North Korean Economy Watch

UPDATE 3:  Executive Order: Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that the current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I further find that, as we deal with that threat through multilateral diplomacy, it is necessary to continue certain restrictions with respect to North Korea that would otherwise be lifted pursuant to a forthcoming proclamation that will terminate the exercise of authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.) (TWEA) with respect to North Korea.

Accordingly, I hereby order:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in statutes or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, the following are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:

all property and interests in property of North Korea or a North Korean national that, pursuant to the President’s authorities under the TWEA, the exercise of which has been continued in accordance with section 101(b) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b) note), were blocked as of June 16, 2000, and remained blocked immediately prior to the date of this order.

Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in statutes or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, United States persons may not register a vessel in North Korea, obtain authorization for a vessel to fly the North Korean flag, or own, lease, operate, or insure any vessel flagged by North Korea.

Sec. 3. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;

(b) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; and

(c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit the recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

GEORGE W. BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 26, 2008.

UPDATE 2: How much plutonium does the DPRK have?

From the Daily Times (Pakistan):

But there may be problems ahead with the declaration. Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported an informed source as saying the North declared it produced around 30 kg (66 lbs) of plutonium, while US officials have said they think it is closer to 50 kg. Sung Kim, a State Department envoy who witnessed the cooling tower blast, told reporters in Seoul on Saturday that there might not be enough time to complete the North’s denuclearisation before President George W Bush leaves office in January 2009.

‘Emotionally attached’: Kim said North Koreans engineers appeared to have formed an “emotional attachment” to their atomic programme that has become apparent during international efforts to dismantle it. Kim told reporters that he saw emotion in Ri Yong-ho, head of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, and his colleagues when they all witnessed Friday’s demolition of the plant’s cooling tower. “I think I detected a sense of sadness when the tower came down but I thought he put it well when he was asked what this all meant for him and he said that he just hoped this would contribute to peace and stability,” said Ri.  

UPDATE 1:
“US Treasury says N.Korea sanctions remain in place”
Reuters via Guardian
David Lawder
6/26/2008

U.S. Treasury financial sanctions aimed at ending North Korean money laundering, illicit financing activities and weapons proliferation remain in effect despite the easing of other sanctions against Pyongyang, a Treasury spokesman said on Thursday.

The move by the Bush administration to lift some sanctions after North Korea delivered a long-delayed account of its nuclear activities will not restore the country’s access to the international banking system, Treasury spokesman John Rankin said.

North Korea was largely cut off from the international banking system in 2005 when the Treasury named Banco Delta Asia, a small bank in the Chinese gambling enclave of Macau, as a primary money laundering concern.

The Treasury accused the bank of circulating counterfeit U.S. currency produced by North Korea, and of knowingly handling transactions by North Korean entities involved in illicit activities, including the narcotics trade and sales of counterfeit cigarettes and other goods.

Both North Korea and Banco Delta Asia have denied the Treasury’s allegations.

Although about $25 million in frozen North Korean funds in Banco Delta Asia was released last year, the sanctions against the bank, which prohibit transactions with U.S. banks, remain in effect, Rankin said. International banks have largely shunned Banco Delta Asia as well.

As recently as April, Treasury officials said so called “supernotes” — high quality counterfeit $100 bills produced by North Korea, were still surfacing.

“The lifting of sanctions associated with the Trading with the Enemy Act, and removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism does not represent North Korea’s re-integration into the international financial system,” he said.

Sanctions that prohibit U.S. companies from owning, leasing, operating, insuring North Korean-flagged shipping vessels, as well as registering vessels in North Korea, remain in place. 

ORIGINAL POST: Today North Korean made the nuclear declaration required by the February 2007 six-party agreement.  This web site does not focus on the nuclear issue, but this turn of events represents a significant US policy shift with economic implications for the DPRK.  The coverage has been overwhelming, so below are media excerpts that cover most of the angles:

“Pyongyang Submits Nuclear Declaration”
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad
6/26/2008

After keeping the U.S. and other countries waiting for 15 months, North Korea delivered a description of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, setting up the next – and more difficult – stage in an international effort to disarm and reshape the isolated, authoritarian country.

North Korean diplomats gave a declaration of its nuclear-weapons program to Chinese counterparts in Beijing who have been coordinating the six-nation talks. In return, U.S. President George W. Bush announced the lifting of some trade sanctions and beginning of the process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terror. (Read the text of the White House statement here).

Under the February 2007 deal, North Korea also agreed to disable a nuclear plant that provided fuel for its nuclear weapons, a step that’s also nearly complete. On Friday, it plans to blow up the cooling tower at the nuclear plant and invited TV crews from several countries, including the U.S. and South Korea, to record the event.

The contents of North Korea’s declaration weren’t immediately disclosed. In recent weeks, U.S. diplomats have said they didn’t expect it to include a key piece of data – how many nuclear weapons the country has built. The document also is believed to be limited to North Korea’s efforts to develop plutonium as a nuclear fuel, but doesn’t mention suspected research into highly-enriched uranium as a fuel nor its suspected proliferation efforts to Syria.

