North Korean Economy Watch

Joong Ang Daily
11/8/2006

Amid continued concern that money spent on the Kaesong inter-Korean industrial complex fuels Pyongyang’s military, the Unification Ministry said yesterday that most of the wages paid by South Korean companies buy daily supplies and food for North Korean workers.

Song Yong-deung, 66, a Korean-Australian who operates a Kaesong-based food and supply company jointly owned by North Korea, told the ministry that his company regularly provides goods to North Korean workers, according to a press release from Goh Gyeong-bin, an official in charge of the complex. Song’s company gets money from North Korean authorities, who in turn accept the wage payments from the South Korean companies operating the complex. The North Korean workers do not directly receive their salaries.

According to data provided by Mr. Song and the ministry, South Korean firms pay an average of $600,000 per month in wages, of which about 45 percent is deducted for fees such as insurance and taxes. In March, after the deductions, a total of $295,000 was paid to the North, of which $219,000 went to Mr. Song’s company to purchase goods, such as rice, for the workers.

Unification Ministry officials said yesterday the bulk of the information provided by Mr. Song matched Seoul’s own assessment on how the money sent to the North is being used. Asked why the ministry has not tried in the past two years since the complex opened to verify how the money sent for wages was being used, Yang Chang-seok, a ministry spokesman, said Seoul has repeatedly asked the North to provide a detailed account of the cash flow, but other than stating the workers bought supplies, little information has been provided.

“Given the nature of the North’s closed society, confirmation itself is problematic,” the spokesman said.

The efforts by Seoul to cast a light on the flow of the money being paid to the North comes at a time when Washington is pushing Seoul to curb inter-Korean projects, citing transparency issues over money sent to the North. Over the weekend, President Roh Moo-hyun vowed to continue with inter-Korean projects in a policy speech addressed to the National Assembly. Currently, there are 15 companies operating at the complex employing 9,632 North Koreans.

The announcement came as U.S. delegation visited Seoul this week to discuss how to implement the United Nations sanctions resolution against the North.

Joong Ang Daily
Lee Young-jong, Shin Eun-jin, Sohn Hae-yong
9/20/2006

North Korea has filed claims with British and Russian reinsurance companies after four disasters in the North, and seeks millions of dollars in compensation, a source in Seoul said yesterday. His comments were confirmed by government officials.

The sources said the claims were filed by Minjok Insurance General Company, and asked for payments related to two rail crashes and two other incidents.

Reinsurers help policy-issuing insurance companies spread the risk involved in their policies to other insurance companies around the world. Companies buy “packages” composed of parts of many policies, and share in both the policy payments and claims made under those policies.

The reinsurers reportedly received permission from Pyongyang to conduct investigations at the accident sites before paying the claims; those visits have already taken place, these sources said, adding that the visits were made to places normally off-limits to foreigners.

One of the incidents was the sinking of a passenger ship traveling between Wonsan and Heungnam, both east-coast ports. Half of the ship’s 200 passengers lost their lives, Minjok reportedly told its reinsurers. Industry officials here estimated that the insurance payment would be in the millions of dollars. Another incident was a train accident in South Hamkyong province in April, which resulted in the deaths of 270 soldiers and 400 civilians. Rumors had circulated in Seoul about the latter accident, but those rumors were dismissed at the time by South Korean government officials.

Another train crash occurred near Nampo, a west-coast port, in April. Dozens were reportedly killed in that crash. Little is known about a helicopter crash near Pyongyang in May, these sources said.

“North Korea has been in a bad plight since September 2005, after its assets in Banco Delta Asia in Macau were frozen and the United States announced financial sanctions,” a Seoul official said. “It is my understanding that the North is also trying to press claims linked to flood damage this summer.”

One observer said the North’s rare disclosure of disasters indicates how serious Pyongyang’s cash crunch is. “It means that Pyongyang is more interested in gaining tangible benefits despite the risk of airing its dirty linen in public,” said Yang Moo-jin, a North Korea-watcher at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul.

Others said Pyongyang may be learning to tweak global financial systems. “North Korean entities have been involved in competition to earn foreign currency, and now one of them is focusing on loss recovery through insurance,” said Lee Yeong-hun, a North Korea economic specialist at the Bank of Korea.

Experts said reinsurance payments to the North are outside the scope of any financial sanctions. “The North is operating all of its legitimate dollar-earning channels at full capacity,” a Seoul official said.

