North Korean Economy Watch

According to Yonhap:

A South Korean automaker operating in North Korea said Wednesday it has posted its first net profit and remitted part of it home, the first southbound money transfer by an inter-Korean venture.

Pyeonghwa Motors Corp. made a net profit of US$700,000 for the fiscal year ending in February and sent $500,000 to its headquarters in Seoul via a bank account in Hong Kong, its spokesman Roh Byoung-chun said.

The automaker began production in 2002 as a joint venture between North Korea and the Unification Church of South Korean Rev. Moon Sun-myung, who was born in the North. Its plant in Pyongyang produces sedans and small buses with some 340 employees, and its customers are mostly local businesses.

Roh said it took a while for North Korea to approve the remittance, which was made through a South Korean lender, Woori Bank, in Hong Kong in late May.

“For North Korea, $500,000 is a large sum of money. It is not used to the capitalist idea of making investments and retrieving profits. We believe they pondered deeply before giving approval,” he said.

Pyeonghwa sold 652 units last year, while North Korea took $200,000 for its 30 percent share in the venture, he said. The company says profits are picking up, with this year’s sales already surpassing 740.

North Korea’s own automaker, Sungri Motor, was established in 1958 and mostly produces cargo trucks.

Pyeonghwa’s production is not influenced by political tensions or South Korea’s ban on cross-border shipments, he said, as raw materials and parts are imported from Europe and China. The ban was enforced after North’s rocket launch in April, with the exception of goods going to a joint industrial complex in the North’s border town of Kaesong, where 109 South Korean small firms operate.

“The remittance is symbolic. They are having a hard time in Kaesong, and many went bankrupt in Mount Kumgang (the North Korean tourist resort),” Roh said. “We hope this can bring hope to people doing business in North Korea that anyone can go there and can bring back profits.”

Officials from the South Korean Unification Ministry said inbound money transfers from North Korea are not restricted, although outbound remittances are strictly monitored and prohibited in some cases. It is the first time a South Korean company has sent profits from sales in North Korea, they said. Other businesses investing in North Korea, including those operating in the Kaesong park, sell their goods in South Korea and elsewhere.

South Korea has put three North Korean firms, including a bank, on its blacklist under a U.N. resolution that bans financial transactions with North Korean entities suspected of aiding the country’s nuclear and missile development.

Read the full artilce below:
S. Korean automaker in Pyongyang sends first business profit home
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
7/15/2009

According to the Wall Street Journal:

The Pyeonghwa spokesman didn’t disclose revenue figures but said last year’s vehicle sales were just over twice the 2007 level. The company has already sold more cars this year, 742, and expects to sell more than 1,500 for the full year, the spokesman said.

The performance is the culmination of an 18-year effort that began when church founder Rev. Moon Sun-myung met North Korea’s then-ruler Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang to propose several business ventures. In 1999, the church spent $55 million to build the auto factory in the port city of Nampo, on North Korea’s west coast. The Unification Church, based in South Korea, has a number of investments in tourism, construction and trade.

Since completing the factory in 2002, Pyeonghwa has imported partially built cars, in a form called knockdown kits, from manufacturers such as Italy’s Fiat SpA and China’s Brilliance Automotive Holdings Ltd.

Pyeonghwa completes the cars and puts its own nameplate and brand names on them. In 2003, its first full year of operation, the company sold 316 cars.

North Korea’s government is a partner in the company and took about 30% of the profit.

When it first started production, the company touted North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il’s role in naming several cars. One sport-utility vehicle, built from the design of Fiat’s Doblo model, was named by Mr. Kim as the Ppeokkugi, or Cuckoo.

Pyeonghwa, like other companies that do business in North Korea, faced enormous difficulty moving its money out of the country. Many Chinese businesses resort to buying commodities in North Korea with their profits, then exporting them to China to be sold for Chinese currency.

The motor company worked from February to May to move its money from North Korea, seeking permission from the North’s central bank, the spokesman said.

Read the full article below:
Pyeonghwa Sells in North Korea
Wall Street Journal
Sungha Park
7/16/2009

Read other Pyonghwa stories here.

Here is the location of Pyonghwa’s factory near Nampo.

Below are excerpts from an article by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland on the complexities of North Korea sanctions.  The full article is worth reading.