“North Korea removed from US ‘axis of evil’”
London Times
Jeremy Page and Richard Lloyd Parry
6/26/008

The US move, which will also see a lifting of long-running sanctions, would mark the most significant thaw in relations between Washington and Pyongyang since the 1950-53 Korean War. Mr Bush said that it was intended to reward and encourage North Korean co-operation and accelerate the tangled negotiations on the country’s nuclear disarmament.

In the first instance, America will exempt North Korea from sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act, a piece of First World War legislation that was employed during the Korean War, and which restricts trade with Pyongyang by US companies and citizens. The only other country subject to its provisions is Cuba.

It also gave notice that it would start the 45-day process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it stands alongside Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. Sanctions against them include a ban on arms sales, economic assistance, and an obligation on the US Government to oppose loans to listed countries by such international institutions as the World Bank.

“Diplomacy Is Working on North Korea”
Wall Street Journal
Condoleeza Rice
6/26/2008; Page A15

In its declaration, North Korea will state how much plutonium it possesses. We will not accept that statement on faith. We will insist on verification. North Korea has already turned over nearly 19,000 pages of production records from its Yongbyon reactor and associated facilities. With additional information we expect to receive – access to other documents, relevant sites, key personnel and the reactor itself – these records will help to verify the accuracy and completeness of Pyongyang’s declaration. North Korea’s plutonium program has been by far its largest nuclear effort over many decades, and we believe our policy could verifiably get the regime out of the plutonium-making business.

Getting a handle on North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program is harder, because we simply do not know its full scale or what it yielded. And yet, because of our current policy, we now know more about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment efforts than before, and we are learning more still – much of it troubling. North Korea acknowledges our concerns about its uranium-enrichment program, and we will insist on getting to the bottom of this issue.

Similarly, we know that North Korea proliferated nuclear technology to Syria, but we do not know whether that is the end of the story. Rather than just trying to address this threat unilaterally, we will be more effective in learning about North Korean proliferation and preventing its continuation through a cooperative effort with Japan, South Korea, China and Russia.

And in return for these steps, what have we given thus far? No significant economic assistance. No trade or investment cooperation. No security guarantees or normalized relations. And our many sanctions on North Korea, both bilateral and multilateral, remain in place.

“‘Good start’ to UN’s Syria probe”
BBC
6/25/2008

The head of a UN team investigating allegations that Syria has been working on a secret nuclear weapons programme says their work is off to a good start.

The IAEA official, Olli Heinonen, said inspectors had taken samples at the al-Kibar site in the Syrian desert.

“It was a good start, but there’s still work that remains to be done,” he said.

“For this trip we did what we agreed to. We achieved what we wanted on this first trip. We took samples which we wanted to take. Now it’s time to analyse them.”

Mr Heinonen also said he was generally satisfied with the level of co-operation by Syria.

Additional information: 

To read a hawk perspective, see Josh’s post at One Free Korea.  Also, the Telegraph (UK) reports that Vice President Cheney tried to block the deal.

David Kang spoke to NPR’s Market Place.

US move reduces Japan’s negotiation leverage over DPRK.

Yonhap
12/11/2007

(NKeconWatch: Joshua over at OFK also has a contribution to this)

A senior U.S. senator introduced a resolution setting conditions for removing North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring nations, one of the key incentives offered for Pyongyang’s denuclearization.

Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kansas) submitted Resolution 399 on Monday and so far has three co-sponsors.

The resolution urges the administration not to lift the designation until it can be demonstrated that North Korea is no longer engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and no longer counterfeiting American currency.

It also demands proof that a North Korean ruling party bureau, believed to be running illicit financial activities including drug trafficking and counterfeiting, has been made inoperable.

The senator also demands that the terrorist-nation designation remain until all U.S. overseas missions have been instructed to facilitate asylum applications by North Koreans seeking protection as refugees.

North Korea was put on the list in January 1988, soon after its agents blew up a South Korean civilian aircraft. Brownback’s resolution demands North Korea’s accounting of Japanese nationals abducted by the North as well as of surviving South Korean prisoners of war.

“If the United States takes the step of removing North Korea from the terrorism list, let’s at least make clear the conditions for such a removal,” Brownback said, adding, “I question the merits of the State Department’s decision to remove North Korea from its terrorist list.”

“It is important that the United States sends a loud and clear message to the North Korean regime that we will remain vigilant,” he said.

Delisting North Korea is one of the key benefits the U.S. offered in return for Pyongyang’s disablement of its core nuclear facilities and full disclosure of its atomic programs, the steps toward full dismantlement agreed on by six nations — South and North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan.
  
Getting off the list would free North Korea from a number of restrictions prohibiting meaningful economic and political assistance and exchange from the U.S. and the international community.

In Seoul, a Foreign Ministry official expressed concerns the resolution, if passed, could undermine progress in the nuclear disarmament talks, but said it did not pose any immediate threats to the six-nation deal on the denuclearization of the North.