From the Joong Ang Daily:

Guarantees for Kaesong

Detailed plans for providing private loans to companies moving to the Kaesong Industrial Complex are being made. Even though the relationship between the two Koreas is in a state of confusion because of the recent missile crisis, several senior officials from big banks and the credit guarantee funds are planning to visit the industrial complex in North Korea.

The administration’s rationale for the visit is to get immediate financial support from the private sector to implement its special loan guarantee program to companies in Kaesong. The banks are certainly willing to give the loans once they have a guarantee certificate from the fund, which is backed by the government. The guarantee fund has nothing to worry about because the government will probably patch up the damage if the companies default on the loans.

Although the funding is considered private capital, it is in effect a loan using tax money as security.

It is not right to support an inter-Korea project through such means. Even if the Kaesong Industrial Complex is a symbol of the economic cooperation between South and North Korea, the competitiveness and the business potential of companies moving to the complex should come first.

The companies should be able to make profits on their own and without any special treatment or support from the government. The banks will be making loans as if they are only hypothetical. They have no intention of giving out loans without the government guarantee. This demonstrates just how uncertain the business potential of the Kaesong Industrial Complex really is.

There is also the problem of getting products made at Kaesong acknowledged as South Korean products. The United States, which is Korea’s most important export market, is not accepting the idea. Without solving this problem, the prospects of the Kaesong Industrial Complex are uncertain.

Giving huge financial support to the Kaesong Industrial Complex at a time when tension in the international community is rising because of the test launch of North Korean missiles sends the wrong signal to the international community. The United States is worried about the cash that the project will generate for North Korea and probably its military programs. This funding is contradictory to the international mood. 

Also from the Joong Ang: Apparently the subsidy-providing agency says it needs a bigger budget!

‘Guarantees’ and ‘North Korea’ sound risky to a state-run fund

As corporate bankers and the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund trek to the Kaesong Industrial Complex today for an inspection visit, the state-run loan guarantor sounds less than happy about its role in funding companies at the North Korean complex.

Last month, the Finance Ministry said the government would give loan guarantees of up to 10 billion won ($11 million) per company to help South Korean companies who have set up plants there.

Several of the big banks here will join the group visiting the complex ― they include representatives from Kookmin, Shinhan and Hana ― and say they are looking for business. “This visit is a step in our preparations for possible financial dealings with the companies there,” said an official at one of the banks who asked not to be identified.

But a credit guarantee fund spokesman seemed to hope that won’t happen under the present ground rules. “We feel the companies at Kaesong present enough financial risk that without special funding from the government, it would be difficult to guarantee all the loans on our own,” he said.

Seoul estimates that about 1.2 trillion won in aggregate will have to be made available to companies operating at the complex; most of them are smaller manufacturers. The program announced by the government on June 16 said the loan guarantees would extend for as long as seven years. So while from the lenders’ point of view any loans would be nearly free of risk, the credit guarantee fund has a different perspective.

“We will do what the government tells us to do,” the fund’s spokesman sighed, “but the government should be responsible [for our losses].”

Seoul has about 7 trillion won available in its Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, but those funds are spread across many programs, including tourism at Mount Kumgang and funding of both North and South Korean visitors at conferences and festivals.

Fifteen companies have set up plants in Kaesong; 24 more have reserved sites, and Seoul’s ambitious plans call for about 800 manufacturers to set up shop by 2012.

The Daily NK speculates about how much money the family of the victim of the accidental death in the Mt. Koumgang resort will receive.  What is interesting about this article is the exploration of dispute resolution without courts or insurance companies…something that most westerners could not imagine.

Here are some bullet points from the article:

