North Korean Economy Watch

Korea Times
Park Song-wu
2/20/2007

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) on Tuesday confirmed that North Korea recently enacted a law that prohibits money laundering.

The standing committee of the North’s Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the legislation last October to ban financial transactions involving illegal earnings, the agency said in a press release.

The enactment apparently aimed at settling the U.S. financial sanctions on a bank in Macau that was blacklisted by Washington in September 2005 for its suspicious role in helping the North conduct illicit financial activities, it said.

Under the latest six-party agreement, reached on Feb. 13, the United States is to resolve financial sanctions within 30 days on North Korean assets worth $24 million that have been frozen in the Macau bank.

The NIS also confirmed that the North has a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.

NIS officials made the confirmation during a closed-door National Assembly session as the Beijing deal on initial actions to implement the denuclearization of North Korea came under criticism for not mentioning the HEU program.

After ending the session, a lawmaker said on condition of anonymity that the NIS officials confirmed the existence of the HEU program in the North.

When North Korea’s uranium enrichment program came to the fore in 2002, Washington and Pyongyang accused each other of violating the 1994 agreed framework that eventually collapsed.

Seoul and Washington are reportedly sharing the view that Pyongyang has an HEU program, for which the North began purchasing large quantities of centrifuge-related equipment in 2001.

But what is not yet clear is whether the North has begun to produce weapons-grade uranium.

In a separate Assembly session, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Song Min-soon also faced the same question from lawmakers on why the Beijing agreement did not mention the HEU program.

He avoided speaking specifically on the sensitive issue that triggered the second nuclear crisis in October 2002. But he said it will be addressed as the latest agreement invoked section one of the joint statement adopted in September 2005.

“The Beijing deal is about initial steps, and it’s not a complete roadmap toward the denuclearization,” Song said. “But the recent agreement requires the North to declare all of its nuclear programs.”

In section one of the September statement, the North committed to abandoning “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons treaty (NPT) and to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) also expressed doubts over Pyongyang’s willingness to abide by its pledges to implement initial measures for the denuclearization of North Korea.

Rep. Kim Yong-kap of the conservative party found problems with the deal reached in Beijing on Feb. 13 since key components of it, especially on the disablement of the North’s nuclear facilities, are overly “abstract.”

“Despite the North’s agreement to disable its 5 megawatt reactor in Yongbyon, it later changed the wording into a temporary stoppage of operations,” Kim said.

The North’s media promptly reported the result of latest six-party talks, but did not use the term “disablement.” Seoul officials interpreted it as an attempt to mislead North Koreans so they do not lose their pride.

“In addition, there is no deadline on the disablement. I am simply doubtful of the deal’s practicality,” he said.

According to a Chosun Ilbo-Gallup Korea poll, conducted on Feb. 19, 77.9 percent of respondents predicted that the North would not keep its pledges, while 15.8 percent of the 1,006 respondents trusted the North.

But Song said the Beijing deal was a good chance to reaffirm Pyongyang’s willingness for an early denuclearization.

He also dismissed the GNP’s claim that Seoul is determined to share the largest financial burden of aiding the North to achieve a second inter-Korean summit in the run-up to the December presidential election.

“We will not bear all the burden because all five parties have agreed to provide economic aid on the principle of equality and equity,” he said. “And the provision of assistance will be made in line with the principle of action for action.”

As a first step toward denuclearization, North Korea is to shut down its nuclear-related facilities at Yongbyon while allowing United Nations nuclear inspectors back to the nuclear complex to seal them off.

Seoul’s top nuclear negotiator, Chun Yung-woo, said in Beijing on Feb. 13 that the deal is working under an “incentive system.”

For shutting down the Yongbyon complex, the North would receive the equivalent of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in emergency relief aid. An additional 950,000 tons of heavy oil or equivalent aid will be provided to the country upon its completion of disabling other nuclear-related facilities.

Korea Times
1/13/2007

Kim Jong-nam, believed to be the eldest son of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, has taken charge of the overseas sales of North Korean military weapons.

