North Korean Economy Watch

The Choson Ilbo reports:

The [Wikileaks] cables say that North Korea received the arms payments through the Seoul branch of Iran’s Bank Mellat and that the U.S. government urged the South Korean government to investigate the matter. According to a cable dated March 24, 2008, a company in Iran called Hong Kong Electronics wired $2.5 million in three separate payments from Parsian Bank in Iran to the Seoul branch of Bank Mellat in November of 2007. Hong Kong Electronics is a paper company owned by North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank. The money was wired entirely in euros, and $1.5 million worth of the payment was then wired to accounts in China and Russia.

Following a U.S. request to investigate, the South Korean government probed the Bank Mellat branch in December 2008 but did not take any punitive measures. Washington then demanded that the branch’s assets be frozen, according to a cable dated May 12, 2009.

The Iranians deny the accusations.  According to the Joongang Ilbo:

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast rejected allegations that Iran transferred a large sum of money via the Seoul branch of Iran’s Bank Mellat to buy North Korean arms.

In an exclusive interview with the JoongAng Ilbo on Friday at the Iranian Embassy in Seoul, Mehmanparast stressed that Bank Mellat’s Seoul office ran its business “under the supervision of South Korean financial authorities.”

Iran’s new ambassador to South Korea, Ahmad Masoumifar, sat in on the interview.

Mehmanparast was in Seoul with seven Iranian journalists to improve relations with the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The South Korean government in September slapped tough sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, with penalties including the suspension of virtually all financial activities at the Seoul branch of Iran’s Bank Mellat.

The South Korean government said its actions complied with United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Q. Cables released by WikiLeaks suggested that North Korea likely received payment for weapons sold to Iran through Bank Mellat’s Seoul Branch.

A. I think there’s someone behind the allegations in regard to Wikileaks’ information on Iran. Bank Mellat operates abiding South Korean law. There’s nothing wrong with the bank. We do maintain diplomatic ties with the North Korean government. But Iran doesn’t damage (diplomatic) relations with one country for the sake of relations with another country.

Q. What about allegations that Iran and North Korea are cooperating on nuclear technology?

A. Iran and North Korea aren’t in a military alliance. Frankly speaking, when it comes to nuclear weapons, Iran doesn’t need other countries’ assistance.

Iran’s young scientists are in the process of successfully developing technology to use nuclear power in a peaceful manner.

Q. What’s Iran’s official position on North Korea’s attacks on the South Korean warship Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island?

A. It was heartbreaking when I heard the news about the Yeonpyeong attack. I hope peace is maintained in Asia. I want to again stress peace through dialogue.

Q. Iran is an oil rich country. Why does it need nuclear power?

A. The Western media also questions why Iran needs nuclear power. But when you look at the world’s latest economic trends, nuclear power is (increasingly important) when used in a peaceful way. Even the United Arab Emirates began nuclear cooperation with the South Korean government.

Crude oil will be depleted in the future. Nuclear power is an answer to that, and it’s necessary for environmental reasons, too.

Q. Former Iranian Ambassador to Korea Mohammad Reza Bakhtiari said in a previous interview with our paper that Iran won’t sit back and watch if the South Korean government joins international sanctions against Iran.

A. That’s an uncomfortable question to answer. South Korea and Iran have lots in common as Asian nations. I hope for South Korean companies’ prosperity in Iran and I also hope for the success of Iranian companies in South Korea.

I hope short-term political pressures won’t hurt our bilateral relationship.

Read the full stories here:
N.Korean Arms Payments ‘Passed Through Seoul’
Choson Ilbo
1/18/2011

‘Bank Mellat didn’t pay for arms from North Korea’
Joongang Ilbo
Chun Su-jin
1/24/2011

The Daedong Credit Bank (Based in the Potonggang Hotel in Pyongyang) has issued a press release.

I have made a PDF of it available here.

Here is their web page.

On November 18, 2010, the US Treasury Department issued the following press release:

Treasury Designates Key Nodes of the Illicit Financing Network of North Korea’s Office 39

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13551 for being owned or controlled by Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party.  Office 39 is a secretive branch of the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) that provides critical support to North Korean leadership in part through engaging in illicit economic activities and managing slush funds and generating revenues for the leadership. Office 39 was named in the Annex to E.O. 13551, issued by President Obama on August 30, 2010, in response to the U.S. government’s longstanding concerns regarding North Korea’s involvement in a range of illicit activities, many of which are conducted through government agencies and associated front companies. Korea Daesong Bank is involved in facilitating North Korea’s illicit financing projects, and Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation is used to facilitate foreign transactions on behalf of Office 39.

“Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation are key components of Office 39′s financial network supporting North Korea’s illicit and dangerous activities,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey.  “Treasury will continue to use its authorities to target and disrupt the financial networks of entities involved in North Korean proliferation and other illicit activities.”

E.O. 13551 targets for sanctions individuals and entities facilitating North Korean trafficking in arms and related materiel; procurement of luxury goods; and engagement in certain illicit economic activities, such as money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling and narcotics trafficking. As a result of today’s action, any assets of the designated entities that are within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen and U.S. persons are prohibited from conducting financial or commercial transactions with these entities.

You can learn more about the Treasury’s press release here.

Here is the US Treasury Department’s new North Korea resource page.

In response, the Daedong Credit Bank issued the following press release:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

US Treasury Press Release 18th November 2010

London UK/Pyongyang DPRK, December 20th 2010

Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) has noted the press release of 18th November 2010 by the US Treasury and makes the following comments:

1.    Korea Daesong Bank (KDB) is a 30% shareholder in DCB.  DCB is not, and never has been, aware of any activity by KDB which is in breach of any of its obligations, domestic or international.  In particular, DCB is not aware of KDB having acted in breach of any sanctions.  DCB is not aware of any cause of concern about the conduct of KDB.

2.    KDB has no executive control of DCB.

3.    DCB is majority owned by overseas investors and is foreign-managed.

4.    DCB does not act and has never acted in breach of any of its domestic or international obligations.  DCB acts in a manner consistent with domestic and international law.

5.    DCB is apolitical and promotes foreign investment in the DPRK as a positive development.

The Daedong Credit Bank looks forward to playing a significant part in facilitating normal commercial relationships between the DPRK and the international business community.

About Daedong Credit Bank

Daedong Credit Bank is a joint venture retail bank based in Pyongyang. It was established in 1995 as “Peregrine Daesong Development Bank”. The Bank underwent a change of name and foreign ownership in 2000.

Daedong Credit Bank is the first, by fifteen years, foreign majority held bank in the DPRK. DCB considers itself a flagship successful joint venture in the DPRK, and a key part of the infrastructure needed to assist the foreign-invested ventures, which drive the country’s economic reforms.

The bank’s principal function is to offer normal “high street” banking facilities in hard currency to; foreign companies, joint ventures, international relief agencies and individuals doing legitimate business in the DPRK.

Daedong Credit Bank was the first bank in the DPRK to introduce, and vigorously implement, a comprehensive set of anti-money laundering procedures. DCB’s anti-money laundering procedure manual was introduced seven years ago, and subsequently updated based on anti-money laundering guidelines provided by the Asian Development Bank. The manual has been sent to, and accepted by, DCB’s international correspondent banks.

Daedong Credit Bank also maintains strict procedures for the detection and rejection of counterfeit bank notes; it uses regularly updated note checking machines, and has personnel with over 10 years’ of experience of handling notes. DCB have encountered and impounded the so-called ‘superdollar’ notes, proving that these notes (despite media misconceptions) are not undetectable.

The wealth of experience garnered over Daedong Credit Bank’s 15 years of successful operation is unrivaled.

Daedong Credit Bank has a significantly strong position in relation to the future economic development of the DPRK and, being the oldest established foreign invested commercial bank in the DPRK, it is the intention of the bank to capitalise on these advantages.

CONTACT INFORMATION:

Daedong Credit Bank office address in Pyongyang is:

Daedong Credit Bank
401, Potonggang Hotel
Ansan-dong
Pyongchon District
Pyongyang
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Phone Switchboard  +850 2 381 2228/9    ext 401
Direct line     +850 2 381 4866
Mobile          +850 193 801 8400 *
*Note, the mobile number may not be obtainable from certain countries (eg UK and Hong Kong).
Corporate Website www.daedongcreditbank.com

According to Bloomberg:

North Korea’s use of international banks to facilitate nuclear weapons-related trade requires financial institutions to step up their vigilance, the European Union said.

