities but said “we cannot enter into discussions relating to any details in regard to this matter.”

According to the report, “a large quantity of rice grains in sacks lined the containers and was utilized as protective buffers for the conveyance of the conventional arms.”

UPDATE 1: According to the Wall Street Journal:

According a terse, two-page account delivered by the Pretoria government earlier this month to the U.N. committee overseeing the enforcement of U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on North Korea, South African authorities in November seized two containers filled with tank parts and other military equipment from North Korea. The report said the containers, which were loaded on a ship in the Chinese port of Dalian and bound for the Republic of the Congo, contained gun sights, tracks and other spare parts for T-54 and T-55 tanks and other war material valued at an estimated $750,000.

The military equipment was concealed in containers lined with sacks of rice, said the confidential South African report, which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Shipping documents identified the cargo as spare parts for a “bulldozer,” according to the report, which said the goods were shipped by a North Korean company.

ORIGINAL POST: According to Reuters (via Yahoo):

South Africa has told a U.N. Security Council committee it intercepted a North Korean weapons shipment bound for Central Africa, which diplomats said was a violation of a U.N. ban on arms sales by Pyongyang.

The seizure took place in November, when South African authorities received information that a ship headed for Congo Republic was carrying containers with suspicious cargo, according to a letter sent by South Africa to the Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee.

Several Western diplomats described the incident as a “clear-cut violation” of Security Council resolution 1874, which bans all North Korean arms exports and most weapons-related imports in response to its nuclear program.

The letter, parts of which were seen by Reuters on Monday, said a North Korean company was the shipping agent and the cargo was first loaded onto a ship in China, then transferred to a vessel owned by French shipping firm CMA CGM in Malaysia.

Diplomats said the French company alerted authorities to the fact it had suspicious cargo on board and was not believed to have done anything wrong. The South Africans intercepted the vessel and seized the containers, which held tank parts.

The letter, which the committee received last week, said the South Africans discovered “that the contents fell within the definition of conventional arms in that the contents consisted of components of a military tank T-54/T-55.”

The letter said the documentation for the containers described the cargo as “spare parts of bulldozer.” T-54 and T-55 tanks were designed and produced in the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s but were later upgraded and made in other countries.

Neither the French company nor the countries involved had any immediate comment.

Congo Republic, which borders Democratic Republic of Congo, has suffered a wave of violence in the Pool region between the capital Brazzaville and the oil port town of Pointe Noire that has broken a period of calm after a decade of instability.

COMMITTEE TO DECIDE
The diplomats said the committee was planning to send letters to countries involved in the case — such as North Korea, Republic of Congo, Malaysia and France — seeking more information so it can decide whether the North Koreans or any other nations were in breach of U.N. sanctions.

Resolution 1874, approved in June 2009, was passed in response to Pyongyang’s second nuclear test in May 2009 and expanded the punitive measures the Security Council had imposed on North Korea after its first atomic test in October 2006.

Last year’s resolution also authorized countries to inspect suspicious North Korean air, land and sea cargo and to seize any banned goods.

“The latest incident shows that the sanctions are working,” one Western diplomat told Reuters. “But it also shows that we have to be vigilant. The DPRK (North Korea) is still trying to violate the sanctions.”

Last week I mentioned that the UN Security Council was investigating four cases of alleged DPRK sanctions violations–but I only knew what three of the cases were:

Case 1: A North Korean shipment of chemical-safety suits that may have been destined for Syria’s military.

Case 2: Italy’s seizure of two luxury yachts allegedly bound for North Korea

Case 3: Thailand’s interdiction of North Korean arms aboard a plane allegedly bound for Iran

And now we know Case 4: Shipping of contraband to Central Africa.

UPDATE:  It looks like case 4 was a shipment of contraband to central Africa.

ORIGINAL POST: Ertugrul Apakan, Chair of the 1718 Sanctions Committee, is reported to be investigating four cases of UNSC sanctions violations by the DPRK. I have listed 3 of the 4 cases below with links (as identified by Business Week):

Case 1: A North Korean shipment of chemical-safety suits that may have been destined for Syria’s military.

Case 2: Italy’s seizure of two luxury yachts allegedly bound for North Korea

Case 3: Thailand’s interdiction of North Korean arms aboard a plane allegedly bound for Iran

Case 4: ?

According to Business Week:

Apakan told a closed session yesterday that South Korea said the suits were from North Korea and that his committee had received an unsolicited letter from Syria denying any involvement, according to diplomats who attended the briefing. They asked not to be identified.

Bashar Ja’afari, Syria’s ambassador to the UN, said his government sent the letter because South Korea’s report of the incident stated that the suits were bound for his nation. He said Syria conducted a “deep inquiry” and concluded it had nothing to do with the case.

Syria and the DPRK were also allegely working on a nuclear reactor together and Syria’s Tishreen War Museum was built by the North Koreans.

Security Council Report, an independent not-for-profit organisation in affiliation with Columbia University’s Center on International Organization, published a February 2010 report on the DPRK which contains additional information.  See it here.