“Delisting North Korea does not depend on the resolution, but whether the North fully discloses its nuclear programs,” the official, who is deeply involved with the nuclear talks, said, asking not to be identified. “Obviously, nothing has been changed so far. The U.S. administration can still delist the North if and whenever it chooses to.”

Asia Times
Bertil Lintner
10/31/2007

North Korean Premier Kim Yong-il is scheduled to pay a four-day visit to Cambodia in early November, underscoring the curious close relationship between one of the world’s last communist dictatorships and one of Asia’s most ancient monarchies.

Kim Yong-il, who should not be confused with the North Korean supremo, “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il or any of his relatives, will hold talks with Cambodia’s retired king Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian Foreign Ministry said in a statement posted on its website.

The North Korean premier will also hold “official talks” with his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen, and “pay courtesy calls” on Senate president Chea Sim, and the president of the National Assembly, Heng Samrin, according to the statement.

Cambodia has long served as a link between North Korea and Southeast Asia and beyond, so it is plausible to assume that trade and related issues will be on the agenda. For years the two countries ran a joint shipping company, and before the China-led six party talks, Cambodia had offered to mediate over Pyongyang’s contentious nuclear program.

Kim Yong-il’s visit to Cambodia is not the first by a North Korean dignitary in recent years. Kim Yong-nam, president of North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly, also visited the country in 2001 at the invitation of Sihanouk, who had then not yet abdicated in favor of his son, Norodom Sihamoni, the current serving monarch.

Kim Yong-nam now functions as de facto head of state, as Kim Jong-il’s father, “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung was elevated to the position of “eternal president” before his death in 1994, making North Korea not a monarchy, but rather the world’s only necrocracy.

As incongruous as it may seem, Cambodia is North Korea’s oldest ally in Southeast Asia. It all began when Sihanouk met Kim Il-sung in 1961 at a Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Belgrade and a personal friendship developed between the two leaders. When Sihanouk was ousted in a coup in 1970, Kim Il-sung not only offered him sanctuary in North Korea but also had a new home built for him about an hour’s drive north of Pyongyang.

A battalion of North Korean troops worked full-time on it for almost a year, and when it was finished, only specially selected guards were allowed anywhere near the 60-room palatial residence. Overlooking the scenic Chhang Sou On Lake and surrounded by mountains, the Korean-style building even had its own indoor movie theater. Like the Great Leader’s son, Kim Jong-il, Sihanouk loves movies.

Sihanouk has both directed and acted in his own romantic feature movies and a few more were made in North Korea, with Cambodian actors strutting their stuff against the backdrop of Korea’s snow-capped mountains.

French wines and gourmet food were flown in via China, and Sihanouk and his entourage were treated as royals would have been in any country that respects monarchy - as North Korea evidently does.

By contrast, North Korea has maintained less cordial relations with neighboring communist Vietnam, which still exerts behind-the-scenes pressure on Cambodia. Kim Yong-il will nonetheless also visit Hanoi during his diplomatic tour of Southeast Asia.

Throughout the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, North Korea refused to recognize the regime that Hanoi installed in Phnom Penh in January 1979 - and that despite immense pressure at the time put on Pyongyang from Moscow. During a meeting between Kim Il-sung and Sihanouk seven years later on April 10, 1986, in Pyongyang, the Great Leader reassured the then prince that North Korea would continue to regard him as Cambodia’s legitimate head of state.

When Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh in September 1993, after United Nations-led mediation to end Cambodia’s civil conflict, he arrived with 35 North Korean bodyguards, commanded by a general from Kim Il-sung’s presidential guards. They are still there, now guarding Sihanouk as well as the new king, Sihanomi, who is not as close to North Korea as his father, but has paid at least one visit to Pyongyang.

Sailing buddies
Sihanouk and the Cambodian royals showed their gratitude to the North Koreans when in the late 1990s they set up a privately-owned shipping registry, the Cambodia Shipping Corporation (CSC). The flag of convenience was used by the North Koreans, and it enjoyed royal protection as it was headed by Khek Vandy, the husband of Sihanouk’s eldest daughter, Boupha Devi.

CSC was also partly owned by a Phnom Penh-based North Korean diplomat and for a few years aggressively marketed itself as a cheap and efficient “flag of convenience” service for international shippers. A series of embarrassing maritime incidents, including the interception in June 2002 of a Cambodian-registered - though not North Korean owned - ship by the French navy, in a joint operation with US, Greek and Spanish authorities, of a massive haul of cocaine off the West African coast prompted Hun Sen’s government to cancel CSC’s concession and reportedly give it to a South Korean company, the Cosmos Group.

At the time, International Transport Federation general secretary David Cockroft told the Cambodia-based fortnightly newspaper the Phnom Penh Post that “they’ll need to be able to walk on water, because nothing short of a miracle will clean up the name of Cambodian shipping”. Indeed, little appeared to change, including North Korea’s use of Cambodia’s flag of convenience for controversial shipments.