North Korea exports $100 million in weapons and missiles each year in violation of United Nations sanctions, a UN panel wrote in a report released on Nov. 10. The EU said it’s concerned that some of the country’s trade involves prohibited nuclear technologies.

The 27-nation EU today urged all members of the International Atomic Energy Agency to “exercise particular vigilance over exports and financial transfers” in order “to prevent a contribution to proliferation-sensitive activities.”

Tensions with North Korea have increased in recent weeks. The country has built a new facility for extracting uranium, the key ingredient for nuclear weapons, a U.S. scientist reported on Nov. 20. Three days later, North Korea fired artillery at Yeonpyeong island, killing soldiers and civilians.

North Korea’s new nuclear facilities “could bolster its pursuit of a weapons capability and increases our concerns about prospects for onward proliferation of fissile material and of sensitive technologies to other parties,” U.S. Ambassador Glynn Davies said in a statement at IAEA’s meeting in Vienna.

The U.S. has been pressuring banks to cut ties with the North Korea’s regime, State Department documents posted today on WikiLeaks.org showed.

Reputation

Austria’s Financial Market Authority told the U.S. that it “exercised additional surveillance regarding North Korean financial activities” and that one bank cut ties with the country “to maintain its good reputation,” according to a February 2006 cable.

The U.S. and Japan will hold a week of naval drills beginning tomorrow. The aircraft carrier USS George Washington will join a force of about 400 aircraft and 60 warships. Drills will include responding to ballistic missile attacks on Pacific islands, the Joint Staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces said in a statement.

“We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state,” Davies said. “We seek an immediate halt of all nuclear activities in North Korea, including enrichment.”

Recent posts about the DPRK’s nuclear program can be found here. 

Recent posts on Yonpyong can be found here.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Use of Bank Transfers for Atomic Work Alarms Europe
Bloomberg
Jennifer M. Freedman, Andrew Atkinson
12/2/2010

According ot the Daily NK:

The rapid ascent of Kim Jong Eun and the building of a new ruling cast in Pyongyang is causing ripples to be felt in North Korea’s foreign currency earning apparatus. In Beijing, it is clear that anyone considered a supporter of Kim Jong Nam or Oh Keuk Ryul faces a rough ride.

One of the most prominent cases is that of Kang, a pro-Kim Jong Nam foreign currency earner who has distinguished himself in various ways, including by installing air conditioning in the Mansudae Assembly Hall. He is noteworthy among North Korea trade workers in China, and was mentioned in articles released by The Daily NK in June on the subject of emergency inspections over North Korean trade departments.

According to the testimony of Kang’s acquaintances, Kang was supposedly summoned to Pyongyang in early July, whereupon he was violently beaten by agents of the National Security Agency. The alleged reason behind the summons was that Kang was guilty of embezzling national assets and corruption; however, trade workers in China generally assume that it was a part of systematically “taking care” of Kim Jong Nam‘s closest associates.

In North Korean diplomatic circles in Beijing, the general interpretation is that Kim Jong Nam‘s outspoken negativity towards North Korea‘s third generation succession has helped to bring trouble upon his supporters.

One Chinese building contractor, Jwa, who sells construction materials to North Korean traders, commented, “Kang pledged allegiance to Kim Jong Nam and received a lot of favors as his affiliate. But a battle between Kim Jong Eun and Kim Jong Nam is taking place, and trade workers are suffering.”

However, the more surprising fact was the return of Kang to Beijing in October. It is highly unusual for someone from a privileged office to be so severely “investigated” by the National Security Agency but then return to their former seat in a foreign trade office.

According to one of Kang’s acquaintances, this was down to the fact that he is actually the person in charge of the North Korean Liaison Office in Beijing.

One Chinese trader who has done business directly with Kang told The Daily NK, “Kang, who is well known as a famous trade worker, was really in charge of North Korean maneuvers for more than ten years while maintaining the identity of a trade worker. This fact has been confirmed through several sources.”

However, South Korean intelligence has neither confirmed nor denied Kang’s true role.

The North Korean Liaison Office is an organization said to be responsible for maneuvers against South Korea, and is thought to have pulled the strings in the South Korean Chosun Workers‘ Party incident of 1992, in which the largest spy ring since the liberation was uncovered, that of Kim Dong Sik, an armed espionage agent arrested in 1995, Choi Jung Nam and Kang Yeon Jung, an agent couple who committed suicide in 1997, the assassination of Lee Han Young, Kim Jong Il’s nephew, in 1997, and the 2006 Ilsimheo spy ring incident.