• Allegedly from a North Korean defector: “In North Korea there is no such national compensation for car accident causalities. So it is pitiful to think that the North Korean government did take away this compensation without giving it to the car accident-related families.”
• “Because of the system of no car insurance in North Korea, offenders must compensate the injured parties for the car accident themselves. If the offenders do not have the ability for compensation, then they must go to prison. And if they have the ability, they pay money for it. The compensation is usually a TV or about one hundred thousand won ($35). “
• If one dies in North Korea, the death is not dealt with seriously.
• The aleged defector again describes an accident in which his friend was killed by a Mercedes: “[After the accident, I put my fired in the back seat of the car].  As soon as I informed those instructors of the hospital who were in charge of Jeong Hyeok’s car accident, they ran to the Red Cross Hospital. In the meantime, Jeong Hyeok had died, and was moved to the mortuary. The vice-president and the teacher in charge of the college construction required the driver to be responsible for drinking and driving and to compensate his parents for the car accident. The chief demanded to finish up this accident, saying that he will give a TV and a refrigerator to Jeong Hyeok’s parents. The teacher repelled the suggestion, ‘This is not enough. If you do it this way, then I will accuse you to the Central Committee.  The next day, a secretary of the Primary Party Committee called the college. He said, “Just follow the suggestion that the Security Safety Agency gives the funeral expenses and a color TV.” It was evident that the Security Safety Agency gave a certain kind of hint to the secretary of the Primary Party Committee. The situation was saying that the chief will evasively save the driver. However, who can refute the instruction of the Party? Despite the undeserved death, the North Korean government just issued one ‘patriot certificate’. Seeing the TV exchanged for her son, she continued sobbing.

I have some personal experience with this topic.  When I visited the DPRK in August 2005, I asked one of my guides how traffic disputes were resolved.  He said that those involved simply had to work out the details.  there were no insurance companies.  This would put the average citizen at a severe bargaining disadvantage in the event of an acident.

The Index of Economic Freedom is published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.   The index tracks the march of economic freedom around the world, becoming a must-have resource for investors, policymakers, academics, and others who want to learn about the link between economic freedom and prosperity. The 2006 Index of Economic Freedom measures 161 countries against a list of 50 independent variables divided into 10 broad factors of economic freedom. Low scores are more desirable; the higher the score on a factor, the greater the level of government interference in the economy, and the less economic freedom a country enjoys.

Accoding to the 2006 Index:

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is undergoing some economic changes. In 2002, the government initiated tentative steps toward markets and entrepreneurship by creating semi-private markets, shops, and small business across the country. Part of these reforms included the phasing out of a decades-old food rationing and public distribution system and allowing prices and exchange rates to float. Nevertheless, the country remains firmly rooted in its communist and authoritarian system with its central command economy, and deeper institutional reform is constrained by the degeneration of North Korea’s industrial, transportation, and energy infrastructure, which continues to be neglected for the sake of the government’s military policy. Although reports indicate that there is greater economic activity in Pyongyang and other cities, economic deprivation seems to be worsening for most of the population. The country remains heavily dependent on external assistance for its food supplies, and there are indications that the economy is opening up to more trade with its two neighbors, China and South Korea. North Korea’s trade volume in 2004 is estimated to have reached its highest level since 1991—$2.85 billion. However, the possibility that North Korea might open wide-scale trade remains low because of lingering tensions about its nuclear weapons program. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s overall score is unchanged this year.

North Korean trade data are compiled from trading partners’ statistics and published by the South’s Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency…. [M]uch trade is de facto aid, mainly with North Korea’s two main partners, China and South Korea.” According to the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, North Korea imported slightly over $2 billion in goods in 2003 while exporting slightly more than $1 billion.

“North Korea has the dubious distinction of being first in and last out of the developing world’s debt crisis, initially defaulting in the 1970s and remaining mired in debt today,” reports the Economist Intelligence Unit. “This dire debt record has not stopped North Korea from seeking new foreign investment. Its first special economic zone, at Rajin-Sonbong in the north-east, was gazetted in 1991. A raft of detailed foreign business laws in the 1990s suggested serious intent, but found few takers. Rajin-Sonbong is remote and still lacks basic infrastructure. Wage rates were unrealistically high, as the state controls labour supply and insists on taking its share. More recent special zones, at Mt Kumgang and Kaesong, are more enticing…. Continued nuclear defiance will inevitably deter investors from what remains largely a leap into the unknown.” Aside from these few economic zones where investment is approved on a case-by-case basis, foreign investment is prohibited.