The junior Kim, 35, went back to Pyongyang via a Koryo Air flight from Beijing on Tuesday after getting a lot of media attention during his three-day stay in the Chinese capital.

According to the Segye Times, a vernacular daily, Jong-nam has made profits for his country by selling military weapons such as Scud medium-range missiles and SA-16 surface-to-air missiles overseas.

He invested money in real estate and overseas banks offering high interest rates in several countries including Britain, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore, said the report based on comments from an expert on North Korean affairs in Japan.

On Sunday Kim was spotted by Japanese television crews at Beijing International Airport. His appearance in Beijing sparked interest among North Korea watchers, as the six-party talks over the North’s nuclear weapons programs were being held there.

Reports said Kim was on a three-day layover on his way back home to attend his father’s 65th birthday party, which falls on Friday.

Wearing a Reebok baseball cap and blue jeans as well as a gold necklace, Kim showed off his foreign language skills in brief interviews with the news media including Japan’s Fuji television.

Asked whether he speaks Japanese, he answered in Japanese that he didn’t understand the language. He also said he speaks a little bit of English and French as he studied in Europe for several years.

Kim said he meets with his father “sometimes” but did not elaborate on their relationship.

According to reports Kim stayed at his favorite hotel, the Kempinski Hotel located adjacent to the South Korean embassy in Beijing during his short visit.

The Toronto Globe and Mail reported earlier this month that the North Korean leader’s son has been spending most of his time for the past three years at casinos, saunas and luxury hotels in Macau, the former Portuguese enclave near Hong Kong.

Kim was photographed in the city by a newspaper as he left his favorite hotel, the Mandarin Oriental.

According to the South China Morning Post, he has frequently visited Macau’s casinos and often goes out drinking late at night.

There have been rumors that fell out of favor with his father in 2001 when he embarrassed the regime in a bizarre incident in Japan.

Kim was briefly detained at Tokyo’s airport where he tried to enter Japan on a fake Dominican Republic passport. He was on his way to visit Tokyo Disneyland, reports said.

Yonhap
2/13/2007

The top U.S. negotiator in international talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program said Tuesday his country will remove its financial sanctions on the communist nation within a month.

The measure follows Pyongyang’s agreement to “disable” its nuclear-related facilities and programs in return for economic and diplomatic benefits.

“We will resolve the matter of the financial sanctions” within 30 days, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill told reporters as he returned from a six-party talks meeting, at which North Korea agreed to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear complex in two months.

His remarks partly confirmed an earlier report by a pro-Pyongyang newspaper that the U.S. nuclear envoy had last month promised his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, to remove the financial restrictions within 30 days after progress in the nuclear negotiations.

The two held three days of meetings in Berlin, which were followed by two-day talks between the countries’ financial officials in Beijing later that month.

North Korea had stayed away from the nuclear talks for over a year after the U.S. imposed sanctions on a Macau bank with suspected links to the North’s illicit financial activities in September 2005.

The six-party talks resumed late last year after a 13-month hiatus, but they again failed to produce a breakthrough as North Korea refused to discuss the nuclear issue, and instead stuck to its demand for the U.S. to remove the financial sanctions.

Tuesday’s agreement marked a milestone in negotiations that had made little progress since they began in 2003.

North Korea is to shut down the Yongbyon complex, which includes a nuclear reprocessing facility, within 60 days, and receive “emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil,” the statement said.

The nuclear talks are also attended by South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Russia and host China.

Yonhap
2/10/2007

An official of Switzerland’s banking industry denied accusations that the country’s banks are involved in dealings with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il, saying such involvement would taint the industry’s image, a report said.

“There is no way a Swiss bank would be running a bank account for Kim Jong-il knowing that he is a dictator. The reputational risk is simply too high,” James Nason, a spokesman for the Swiss Bankers’ Association, told Washington-based Radio Free Asia (RFA) on Friday.

Korea Herald
Lee Joo-Hee
1/30/2007

Officials from Washington and Pyongyang are in Beijing today for their second round of talks on U.S. financial sanctions against North Korea.

The discussions are likely to set the tone for the upcoming round of six-party talks scheduled to resume early next month.