Mr. Kang also owns a well-appointed villa, recent sedan and VIP membership of the fitness center at a five-star hotel.

Generally, North Korean employees abroad have to leave one of their children in Pyongyang as what can only be described as hostages to loyalty. However, the testimony of Kang’s acquaintances states that he is permitted to live in Beijing with his wife, daughter and son, who has studied in England. This is due to Kim Jong Nam’s full support, an extraordinary level of operational funding and the superior status of a person in charge of a covert operation.

He has avoided being outright purged, despite the fact that he is an affiliate of Kim Jong Nam, thanks to the fact that he is the person in charge of operations against the South. However, other trade workers in China who are also affiliated with Kim Jong Nam are desperate to forge new connections in Pyongyang to secure their positions, and, as such, many seem to have been absorbed by the Jang Sung Taek camp.

Other overseas officials are also on the back foot. Not only are affiliates of Kim Jong Nam being called into Pyongyang, but affiliates of Oh Keuk Ryul, a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission who is also actively involved in bringing foreign capital into North Korea in de facto competition with Jang Sung Taek, are also being summoned. Oh Keuk Ryul was shut out of the recent process of realigning the Chosun Workers’ Party and has lost a lot of his former influence as a result.

North Korean foreign trade departments are a target of veneration within North Korea. However, trade workers must strive to preserve their status with bribes like supplies which are hard to find within North Korea or large amounts of money. Now the dynamic is changing, so it is proving difficult to preserve their desirable positions.

Read the full story here:
Traders Living in Fear of Pyongyang Summons
Daily NK
Shin Joo-hyun
11/8/2010

According to the Daily NK:

It has been confirmed by The Daily NK that North Korea failed in a recent attempt to import beef from New Zealand for the purpose of providing special gifts to cadres on Kim Jong Eun’s birthday, January 8, after the plan ran afoul of the New Zealand government, which froze the funds.

According to a source from North Korea today, “$170,000 remitted by ‘Myohyang Bureau’ to a New Zealand bank in October to import parts for Japanese tourist buses and beef has been frozen by the New Zealand authorities.”

The source added, “The New Zealand authorities are investigating whether or not the money is related to (North Korea’s) drug dealing.”

The source explained, “The beef is for special distribution to cadres on the Youth Captain (Kim Jong Eun)’s birthday, while the parts of Japanese buses are to repair buses operated by the Tour Bureau,” adding, “Myohyang Bureau is alarmed that there might be a snag in Comrade Youth Captain’s birthday special distribution.”

In North Korea, workplaces have already started to prepare presents for Kim Jong Eun’s birthday. There are two types of presents: the first is from cadres to Kim Jong Eun; and the latter is special distribution to cadres in Kim Jong Eun’s name. However, even though the special distribution is like a gift handed out by a monarch, factories and Party organs have to prepare it. According to the source, the Myohyang Bureau’s duty this time is to supply beef.

The Myohyang Bureau is directly in charge of tour events including Arirang performance-related tours and Mt. Baekdu and Geumgang tours. It sends the profits from these businesses involving foreign tourists to the No. 39 Department of the Central Committee of the Party.

The source explained further, “Due to Japanese sanctions against North Korea, the Tour Bureau has not been able to obtain parts for Japanese buses, so the Myohyang Bureau asked a New Zealand business partner to obtain them for them. In doing that, they also asked for beef.”

“Since the Myohyang Bureau sent the money via a secret bank account held with a bank in Latvia to a bank in New Zealand, it incurred the suspicion of the New Zealand government. Money is still money, but the bigger problem is to expose the Latvian account.”

This is the first time that a Latvian account has been linked to North Korea, adding to known secret accounts in Switzerland, China, Macau and the Caribbean.

The source said, “The Myohyang Bureau opened the account in the name, ‘RUSKOR International Company Ltd’ in a bank of Latvia,” adding, “The account name is the connecting of the words Russia and Korea.”

