North Korean Economy Watch

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Bfrief No. 08-2-5-2
2/5/2008

It appears that from the end of last year through this January, North Korean Party, regional, cabinet and People’s Committee officials have been carrying out inspections of trading companies, ordering massive layoffs and closings of companies where mis-management or other abnormalities are found.

In Yonhap News, a North Korean insider in Beijing, China was quoted on the 31st as saying, “Since November of last year, North Korean authorities have carried out inspections on trading companies under the control of each organization, with layoffs at most trading firms with abnormalities, deficits, or other mismanagement.”

According to the source, over 100 trading companies are registered in Chungjin, South Hamkyung Province, but after the current housecleaning measures are enforced, only around 15 will remain in operation, with practically all problematic offices being closed down.

Another North Korean source in Shenyang, China reported, “These inspections include trading offices run by the Party, military, and other so-called ‘powerful institutions’, so across the board, there are no exceptions, and as to the growing intensity [of the inspections], they are much stronger and wider in scope than formal annual inspections that have been carried out in the past.” “The order handed down at the end of last year to greatly reduce staff in the Party, military and Cabinet happens every year, but this year massive lay-offs in the workforce at trading companies appears to related to a different kind of personnel liquidation.”

These inspections reportedly stem from an incident at the end of last July in which Oh Moon-hyuk, branch manager of the Ruengra 888 trading company in Yunsa, North Hamkyung Province, was executed after being implicated in the smuggling of timber. The trading company was responsible for the export of timber, and operates under the control of the Party’s accounting bureau. The inside contact stated that because of this incident, North Korean authorities carried out further inspections, leading in October of last year to the dismissal of one official receiving vice-minister pay, and the broadening of the inspections nationwide.

Through the inspection-broadening measures, trade officials under the North Pyungan Province trade office also received an inspection party from the central government, causing many problems for Chinese traders who could not travel in from Dandong. Through these inspections, North Korean authorities reportedly uncovered several cases of embezzlement and misappropriation of company finances while the trading companies were exporting marine products or coal, iron ore, and other mining materials.

The goal of these inspections appears to have been the restoration of public order, just as the recent measures preventing women under the age of 45 from working in markets was a reaction to diminishing public discipline. In the future, price controls, regulations on export goods, or other government regulations regarding international trade are likely to be strengthened.

The most authoritative map of North Korea on Google Earth
North Korea Uncovered v.7
Download it here

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the sixth version.

Additions to the latest version of “North Korea Uncovered” include: A Korean War folder featuring overlays of US attacks on the Sui Ho Dam, Yalu Bridge, and Nakwon Munitians Plant (before/after), plus other locations such as the Hoeryong Revolutionary Site, Ponghwa Revolutionary Site, Taechon reactor (overlay), Pyongyang Railway Museum, Kwangmyong Salt Works, Woljong Temple, Sansong Revolutionary Site, Jongbansan Fort and park, Jangsan Cape, Yongbyon House of Culture, Chongsokjong, Lake Yonpung, Nortern Limit Line (NLL), Sinuiju Old Fort Walls, Pyongyang open air market, and confirmed Pyongyang Intranet nodes.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

Bloomberg
Bradley Martin
Hideko Takayama
11/21/2007

In some parts of the world, floods and famine are acts of God. In North Korea, they’re acts of government.

For decades, the late North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung mobilized vast work teams to fell trees and turn the mountainsides into farmland, allowing rainwater to wreck roads, power lines and agricultural fields.

Following Kim’s death in 1994 — just before a flood- linked famine gripped the nation — his son and successor Kim Jong Il continued the sacrifice of forest cover until 2000, when he began encouraging reforestation. But the shift hasn’t reversed the damage, and some analysts warn that another famine, close to the scale of the 1990s disaster that may have killed millions of people, might occur as soon as next year.

“Next year’s food situation is quite serious,” said Kwon Tae Jin, a researcher at the Korea Rural Economic Institute in Seoul. The famine risk is greatest starting next spring, after the current harvest is used up, he said; North Korea’s best hope may be for more food aid from abroad as a result of its agreement to begin dismantling its nuclear-weapons program.