The agenda is thought to include North Korea’s acknowledgement of illicit financial activity, a pledge to prevent any reoccurrence, and the lifting of a U.S. embargo on North Korean accounts at a Macau bank.

Washington imposed financial restrictions against Banco Delta Asia after charging the bank with helping North Korea launder counterfeit dollars and funds raised from smuggling restricted goods. The move prompted Pyongyang to boycott the six-party talks process in 2005.

Upon returning to the six-party process in December last year, North Korea demanded it must first solve the financial issue before discussing the nuclear question.

The United States remains adamant that the financial measures were separate from the nuclear issue but has offered to discuss it on the sidelines of the nuclear talks.

The U.S. side is led by Daniel Glaser, the Treasury Department’s deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes.

The North Korean team is led by Oh Gwang-chul, president of the Foreign Trade Bank of Korea, the reclusive regime’s window for foreign banking.

The two delegations are likely to discuss the technical aspects of the issue, which North Korea claims was a political gesture by the United States as part of its hostile policy.

On Sept. 15, 2005 the U.S. Treasury Department banned all American banks from dealing with Banco Delta Asia for allegedly helping North Korean companies launder money from smuggled cigarettes and counterfeit $100 bills.

Washington and Pyongyang have been exchanging questions and information regarding the measures since their first discussion in Beijing on the sidelines of the six-party talks last month.

N. Korean financial officials arrive in Beijing for talks on U.S. sanctions
Yonhap
1/30/2007

A group of North Korean financial experts arrived in Beijing Tuesday for talks with their U.S. counterparts on removing U.S. financial sanctions on the North, a major hurdle to six-way negotiations on the communist nation’s nuclear weapons program.

The U.S.-North Korea financial talks come ahead of a new round of six-nation negotiations next week aimed at persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Tuesday the new round of the nuclear disarmament talks will start Feb. 8.

The North Koreans, headed by O Kwang-chol, president of the North’s Foreign Trade Bank, arrived in the Chinese capital at 9:30 a.m. The North Koreans were expected to hold talks with a U.S. financial team led by Daniel Glaser, a deputy assistant secretary at the U.S. Treasury Department.

Upon arriving from Pyongyang, the head North Korean delegate said the sides would hold talks at their countries’ embassies here.

The two last met here on the sidelines of a December round of the nuclear talks, also held in Beijing. The working-group financial meeting seeks to remove U.S. sanctions imposed in September 2005 on a Macau bank suspected of laundering money for the North, which Pyongyang used as an excuse to stay away from the nuclear talks for 13 months.

Expectations of progress from the financial discussions, as well as the nuclear talks, have been significantly raised following a three-day meeting of top U.S. and North Korean nuclear negotiators in Berlin earlier in the month, at which the two agreed “on a number of issues,” according to Christopher Hill, the top U.S. nuclear envoy.

Hill said Monday (Washington time) that the next round of the nuclear talks could produce an agreement similar to a 1994 pact in which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear activities in return for economic and energy assistance. The 1994 Agreed Framework became defunct when the ongoing dispute over the North’s nuclear ambitions erupted in late 2002.

However, Hill made it clear that the goal of the six-party negotiations is to carry out a 2005 agreement in which Pyongyang agreed in principle to completely and verifiably dismantle its nuclear program in return for economic and diplomatic benefits.

“Whatever emerges in the next round, our job will not be finished until the full joint statement is finally realized and implemented,” Hill told Reuters in Washington.

“I am not too worried whether something might look like the Agreed Framework because we’re only looking at part of what we’re aiming at,” Hill added.

The top U.S. envoy to the financial talks Tuesday also expressed hope for progress.

“We are prepared to go through these talks as long as it takes for us to get through our agenda,” Glaser was quoted as telling reporters in Beijing. “I am hopeful we’ll make progress.”

Treasury officials have so far refused to confirm it, but recent reports said the United States may unfreeze part of North Korea’s assets at the Macau bank to help move the nuclear negotiations forward.

Pyongyang has about US$24 million in 50 accounts at the Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, and as much as $13 million is believed to belong to legitimate accounts.