“Gift rations” have been in the news a lot lately.  Links to previous posts about the DPRK’s “gift rations” can be found here.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Funds for Beef Frozen by New Zealand
Daily NK
Park In Ho
11/5/2010

According to Bloomberg:

The two sides of Chang Gwang Street (Satellite image here) in North Korea’s capital of Pyongyang show the gap between the Stalinist country’s elites and its capitalist-minded citizens. On one side, English-speaking officials mingle with Dutch traders at the Koryo Hotel. There, those with foreign currency can buy Heinekens for about a buck a can at the official exchange rate of 100 North Korean won to the U.S. dollar.

Across the street, a saleswoman at one of the private markets still allowed by the authorities giggles when a foreign guest says he doesn’t have the 200 won needed to buy a steamed vegetable bun. She flips the placard to reveal the cost in dollars, the currency of a country that doesn’t have diplomatic ties with North Korea. The price: 20 cents, implying an unofficial exchange rate of 1,000 won to the dollar.

Old Asia hands say this is one of the biggest spreads between the official and unofficial currency rate they have ever seen in the region. Back in the 1980s the gap between the official and market rates in China was not nearly as great as in North Korea today, says Ken Dewoskin, a director of Deloitte’s China Research and Insight Center in Beijing, who began his career watching China in the mid-1960s and first traveled there in 1977. “Even closed economies like Cambodia in the 1960s had only a 2-to-1 pricing discrepancy,” he says.

President Kim Jong Il moved late last year to revalue the won and limit the amount of cash that North Koreans could exchange for newly printed bills. The policy was designed to clip the wings of the private merchants who were increasingly creating an economy beyond the control of the authorities, according to the University of Vienna’s Rüdiger Frank, a political scientist who specializes in North Korea. The impact of the abrupt policy shift extended far beyond the merchants. “The revaluation not only wiped out people’s savings, but their trust in the government and their currency,” says Ha Tae Keung, founder of Open Radio for North Korea. “There’s a widespread belief among North Koreans that their money is going to get further devalued and they’ll get poorer just by holding onto it.”

The currency turmoil came amid mounting speculation that Kim Jong Il’s health was failing. Last month he promoted his son, Kim Jong Un, to four-star general, setting the stage for the country’s second hereditary power transfer. The government extended an unprecedented invitation to international media to witness the Oct. 10 anniversary celebrations marking the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

The next day, Pyongyang residents queued up as usual to spend their won at the Chang Gwang Street market. Twenty-four shoppers patiently lined up to buy a small cone of vanilla ice cream at 20 won each. A similar number waited for shaved ice with sweet bean paste at 5 won a bowl. Fifteen were there to buy sweet potatoes at 60 won per kilo. No one was seen lining up to purchase sausages, which at 1,700 won each were priced at the equivalent of 16 cans of Heineken beer at the Koryo Hotel.

While price tags at the hotel are in won, the national currency isn’t accepted there. That wasn’t a concern for guests and shoppers buying foreign goods—Scotch whisky and Syrian olive oil were on offer—with dollars, euros, and Chinese yuan.

One hotel worker, who said he made about 2,500 won a month, said the government provided people with food and other necessities such as clothing and housing. The free markets like the one across the street were there to supplement their diets, he said, adding: “We don’t operate like a capitalist country.”

Read the full story here:
In Pyongyang, the Dollar Commands Respect
Bloomberg
Michael Forsythe, Bomi Lim, Frances Yoon and Zeb Eckert
10/21/2010

According to the Daily NK:

An inside source reports that popular dependence on foreign currencies for trading continues in spite of last year’s currency redenomination, to the extent that market traders are openly setting separate prices in U.S. dollars or Yuan alongside the depreciating North Korean won.

The inside source from Pyongyang explained to The Daily NK on September 5th, “In recent market trading, usage of dollars has increased rapidly, and now market prices are being set according to a dollar standard. Even when money is loaned and repaid, the amount for repayment is decided based on the dollar standard.”

As of September 2nd, the exchange rate in Pyongyang was around 150,000 won to $100, as North Korean people refer to it. Loans made in North Korean won are always calculated according to the value of the dollar, and the value of the loan fluctuates accordingly.

The source added, “Recently, market merchants have been setting separate Yuan or dollar prices, except for on rice, corn, and ingredients for side-dishes. The fabric stalls in Sunkyo market in Pyongyang put up all their prices in dollars.”

“Especially in the case of wholesalers,” he added, “they are all trading in dollars or Yuan. They depend on foreign currency since the value of the North Korean currency has fallen so badly and also because there is a lack of large-denomination bills.”