In December 2002, a Cambodian-registered, North Korean-owned ship named So San was intercepted by Spanish marines, working on a US tip, in the Arabian Sea. It was found to be carrying 15 Scud-type missiles, 15 conventional warheads, 23 tanks of nitric acid rocket propellant and 85 drums of unidentified chemicals under a cargo of cement bags.

The destination of the weaponry was said to be Yemen, and following protests from both Yemen and North Korea - and intervention by the US, which apparently did not want to antagonize Yemen, a supposed ally in Washington’s “war on terror” - the ship was allowed to continue to Yemen. Later revelations indicated that the cargo was ultimately delivered to Libya, which caused considerable embarrassment in Washington.

Premier Kim Yong-il is likely to be quite familiar with the CSC, as he served as minister for land and marine transport from 1994 until the Supreme People’s Assembly appointed him to the premiership in April this year. But since the scandal-ridden CSC was reorganized five years ago, Cambodia’s economic importance to Pyongyang would appear to have waned, and North Korea’s only known activity in the country today is in the restaurant business, including eateries in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap.

Yet as a diplomatic link to the wider region, Cambodia is still important to North Korea. In April 2003, the Cambodian government, at the urging of Sihanouk, had plans to send an envoy to Pyongyang in a bid to persuade the North Korean leadership to be more flexible about talks on its nuclear program, which at that time had stalled.

The mission never materialized, but North Korea no doubt remembers that its trusted ally Cambodia tried first to mediate - and that Phnom Penh in future could still serve as a gateway for improved contacts with the outside world. It remains to be seen what message Kim Yong-il will bring to Phnom Penh, but it is reasonable to assume that his visit will, despite the official announcements, be confined merely to “courtesy calls” and royal audiences.

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the Kim Clan. He is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services.

Daily NK
Namgung Min
9/27/2007

The Sankei Shimbun reported on the 26th that a smuggling vessel containing North Korean weapons have been caught on their way to illegally entering Sri Lanka.

According to the Sankei, the Sri Lanka navy arrested the vessel containing the 68 automatic rifles manufactured by the Munitions Industry Department (No. 99 Department) of the Worker’s Party that was leaving from Chonjin to Sri Lanka.

The Sankei announced that when the Sri Lanka navy tried to capture the smuggling vessel on October in 2006 and February this year, the smuggling vessel opened fire so the Sri Lankan navy shot them down. On March in 2007, the Sri Lankan navy took the North Korean vessel near the shore and confiscated the North Korean weapons and arrested the captains.

Furthermore, the newspaper revealed that there was no sign implying the nationality but it was identified as North Korean due to the confiscated weapons which were identified by the former North Korean military men who defected to South Korea.

It was announced that the North Korean machine guns and antitank guns were planned to be passed over to the Anti-government guerrilla groups named the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

The U.S. appointed LTTE as a foreign terrorist group in 1997 and the EU also appointed the LTTE as a terrorist organization in April, 2007.

According to the newspaper, the Sri Lankan government conducted investigation and came to a conclusion that a Chinese weaponry company probably acted as an intermediary to smuggle the North Korean weapons to the anti-government guerrillas in Sri Lanka.

In regards to this incident, the Sri Lankan government raised complaints to the North Korean ambassador located in India and the Chinese government, but the both representatives are denying their relations to the illegal smuggling of the weaponry.

Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
9/26/2007

The U.S. State Department is expected to announce additional sanctions on North Korean entities connected to missile proliferation, Yonhap News reported Wednesday.

Some of the entities are believed to be linked to the Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), which was designated in June 2005 in an executive order for supporting weapons of mass destruction proliferation, it said.

The measure would come at an awkward moment as envoys from six nations _ South and North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan _ gather in Beijing from Wednesday for a fresh round of negotiations aimed at disabling and eventually dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and programs.

The U.S. Treasury had frozen some $25 million in North Korea-related money held in a Macau bank in late 2005, a punitive measure imposed as the six countries were signing an agreement toward denuclearization. That led to more than a year’s suspension in negotiations with the North.

The new round of six-party talks is already on shaky ground with suspicions that Pyongyang may have transferred nuclear-related material to Syria, prompting the unexplained Israeli air incursion into Syria earlier this month.

Tom Casey, a State Department spokesman, said Tuesday the new sanctions are related to missile technology transfers and downplayed possible negative repercussions on this week’s talks.

“The company that was sanctioned has been sanctioned previously for the same thing. So the net effect of this is really pretty minimal,” he said. “I don’t see…any reason why this should impact on the six-party talks.”

North Korea accused the United States of defending Israel’s recent airstrike against Syria, calling the strike a grave crime that undermines regional peace and stability.

The North’s main Rodong Sinmun newspaper said, “Israeli warplanes’ intrusion into the territorial airspace of Syria and bomb-dropping are an outright violation of Syria’s sovereignty and a grave crime that destroys regional peace and security,” according to Yonhap.

The North’s comments came days after high-level talks between North Korea and Syria. The two countries, which deny the allegation of a secret nuclear connection, did not provide details of Pyongyang talks.