Floods in August and September left 600 people dead or missing by official count, and 270,000 homeless. “Corpses were dug out of the silt” still clutching vinyl-wrapped photos of the Kims, the official Korean Central News Agency reported.

`Bad Governance’

South Korea has similar rainfall but has largely avoided such calamities. The North’s flooding “is a product of bad governance, economic mismanagement, poor agricultural policy and haphazard short-term survival strategies of the starving, desperate population,” Alexandre Y. Mansourov, a Korea specialist at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, said in a study.

North Korea’s deforestation program dates back to a 1961 speech by Kim Il Sung. In a mostly mountainous country, he proclaimed, “it is necessary to obtain more land through the remaking of nature.” Not only tidelands but “hills throughout the country and plateaus” should be “brought under the plough,” he said.

“The hills and mountains still had trees, and I never heard of floods,” said Hiroko Saito, a Japanese woman who moved with her Korean husband to North Korea in 1961. Her husband joined one of Kim’s vast mountain work teams in the early 1970s, said Saito, now 66 and back in Japan.

Workers and Soldiers

The crews included “city workers, students, soldiers of the Korean People’s Army and anybody else who could move,” said Lee Wo Hong, a pro-communist Korean agricultural expert living in Japan who began spending time in North Korea as a teacher and adviser in 1981.

What he saw there turned him into a critic of Kim Il Sung’s agricultural policy, he said. The country “was filled with bald mountains” on which the North Koreans had planted fast-growing maize; even relatively light rain would wash the crop away.

Reclaiming marginal land appeared successful for a while as North Korea’s overall crop yields increased, agriculture specialist Edward Reed wrote in a 2001 University of Wisconsin study. “Yet from the mid-1980s on, there appears to have been a slow decline in production, probably due to soil depletion from overintensive production,” he said.

By the early 1990s, yields dropped so low that hungry North Koreans went to the mountains to bring even more land under cultivation. Meanwhile, increased demand for firewood — the result of an energy shortage caused when former communist trading partners halted cut-rate fuel exports — added a new incentive to strip the mountainsides.

Death Toll

The results came to the world’s attention in 1995, with the worst floods in a century. The lost farmland contributed to a famine — already under way — that killed somewhere between 600,000 and 1 million North Koreans, according to “Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform,” by Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland. Other estimates put the death toll as high as 4 million.

As floodwaters poured into coal mines, the energy shortage worsened and the state-run economy all but collapsed. Economic recovery — which didn’t begin until 1998 — was halted by further catastrophic floods in 2006, when the economy again shrank, according to an estimate by South Korea’s central bank.

A report on North Korea’s environment as of 2003, jointly prepared by North Korean government agencies, the United Nations Environment Program and the United Nations Development Program, blamed severe “land degradation” on “conversion of forest land in hilly areas to agricultural land.”

Enthusiast

The report portrayed Kim Il Sung as a forest-planting enthusiast from as early as six decades ago. Nick Nuttall, a spokesperson at UNEP headquarters in Nairobi, said the agency was “not in a position to comment” on why the report didn’t mention Kim’s mountain-clearing policy.

While the report said reversing the environmental damage through reforestation has become “an all-out campaign,” hungry people have continued cultivating crops between the tree seedlings, according to Han Young Jin, a defector from the North who lives in South Korea.

As the branches spread, “people would tie the sprigs together so the trees could not grow,” Han wrote on a defector-staffed Web site, Daily NK. “When the trees inevitably died, new saplings would be planted.”

The most authoritative map of North Korea on Google Earth
North Korea Uncovered: Version 6
Download it here

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the sixth version.

Additions to the newest version of North Korea Uncovered include: Alleged Syrian nuclear site (before and after bombing), Majon beach resort, electricity grid expansion, Runga Island in Pyongyang, Mt. Ryongak, Yongbyon historical fort walls, Suyang Fort walls and waterfall in Haeju, Kaechon-Lake Taesong water project, Paekma-Cholsan waterway, Yachts (3), and Hyesan Youth Copper Mine.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

Version 5: Download it here (on Google Earth) 

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the fifth version.