“North Korea largely lacked a financial sector in the capitalist sense. Most funding for industry came from the state, which also earned revenue by taking a percentage on transactions among enterprises…. At least two foreign aid agencies have recently set up microcredit schemes…. Reports in early 2005 suggested that a radical overhaul of the financial system is under way. As a next step in market reforms, investment funds will no longer be allocated by the state under a plan. Instead, as normal elsewhere, firms will have to borrow from banks, whose role and importance are therefore set to grow and change markedly.” Because of debts dating back to the 1970s, most foreign banks will not consider entering North Korea. The central bank also serves as a commercial bank with a network of 227 local branches. A South Korean bank has opened a branch in the Kaesong zone, and a Hong Kong hotel and casino in Rajin-Sonbong includes a bank. The state holds a monopoly on insurance through the State Insurance Bureau and the Korea Foreign Insurance Company. The state continues to dominate the financial sector.

The government controls and determines all wages and prices. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, “Only in 2002 did real change begin. In July wages and (more so) prices were raised drastically for producers and consumers typically tenfold or more. Enterprises were told to charge prices that reflected their costs, and no longer expect subsidies.” In addition, “the government had adopted a law that acknowledged the existence of farmers’ markets for the first time [in 2003]. However, with no matching supply-side measures to boost output, the result of these tentative reforms has been rampant inflation for many staple goods.” According to the U.S. Department of State, “Government ministries set wages.”

North Korea’s informal market is immense even though the government imprisons many who engage in such activity. Informal market activity in agricultural goods flourishes as a result of famines and oppressive government policies. There is also an active informal market in currency and in trade with China.

Major exports: minerals, metallurgical products, machinery, textiles, fishery products

Major export trading partners: China 37.1%, South Korea 27.1%, Japan 16.3%

Major import trading partners: China 30.6%, South Korea 21.2%, Thailand 9.9%

Korea Times
Na Jeong-ju
6/9/2005

South Korean companies setting up operations in the Kaesong industrial complex face difficulties due to a North Korean obligation that they must purchase insurance policies from a North Korean state-run firm.

North Korea demands that South Korean firms have insurance against accidents with a North Korean state-run firm, but they question whether it is financially stable enough to cover all possible accidents.

According to related regulations set up by North Korea last November, South Korean firms in the Kaesong industrial complex must buy insurance policies from North Korean firms. If South Korean companies didn’t follow the rule, they had to pay $10,000 in fines.

South Korean firms regard this rule as unfair.

“We have to buy insurance from a North Korean company despite its inability to cover possible accidents,’’ said an official of a company in the Kaesong complex.

“We have asked the South Korean government to correct this problem because we don’t trust North Korean companies.’’

According to sources, the Unification Ministry, the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Korea Non-Life Insurance Association (KNIA) will hold a meeting today to discuss the matter. The South Korean government has been aware of the problem faced by South Korean companies, but it has delayed notifying the issue to North Korea, the sources said.

“South Korea should have a consultation with North Korea to address insurance matters,’’ a source said. “North Korea may be active in correcting the problem, but it may demand something in return.’’

Currently, a total of 15 South Korean companies have signed contracts with Hyundai Asan, a North Korean business arm of Hyundai Group, to set up a factory in the Kaesong complex. Hyundai Asan has the exclusive rights to develop the Mt. Kumgang tourism complex and the Kaesong complex under agreements signed in 2000.

“South Korean companies have asked the government to check the financial status of the North Korean insurance firm, but they have received no answer,’’ a KNIA official said. “In case of accidents, insurance firms must conduct investigations and check the financial status of policyholders. In this sense, we believe North Korean insurance companies are not capable.’’

North Korea has only one insurance company run by the government, but South Korean companies have little information about it.

From KCNA:

Regulations of Insurance in Kaesong Industrial Zone Adopted

Pyongyang, October 11 (KCNA) — Decision No. 35 of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly “On the Adoption of the Regulations of Insurance in the Kaesong Industrial Zone” dated September 21, Juche 93 (2004) has been published. The decision says the regulations were adopted and the Cabinet and organs concerned of the DPRK are to take working measures for their implementation. 

The regulations consist of 28 articles.

The mission of the regulations is to strictly establish the system and order in the work of insurance in the Kaesong industrial zone so as to help toward stabilizing the business activities and life of those who reside and stay there.

The regulations are applied to the enterprises, branches and offices established in the Kaesong industrial zone.

They are applied also to the south Koreans, overseas Koreans and foreigners who stay and reside in the industrial zone.

KIEP has published the North Korea Development Report 2003/04 (follow the link to download all several hundred pages!)