Andrew Semmel, acting U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation policy, said earlier this month that North Koreans were in Syria, and that Syria might have had contacts with “secret suppliers” to obtain nuclear equipment.

Semmel did not identify the suppliers. However, he said he could not exclude the possibility that a nuclear black-market network, run by the disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, might have been involved.

Semmel’s comments raised speculation that an alleged Sept. 6 Israeli incursion into Syrian airspace was a strike targeting a nuclear installation. U.S. officials have said Israeli warplanes struck a target. One U.S. military officer said the strike was aimed at weapons being shipped to Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.

Korea Times
8/15/2007

To understand what is at stake, we need to look back at key events in the past that led to North Korea’s isolation in the global economy.

U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea began on June 28, 1950, only three days after North Korea invaded South Korea, when the United States invoked a total embargo on exports to North Korea. Over the years, many more U.S. sanctions have been imposed against North Korea, and North Korean companies. Three of these sanctions have had a significant impact.

The first was the suspension of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status, imposed on September 1, 1951. This sanction, which is still in effect, made it impossible for North Korea to even consider exporting its products to the United States.

The second is the placement of North Korea on the list of countries that support international terrorism. This sanction, imposed on January 20, 1988, followed North Korea’s blowing up of Korea Air Lines 858 on November 29, 1987, off the waters of Thailand.

This sanction has entailed many restrictions, including denial of North Korea’s ability to borrow money from international financial institutions.

The third measure is not a single action, but has taken the form of a tightening grip around the financial network used to fund North Korea’s illicit financial activities.

Although the ultimate target is North Korea, the threat of actual sanctions has been targeted against banks, including Banco Delta Asia, which deal with North Korea’s accounts. These financial sanctions involving Banco Delta Asia have been the focus of recent overt and covert negotiations between North Korea and the United States.

On September 17, 1999, President Clinton agreed to the first significant easing of economic sanctions against North Korea since the Korean War ended in 1953.

The U.S. easing of sanctions against North Korea, announced on June 19, 2000, may have been too little to persuade the leaders of North Korea to give up their prized long-range missile technology. North Korea carried out a nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and the United Nations passed Resolution 1718, further tightening North Korean economy.

There is no doubt that all these sanctions are having an impact on the North Korean economy. For instance, the North Korea’s annual trade deficit has averaged between $800 million and $1 billion in recent years, depending on whether deficits against South Korea are included.

The huge trade deficit is not sustainable, and it will eventually lead to a decrease in North Korea’s trade and gross domestic product. Studies indicate that the entire trade deficit appears to have been financed by weapons sales, illicit activities, and funds flowing from South Korea through joint projects. With the two UN resolutions adopted during 2006 and the tightening of North Korea’s financial transactions that began in 2005, North Korea should find it increasingly more difficult to pay for its trade deficit.

The key issue is not whether North Korea deserves the lifting of all the sanctions imposed against the country on the basis of its behavior since 1950, but how to bring about a peaceful resolution of pending security and humanitarian issues without military confrontation. This brings us to the importance of the upcoming summit between President Roh and North Korean leader Kim.

My assessment is that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 led to an important change in the approach of North Korean leaders toward a better calculation of costs and benefits.

For international readers: The Congressional Research Service is an organization that puts together issue briefs and legislative histories for congressional staff.  They are one of the first places US Congressional staff go to learn about a topic.

In April, the Congressional Research Service published a document on the North Korean Economy.  The full report, as well as some past reports, can be downloaded here.

Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of the economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea, its external economic relations, attempts at reform, and U.S. policy options. Along with the United States, North Korea’s major trading partners — China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia — form the socalled “six parties,” who are engaged in talks, currently restarted, to resolve issues raised by the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons.

The economy of North Korea is of interest to Congress because it provides the financial and industrial resources for Pyongyang to develop its military, can be used as leverage in negotiations, constitutes an important “push factor” for potential refugees seeking to flee the country, creates pressures for the country to trade in arms and illegal drugs, is a rationale for humanitarian assistance, is tied to Pyongyang’s nuclear program, and creates instability that affects South Korea and China. The North Korean threat to sell nuclear weapons material could be driven in part by Pyongyang’s need to generate export earnings. The dismal economic conditions also foster forces of discontent that potentially could turn against the Kim regime — especially if knowledge of the luxurious lifestyle of communist party leaders becomes better known or as the poor economic performance hurts even Pyongyang’s elite.

Economic conditions in North Korea currently seem to be improving but have been dismal for those out of the center of power. Mass starvation — eased only by international food aid and other humanitarian assistance — has stalked the countryside. Over the past 15 years, industrial production in North Korea has shrunk considerably. The country has embarked on a program of economic reforms that include raising wages, allowing prices to better reflect market values, reducing dependence on rationing of essential commodities, trimming back centralized control over factory operations, and opening foreign trade zones for international investment.