Since 2000, Yuan has been in common use alongside the North Korean currency in border regions. The popularity of dollars is higher in Pyongyang and North and South Hwanghae Provinces. Especially in cases where the unit price of the item is high, such as for home appliances or industrial products, most are dealt with in dollars or Yuan.

However, this is also now spreading to lower value consumer goods like shoes and clothing. Dollar and Yuan prices are applied to such items even when the seller is not a foreign currency store or international hotel.

Despite the fact that the North Korean currency was redenominated at a rate of 100:1 on November 30th, 2009, the monetary authorities have not been able to break North Korea’s inflationary cycle. Currently, rice in North Korean markets goes for around 900 won per kilo, which is only around half the 2,000 won it cost prior to the redenomination, far from the approximately 20 won it would cost in a more stable economy.

The source explained, “The value of the won is unstable, making foreign currency exchange rates more volatile. So merchants are selling products at higher prices than normal to compensate for their losses. This phenomenon is creating in them the mentality of raising their product prices.”

He also emphasized, “Prices for all products imported from China are set in dollars or Yuan. Considering the fact more than 90% of products in the North Korean market come from China, it looks like a world in which the North Korean currency is useless is coming.”

The source added, “Since Yuan are used quite commonly in North Hamkyung Province, Yangkang Province, and Shinuiju, a phrase, ‘This is Chinese land!’ is spreading. At the same time, since the dollar is used a lot in Pyongyang, Sariwon, Haeju, and Wonsan, another joke suggesting that ‘here is U.S. soil!’ is going around as well.”

IFES also covered this story:

With last November’s currency reform, North Korea’s dependence on foreign currency has increased to the point that market prices today are determined in terms of dollars or yuan.

According to Daily NK’s internal sources in Pyongyang, a recent surge in the use of dollars in market transactions has meant that market prices of goods are now determined based on dollars. Moreover, it has been revealed that individuals lending and borrowing money from one another collect and pay the interest in dollars.

As of September 2, the exchange rate in Pyongyang was about 100 US dollars to 150,000 won. If someone was to borrow 150,000 North Korean won from a friend, he would later have to repay that loan in however much North Korean won is equivalent to 100 US dollars at the time.

The source said, “These days, the merchants in the market charge everything in yuan and dollars, except for rice, corn or side dishes,” and, “Clothing stores in Pyongyang’s Seonkyo Market have actually put up signs indicating prices in dollars.”

The source added, “Wholesale merchants, especially, do all of their business in dollars or yuan now,” and “The value of North Korean money has fallen, and there are no more large bills anymore, so everyone is dependent on foreign currency.”

After 2000, the yuan and the North Korean won were both came into common use in the border area between North Korea and China, while the dollar became popular in Pyongyang and Hwanghae Province. Expensive items, such as electric home appliance or industrial goods, were more often than not bought and sold in terms of dollars or yuan, bypassing North Korean currency altogether.

However, recent trends show that the use of dollars and yuan has spread to the sale of shoes, clothes, and other everyday consumer goods. Stores put up signs indicating prices in dollars and yuan, once done exclusively by currency exchange shops or hotel restaurants frequented by foreigners.

Last year, North Korea depreciated its currency at a rate of 1:100 in an attempt to reform its currency, but the efforts to control inflation throughout the country failed. The price of rice in North Korean markets today is about 900 won per kilogram, about half the price it was before currency reform (about 2000 won per kilogram).
The source explained, “Because the value of the won is unstable, the exchange rate varies wildly. In order to not lose money, merchants have been fixing their prices higher than normal.”

The source emphasized, “Goods from China are all sold in dollars or yuan,” and “Considering that over 90% of the commodities circulating in the markets today are from China, it appears that North Korean money will be rendered useless in the near future.”

“In North Hamkyeong Province, Yangkang Province, and Sinuiju, where the yuan is often used, they say ‘This is Chinese land,’ and in Pyongyang, Sariwon, Haeju, and Wonsan, where the dollar is often used, they joke, ‘This is American land,’” added the [sic].

Read the full stories here:
North Korea’s Fiscal Sovereignty Collapsing
Daily NK
Park In-ho
9/6/2010

North Korea’s dependence on foreign currency increases
Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No.10-09-07-2
9/7/2010

Pictured above is the location of the First Caribbean International Bank

According to the Daily NK:

The existence of a secret bank account operated by the No.39 Department of the Chosun Workers’ Party has been publicly confirmed for the first time, bringing yet more attention to bear on the activities of banks in one of the western world’s renowned tax havens.