Summary: As a result of North Korea’s isolation from the outside world, international
communities know little about the status of the North Korean economy and its
management mechanisms. Although a few recent changes in North Korea’s economic system have attracted international interests, much confusion remains as to the characteristics of North Korea’s recent policy changes and its future direction
due to the lack of information. Therefore, in order to increase the understanding of readers in South Korea and abroad, KIEP is releasing The North Korea Development Report in both Korean and English. The motivation behind this report stemmed from the need for a comprehensive and systematic investigation into North Korea’s socio-economic conditions, while presenting the current status of its industrial sectors and inter-Korean economic cooperation. The publishing of this second volume is important because it not only supplements the findings of the first edition, but also updates the recent changes in the North Korean economy. The topics in this report include macroeconomics and finance, industry and infrastructure, foreign economic relations and inter-Korean economic cooperation, social welfare and science & technology.

This report also covers the ‘July 1 Economic Reform’ launched two years ago and
subsequent changes in the economic management system. The North Korea
Development Report helps to improve the understanding of the contemporary North
Korean economy.
Table of Contents  
 
Part I Macroeconomic Status and Finance
Chapter 1 Current Status of the North Korean Economy and Its Prospects
Chapter 2 National Financial Revenue and Expenditure
Chapter 3 Banking and Price Management

Part II Industrial Management and Problems
Chapter 4 The Industrial Sector
Chapter 5 The Agricultural Sector
Chapter 6 Social Overhead Capital
Chapter 7 Commerce and Distribution Sector
Chapter 8 The Defense Industry

Part III International Economic Activities
Chapter 9 Foreign Economic Relations
Chapter 10 Special Economic Zones
Chapter 11 Inter-Korean Economic Relations

Part IV Social Security and Technology Development
Chapter 12 Social Security and Social Services
Chapter 13 Science and Technology Sector

Part V The Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 14 The Contents and Background for the Recent Policy Changes
Chapter 15 The Features and Problems of the Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 16 Prospects and Future Tasks of the July 1 Economic Reform  

Here is the main page

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From our friends at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul:

North Korean financial institutions
U.S. Embassy; Seoul, South Korea
Flash Fax Document Number: 5711
Date: April, 1995
——————————————————————————–

1. This cable summarizes information obtained from meetings with Korean Development Institute (KDI) officials as well as from two unclassified publications:
– “Status of North Korea’s financial system and expected reform in North Korea’s financial world in case economic integration takes place,” written by Dr. Chun Hong-Taek, and published by KDI in January 1994. Chun notes that his information is from open sources as well as interviews with South Korean companies that have done business with North Korea.

– “North Korean trading companies and financial institutions,” published by the National Unification Board (NUB) in October 1994. The NUB notes that the data in its publication is based on contract forms between South and North Korean trading corporations and other open sources, such as “Foreign trade of the DPRK” (published by the DPRK International Trade Promotion Committee, editions of January 1993 to June 1994) and “Directory of DPRK Foreign Trade Organizations,” (published in March 1994 by Japan’s East Asian Trade Society).

2. A few observations about the information:

– It provides a snapshot of individual North Korean financial institutions, such as a bank’s areas of specialization (if any), its address, key personnel, and its correspondent banks overseas. It does not provide information on current financial transactions.

– There are some differences in the information provided by the KDI and NUB, especially regarding subordination/jurisdiction. For example, the KDI publication notes that all banks are subordinate to the Central Bank, which itself is subordinate to the State Administration Council (SAC). The NUB, however, indicates that some banks are directly responsible to the Central Bank, while others are responsible to the SAC.

– Neither the KDI nor NUB publication lists any North Korean financial institution as having a correspondent agreement with Ashikaga Bank in Japan — a relationship that has been discussed in the press.

– Because of the date of information, newly created banks, such as the Ing-North East Asia Bank (reftel), are not included below.

– Likewise, the KDI and NUB include the names of several banks that may not be currently operating (such as Lyongaksan Bank), may have merged, or may have been renamed. 3. According to KDI officials and the two documents mentioned above, North Korean financial institutions include:

The Central Bank
4. Its title in English is the “Central Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The CB is located In the central district of Pyongyang. Its telegraphic address is central bank. The CB operates 227 branches throughout North Korea, including P’yongyang, Ch’ongjin, Haeju, Hamhung, Hyesan, Kaesong, Kanggye, Namp’o, Najin, Sariwon, Sinuiju, and Wonsan. According to NUB, CB’s President is Chong Song-t’aek.