Additions to the latest version of “North Korea Uncovered” include updates to new Google Earth overlays of Sinchon, UNESCO sites, Railroads, canals, and the DMZ, in addition to Kim Jong Suk college of eduation (Hyesan), a huge expansion of the electricity grid (with a little help from Martyn Williams) plus a few more parks, antiaircraft sites, dams, mines, canals, etc.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

I hope this map will increase interest in North Korea. There is still plenty more to learn, and I look forward to receiving your additions to this project.

Korea Times
Jane Han
10/2/2007

Economic cooperation topping the agenda for the inter-Korean summit, plus the van of corporate decision makers traveling to the North together, begs the question: Will the trip bear fruit for two-way business?

Chung Mong-koo of Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group, Chey Tae-won of SK Group, Koo Bon-moo of LG Group and Hyun Jeong-eun of Hyundai Group, who are among the 18 CEOs accompanying President Roh Moo-hyun as part of a special entourage, showed signs of hope as they departed for Pyongyang on their three-day trip that started Tuesday.

“I hope the talks will go well and further the ongoing business between the two Koreas, while opening doors to new areas as well,” said Hyundai Chairwoman Hyun.

Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung was also optimistic as he detailed some of the items, including North Korea’s expansion of social overhead capital (SOC) and construction of railroads, which may be discussed among leaders of both sides.

“As there has been much progress in the peninsula over the past seven years, we’re hoping that this experience will set a milestone in history,” he said in a television interview.

These hopes may be translated into reality through at least two scheduled business leader meetings during the summit period.

“The definition of economic cooperation between the two Koreas, so far, has implied one-way support from Seoul,” said Koh Il-dong, a research fellow of the Korea Development Institute (KDI). “But now, it’s time to break free of that old understanding and move toward real cooperation.”

And “real cooperation” is what the North bound corporate executives are looking to, as they hint some of the possibilities they have in mind.

Among the top three business topics expected for discussion _ natural resource developments, roadway and railway distribution system expansions and dockyard construction _ Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group is said to be interested in building railroad cars through its shipping affiliate Glovis, and also measure the feasibility of SOC businesses, while POSCO showed interest in forestation.

Although company officials said forestation is just a possibility, as the steel maker has shown its interest in securing carbon credit overseas, industry insiders say the opportunity will be advantageous for POSCO if cooperation comes through.

And as speculations rose that SK Group may be considering communication and energy projects in the North, company officials said plans are open for review if the right offer is made.

LG and Samsung, which are said to be mulling over their specialty areas of electronics, seem to be in the same scouting stages as others.

“Each company needs to be given the time and circumstances to carry out through market research,” said Dong Yong-sueng, a research fellow of the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), implying that those are some of the accommodations that must be worked out if business is to happen.

Contrary to the high hopes, economic experts pointed out that some corporations would be wary of cooperating with North Korea, as it may ruin their reputation in the global market.

Daily NK
Jeong Jae Sung
9/18/2007

North Korea has requested for negotiations to begin at the Inter-Korean Summit Talks on the co-development of the Kaema Plateau, also known as “the roof of Korea.” The request was taken into consideration by the Ministry of Unification.

In light of North Korea’s request, the Ministry has recently conducted a survey of North Korean defectors from South Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jagang, where the Kaema Plateau is located, regarding the significant geographical features, the status of current development at the plateau, and the intentions of the North Korean government.

Kim Hyung Seh (pseudonym), a North Korean defector from Yangkang, stated that “I was told by interested parties at the Ministry of Unification that right after the Summit Talks North Korea will deliberate the Kaema Plateau development issue and that they needed my cooperation for a sound investigation.”

According to Kim, the questions asked focused on the North Korean government’s purpose in developing the Kaema Plateau, the potential value of this site as a tourist resort, and wether or not there is enough possibility for tourism given the ever increasing number of visitors from Mongolia.