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/26/2007

The “first-runners” are first-tier wholesalers who connect Chinese manufacturers and North Korean market owners in large cities such as Sinuiju, Hyesan, Hamheung or Chongjin. The goods transported by the first-runners to metropolitan markets in NK are met by second-runners in smaller cities.

South Pyongan province’s Pyongsong, Sunchon and Nampo are the hub for those second-runners, who move imported commodities to further deep into countryside of North and South Pyongan provinces and Hwanghae province.

Moon, a 38-year old shopkeeper in a market in Sunchon, South Pyongan, said “As soon as we hear the news that first-runners brought goods, we go to them with money right away. Since they run a huge amount of money, ordinary buyers can’t even meet them.”

Moon said that for second-runners including herself it took about half million NK wons (180 US dollars) to buy goods for one time. She buys merchandise from first-runners and sells it back to local storeowners.

For second-runners, it is crucial to procure enough high-quality goods with low price. If one buys bad products, he or she loses money. Same rule applies to first-runners.

Second-runners also hand over raw materials to manufacturers. The diminutive North Korean industry relies partly on them.

Chinese sugar and flour turn to bread and candy, and imported clothing materials are manufactured in home factories. Most of the manufacturers who buy raw materials from second-runners are individual handicraftsmen.

Lee, a clothing producer in Hamheung, sells her homemade clothes in market. Lee has had good relationship a number of second-runners, who trade Chinese fabric, so she can even buy stuff on credit.

Throughout the March of Tribulation in late 90s, North Korean people had depended on home industry for their basic necessities. And now it is estimated that significant amount of industrial products in North Korean markets are home-produced.

Those with little capital or without a stand in local market go to the most remote regions in high mountains or countryside and sell their handicrafts via train. Although it is not North Korean business slang, such activity can be classified as “third-running.”

The so-called “third-runners” trade their home-manufactured goods with country people’s corn, bean or rice, since it is rare to own a lot of cash in rural area.

In sum, once persecuted North Korean private markets are now reflecting every aspect of capitalist economy.

Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
1/25/2007

North Korea recently banned the domestic use of all foreign currency in a desperate effort to get hold of U.S. dollars possessed by individuals amid strict financial sanctions imposed by the outside world, reports said.

South Korea’s Ministry of Unification that deals with inter-Korean affairs said it is trying to clarify whether the report is based on the truth or not.

According to the Dong-a Ilbo, a vernacular daily, the Stalinist state Wednesday announced a ban on its people from paying with foreign currency without getting prior approval.

The decision will be applied to all kinds of foreign currency including the greenback and euro as well as the Chinese yuan, it said.

“It seems Pyongyang is trying to overcome its shortage of foreign reserves by gathering what its people are keeping at home,” a North Korean expert was quoted as saying on condition of anonymity by the newspaper.

Those who wish to pay with foreign currency must convert their foreign money into a sort of gift certificate at designated money exchange spots.

Back in the late 1980s, the North maintained a similar regulation, but later withdrew the decision. The measure was shunned in its socialist market.

Shops in the downtown shopping district of Pyongyang, the North’s capital, have sold goods priced in both North Korean won and U.S. dollars.

With the reintroduction of the measure, the North Korean won-U.S. dollar exchange rate in the North’s black market plunged from 3,285 won to 2,800 won, according to the report.

The North’s official, but not internationally accepted, currency ratio is $1 to 143 North Korean won.

However, the decision is unlikely to influence the two inter-Korean projects _ the Kaesong industrial complex and the tourism project to Mt. Kumgang _ as Pyongyang has not informed Seoul of any decision to ban the use of foreign currency including the South Korean won at the two sites.

South Korean companies in the Kaesong industrial complex pay $57.50 per month to their North Korean workers.

The Unification Ministry has explained that most of the U.S. dollars paid in wages to North Korean workers have been used to provide daily necessities for the workers, not to benefit Kim Jong-il’s regime or its nuclear and other weapons programs.

Daliy NK
Yang Jung A
1/24/2007

North Korean authorities are requesting “implied” voluntary offerings to be made to the army, placing a greater burden on the North Korean citizens who are battling a tough winter due to the bitter cold and dire food crisis.