The No.39 Department, which is responsible for the management of Kim Jong Il’s private funds, holds the bank account with the British Virgin Islands branch of First Caribbean International Bank (FCIB), a prominent bank in the Caribbean region.

According to an expert source familiar with China and North Korea, the No. 39 Department’s secret overseas account exists under the name “Hana Holdings”. It is apparently held with the Road Town branch of the bank, which is based in Barbados and has branches in 17 countries.

Explaining the importance to North Korea of the No.39 Department account, the source told Daily NK, “Due to recent UN Security Council sanctions, the No. 39 Department is experiencing considerable difficulties with its overseas financial trade. Currently, excluding Chinese banks, their only active overseas account is that held with FirstCaribbean International Bank.”

Also, he added, “The only bank through which the No. 39 Department can make overseas transfers is FirstCaribbean International Bank in the British Virgin Islands, since their other secret bank accounts are all blocked.”

He said, “In cases of normal trade relationships with other companies, it used to be possible to transfer the money overseas from China. However, those routes are blocked as well. Since United Nation’s financial sanctions against North Korea make it difficult for North Korea to transfer money to accounts in third countries from Chinese banks, all foreign currency earning units including the No. 39 Department are experiencing the same difficulties.”

Generally, the No. 39 Department works by transferring money from secret overseas bank accounts to accounts with Chinese banks for money laundering.

The source explained, “No. 39 Department moves the management funds from third countries to FirstCaribbean International Bank, then sends the money to the Bank of China until it can be transferred to a North Korean bank or withdrawn.”

According to the source, the person in charge of transfers between FirstCaribbean International Bank and Bank of China is dispatched by the No. 39 Department under a false name. Also, the official allegedly travels to China frequently to deal with problems involving trade with the Chinese bank.

News of the FCIB account will not be too surprising to North Korea economy watchers. Entities in the British Virgin Islands were already suspected of doing business with the North Korean regime before this latest revelation because of the islands’ connection to the activities of Taepung International Investment Group.

The annual returns of the Taepung Group, as it is more commonly known, show that it was originally set up in September, 2006. However, it became better known early in 2010 when it was placed at the center of efforts to revive the North Korean economy through the creation of a state development bank.

Registered in Hong Kong, its only shareholder as of its 2010 Annual Return was Taepung International Investment Holdings Ltd, whose registered address is in Road Town, British Virgin Islands.

According to the same return, obtained by a keen observer of North Korea’s illegal activities, Ken Kato, the Taepung Group’s corporate secretary is Sai Ying Company Ltd, whose only shareholder, and corporate director, is JYBD Holdings Ltd. JYBD Holdings Ltd’s registered address is the same one in Road Town, British Virgin Islands.

This is not the first time that FirstCaribbean International Bank has run into trouble, either. In 2008, it was indicted on 113 charges of “failure to report suspicious transactions” between 2001 and 2005 by the Belize Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).

However, the charges were dropped because, according to a Belize newspaper, they were threatening to destabilize the country’s financial sector. Instead, First International was ordered to pay for both an electronic reporting system for the country and the refurbishment of two parks.

There are known to be a substantial number of other North Korean accounts held in countries around the world. At the time of the report completed by the 1718 Committee (North Korea sanctions committee) under the UN Security Council last July, North Korean banks were said to hold a total of 39 accounts with 18 banks located in 14 countries. Allegedly, these accounts include a considerable number managed by the No. 39 Department.

17 of the 39 accounts were located with big Chinese banks like Bank of China, China Construction Bank and HSBC, according to the report. Bank of China in Macao had the largest number of North Korean accounts, while some other accounts were held with Beijing and Dandong branches.

In addition, at the time, North Korea had 18 accounts with 11 banks in 8 countries in Europe; Russia, Switzerland, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Germany, and Belarus; also, it had one account each in Malaysia and Kazakhstan.

As the 1718 Committee report explained, “The DPRK… employs a broad range of techniques to mask its financial transactions, including the use of overseas entities, shell companies, informal transfer mechanisms, cash couriers and barter arrangements. However, it must still, in most cases, rely on access to the international financial system to complete its financial operations. In structuring these transactions, attempts are made to mix illicit transactions with otherwise legitimate business activities in such a way as to hide the illicit activity.”