He asserted that “the Kaema Plateau is a huge forest which has no value as a tourist attraction at the moment. All the particular tourist attractions in North Korea retain villas owned by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, but there are none at Kaema Plateau, which speaks for itself.”

Kim also added that the affiliates of the Ministry of Unification did not know where the Kaema Plateau was.

“It is difficult for North Korea to develop the area around Kaema Plateau, which is why they followed the shoreline to develop their railways. In order to make this project possible, the basic transportation infrastructure such as airline facilities, roads and railroads must be established first” advised Kim.

The Ministry of Unification has denied every having conducted these surveys. Regarding the interviews with defectors, one affiliate of the Ministery said “We have not held such meetings,” and another said that “We have met [with the defectors], but we never asked about the Kaema Plateau issue.”

Kim Joong Tae, the Director of the Ministry of Unification’s Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Team, who interviewed Kim, told the DailyNK that “North Korea has never suggested the development of Kaema Plateau. The Ministry merely asked North Korean Defectors about tourism development at Mt. Baekdu.”

The Kaema Plateau is situated across the Middle and Southern region of Yangkang Province, South of Northwest Hamgkyung and East of Jagang. The total area is 14,300 km2 and the height is 1,340m. It is the highest and widest plateau in the entire peninsula, also known as “the roof of Korea.”

Kaema Plateau has abundant forest resources which provide avariety of material lumber. There is also a rich supply of mineral resources, including steel, magnesite, gold, apatite, and copper.

The only source of transportation infrastructure is the military airfields in Pungseo and Jangjin.

It is probable that North Korea’s reason for suggesting the development of Kaema Plateau is to make it tourist site, showcasing various amusment parks and ski resorts. As it is now, this area is completely restricted to civilian traffic. If transportation in the high region is developed, this could be applied for military purposes.

Lee Jin Young (pseudonym), a defector currently residing in South Korea’s Yangcheon district, explained that “the Kaema Plateau is so treacherous that it is only used as a military training field for Special Forces. This was the one area that allied forces could not get control of, even during the Korean War.”

She also added that, “rather than developing Kaema Plateau as a tourist attraction, they should develop the Baekmoo Plateau which includes Mt. Baekdu. The suggestion to develop the Kaema Plateau can only be seen as their intention to construct a better transportation infrastructure.”

Therefore, even if South Korea were to agree to the co-development of Kaema Plateau, there will be huge difficulties regarding the expansion of the social infrastructure and compromising with the military. In particular, the construction of Korean roads, railroads and airfields in the region is sure to cost a lot of money.

The most authoritative, publicly available map of North Korea
Version 4: August 29, 2007

Download it here 

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the fourth version.

Additions to the latest version of “North Korea Uncovered” include the city of Manpo along the Chinese border, KEDO, Kumgang Resort expansion, Kaesong Industrial Zone, as well as a few more parks, antiaircraft sites, dams, mines, canals, etc. I have also added more links in the menu which will tell the viewer a bit about the locations themselves. I have also changed the color scheme to make the collage easier to view.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

I hope this map will increase interest in North Korea. There is still plenty more to learn, and I look forward to receiving your additions to this project.

Institute for Far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-8-22-1

The Bank of Korea released a report on August 17 that details economic estimates on a variety of sectors in North Korea. Overall, North Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell 1.1 percent during 2006, the first time since 1999 that the North has failed to increase its GDP. Inclement weather was one factor that played into a fall in agricultural production, and there also appears to have been little progress in the construction of public works in the country. Overall, North Korean GNI was 2.9 percent of that in the South, with per capita GNI at 1,108 USD, 6 percent of the 18,372 USD per capita GNI in South Korea.

The entire economy of the DPRK is approximately 1/35th that of the South, with the Gross National Income (GNI) a mere 1/17th the level seen in the ROK. This shows a growing divide between the two Koreas, as the comparisons in the previous year were 1/33rd and 1/16th, respectively. Due to the North Korean nuclear issues and other foreign relations problems faced during 2006, a worsening of diplomatic relations with other countries, energy shortages and other economic woes befell the North, putting the entire economy in a difficult situation.