The Marmot’s Hole posted some great information on the DPRK-Malta relationship.  I encourage you to read his full post, but below I have posted information he provided from the Malta Independent:

With the Labour Party trying to project an image of a progressive and moderate all-inclusive party with new ideas, this newspaper asked Dr Sceberras Trigona, a former Foreign Minister in the Labour 1981-1987 government, for his views on the agreement he had signed with North Korea in July 1982.

At the time North Korea’s regime had, and still has, few ties with other countries due to its policy of self-reliance. However, Malta under Labour had close connections with the Asian country, with Kim Jong-Il, son of then dictator Kim Il-Sung, studying English at the University of Malta and reportedly visiting frequently with then Prime Minister Dom Mintoff.

Contact with Dr Sceberras Trigona was first made via telephone on Thursday, and he asked that the questions be sent by e-mail. The questions were as follows: 1) Given the political climate of the time, what led the Labour government to sign such an agreement with North Korea? 2) Why was a clause included in the agreement stipulating that the agreement should be kept a secret? 3) Would you sign such an agreement again if you were given the chance?

The answer to these questions received on Friday was two words: “Times change,” Dr Sceberras Trigona said tersely.

The signing of the agreement in 1982 had sparked off a political controversy after it was revealed by then Opposition Leader Eddie Fenech Adami during a Nationalist Party mass meeting in Floriana on 4 December 1983.

Newspaper reports later said that a high-level investigation had been started in the Foreign Affairs Ministry to find out who had leaked the information to Dr Fenech Adami.

In actual fact, two agreements had been signed for “a free offer of military assistance” with North Korea. The first agreement was signed in Valletta on 25 March 1982, three months after the perverse result of an election that returned the Labour Party to government in spite of obtaining fewer votes.

A second agreement, this time signed in Pyongyang in July of that same year, superseded the first, changing only the number of weapons and ammunitions that North Korea agreed to donate to Malta.

For Malta, the first agreement was signed by then Interior Minister Lorry Sant at the specific request of Dr Sceberras Trigona, who then signed the second agreement.

The agreement stipulated that North Korea “will, free of charge, provide (Malta) with weapons and ammunitions”.

The difference between the first and second agreement was in the number of weapons and amount of ammunition that North Korea agreed to give Malta – the number was increased in the second agreement.

Otherwise, the agreements were more or less the same. North Korea was responsible for the transportation of weapons and ammunition, and dispatched military instructors to train and teach local military personnel. Four instructors were sent for three months and were paid according to their military rank equivalent to those of Maltese officers.

The agreement stipulated that the Maltese government had to provide a one way ticket from Malta to Pyongyang to the instructors and “subsistence expenditure during the flight and expenses for lodging, meals, medical treatment, transport means (including the driver) and salaries during their stay in Malta, and training equipment needed in the education of the Maltese military personnel”.

The Maltese government had also agreed to “protect” the Korean instructors and “ensure their safety, and exempt them from Customs duties and taxes”.

Both sides also agreed to “observe strict secrecy in respect of all transaction made pursuant to this agreement and shall not disclose any matter hereof to any third country”.

Read the Marmot’s Hole post here.

Read the Malta Independent article here:
1982 Labour government “secret” agreement with North Korea
Malta Independent
Stephen Calleja
Date unknown

According to the Choson Ilbo:

Christian Dietrich, a member of the UN Security Council committee investigating Congo, told VOA that the North Korean ship Birobong arrived in the port of Boma, Congo on Jan. 21, where it unloaded some 3,400 tons of weapons, 100 times the amount seized in Thailand earlier this month.

Dietrich said the committee was told the weapons were “modern” but was unable to find out any details. Assuming all the weapons were AK rifles, the weight would be equivalent to about 800,000 of them, he added.

North Korea in May also sent military instructors to train Congolese government soldiers for about four weeks, around the time the North conducted its second nuclear test.

Dietrich said there are indications that North Korea was the source of state-of-the-art weapons carried by insurgents in eastern Congo. In some cases, Congolese government soldiers have sold their arms to neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe, he said.

Under UN Resolution 1807, adopted in 2008, the UN must be informed in advance of all arms transactions with and military training for Congo, but North Korea did not. The UNSC committee is a watchdog that oversees implementation of the UN resolution.

Additional information:

1. Here is a link to the story about the arms intercepted in Thailand (Including updates).

2. The DPRK has long been involved in African political, economic, military, and cultural affairs.  When I read this story I immediately thought of Zimbabwe’s 5 Brigade which was trained by the North Koreans.  Here are a few stories which are related to the DPRK and Zimbabwe.

3.  The North Koreans also constructed the statue of Laurent Kabila in Kinshasa. The statue is located here.

July 1, 2009
Download the full report here. Download other CRS reports here.