North Korea has extensive trading relationships with China and South Korea and more limited trade with Japan and Russia. Because of U.S. economic sanctions and lack of normal trade relations status, U.S. imports from North Korea in 2006 were nil, while U.S. exports consisted of $3,000 worth of books and newspapers.  The DPRK has been running an estimated $1.8 billion deficit per year in its international trade accounts that it funds primarily through receipts of foreign assistance and foreign investment as well as through various questionable activities, such as sales of weapons, transporting and producing illegal drugs, and counterfeiting brand name products and currency.

U.S.-led financial sanctions on North Korea have disrupted that country’s trade. In the six-party talks, economic assistance (including fuel oil) is a major bargaining chip. Economic policy options include increasing or easing economic sanctions, preventing shipments of illicit cargo, normalizing relations with Pyongyang, negotiating a trade agreement, allowing the DPRK to join international financial institutions, and removing the country from the terrorism list. This report will be updated as conditions warrant.

American Enterprise Institute Book forum
4/17/2007

A couple of weeks ago, I had the opportunity to attend a book forum at the American Enterprise Institute on Nicholas Eberstadt’s new book, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe.  It was very informative to hear three different perspectives on the direction of North Korea’s economic reform. 

Panelists included:

Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University
Deok-Ryong Yoon, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

In summary, Mr. Eberstadt and Mr. Lankov are pessimistic about the North Korean leadership’s desire to enact reforms–knowing that information leakages will undermine their political authority.  As Mr. Lankov pointed out, the North Korean nomenklatura are all children and grandchildren of the founders of the country who are highly vested in the current system.  They have no way out politically, and as such, cannot reform. 

They argue that the economic reforms enacted in 2002 were primarily efforts to reassert control over the de facto institutions that had emerged in the collapse of the state-run Public Distribition System, not primarily intended to revive the economy.  Lankov does admit, however, that North Korea is more open and market-oriented than it has ever been, and  Mr. Yoon was by far the most optomistic on the prospects of North Korean reform.

Personally, I think it makes sense to think about North Korean politics as one would in any other country–as composed of political factions that each seek their own goals.  Although the range of policy options is limited by current political realities, there are North Koreans who are interested in reform and opening up–even if only to earn more money.  In this light, even if the new market institutions recognized in the 2002 reforms were acknowledged only grudgingly, they were still acknowledged, and their legal-social-economic positions in society are now de jure, not just de facto.  The North Korean leadership might be opposed to wholesale reform, but that is economically and strategically different than a controlled opening up on an ad hoc basis–which is what I believe we are currently seeing. Anyway, dont take my word for it, check out the full commentary posted below the fold:

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Asia Times
Robert Neff
4/20/2007

Many small countries in the world have resorted to unorthodox methods of obtaining much-needed currency. Although these methods may be legal, they often assist unscrupulous individuals and governments in conducting illegal activities. One popular method of obtaining cash is through flags of convenience (FOC). Countries, even land-locked ones, register other nations’ ships under their flag for a price.

It is a profitable industry that has no shortage of customers. Shipowners choose to register their ships under a foreign flag for a number of reasons, including tax advantages, cheap non-union crews, the ships’ conditions fail to meet the standards of the owner’s country, political reasons, or to facilitate illegal activities.

Because many of these ships often exchange flags and even their names, it is difficult to trace them, thus providing the anonymity they need to conduct their illegal operations. According to a statement by David Cockroft, general secretary of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF): “Arms smuggling, the ability to conceal large sums of money, trafficking in goods and people and other illegal activities can also thrive in the unregulated havens which the flag of convenience system provides.”

Flying the Cambodian flag
One of the most notorious FOC countries was Cambodia. In 1994, Cambodia established its own ship registry - Cambodian Shipping Corporation (CSC), based in Singapore - and began immediately flagging ships of other nations.

Although its beginnings were modest (only 16 foreign ships registered with Cambodia during the first year) the CSC rapidly expanded. According to CSC, prior to its closing in 2002, the number of ships registered with the company was between 400 and 600, but according to US investigators and Cambodian officials the number was probably twice that.

CSC offered basically what many other FOC countries offered: registry for any ship, no questions asked, under its (Cambodia’s) flag for a low price. But, unlike other FOC countries, it offered to do the entire process online and within 24 hours. Despite Cambodia’s relative lag in Internet technology, its operation in Singapore enabled CSC to pioneer online registration.

As more and more foreign ships registered with CSC, it soon became apparent that a large number of the ships were involved in illegal activities. Cigarette smuggling operations were discovered near Crete and Albania; during the oil embargo of Iraq, oil was smuggled out of that country; human trafficking and prostitution operations were discovered near Japan and Crete, and, of course, drug trafficking.

All of these activities were cause for concern and drew condemnation, but there was one more criminal activity that concerned many nations even more: allegations that many of the ships were running arms. “Cambodia is one of the highest-risk flags. It is particularly murky and has got to be one of the first choices if you are running arms,” a spokesman for ITF said.

When asked about CSC’s alleged illegal operations, Ahamd Yahya of the Cambodian Ministry of Public Works and Transport was reported to have told Fairplay: “We don’t know or care who owns the ships or whether they’re doing ‘white’ or ‘black’ business … it is not our concern.” (Fairplay, October 12, 2000.)