According to Haggard and Noland in the Oriental Economist:

On June 12, 2009, in response to North Korea’s second nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed additional economic sanctions via UNSC Resolution 1874. This measure is politically significant, particularly in signaling the changing attitude of Beijing. However, it is highly unlikely that the sanctions by themselves will have any immediate effect on North Korea’s nuclear program or on the increasing threat of proliferation. Sanctions need to be coupled with a nuanced policy that includes a strongly stated preference for a negotiated solution as well as defensive measures, of which the sanctions are only one part. Proliferation can be impeded. However, elimination of the North Korean nuclear weapons capability is likely to require a regime change in Pyongyang.

…

The most interesting features of the resolution have to do with means of enforcement. In 2003 President Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose effort to secure international cooperation in monitoring and interdicting ships that might be trafficking in WMDs or WMD-related materials. The new Security Council Resolution comes close to making the PSI a formal multilateral effort. The resolution calls upon member states to inspect vessels on the high seas or escort them to port if they have reasonable grounds to believe that they are carrying prohibited cargo. South Korea, which sat on the fence under the previous government of Roh Moo-hyun, has now formally joined the PSI effort.

An important loophole is that such interdiction must have the assent of the country under which the vessel is flagged. This provision could provide incentives for North Korea to do more shipping under its own flag. But there are clear constraints on doing so because of the country’s pariah status, and the major flags of convenience, such as Panama and Liberia, would come under strong pressure to comply. This obligation will almost certainly generate a confrontation at some point, given that North Korea has stated unambiguously that it would view such action as an act of war.

In addition to interdiction, the UNSC resolution explicitly provides for the use of financial means for stopping the flow of WMD-related trade. These measures are potentially more sweeping than those related to trade sanctions per se, since the resolution permits the blocking of transfers and even the freezing of any assets that “could contribute” to North Korea’s weapons programs or activities. Such a provision is similarly open to quite broad interpretation.

Finally, the new resolution establishes a new enforcement process by creating a panel of experts that will monitor efforts and provide recommendations to the Security Council.

Will Sanctions Work?

Despite these steps forward, the sanctions effort is not likely to yield immediate results and could even appear to backfire in the short run.

First, the North Koreans have typically responded to pressure not by complying but by escalating. The most recent cycle of escalation, culminating in the nuclear test, was in fact triggered by the sequence of UN actions described above.

Second, those favoring engagement had hoped that expanded trade, investment, and aid would encourage North Korea toward a more reformist path by demonstrating the gains from economic integration and by tilting the internal debate in favor of liberalizers. Economic inducements were probably never as powerful carrots as some believed. However, in 2005, the risk-averse North Korean leadership began reversing its limited economic reforms anyway. Kim Jong Il’s stroke in August 2008 has only exacerbated such tendencies; In the succession process, no one wants to be vulnerable to charges of apostasy. The influence of the military, a conservative, antireform institution is on the rise. In today’s environment, sanctions may be welcomed by reactionary elements as a justification for circling the wagons.

Finally, those countries most inclined to sanction North Korea no longer have much economic interaction with it anyway. Japan, once an important mainstay of the North Korean economy through transfers, has imposed an embargo (though circumvention via third countries is reputedly easy). Aid from South Korea has dropped to a trickle, and commercial relations through the collaborative Kaesong industrial park in North Korea have also been held hostage by new North Korean demands to renegotiate contracts. US economic exchanges with North Korea are miniscule. Indeed, the North Koreans even rejected the last important economic link to the United States by declining to continue a generous food aid program negotiated last year.

Thus an unintended consequence of the crisis has been to dramatically raise the share of North Korea’s trade with China, and with Iran Syria, and Egypt, countries with which it shares nuclear and/or missile interests. These latter partners show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. This geographical shift in trade makes traditional sanctions even less potent.

Consequently China has become even more central to any effective sanctions effort. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for about one-third of its trade, and is the country’s most generous aid donor. A cut-off of critical Chinese oil shipments, much less a complete trade embargo, would bring the country to its knees.

But China has ambivalent, conflicting interests in North Korea. It values having a fraternally allied buffer state on its border and regards the country as a useful pawn in its rivalries with the United States and India, acting as its proxy in dealings with Iran and Pakistan. Yet North Korean provocations push South Korea, Japan, and the United States closer together, and ultimately could trigger a major arms race in Northeast Asia, which would not be to China’s benefit. Finally, China has concerns that excessive pressure on the regime could provoke its collapse, in the worst case sending millions of North Korean refugees into China and ending with US troops on the Yalu River. For China, a stable, nuclear-armed North Korea is preferable to an unstable one, nuclear or not, and this consideration ultimately limits the degree of pressure that Beijing is willing to bring to bear.