5. Established in 1946, the CB falls under the jurisdiction of the State Administration Council. Organizationally, the CB consists of three departments (Cadre Affairs, Material Supply, and Finance) and 14 Offices (coordination/planning, floating fund, Construction fund, repair fund, technology, currency control, banknote issue, fixed assets, savings/insurance, bookkeeping, inspection, business, and mobilization).

6. As a central bank, it is responsible for issuing bank notes, regulating currency in circulation, handling matters related to payment of accounts on a national level, making the government’s budgetary payments, and purchasing/managing precious metals. The Central Bank also operates as: a “special bank” by supplying state funds; a “commercial bank” by accepting deposits and lending money; a “state auditor” by exercising financial control in matters regarding the use of state funds; a “state property manager” by registering and evaluating the fixed assets of state institutions and enterprises; and as an “insurance institution” by handling domestic insurance matters–including property insurance for cooperative farms and factories and accident insurance for working Persons between 16 and 65 years old.

7. (FYI: according to KDI, there are four kinds of savings accounts available at the CB and north Korean Post Offices: ordinary savings accounts carrying 3.0 percent interest per year; long-term savings accounts carrying 3.6 percent interest per year; time deposit accounts carrying 4.0 percent interest per year; and a lottery-type deposit whereby the subscriber-if he/she draws a winning number in a lottery held every quarter–is paid a prize instead of interest.)

8. Funds lent by the CB to North Korean enterprises come from three sources, including the state budget, savings accounts, and insurance premiums. If an enterprise suffers a temporary cash flow problem while implementing Its projected economic plan, it can go to the CB because — according to KDI — the CB is the only supplier of state budgetary funds and money needed for financing national economic plans comes out of the state budget.

9. The NUB publication lists a firm named “Eunbyol Corporation of the Central Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” It is located in the central district of P’yongyang, its telex number is 5965 zu kp, and its telephone numbers are 33946 and 36882. According to the NUB, Eunbyol accepts orders for the manufacture of memorial coins. (Comment: The relationship between Eunbyol and the Central Bank is not further defined.)

Trade Bank (aka Korea Trade Bank)
10. The Korea Trade Bank’s (KTB) title in English is the “Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The bank is located in the central district of P’yongyang. Its telegraphic address is Mooyokbank Pyongyang; its telephone numbers are 32588, 34531, and 36508; its telex is 5460, 5465, 5477 and 36032 muyok bk kp; and its fax number is 814467. KTB’s president is Kim Ung-ch’ol, and its vice presidents are Kim Chun-ch’ol, Kim Myong-po, Pak Yang-sok, and Kim Yun-sik.

11. KTB was established in November 1959. The bank comes under the Central Bank’s jurisdiction, although KDI officials believe that the bank is now operating with less Central Bank oversight. According to KDI — KTB actually functions like a central bank’s foreign exchange department because its responsibilities include settling accounts in trade and invisible transactions, exercising control in matters regarding foreign exchange acquisition and disbursement, setting and announcing foreign exchange rates, and issuing foreign exchange convertible notes that can be used only by foreigners while staying in north Korea. According to NUB, KTB was once involved in trade with South Korea, such as selling gold and silver nuggets.

12. In order to settle its trade accounts overseas, KTB has correspondent agreements with foreign banks, including 18 banks in Japan, which (as of March 1993) the NUB identified as Sanwa, Tokyo, Sakura, Mitsubishi, Fuji, Daiichi-kangyo, Tokai, Sumitomo, Asahi, Saiwa, Hokkaido Takushoku, Nihon Kogyo, Nihon Long-term Credit Bank, Itsui Trust, Sokuri, Hyogo, Hokkuriku, and Norin Chuou Kinko. According to KDI, other foreign banks include Great Britain’s Lloyds and Standard Chartered, Germany’s Deutsche and Commerze, France’s BNP and Credit lyonnaise, Switzerland’s SBC and UBS, Austria’s Creditanstalt Bankverein and Girozentrale Vienna. KTB also has correspondent agreements with unidentified banks in Hong Kong.