The first journalist to report about North Korea Lee Joon said that at a people’s unit meeting held in the rural district of Dancheon, North Hamkyung from January 7th to the 13th, orders were made from the central committee indicating a “severe food crisis amidst the people’s army,” reported Japan’s Asia Press on the 22nd.

Lee Joon is the first underground journalist to work in North Korea and has exposed the daily lives of North Korean citizens through video footages, collections of still life photos and voice recordings both nationally and worldwide.

At the people’s unit, an order was made “The food shortage in the people’s army is severe. With a devoted heart to the nation, every family must voluntarily offer food to the army.” Though the orders imply donations as a voluntary act, it is in fact forced upon the citizens or as it implies otherwise, suffer the consequences.

Lee informed “The exact amount of donations were not specified, though citizens are being pressured to increase their offerings as one person was said to have offered 600kg and another even up to 1tn.”

Lee said “Though the army declares a shortage in food, the cost of rice and corn at the markets has not risen in comparison to late November and early December” and commented “There does not seem to be a great shortage in supply as merchants at the markets sell rice imported from China.”

Contrastingly, Lee explained “From a national perspective, it seems that the supply of food had been considered low as international aid was terminated and crop output minimal.”

In addition to this “As the nation does not have any funds, an order was made for each family to invest their money into banks” and again “Though the exact amount was not specified, this order was indisputably forced” upon the citizens, Lee said.

Lee continued “Even 3 years ago, as a 10 years redemption national loan, the people had to support the nation with their funds” and “As there were many complaints from the people, the idea was changed to a look like a savings account. I believe that forcibly collecting money is no different to the national loan.”

At present, as there are many cases where North Korean banks cannot pay interest or capital from investments, any person that does invest in banks is called as a fool. Even though the government enforces a directive, it is unlikely that the people will invest their money in banks.

Lee said “Each person must gather 2.5tn’s of provisions and offer it to the local farms because a task was assigned to increase the output of fertilizer.” and remarked “It’s something that happens often, but it did come earlier than expected.”

“The poor collect excrement from their homes or public places whereas the rich slip through the cracks by either buying goods from the markets or offering bribes” Lee explained.

Complaints are rising against the government’s frequent tasks of offering goods, though “with feelings of discontent (resulting from international sanctions) the government exploits the people as they cannot make any money” Lee said.

In particular, “There is a general consensus amongst the people who now believe that the government is not trying to change the economy (through openness and reform) but only making their lives more difficult” revealed Lee.

Korea Times
Chang Se-moon
1/23/2007

Obviously, it is important to know the correct answer to this question. Sanctions that have no impact on North Korea’s economy will not change the behavior of North Korean leaders. If sanctions do have a significant impact, the possibility that North Korean leaders may be tempted to resolve the pending security issues through negotiations exists.
In answering the question, however, we need to keep in mind what the British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) said: “The theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking which helps its possessor draw correct conclusions.’’ In plain English, Keynes stressed an unbiased economic way of thinking that could help us draw correct conclusions. In other words, until we review all the facts with an open mind we should not make up our minds.

This is exactly what we will do by assessing the impacts of economic sanctions on North Korea.

The first question that comes to mind is which sanctions are we talking about. If we review U.S. sanctions on North Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, there would be too many sanctions imposed on North Korea to be practical. There are three important sanctions that are still in effect, however. One is the U.S. denial of a Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea’s exports.

This sanction was imposed on North Korea’s exports to the United States on September 1, 1951, following the outbreak of the Korean War. MFN tariffs are the lowest tariffs that are levied on imports to the U.S. Over 99 percent of imports to the United States qualify for the MFN tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States are so high that North Korea simply cannot even imagine exporting anything to the United States.

The second of the three important sanctions stemmed from the bombing of Korean Air 858 by North Korean agents on November 29, 1987. The explosion killed 115 innocent passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on the list of countries that supported international terrorism according to the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979.

The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list has made it impossible for North Korea to borrow money from international financial institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Like the denial of MFN status, the placement of North Korea on the list of countries supporting international terrorism continues to this date.