Financial Levers

This does not mean that the United States and its allies are without economic options, however. Even in the absence of complete multilateral coordination, the United States can still exercise leverage if it can identify how and where North Korea finances its international trade and goes aggressively after financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the US Treasury has identified as engaged in illicit finance.

In 2005 the US Treasury signaled that a small Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, was possibly engaged in money laundering activities on North Korea’s behalf. Without any further action, the bank immediately suffered a run on its deposits and was forced into receivership, freezing $25 million of North Korean funds. The issue became a major sticking point in the Six Party talks but also appeared to motivate the North Koreans to return to them, setting the stage for the agreements reached in 2007. Undoubtedly the North Koreans have attempted to diversify their financial linkages since then.

In sum, the world appears capable of hurting North Korea economically, but given the extreme priority that the regime places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pain that the world can bring to bear will be sufficient to induce North Korea to abandon core political goals. However, holding out the possibility of removing these measures could constitute one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country’s diplomatic situation and to terminate its nuclear weapons program.

Read the full articles here:
Sanctions harden the lives of ordinary North Koreans
Oriental Economist
Haggard, Noland
7/3/2009

Last week we mentioned the curious case of Kim Kwang Jin, a high-ranking defector who helped raise money for the North Korean government who is spending a year here in DC at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.  This week he spoke to Fox News and painted a broad picture of the DPRK’s financial strategy:

Trim and sharply dressed, his bushy head of hair dyed jet black, the 42-year-old Kim, once an English professor at a computer college in Pyongyang, speaks polite and fluent English, albeit in a halting style and with a heavy accent.

An interview with FOX News in late June marked Kim’s first with an American TV news channel. Kim recounted his extraordinary experiences working for the Northeast Asia Bank and Korea National Insurance Corporation, where he handled accounts worth hundreds of million of dollars.

He described two economies in North Korea: one administered by the North Korean Cabinet and nominally oriented toward serving the needs of the people; and a “Royal Court economy,” financed by illicit enterprises worldwide and providing the stream of hard currency that keeps Kim Jong Il, and his cronies, ensconsed in power and luxury.

“Kim [Jong Il] himself enjoys a lavish lifestyle,” said Kim Kwang Jin. “He is giving gifts to his associates: the Mercedes-Benz[es] and whiskeys, first-class room and [air]fare from Japan. Everything’s provided to his aides….Kim Jong Il himself is now ruling the country with [the] dollar, hard currency….Without hard currency they cannot rule the country.” 

Kim Kwang Jin described a society in which bankers demand bribes from clients, doctors from patients, professors and teachers from students. 

“Everybody tries to make use of their position, their authority…to survive,” Kim said.

The former banker said the regime’s largest source of hard currency comes from the clandestine manufacture and sale of weapons of mass destruction. After that comes the regime’s multibillion-dollar insurance fraud business, in which the authorities stage arson and bogus accidents to collect multimillion-dollar payouts from international banks and insurers. 

“The state — Kim Jong Il himself — controls all these funds,” said Kim Kwang Jin. “It is funneled to him. And then he’s using all these revenues according to his regime’s priorities, which are now the missile program and nuclear weapons development.”

Kim Kwang Jin believes the North Korean government has never negotiated in good faith with the United States and its allies at the Six-Party nuclear disarmament talks. 

“The North Koreans are coming to the table not for negotiation; they are there for winning, for implementing their strategy,” he said. To grant meaningful concessions at such negotiations, or to enact meaningful internal reforms toward democratization, would, Kim says, be tantamount to “suicide to the regime.”

Yet Kim also believes financial sanctions can compel better behavior from Pyongyang, and cites as an example the Treasury Department’s targeting from 2005 to 2008 of Banco Delta Asia: a bank in Macau, also known as “BDA,” through which the North Korean regime once transferred large sums. It was during this period, when Banco Delta Asia faced international restrictions, that the North made its most far-reaching concessions in the Six-Party Talks, only to renege on them once the sanctions were lifted.

“The BDA case was a frightening thing to the regime,” Kim said. “It was a blow to [Kim Jong Il’s] personal funding, to the economic sector which is now supporting the regime. And even the national economy, the people’s economy run by [the] Cabinet, is influenced by this BDA case. 