Daesong Bank
13. This bank’s title in English is “Korea Daesong Bank” (KDB. It is located in the central district of P’yongyang. Its telegraphic address is Daesongbank Pyongyang; its telephone number is 43002; and its telex is 36023 and 37041 kdb kp. According to the NUB, KDB’s President is Kim Myong-hui, its vice president is Chang Kon-il, and its chief managing director is Ch’oe Su-kil. (comment: according to KDI, the KDB’s top managers traditionally hold high posts within the KWP, and these persons are typically more influential than other government officials.)

14. Established in November 1978, KDP comes under the Central Bank’s jurisdiction. The bank settles accounts for trading and shipping companies, such as Korea Daesong Trading Corporation, Korea Tonghae Shipping Company, and Korea Mangyong Trading Corporation. The bank was also once involved in trade with South Korea, such as selling gold and silver nuggets

15. (Comment: the KDI and NUB publications say that KDB is under the Central Bank’s jurisdiction, but the NUB write-up on Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation (KDGTC) notes that KDGTC operates a bank, most likely referring to Korea Daesong bank. Moreover, the NUB says That kdgtc itself is under the jurisdiction of the Daesong General Bureau, Office 39, KWP Central Committee.)

16. KDB operates a branch/affiliate in Vienna, Austria, named the Golden Star Bank. It also operates a branch of the Korea Daesong Trading Corporation in Hong Kong, according to KDI. In addition, KDB has correspondent relations with banks in Japan (Tokyo, Sanwa, and Sokuri), In the United Kingdom (Midland, National Westminister, and Standard Chartered), in Germany (Deutsche Bank) and in Switzerland (Swiss Bancorp). It also has correspondent relations with unidentified banks in Bombay, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London, Paris, Singapore, Stockholm, and Vienna.

Changgwang Credit Bank
17. Its title in English is “Korea Changgwang Credit Bank” (KCCB). The bank is located in P’yongyang. Its telegraphic address is Changgwang credit; its telephone number is 31477; its telex is 36016 kccbc kp; and its fax number is 814414. According to NUB, the chairman of Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (KCCB) is Sin Ho and its president is Maeng Pok-sik.

18. According to NUB, KCCB was established on 25 February 1983 and deals in international financing – making exchange transactions in Beijing, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Geneva, Hong Kong, London, Milan, Rome, Singapore, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. KCCBC also has 172 branches. (Comment: the NUB publication does not specify whether these branches are located in North Korea or overseas.)

19. (Comment: Although KDI’s banking document does not contain any details on KCCB or its activities, a KDI official told Emboffs that he considers KCCB to be the richest bank operating in North Korea — primarily because it is associated with the military (NFI).)

Koryo Commercial Bank
20. The bank’s title in English is “Koryo Commercial Bank Ltd.” This bank is located in Taedonggang District, P’yongyang. Its telegraphic address is Koryo bank; its telephone number is 32060; its telex is 36019 kcb kp; and its fax number is 814441. According to NUB, the bank was established in 1988, jointly financed by the DPRK and a Group of Korean residents in the United States. Its business reportedly is to issue “National Reunification Fund” bonds.

Credit Bank
21. The Credit Bank’s title in English is “Credit Bank Of Korea.” It is located in the Taedonggang District of P’yongyang. Its telegraphic address is credit bank; its telephone number is 814285; its telex is 5939 cbk kp; and its fax number is 817806. The president of Credit Bank is Pak Ki-chu.

22. Credit Bank was first established in September 1986. It was initially called the International Credit Bank, but its name was changed to its present form on 23 August 1989. Dealing in international finance, the Credit Bank does exchange transactions in cities around the world, including Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London, Milan, Moscow, New York, Paris, Tokyo, Vienna, and Zurich. The Credit Bank also was once Involved in trade with South Korea, selling gold nuggets to it.

Kumgang Bank
23. Kumgang bank is located in the central district, P’yongyang. Its telegraphic address is Kumgang Pyongyang; Its telephone numbers are 32029 and 32797; its telex is 5355 kgbk kp. Kumgang Bank settles accounts for export-import transactions of North Korean trading corporations, including Korea Pyongyang Trading Corporation and Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corporation.

24. According to the NUB, Kumgang bank was established in September 1978. Its subordination is not clear as the NUB says it is under the state administration council’s jurisdiction, while KDI says it is under the Central Bank’s. (Comment: to further complicate the issue, the NUB document notes in its write-up of Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (SEPTEL) that Ponghwa itself operates the Kumgang Bank.)