The third of these three key sanctions relates to tightening of North Korea’s illegal financial transactions, which culminated in Banco Delta Asia’s termination of business dealings with North Korea as of February 16, 2006. You may know that Banco Delta Asia had long been suspected of handling North Korea’s illicit activities overseas such as laundering of counterfeit U.S. dollars and sales of illegal drugs

Banco Delta Asia is located in Macao, which is a Special Administrative District of China. Tightening of North Korean financial transactions was extended to North Korean trade during 2006. This added pressure on North Korea originated from U.N. Resolution 1540 following North Korea’s test-launching of long-range missiles on July 5, 2006, as well as from U.N. Resolution 1718 which followed North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006.

Are these sanctions having an impact on North Korea’s economy? Perhaps, a more accurate question is whether these sanctions are placing enough pressure on North Korean leaders to reconsider the possibility of returning to the negotiation table?

One aspect is the status of North Korea’s trade deficit. As you probably know, North Korea buys from other countries much more than it sells to other countries. When the amount of imports exceeds the amount of exports it’s called a trade deficit. North Korea’s annual trade deficit averaged about $800 million from 2003 to 2005. This figure does not include North Korea’s trade deficit against South Korea, since South Korea appears to consider any financial support to the North as a long-term investment rather than a trade deficit.

How has North Korea been paying for the trade deficit? The ways have been unique. Almost the entire deficit appears to have been financed by weapons sales, illicit activities, and funds flowing from South Korea through joint projects.

In fact, a study by the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis indicates that full implementation of U.N. Resolution 1718 would cause North Korea to lose just about the same amount ($700 million to $1 billion) by stopping exports of weapons and illegal drugs and counterfeit money.

The Economist Intelligence Unit is quoted to have estimated in 2003 that “North Korea earned as much as $100 million a year from counterfeit money, while in 2005, a U.S. task force estimated that “$45 million to $60 million in Pyongyang’s counterfeit currency (primarily in U.S. $100 bills) is in circulation,’’ reportedly, including some in Seoul’s Namdaemun Market.

Assuming that recently added sanctions will cause North Korea to lose about $800 million that it has been earning overseas each year, the next interesting question is how North Korea will pay for the annual trade deficit of $800 million in the future? If North Korea does not pay for its imports, other countries will refuse to sell products to North Korea and the North Korean economy will suffer.

North Korea cannot borrow from world financial institutions because of the 1988 U.S. sanctions that branded North Korea as one of countries supporting international terrorism. They cannot use the money from foreign direct investment because China and Korea are the only two countries that have been willing to invest in North Korea, but the combined amount is not even close to paying for the annual trade deficit.

Think of it this way. If you borrow money every year, and lenders believe that your ability to pay off the debt is rapidly declining, will lenders continue to lend you money? Not likely. With sanctions adversely affecting North Korea’s ability to pay for imports, North Korea will find it increasingly difficult to buy what it needs. The breaking point may not be imminent, but the future is predictable.

This is what I think will happen. North Korea will ask China to increase its foreign direct investment in North Korea by giving China more incentives for such investment. These incentives may include low taxes and free land. North Korea will ask South Korea to send more money.

For instance, as of July 1, 2004, Hyundai Asan and North Korea set the entrance fee to Mt. Kumkang at $10 for a day trip, $25 for a two-day trip and $50 for a three-day trip. On May 1, 2005, these fees were raised to $15, $35, and $70. On July 1, 2006, these fees were raised again to $30, $48, and $80. This is just one way.

North Korea may also ask South Korea to lend it a large sum of money with an empty promise of paying it back. This explains in part why it is so important for North Korea to have leaders of the South Korean government who are friendly to North Korea.

These desperate acts are likely to be very short of paying for the majority of the annual trade deficit. If sanctions continue to be effective, the likelihood of North Korea returning to the negotiation table increases. Economics is rarely boring, especially when it deals with real problems.

Christian Science monitor
Donald Kirk
1/22/2007

More than a century after American mining engineers first opened up North Korea’s gold mines, a fortune in gold and other metals and minerals offers the prospect for North Korea to ease the pressures of financial sanctions.