Here is his interview on Fox News via YouTube. 

Read the full story here:
North Korean Defector Describes Inner Workings of Isolated Regime
Fox News
James Rosen
7/2/2009

According to the Washington Post:

The White House is ramping up its efforts to enforce sanctions against North Korea by forming a new interagency team to coordinate U.S. actions with other nations, senior administration officials said today.

The new team will be led by former ambassador to Bolivia Philip S. Goldberg, who is slated to leave for China in the near future as the U.S seeks concerted action to stop the North Korean regime from developing nuclear weapons.

“There is a broad consensus about the need to have a focused and engaged effort to see that these sanctions are implemented … and that we’re sharing information with each other,” one official said, speaking on background.

U.S. officials described the new group as a way to focus the administration more squarely on implementation of the latest sanctions, which were approved by the United Nations in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear test last month.

The officials said they are hoping the group — with representatives from the State Department, the White House, the National Security Agency, Treasury and others — will help “shine a spotlight” on the actions of the regime.

“We wanted somebody who woke up every morning and thought about nothing but sanctions implementation,” one official said. “It’s a huge difference when you have somebody who isn’t worried about any of the other aspects of this.”

The White House also announced a renewed effort to use the authority of the U.N. resolution to take financial actions against the North Korean regime in an effort to choke off the money flowing from small arms trade and other activity.

Treasury officials have issued a public memorandum to private financial institutions reminding them of the global condemnation and other risks of doing business with the North Korean regime.

The letter warns that North Korean banks and institutions often use deceptive techniques to engage in financial transactions that could place legitimate financial firms at risk.

“Financial institutions should apply enhanced scrutiny to any such correspondent accounts they maintain, including with respect to transaction monitoring,” the letter states.

One senior official said the U.S. is confident that the financial sanctions will over time help to further isolate North Korea and pressure its leaders to abandon its nuclear program.

“It’s going to take time to have a bite,” he conceded. “But we’re trying to get out of the box quickly.”

The Bush administration also had a sustained effort to implement United Nations sanctions after North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006.

The Counterproliferation Directorate of the White House National Security Council coordinated the effort, while the State Department and Treasury also co-chaired an interagency effort to examine specific cases that eventually worked their way up the chain for approval.

A team of senior officials, led by the undersecretary of State for arms control, traveled to Asia to work closely with allies. But the effort was dropped after Bush shifted course and decided to pursue diplomacy with North Korea.

Their first stops: China then Malaysia.

Citations:
New North Korea Sanctions Team Formed
Washington Post
Michael D. Shear and Glenn Kessler
6/26/2009

U.S. North Korea sanctions team to visit Malaysia
Reuters UK
7/2/2009

North Korea Uncovered version 18 is available.  This Google Earth overlay maps North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, markets, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks.

This project has now been downloaded over 140,000 times since launching in April 2007 and received much media attention last month following a Wall Street Journal article highlighting the work.

Note: Kimchaek City is now in high resolution for the first time.  Information on this city is pretty scarce.  Contributions welcome.

Additions to this version include: New image overlays in Nampo (infrastructure update), Haeju (infrastructure update, apricot trees), Kanggye (infrastructure update, wood processing factory), Kimchaek (infrastructure update). Also, river dredges (h/t Christopher Del Riesgo), the Handure Plain, Musudan update, Nuclear Test Site revamp (h/t Ogle Earth), The International School of Berne (Kim Jong un school), Ongjin Shallow Sea Farms, Monument to  “Horizon of the Handure Plain”, Unhung Youth Power Station, Hwangnyong Fortress Wall, Kim Ung so House, Tomb of Kim Ung so, Chungnyol Shrine, Onchon Public Library, Onchon Public bathhouse, Anbyon Youth Power Stations.

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
East-West Center Working Papers
Economics Series, No. 104
Download paper here (PDF)

Abstract:
Despite North Korea’s turn away from economic reform and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, the country has in fact become more economically open. But it has emphasized closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. Yet the U.S. can still exercise economic leverage by going aggressively after third-party financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the United States Treasury has identified as money laundering or proliferation concerns.

There is some evidence that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority, but in the absence of such interest and as legitimate trade, investment, and aid dry up, the incentives to intensify proliferation activities increase.