And also according to the Daily NK:

The newly revealed secret overseas bank account held by the No. 39 Department is just one of several accounts set up in various locations around the world to manage Kim Jong Il’s funds.

However, due to the financial sanctions brought about by two nuclear tests and multiple missile launches, the No. 39 Department’s secret overseas accounts are continuously shrinking. As one North Korean source in China put it, “Due to United Nation’s financial sanction against North Korea, the No. 39 Department’s management of its overseas secret accounts has become difficult.”

Now, due to the Cheonan incident, the U.S. is planning to put in place “customized” financial sanctions which incorporate existing UN Security Council and EU financial sanctions, so the No. 39 Department’s overseas accounts will only get more difficult to manage in the future.

The No. 39 Department’s overseas accounts, which allegedly contribute much to Kim Jong Il’s governing funds, are prime targets for financial sanction since they are key to transferring those funds generated by illegal activity.

According to intelligence authorities, the No.39 Department has a bank account with Daesung Bank in Pyongyang, and manages capital in some of the world’s most influential banks in Macao, Hong Kong, Germany, Japan, and England through a subsidiary of Daesung Bank, Gold Star Bank (Geumbyeol Bank) in Vienna, Austria.

The $25 million which was frozen in Banco Delta Asia in 2005 was allegedly known to be some of Kim Jong Il’s governing funds managed by the No. 39 Department.

Radio Free Asia reports that even the Luxembourg government seems likely to implement any new sanctions, quoting them as saying, “We are keeping a close eye on the illegal activities which can take place through North Korea’s overseas accounts.”

The No. 39 Department has 17 overseas branches, 100 trading companies and banks under its auspices. They generate foreign currency through loyalty funds collected from each agency and management of hotels and foreign currency stores. Also, they trade the country’s natural resources including pine mushrooms, gold and silver.

The department is also in charge of the production of “supernotes,” high quality counterfeit $100 bills, and has a role in weapons and the illegal drugs trade.

The funds are mostly spent on the living costs of the Kim family and the patronage network required to maintain his coterie of high officials. In 2008, the sum of luxury goods purchased by North Korea was estimated to be more than $100 million. For example, immediately prior to the anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth on April 15th, North Korea imported approximately 200 high grade vehicles from China.

Since foreign currency generation started to become difficult due to the sanctions, Kim Jong Il has allegedly revived the No. 38 Department, which used to be in charge of overseas currency earning and was only merged with the No. 39 Department in September of 2009, and replaced the head of No. 39 Department with Jeon Il Choon, an old high school friend.

As Kim Kwang Jin, a North Korean defector who worked for the Northeast Asia Bank of North Korea, pointed out in a recent press interview, “The UN Security’s North Korea sanctions and the United States’ Banco Delta Asia sanctions must have caused the shrinking of North Korea’s overseas accounts. It is possible that North Korea could try to open accounts under phantom company names to continue with its financial trades.”

According to the Korea Herald:

North Korea watchers in the West estimate the North’s outstanding debts to be around $12 billion, two thirds of which is owed to former communist states.

In 2008, a ruling Grand National Party lawmaker had suggested allowing North Korea to pay back its loans from South Korea with mineral resources or development rights.

Rep. Kwon Young-se said during a parliamentary audit two years ago that North Korea’s debts amount to $18 billion, nearly as much as the country’s economic output in the year 2007.

About five percent of it, or $920 million, was borrowed from South Korea.

“Loans for North Korea’s economic development from socialist countries in the 1950s and 60s, and Western nations in the 1970s have accumulated with overdue interest on outstanding debts,” Kwon said.

“North Korea’s per capita debt is around 930,000 won, slightly less than the country’s annual per capita income of 1.07 million won.”

Last year, a top South Korean government official said Seoul could pay for tours to North Korea with commodities instead of cash.

He said the issue of paying cash to North Korea had to be reconsidered based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which slapped tightened sanctions on the reclusive state as punishment for its nuclear and missile programs.

The crossborder tours have been suspended for the past two years after a South Korean tourist was shot to death in the North’s mountain resort.

Read the full sotry here:
North Korea cornered with snowballing debts
Korea Herald
Kim So-hyun
8/17/2010