The question, however, is whether North Korea can navigate around a US Treasury order that forbids institutions doing business in the United States from dealing with Banco Delta Asia in Macao, the main avenue for North Korean financial dealings.

The Treasury ban, first promulgated in 2002, has effectively frozen the North’s efforts to conduct international business. While it doesn’t extend to gold, market experts say that US officials have made it clear that banks should not buy North Korean gold.

“The US has been using coercion, innuendo, and sheer force to intimidate banks from dealing with North Korea,” says Colin McAskill, chairman of Koryo Asia Ltd., which invests in North Korea through the Chosun Development & Investment Fund. “We want to get a breakthrough on the six-party talks by getting the sanctions eased or lifted entirely. We’re at a very delicate stage.”

North Korea, says Mr. McAskill, “wants to move back into legitimate business.” Selling gold on the London market – the world’s largest – “is one way they can prove that,” he adds. “They have a wealth of minerals – gold, silver, zinc, magnesite, copper, uranium, platinum – that needs investment to extract.”

One indication of North Korea’s need to sell gold was its decision to provide information needed by the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) to list the North’s central bank as a “good deliverer” of gold and silver. Listing with the LBMA is essential for refiners who want to sell their products in London. The bank’s listing was suspended 2-1/2 years ago when it failed to respond to LBMA requests for “proactive monitoring.”

The LBMA said it does not “take into account any political criteria,” and will keep the bank on its rolls for another three years without monitoring.

Despite the listing, market experts say the big banks that are major buyers of gold – and form the LBMA’s core membership – are not likely to flout the spirit of the US Treasury order against Banco Delta Asia, through which North Korea exported gold prior to the ban.

“The fact that they’re on the list does not mean they can deliver to the London market,” says Stewart Murray, the LBMA’s chief executive. “When we have sanctions, none of the facilities will accept delivery from a company or a country that is subject to these sanctions,”

Trying to build momentum for talks

The reluctance of buyers in London to deal in North Korean gold, widely seen as the likeliest legal way to mitigate the impact of the banking ban, adds urgency to another effort at six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

The chief US negotiator, Christopher Hill, has been traveling through northeast Asia, stopping off here, in Tokyo, and in Beijing after talks in Berlin last week with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye-Gwan. The Chinese are expected to set a date for renewing the talks, which broke off before Christmas amid North Korean demands for the US to lift the ban on Banco Delta Asia.

North Korea raised hopes for renewed six-party talks, saying “a certain agreement” was reached in Berlin last week. Neither Mr. Kim nor Mr. Hill have provided details, but analysts suspect that the two discussed the financial issue and its relationship to the ultimate purpose of six-party talks: getting North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.

North Korea has been renewing its drive to sell gold for the past year since submitting to the LBMA’s monitoring requirements. At the same time, the North has sold relatively small amounts of gold in Thailand, with which it has developed a strong trading relationship in recent years. Last spring, North Korea exported 1.3 tons of gold to Thailand for nearly $30 million while also looking for markets elsewhere in the region.

“Why would you go to the trouble of going to London,” asks Roger Barrett, whose firm, Korea Business Consultants in Beijing, is helping to develop gold mining in North Korea. “They’re totally entitled to sell their gold.”

No reports of exports since July

Yet there have been no reports that North Korea has exported any gold since testing seven long-range missiles in July. Since the North conducted an underground nuclear test in October, which resulted in deeper sanctions from the UN Security Council, dealers have reportedly been even more reluctant to buy North Korean gold.

Estimates of North Korea’s gold reserves range as high as 2,000 tons, but mining has been sporadic since British, American, and then Japanese interests mined for gold beginning in the 19th century. With foreign expertise, North Korean mining may return to the period between 1983 to 1993, when its central bank sold an average of one ton a month on the London market.

“What we’re doing is normal business,” says Mr. Barrett in Beijing, explaining the efforts at reviving the mining industry. “We’re creating jobs for people, in line with the UN basic charter, in line with economic growth.”