The internal organization of the North Korean economy has important implications for any policy seeking transformation via engagement. The economy is structured in such a way that outside economic ties are still largely monopolized by stateowned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires very close scrutiny. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North Korean counterparties believe that they are ultimately political in nature, subsidized and thus vulnerable to blackmail. If economic ties are truly commercial in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a supportive policy environment.

Paper prepared for the conference on “North Korean Nuclear Politics: Constructing a New Northeast Asian Order in the 21st Century,” University of Washington, June 4-5, 2009. We would like to thank the Smith Richardson, MacArthur, and Korea Foundations for financial support and Jennifer Lee for research assistance.

UPDATE: A shorter version of this paper can be found here.

North Korea Uncovered v.16
Download it here

The most recent version of North Korea Uncovered (North Korea Google Earth) has been published.  Since being launched, this project has been continuously expanded and to date has been downloaded over 32,000 times.

Pictured to the left is a statue of Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  This statue, as well as many others identified in this version of the project, was built by the North Koreans. According to a visitor:

From the neck down, the Kabila monument looks strangely like Kim Jong Il: baggy uniform, creased pants, the raised arm, a little book in his left hand. From the neck up, the statue is the thick, grim bald mug of Laurent Kabila (his son Joseph is the current president). “The body was made in North Korea,” explains my driver Felix. In other words, the body is Kim Jong Il’s, but with a fat, scowling Kabila head simply welded on.

This is particularly interesting because there are no known pictures of a Kim Jong il statue.  The only KJI statue that is reported to exist is in front of the National Security Agency in Pyongyang.  If a Kim Jong il statue does in fact exist, it might look something like this.

Thanks again to the anonymous contributors, readers, and fans of this project for your helpful advice and location information. This project would not be successful without your contributions.

Version 16 contains the following additions: Rakwon Machine Complex, Sinuiju Cosmetics Factory, Manpo Restaurant, Worker’s Party No. 3 Building (including Central Committee and Guidance Dept.), Pukchang Aluminum Factory, Pusan-ri Aluminum Factory, Pukchung Machine Complex, Mirim Block Factory, Pyongyang General Textile Factory, Chonnae Cement Factory, Pyongsu Rx Joint Venture, Tongbong Cooperative Farm, Chusang Cooperative Farm, Hoeryong Essential Foodstuff Factory, Kim Ki-song Hoeryong First Middle School , Mirim War University, electricity grid expansion, Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (TSLG)” is also known as the “Musudan-ri Launching Station,” rebuilt electricity grid, Kumchang-ri suspected underground nuclear site, Wangjaesan Grand Monument, Phothae Revolutionary Site, Naedong Revolutionary Site, Kunja Revolutionary Site, Junggang Revolutionary Site, Phophyong Revolutionary Site, Samdung Revolutionary Site, Phyongsan Granite Mine, Songjin Iron and Steel Complex (Kimchaek), Swedish, German and British embassy building, Taehongdan Potato Processing Factory, Pyongyang Muyseum of Film and Theatrical Arts, Overseas Monuments built by DPRK: Rice Museum (Muzium Padi) in Malaysia, Statue de Patrice Lumumba (Kinshasa, DR Congo), National Heroes Acre (Windhoek, Namibia), Derg Monument (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), National Heroes Acre (Harare, Zimbabwe), New State House (Windhoek, Namibia), Three Dikgosi (Chiefs) Monument (Gaborone, Botswana), 1st of May Square Statue of Agostinho Neto (Luanda, Angola), Momunment Heroinas Angolas (Luanda, Angola), Monument to the Martyrs of Kifangondo Battle (Luanda, Angola), Place de l’étoile rouge, (Porto Novo, Benin), Statue of King Béhanzin (Abomey, Benin), Monument to the African Renaissance (Dakar, Senegal), Monument to Laurent Kabila [pictured above] (Kinshasa, DR Congo).

(Hat tip to One Free Korea)—According to Open Radio for North Korea, the DPRK won experienced a significant devaluation against to the dollar in the latter half of 2008:

According to the table and the article:

In 2008, North Korea’s exchange rate has shown relative stability of 3200 Won per Dollar and 460 Won per Chinese Yuan.

However, in December 2008, the exchange rate started to skyrocket.  The exchange rate in December was 3630 won per Dollar and 530 Won per Chinese Yuan- which was approximately 13 to 15 percent increase from the month before.  The exchange rate fell slightly to 3540 Won per Dollar and 530 Won per Yuan in January.  Nonetheless, the exchange rate isn’t likely to decrease further.