The North showed a weakening of the agricultural and forestry industries, increasing production by a mere 2.4 percent, 2.6 percent down from 2005. Corn and other cereal production grew by 7 percent, but rice was down 6.4 percent, and bean production was down 6.6 percent from the year before, leaving overall grain output down 3.6 percent. On the other hand, shellfish and crustacean harvests grew by 1.5 percent, while timber and livestock harvests remained unchanged.

On the mining front, coal and other non-metal mined resources showed promising increases, but production of lead, zinc, and copper fell by 1.7 percent, compared to the 3.5 percent growth posted in the previous year. Despite promising increases in production of manufactured goods and growth in the chemical and heavy industries in 2005, last year North Korean production growth rates in these fields fell flat at a mere 0.4 percent, increasing production rates of fibers, clothing and shoes, but turning out less kitchenware and food-related products. Coal and fuel products looked favorable, but fabricated metals and machine parts, as well as nonferrous metal products grew at a rate of 1.1 percent, down from 5.4 percent.

Gas-fired electrical generation was up 17 percent, while hydroelectric power grew only 2.7 percent, falling from 4.4 percent in 2005. Other infrastructure projects were also on the decline, with only 49 km of road paved in 2006.

The number of foreign tourists declined, with visitors to Kumgang Mountain falling from 366,000 in 2005 to only 265,000 last year, adding to the 21.8 percent decline in the food and lodging sector, but the transportation and communication sector grew by 5.1 percent, leading to an overall gain of 1.1 percent in the service industry.

The gap in overseas trade between the two Koreas increased from 182-fold to 212-fold as North Korean foreign trade fell off 5.2 percent. Imports in the North were up 2.3%, although seafood imports were down 48.4 percent. The slack was made up by a 34.1 percent increase in the import of plastics, a 31.2 percent increase in imported chemical goods, and a 12.4 percent increase in imported machinery.

During 2006, inter-Korean exchanges grew 27.8 percent, reaching 13.5 billion USD. South Korean exports to the North grew 16 percent as Seoul increased rice and fertilizer aid, and exports to the Kaesong Industrial Complex grew. On the other hand, North-South cooperative projects grew 52.7 percent as South Korea increasingly imported North Korean zinc, sand, and other natural resources.

In order to give some perspective to the North Korean economic data, the Bank of Korea offered the following comparisons:

DPRK/ROK/Ratio
Population (thousand) 23,079/48.297/2.1
Economic Growth (2006) -1.1%/5.0%
Nominal GNI (100 million USD) 256/8,873/34.7
Per Capita GNI (USD) 1,108/18,372/16.6
Exports (100 million USD) 9.5/3,254.6/343.8
Imports (100 million USD) 20.5/3,93.8/151.0
Coal Production (10,000 tons) 2,468/280/0.11
Electrical Use (10,000 kW) 782/6,551/8.4
Electrical Production Capacity (100 mill. KW) 225/3,812/16.9
Petroleum Imports (10,000 bbl) 384/88,843/231.4
Cereal Production (10,000 tons) 448.3/530.0/1.2
Rice Production (10,000 tons) 189.4/468.0/2.5
Seafood Harvest (10,000 tons) 92.3/303.3/3.3
Iron Ore Mining (10,000 tons) 504.1/22.7/0.05
Nonferrous Metals Mining (10,000 tons) 8.6/187.7/21.8
Automobile Production (10,000) 0.44/384.0/872.8
Steel (10,000 tons) 118.1/4,843.3/41.0
Cement (10,000 tons) 615.5/4,920.9/8.0
Fertilizer (10,000 tons) 45.4/318.3/7.0
Chemical Products (10,000 tons) 2.9/145.7/50.2
Railways (km) 5,235/3,392/0.6
Roads (km) 25,544/102,061/4.0
Port Loading Capacity (10,000 tons) 3,700/69,213/18.7
Shipping Capacity (10,000 tons) 90.4/1,180.2/13.1

Korea Times
Na Jeong-ju
8/16/2007

North Korea’s economy posted negative growth in 2006 for the first time in eight years on decreased production of agricultural and fisheries goods, the Bank of Korea (BOK) said Thursday.