Nagwon Financial Joint Venture Corporation
25. According to the NUB publication, Nagwon was established in October 1987, jointly financed by Korea Nagwon Trading Corporation and a Japanese firm “Palace.” Its subordination is not clear as NUB says it is under the State Administration Council jurisdiction, while KDI says it is under the Central Bank’s. The bank accepts deposits, remits money, and provides financial services to joint venture projects, trading corporations, and companies run by overseas compatriots.

26. (Comment: The KDI publication does not provide information on this firm. Instead, it notes that a bank named Korea Ragwon Kumyung Company (aka Korea Ragwon Financing Company) operates in North Korea, but information on its activities is not available. It is not clear whether the NUB and the KDI firms are one and the same.)

Yongaksan Bank (aka Lyongaksan Bank)
27. This bank was established in February 1983. It settles trade accounts of trading companies, including Yongaksan Trading Corporation.  T’ongil Palchon Bank (aka Korea Tongil Paljon Bank)

28. (Comment: T’ongil Palchon means “reunification and development.” Based on the information below, this bank is probably the same as “United Development Bank” which was formed in November 1991 between Ruby Holdings (now known as China Strategic Investments) and Osandok General Trading Corporation.)

29. According to NUB and KDI, T’ongil Palchon Bank (TPB) is a joint venture between Hong Kong’s Ruby Holdings Company and North Korea’s Osandok General Bureau. The two publications differ regarding the bank’s financing and subordination: –NUB says that TPB was jointly financed; KDI indicates that Ruby Holdings financed 51 percent of TPB’s US $30 million capital, with Osandok financing the remaining 49 percent. (Comment: According to the KDI publication, China’s International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) had an option to buy into the joint venture, but it is not clear whether CITIC ever did so.)

– The NUB says TPB falls under the State Administration Council’s jurisdiction; KDI says TPB is subordinate to the Central Bank.

30. According to KDI, TPB deals in general trade, including the import of advanced technologies (NFI). It also operates an affiliate, Korea International Trust Investment Corporation (KITIC). KDI notes that North Korea appears interested in learning market financing techniques because the holding company of the joint venture partner (Ruby Holdings) is Indonesia’s Sinarmas (phonetic) Business Group which owns the Bank International Indonesia. (Comment: KDI defines “financing techniques” as ones required for inducing foreign capital.)

Habyong Bank
31. Habyong Bank’s title in English is “Korea Joint Venture Bank” (KJVB). It is located in the Central District, P’yongyang. KJVB’s telephone numbers are 33052 and 39620; its telex is 36001 kjb kp; and its fax number is 814497. The bank’s vice president is Pak Il-nak, who the NUB document says is from the Chosen Soren.

32. KJVB was established in April 1989. The NUB and the KDI publications differ on the names of the joint venture partners:

– The NUB says that the bank was formed by the Chosen Soren and its affiliate, the Federation of Korean Traders and Industrialists in Japan. The North Korean partner is the State Administration Council’s Joint Venture Industry General Bureau.

– KDI notes that KJVB was jointly financed by the Chosen Soren’s Joint Ventures Promotion Committee and North Korea’s Korea International Joint Venture Company.

33. The bank functions as an international financial institution, providing financial assistance for North Korea’s joint venture projects and settling domestic and foreign accounts for joint venture companies. According to NUB, the bank also conducts economic surveys. KJVB operates branches in North Korea, including Hamhung, Sariwon, Sinuiju, Wonsan, P’yongsong, and Ch’ongjin. It also has correspondent relationships with some 30 foreign banks, including Japan’s Sokuri Bank, Hong Kong’s Maritime Commercial Bank, and China’s Bank of China.

Kukche Insurance Company
34. This firm’s title in English is “Korea Foreign Insurance Company” (KFIC). It is located in P’yongch’on District in P’yongyang. Its telegraphic address is chosunbohom; its telephone numbers are 36147, 38805, and 45501; and its telex number is 5464 bohom kp. KFIC’s president is Paek Myong-non, and its vice presidents are Yi Sang-chu and Pak Kun-pae.

35. According to NUB, KFIC handles insurance matters involving ships and export-import cargos and reinsurance issues involving foreign insurance companies. It also does business with some non-life insurance companies in Japan regarding reinsurance matters. KFIC operates branches at major ports, including Namp’o, Hungnam, Ch’ongjin, Najin, and Haeju.