The sudden rise in foreign currency exchange rate in December seems to have correlation with the Chinese restriction on North Korean imports.  According to Chinese and North Korean traders, the sub par quality of imported products from China (speculated to be food products with melamine) was the origin of the Chinese restriction.  Sporadic breakout of illnesses in various regions of North Korea caused general distrust over Chinese imports, and the North Korean government relayed the complaints to Chinese authorities.  China in turn took a chauvinistic approach and unilaterally regulated trade between China and North Korea to teach North Korea a “lesson”

Nearly 50% of North Korean trade is with China.  Therefore, regulation on trade between North Korea and China, especially on North Korean exports to China inevitably has a severe impact on foreign currency market in North Korea.

For comparison I put together a table of the US$-RMB exchange rate during 2008 (interbank spot rate) using FX history:

So now we can conclude that in 2008 the Yuan appreciated against both the DPRK won and the and the US dollar, and that the US dollar appreciated against the DPRK won. 

So the next question is: how efficient are the currency markets which trade DPRK won? Doing some back of the napkin calculations using data from these two different sources (the story and FX History), I seem to have reached the conclusion that the DPRK won is traded rather efficiently.

The average RMB/USD exchange rate (interbank spot) in December 2008 was 6.86 RMB/USD (from FX history).  If you converted 686 RMB into USD, you would receive $100.  If you converted US$100 into DPRK won at the 3,630 rate in the story quoted above, you would receive w 363,000.  If you exchanged those won for Chinese RMB at the 530 rate quoted in the story, you would receive 684.90 RMB.  684.90 is 99.83% of 686. 

That seems too good to be true.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-1-15-1
2009-01-15   

The exchange rate for the North Korean won shot up approximately 13-15 percent at the end of last year, and has maintained this high rate into January, according to an article in the on-line newsletter, “Open News for North Korea,” on January 12.

According to the inaugural edition of the newsletter, the exchange rate last year was around 3,200 won per USD, or 460 won per Yuan, with only slight fluctuations, but shot up to 3,630 won per USD and 530 won per Yuan in December. In the first weeks of the new year, it has fallen only slightly, to 3,540 won per USD, and 530 won per Yuan.

According to traders who import and export between North Korea and China, “The sudden rise in the exchange rate appears to be related to trade regulations on goods imported from the North,” and they stressed, “After North Korea protested to China about inferior Chinese goods leading to accidents around the country, China decided to set an example, and unilaterally imposed [trade] restrictions.”

Because business with China makes up almost 50 percent of North Korea’s trade, if DPRK-PRC trade, and in particular, North Korea’s exports to China, are restricted, this would cause a large shock to the foreign currency market,” and, “China’s regulatory measures were eased as January come around,” but, “this year, North Korea is strengthening crackdowns on domestic markets, making it difficult to expect the exchange rate to return” to last year’s lower numbers. According to the article, “There is a foreign currency crisis in North Korea, as well, the scale of which is so great it can’t even be compared to what is happening in the South.”

The black market price for U.S. dollars has shot up from a low of 200 won, in July 2002, to 3,200 won in July of last year, and has continued to rise, peaking at 3.500 won currently. This is a sixteen-fold increase in just over six years. The newsletter put this in perspective by explaining, “North Korea has experienced a foreign currency crisis like that seen in South Korea in 1998 every year since 2002.”

North Korea’s haphazard currency distribution and chronic trade deficit has led to a reduction in the country’s foreign currency reserves, while the failure of the authorities’ currency stabilization policies combined with the growing demand for U.S. dollars by North Korean residents seeking imported goods have led to the sharp growth in the exchange rate.

UPDATE: Here is an older paper by Stacey Banks which I have not read: North Korean Telecommunication: On Hold.

ORIGINAL POST: On Monday the Orascom 3G mobile network launched in North Korea.  Just about everyone covered this story…so here are the highlights:

Telecommunications in North Korea: Has Orascom Made the Connection?
Working Paper: Marcus Noland

The topicality of the second paper, on the Egyptian firm Orascom’s role in North Korea’s telecommunications modernization, received a boost this week with the announcement in Pyongyang that Orascom was finally rolling out its cell phone service and creating a joint venture bank with a North Korean partner.  The planned Orascom investments are large: if actualized, they would be the largest non-Chinese or non-South Korean investments in North Korea, and would exceed total private investment in the Kaesong Industrial Complex to date

Financial Times

Orascom is confident North Korea is opening up its economy and says it has been assured by the ­government that everyone will be allowed to buy a mobile. However, experts think that such a volte-face is highly unlikely and reckon only senior military and government officials will be allowed access, and then only to a closed network.