Unsafe ships
In addition to illicit activities, the condition of the ships themselves was a concern. According to an article in the Guardian of London, by 2002 the company had about 450 registered ships, and out of this number 25 had suffered shipwrecks/strandings, 41 collisions, nine fires and 45 arrests. Nine  ś% ¬’n-registered ships were deemed severely hazardous and banned from entering European ports.

By the summer of 2002, many of the leading shipping organizations were calling for action to be taken against CSC. A spokesman for ITF condemned CSC and Lloyds shipping intelligence service wrote in an opinion piece: “The world should join us in demanding that Cambodia shut down this sleazy and pestilent offshore registration. How many more people have to die in incidents involving Cambodian-flagged vessels, or its ships detained for illegal activities, before something is actually done about it?”

The North Korean connection
American and South Korean interests in CSC were aroused when it was observed that a large number of North Korean ships, at least a dozen according to Michael Richardson, journalist and author of A Time Bomb for Global Trade, were registered with CSC and flying the Cambodian flag.

It is no secret that the Cambodian royal family had, and still maintains, a close relationship with the North Korean regime. King Norodom Sihamoni has often spoken of the Kim regime in a favorable manner. Kim Il-sung provided him with asylum during the turbulent years of Cambodia’s past and even built him an extensive 60-room palace outside Pyongyang. When the royal family returned to Cambodia it was accompanied by North Korean diplomats and bodyguards.

North Korea’s involvement in Cambodia’s flag of convenience operation was suspected after an investigation revealed that one of the primary partners in CSC was Lim In-yong, a senior North Korean diplomat who had served in Cambodia for many years. His role with CSC was described as being that of “a private citizen, [and] not as a representative of the North Korean government”. Whether his role was purely that of an individual or of a more sinister nature is unclear. But the United States and several other countries became increasingly suspicious of North Korea and the company’s motives.

Among several charges of illegal operations by North Korean ships, one was drug smuggling. When it was suggested in the media that Cambodian-registered North Korean ships may have been involved in drug smuggling, CSC denied any knowledge.

Incidents of drug smuggling involving ships from other nations flagged by the company were apparent. In 2002, the Greek-owned, but Cambodian-registered Winner was seized by French forces and discovered to be smuggling a large amount of cocaine. Interestingly enough, Hun Sen, the prime minister of Cambodia, gave his permission to the French government to board the ship - an indication that he did not support CSC. A short time later he revoked CSC’s authority to grant registry to foreign ships.

Perhaps the most infamous North Korean drug smuggling operation took place in 2003. The North Korean freighter Pong-su began its journey from North Korea under its own flag, but on arriving in Singapore changed its registration and reflagged under Tuvulu. It then proceeded to Australia where it was discovered trying to smuggle in a large amount of heroin, and was eventually seized after it tried to resist Australian authorities. Although this incident did not involve a Cambodian-flagged ship, it does give some credence to speculation that North Korea had smuggled drugs using CSC-flagged ships.

Weapons smuggling
While North Korea’s attempts to gain badly needed hard currency by smuggling drugs and tobacco were of some concern to the United States, more important were allegations that North Korea was smuggling and selling advanced weapons technology to other nations.

“Of most concern to the US and indeed to South Korea was the clear evidence that North Korean freighters flying the Cambodian flag or on the Cambodian register were moving ballistic missiles to clients in the Middle East and Africa,” noted journalist Richardson.

Perhaps the best-known of these Cambodian-registered North Korean ships was the Song Sang. In November 2002, a freighter believed to be carrying weapons departed a North Korean port and was tracked by American satellites and American naval ships. In December, as it made its way through the Indian Ocean, it was stopped by American and Spanish naval forces and inspected.

The United States justified its actions by claiming that it was flying no flag and thus was considered a pirate ship. According to Richard Boucher, the State Department’s spokesman, “At first we couldn’t verify the nationality of the ship because the ship’s name and the indications on the hull and the funnel were obscured. It was flying no flag.”

On investigation it was found that the ship was the So San, which claimed to have Cambodian registry. The So San’s manifest stated it was transporting cement to Yemen, but an examination revealed 15 Scud missiles with 15 conventional warheads, 23 tanks of nitric acid rocket propellant and 85 drums of unidentified chemicals all hidden beneath the bags of cement.

It is believed that the North Koreans tried to disguise the ship (Song Sang) by painting over the last two letters in the first name and the final letter in the second name (So San) to help prevent identification. The ship was eventually allowed to continue on its course after it was determined that it had broken no laws.

World criticism
Following the World Trade Center and other terrorist attacks, world opinion began to force the Cambodian government to reconsider its policy of allowing CSC to flag ships at will. The Cambodian government felt compelled to take action before one of the ships under its flag was found guilty of terrorist activity.

“We are victims because the company recklessly allows ships to use the Cambodian flag without proper inspection or control,” said Hor Namhong, the foreign minister, adding: “The company will be audited by the government.”