Summary: The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Res. 1874 on June 12, 2009, in response to North Korea’s second nuclear test. The resolution puts in place a series of sanctionson North Korea’s arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons programs, and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the case with an earlier U.N. resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea’s first nuclear test, Res. 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea’s regime and its weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Res. 1874.

On the surface, financial sanctions aimed solely at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name of North Korea) and its prohibited activities are not likely to have a large monetary effect. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the resolution liberally in order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of North Korean trading corporations. A key to its success will be the extent to which China, North Korea’s most important economic partner, implements the resolution. In summary, the economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being “tainted” by handling any DPRK transaction. A ban on luxury goods will only be effective if China begins to deny North Korea lucrative trade credits.

Provisions for inspection of banned cargo on aircraft and sea vessels rely on the acquiescence of the shipping state. In the case of North Korean vessels, it is highly unlikely that they would submit to searches. Resolution 1874 is vague about how its air cargo provisions are to be implemented, in contrast to the specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo. While procedures are specified for sea interdictions, the authority given is ambiguous and optional. Further, DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant, and therefore the ban on those exports is unlikely to have a great impact.

Vanity Fair has published a lengthy article about the DPRK’s mysterious Bureau 39 which is allegedly behind a number of illicit activities such as counterfeiting US currency and cigarettes, smuggling drugs and bilking western insurance companies with fraudulent claims. The full article is worth reading here.  (h/t DPRK Studies)

Of immediate interest, here is the supposed location of Bureau 39 just south of the Grand People’s Study House:

Hamer’s three-year investigation—code-named Operation Smoking Dragon—began not with supernotes but with counterfeit cigarettes, which were being shipped by freight container from China into California ports by the millions. These, too, says Asher, originated in North Korea, and were the subject of a report by the Coalition of Tobacco Companies, one of whose investigators made an undercover visit, posing as a buyer, to North Korean factories in Pyongyang and the northeastern city of Rajin. These turn out fake Western brands, such as Marlboros, in such quantities that they generate as much as $720 million in gross revenue each year. Hamer set up a number of front operations to get inside the cigarette-smuggling business, and soon had many contacts who dealt with him as if he were a smuggler, too. In the spring of 2004, Hamer and his colleagues were asked by F.B.I. headquarters to see if they could acquire North Korean supernotes. One of Hamer’s best customers, Chao Tung “John” Wu, who eventually pleaded guilty to smuggling counterfeit currency, cigarettes, and narcotics, as well as conspiring to broker a deal for Chinese-made, shoulder-fired missiles, but died before he was sentenced, promised he could supply them with the help of a man who was a frequent visitor to North Korea—Wilson Liu. The notes were so good, Wu said at a secretly recorded meeting, “you can even go to Las Vegas and slide them into the machines—they take them right away.”

According to Aung Zaw in the Wall Street Journal Aisa:

A government report leaked by a Burmese official last month shed new light on these ties. It described a Memorandum of Understanding between Burma and North Korea signed during a secret visit by Burmese officials to Pyongyang in November 2008. The visit was the culmination of years of work. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were cut in 1983 following a failed assassination attempt by North Korean agents on the life of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan while he was visiting Rangoon. The attack cost 17 Korean lives and Burma cut off ties.

One of the first signs of warming relations was a barter agreement between the two countries that lasted from 2000 to 2006 and saw Burma receive between 12 and 16 M-46 field guns and as many as 20 million rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition from North Korea, according to defense analyst Andrew Selth of Griffith University in Australia. In exchange, Burma bartered food and rice.

The two countries formally re-established diplomatic relations in April 2007. After that, the North Korean ship the Kang Nam — the same ship that recently turned away from Burma after being followed by the U.S. navy — made a trip to Burma’s Thilawa port. Western defense analysts concluded that the ship carried conventional weapons and missiles to Burma.

This laid the ground for the MoU signed in November, when Shwe Mann, the regime’s third-most powerful figure, made a secret visit to North Korea, according to the leaked report. Shwe Mann is the chief of staff of the army, navy and air force, and the coordinator of Special Operations. He spent seven days in Pyongyang, traveling via China. His 17-member delegation received a tour around Pyongyang and Myohyang, where secret tunnels have been built into mountains to shelter aircraft, missiles, tanks and nuclear and chemical weapons.

The MoU he signed formalizes the military cooperation between the two countries. According to the terms of the document, North Korea will build or supervise the construction of special Burmese military facilities, including tunnels and caves in which missiles, aircraft and even naval ships could be hidden. Burma will also receive expert training for its special forces, air defense training, plus a language training program between personnel in the two armed forces.

Shwe Mann’s delegation also visited a surface-to-surface missile factory, partially housed in tunnels, on the outskirts of Pyongyang to observe missile production. The Burmese were particularly interested in short-range 107 mm and 240 mm multirocket launchers — a multipurpose, defensive missile system used in case of a foreign invasion. Also of great interest was the latest in antitank, laser-guided missile technology.

Previous Myanmar - DPRK posts here.

Read the full story below:
Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms
Wall Street Journal Asia
Aung Zaw
7/10/2009