When asked how many people would ultimately use the service, Orascom’s chairman Naguib Sawiris said: “We have a modest target of 5 to 10 per cent of the population.” The population is about 23m. Mr Sawiris expects 50,000 subscriptions in the first three-to-six months.

Jim Hoare, Britain’s former chargé d’affaires to Pyongyang, says the new network is bound to have severe restrictions.

“It’s unlikely that a country that doesn’t allow you to have a radio unless it’s set to the state frequency will suddenly allow everyone to have mobile phones. It’s more credible that there will be a limited network for officials in Pyongyang and Nampo.”

Dong Yong-sung, chief of the economic security team at the Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul, believes another obstacle to ordinary North Koreans owning phones will be the cost. “As far as I know, mobile phone registration costs about $1,000,” he said, a sum equivalent to the average annual income.

(NKeconWatch: Others put the price at $700…and there are many problems with asserting that the DPRK’s per capita income is $1,000 per year.)

Bloomberg

The inauguration of Koryolink took place today in North Korea, Orascom Telecom said in an e-mailed statement. Orascom Telecom Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Sawiris attended the event, a company official said, requesting anonymity. The Cairo- based company got a 25-year license and exclusive access for four years in January. It plans to spend as much as $400 million on a high-speed network and the license for the first three years.

The North Korean venture is “in line with our strategy to penetrate countries with high population and low penetration by providing the first mobile telephony services,” Sawiris said in a statement earlier this year.

CHEO Technology JV Company, the North Korean unit that will operate under the Koryolink name, is 75 percent owned by Orascom Telecom and 25 percent by the state-owned Korea Post and Telecommunications Corporation.

The unit will see average revenue per user of $12 to $15 this year as Orascom Telecom targets three of the country’s biggest cities, according to company forecasts.

Koryolink has rolled out its so-called third-generation grid to initially cover Pyongyang, with a population of 2 million.

Orascom is counting on four potential markets in the Stalinist nation, according to a study by Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

The military and government officials are the top targets, followed by foreigners working for UN organizations and diplomats. The others are customers from South Korea, which has several economic projects with its neighbor, and local demand from rich North Koreans.

To protect its investment, Orascom “hedged its bet, committing only half of its investment at the outset and making additional investment conditional on its assessment of conditions going forward,” Noland said.

If the deal is threatened, Orascom may withdraw specialized equipment or technicians, reducing the value of the network to Pyongyang, Noland said in his study.

“Orascom may have spread the wealth informally, creating beneficiaries within the decision-making apparatus who would stand to lose if the agreement failed,” according to the study.

Bloomberg

Orascom Telecom, the Middle East’s biggest wireless company, opened Ora Bank in Pyongyang in the presence of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Naguib Sawiris, a company official said on condition of anonymity. Ezzeldine Heikal, who is also head of Koryolink, Orascom’s North Korean mobile-phone network, was appointed president of the bank, the official said without providing further details.

“This is a big deal, especially as far as North Korea is concerned, because the current banking system is virtually non- existent,” Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics said in a telephone interview from Washington, D.C. “It’s a ground that others have feared to tread and is perhaps an endorsement for North Korea that says ‘we’re open for business.’”

Ora Bank is a joint venture between Orascom Telecom and North Korea’s state-owned Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea’s official news agency reported today. The director of North Korea’s central bank Kim Chon Gyun and Egypt’s ambassador to Pyongyang Ismail Abdelrahman Ghoneim Hussein, were also present at the opening ceremony, the news agency said.

Radio Free Asia

Chinese traders who regularly travel back and forth to North Korea said local residents showed little enthusiasm for the new service, which cost more than U.S. $900 to set up before the Ryongchun explosion.

North Korean defector Kim Kwang-jin, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, said the fact that the government had once pulled the plug on North Korean cell phones meant that it could easily do so again.

“In the beginning, people will be hesitant, because a few years ago many of them made a big investment in cell phones. But service was suspended abruptly, so they are still very concerned that might happen again,” Kim said.

“People are also worried that the ability to pay such a high amount of money for a cell phone may raise a red flag and bring them under scrutiny by the North Korean authorities.”