In July 2002, bowing to international criticism over concern for “Cambodia’s maritime safety record”, the Cambodian government revoked CSC’s authority to grant registrations, giving that authority to the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation. Ironically, it was this ministry that had just two years earlier declared disinterest into the alleged illegal activities of ships registered under its flag.

The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation was only in control of the registry for about six months before the Cambodian government granted the authority to register and flag ships to a new company, International Ship Registry of Cambodia, and its representatives in Busan, South Korea. According to e-mail correspondence from the company’s managing director, Charles Bach, to New York Times reporter Keith Bradsher, there are no longer any North Korean ships registered under the Cambodian flag.

But Marcus Hand, the Asian editor for Lloyd’s List, explained how difficult it is to know for certain who owns what ship because so many of them are owned by different companies registered throughout the world and only the North Koreans themselves know how many ships they own and what flag they fly.

Not only does North Korea purchase flags of convenience, it also sells them for nearly three times the normal asking price. According to ITF in 2006, out of 408 North Korean-flagged ships, only 187 of them were actually owned by North Korea; the rest were owned by other nations including Cambodia, Tonga, Comoros and Sao Tome and Principe - nations that are infamous for their own flags of convenience.

Prior to the United Nations Security Council’s resolution following North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, some of the ships registered to North Korea may have done so to avoid inspection while they carried out illegal activities.

There is some question as to the number of ships that were owned by United States-based companies and registered and flagged under North Korea. According to the American Central Intelligence Agency’s Fact Book, there were three, but Bill Gertz, in an article published with The Washington Times (June 8, 2006), listed nine ships owned by foreign companies, such as Egypt and Syria, based in Delaware, United States. One of these ships was discovered in March 2006 engaged in smuggling migrants off the coast of Europe. Under sanctions that went into effect in May 2006, the companies were required to cancel their registrations with North Korea and seek new registrations with other countries.

The new threat
With the CSC no longer able to grant registrations and Cambodia and South Korea’s progressively warmer relationship, North Korea has been forced to look elsewhere to register its ships. According to The Straits Times, at least 40 nations in the world engage in flags of convenience; many of them willing to flag North Korean ships for a price. North Korea does business with several of them, but a surprising replacement for Cambodia has apparently been found - Mongolia, a land-locked nation.

However, following North Korea’s nuclear test in October of last year, Mongolia’s Ship Registry has urged ships under its flag to abide by the United Nations resolution against North Korea. It is unclear what effect this has had on North Korean ships registered with Mongolia.

In addition to the North Korean threat of nuclear weapons, it has been speculated that North Korea may have the ability to launch modified missiles from its submarines and cargo ships. North Korean-flagged ships would be more susceptible to being stopped and searched by United Nations forces, but ships under FOC might pass unnoticed through surveillance and pose a significant threat to the enemies of the Pyongyang government and to the reputations of the governments which flagged them.

New York Times
Michael R. Gordon
4/15/2007

The Ethiopian government has denied that it violated United Nations sanctions by carrying out a secret purchase earlier this year of military equipment from North Korea.

The Central Intelligence Agency reported in late January that an Ethiopian-flagged ship had left a North Korean port and that its cargo probably included tank parts and other military cargo, according to American officials.

The purchase of tank parts would violate restrictions on dealings with North Korea imposed by the United Nations Security Council in a resolution adopted in October. The Security Council acted less than a week after North Korea tested a nuclear device.

The Bush administration decided not to press Ethiopia to reject the shipment, and the vessel was not inspected after it took its cargo to a port in Djibouti for overland transport to Ethiopia. Some American officials said the shipment was most likely a Security Council violation.

In a statement issued Friday, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry acknowledged that it had received a cargo shipment from North Korea on Jan. 22, but asserted that it did not include prohibited items like tank parts.

“This shipment contained spare parts for machinery and engineering equipment and raw material for the making of assorted ammunition for small arms,” the Ethiopian statement read. “The United States Embassy in Addis Ababa might have been aware of Ethiopia’s importation of the said cargo from North Korea. “However, the fact is that Ethiopia did not purchase arms or any other item covered by Resolution 1718 under the contractual agreements,” the statement read, referring to the Security Council measure. Ethiopia said the shipment was carried out under the terms of several contracts that were signed with North Korea in June and was paid for in advance.

The State Department has declined to comment on the details of this episode.

Ethiopia purchased $20 million worth of arms from North Korea in 2001, according to American estimates, and American officials say this pattern has continued. Ethiopia has an arsenal of Soviet T-55 tanks and other Soviet-style equipment. The United States has sought to persuade Ethiopia to wean itself from its longstanding reliance on North Korea for inexpensive Soviet-era military equipment.

The United States has had close ties with Ethiopia. American officials say that Ethiopia was provided with American intelligence about the location of Islamist forces before its recent offensive in neighboring Somalia. On Jan. 7, American AC-130 gunships launched two strikes on terrorist targets from an airstrip inside Ethiopia, according to American officials. Ethiopia has said such reports are a fabrication.

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