In its estimate for the North’s economic growth, the central bank said the North’s real gross domestic product (GDP) shrank 1.1 percent in 2006 from a year ago, a turnaround from a 3.8 percent expansion in 2005. Until 2006, the North’s GDP had grown for seven years in a row since a 6.2 percent rise in 1999.

The GDP is the total output of goods and services produced within a country.

“Due to bad weather, North Korea’s agricultural, forestry and fisheries production fell with the construction industry remaining sluggish,” the BOK said. “North Korea seems to have suffered a blow as its international relations deteriorated due to its nuclear issues on top of a shortage of energy.”

The economic gap between the two Koreas grew larger last year.

North Korea’s nominal GDP increased 5.8 percent from a year ago to $25.6 billion last year, while South Korea’s GDP rose to $887.3 billion. South Korea’s GDP is 34.7 times larger than that of North Korea, widening from a 32.6-fold difference in 2005.

North Korea’s per-capita gross national income (GNI) came to $1,108 last year, up from $1,056 a year earlier, while South Korea’s per-capita GNI of $18,372 was 16.6 times bigger than that of the North, expanding from a 15.5 fold-difference. The North’s population reached 23.1 million, while the South’s was 48.3 million.

North Korea’s trade remained unchanged year-on-year at $3 billion last year, compared with South Korea’s $634.9 billion. The South’s trade was 212 times bigger than the North’s last year, rising from a 182-fold difference in 2005.

Pyongyang saw its exports dip 5.2 percent year-on-year to $950 million in 2006 as outbound shipments of animal products, non-metal goods and machinery decreased, while imports gained 2.3 percent to $2.1 billion.

Inter-Korean trade increased 27.8 percent from a year earlier to $1.4 billion. South Korea’s shipments to North Korea advanced 16 percent to $830.2 million, mainly on increased rice and fertilizer aid.

Inbound shipments from the North jumped 52.7 percent to $519.5 million on a hike in inter-Korean projects and mineral imports, the BOK said.

North Korea’s agricultural, forestry and fisheries industry declined 2.6 percent year-on-year last year, a turnaround from a 5 percent gain in 2005. The construction industry dipped 11.5 percent after gaining 6.1 percent the previous year.

The mining sector growth decelerated to 1.9 percent from 3.5 percent. Its manufacturing sector expansion slowed to 0.4 percent from 4.9 percent. The services industry grew 1.1 percent last year after increasing 1.3 percent in 2005, the central bank said.

North Korean economy posted 2006 downturn
Joong Ang Daily
Jung Ha-won
8/17/2007

North Korea’s economy shrank for the first time in eight years last year as agricultural production declined due to natural disasters and sluggish infrastructure development, according to estimates by South Korea’s central bank.

The Bank of Korea said yesterday that it believes North Korea’s 2006 gross domestic product declined 1.1 percent from a year earlier, the first downturn since 1999. The BOK, since 1991, has estimated the figures based on data from South Korean intelligence agencies and other research institutes. North Korea does not release economic data.

According to the estimate released yesterday, North Korea’s agriculture and marine industries last year declined 2.6 percent from 2005, when production rose by 5 percent.

“North Korea suffered from a serious flood last year, in stark contrast to 2005 when there was no major flood and farm production was good,” said a BOK official who refused to be named.

Growth in mining production, one of North Korea’s major industries, slowed to 1.9 percent from 3.5 percent in 2005. Manufacturing inched up 0.4 percent, down from 4.9 percent growth in 2005.

Construction sector production showed the biggest downturn at 11.5 percent from a year earlier, compared to 6.1 percent growth in 2005, as road and railway construction slowed, the central bank said.

Using satellite data, the bank estimated North Korea built just 49 kilometers (30.4 miles) of new roads last year, a sharp decline from 310 kilometers built in 2005.