Most foreigners are banned from using cell phones while in North Korea, although a network for government officials is believed to exist in the capital, Pyongyang.

(NKeconWatch: I personally saw elite North Koreans use mobile phones and even some western journalists in 2005.)

The Guardan

North Korea first experimented with mobile phones in 2002, but recalled the handsets 18 months later after a mysterious train explosion that killed an estimated 160 people. Some experts argue that officials feared the incident was an attempt to assassinate the regime’s “dear leader”, Kim Jong-il, and that mobile phones were involved.

BBC

Some reports suggest that handsets for the new network will cost around $700 each, putting them far beyond the reach of the vast majority of people in the impoverished country.

Choson Ilbo

Although the technology would enable users to send and receive text messages and video content, North Korean customers will only be allowed to speak over their phones.

BMI Political Risk Analysis, Dec 16, 2008 (h/t Oliver)

BMI View: North Korea has officially begun third-generation (3G) mobile phone services, thanks to Egypt’s Orascom Telecom (OT). However, the growth of the network could be limited by the regime’s fear that mobile phones will increase the scope for anti-regime activities.

North Korea has officially commenced third-generation (3G) mobile phone services, thanks to an investment by Egypt’s Orascom Telecom (OT). The firm’s initial target is 100,000 subscribers in three major cities, including Pyongyang, and it eventually hopes to develop a nation-wide network connecting North Korea’s 23mn citizens. OT has promised to invest US$400mn in network infrastructure over the next four years. It has signed a 25-year contract with the North Korean government, and owns 75% of their joint-venture (known as Korealink). OT’s exclusivity rights will last for four years. Orascom’s foray is something of a coup, given that North Korea’s communications network is so rudimentary (for further background see December 8 2008, Industry Trend Analysis – North Korea Prepares For Mobile Network Launch).

Why Pyongyang Fears Mobile Phones
North Korea launched a mobile phone service operated by a Thai subsidiary firm in 2002, but reversed course in 2004, apparently because of a devastating bomb blast on a train in Ryongchon in April of that year. Given that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s personal train had passed through the area only a few hours earlier, there was speculation that the explosion had been an assassination attempt, possibly triggered by mobile phone. Since then, only those living in areas close to the border with China have had access to mobile phones, thanks to the proximity of the Chinese network.

Aside from the notion of mobile phones as bomb triggers, they can also make it easier for citizens to communicate with one another. This would increase citizens’ ability to organise anti-government activities – such as protests or sabotage. For example, the popular uprising that led to the overthrow of Philippine president Joseph Estrada in 2001 was dubbed the ‘text message revolution’, because that is how the marches were announced and coordinated. Admittedly, the Philippines is a far more open society than North Korea, but the subversive aspect has not been lost on the regime.

Mobile phones would also make it easier for North Koreans to communicate with the outside world, and thus allow the real-time transmission of information or intelligence to foreign media or spy agencies, and vice versa. They would also allow the North Korean elite to communicate more efficiently, allowing dissident elements to plot against the regime.

Thus, even something as basic as mobile phones are seen as potentially regime threatening.

Mobile Service Difficult To Spread
Consequently, Orascom will surely find it difficult to spread its mobile service across the country. For a start, registration will be tightly watched. Secondly, the cost of the handsets, at several hundred dollars, will mean that only the political and moneyed elites will be able to afford mobiles. Of course, elements of the elite can ‘misuse’ their phones to arrange subversive actions if they deem it worthy, but it seems that the regime are counting on loyalty. Indeed, depending on the sophistication of their equipment, the regime will probably be able to snoop in on the elite’s conversations and movements, giving them an additional layer of security.

Read the full articles below:
Orascom eyes North Korean network
Financial Times
Christian Oliver
12/14/2008

Orascom Telecom’s Sawiris Signs North Korean Deal
Bloomberg
Tarek Al-Issawi
12/15/2008

Orascom Telecom of Egypt Opens Bank in North Korea
Bloomberg
Tarek Al-Issawi
12/16/2008

North Korea Brings Back Cell Phones
Radio Free Asia
Jung Young
12/16/2008

Secretive North Korea launches restricted mobile phone service
The Guardian
Tania Branigan
12/16/2008

N Korea launches 3G phone network
BBC
Steve Jackson
12/15/2008

N.Korea Restarts Cell Phone Service
Choson Ilbo
12/17/2008