Archive for the ‘Banking’ Category

North Korea joins OECD anti-money laundering group

Saturday, July 19th, 2014

According to the JoongAng Daily:

North Korea has joined the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), whose purpose is to prevent funding of terrorism and development of nuclear weapons.

Members of the APG unanimously decided to accept North Korea and Tuvalu as observers during its general meeting held in Macau yesterday.

APG is the Asia Pacific unit of the Financial Action Task Force under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has 41 member countries including the U.S., South Korea, China and Japan and observers include countries such as Germany, France and the U.K., as well as 27 international organizations such as the Asia Development Bank and World Bank.

Since North Korea has been accepted as an observer, it has to follow several rules including the prevention of money laundering, funding of terrorist organizations or actions, sharing its knowledge and experience and following global regulations and laws.

The APG will decide later whether to elevate North Korea from observer status to a member country once it evaluates Pyongyang based on its annual reports to the organization and visits by the representatives of the group over the next three years.

South Korea and many other members are trying to figure out the motive behind the unexpected move by Pyongyang, because North Korea was previously opposed to joining the APG.

“[North Korea’s motive] is a mystery to us,” said a high ranking government official, who requested anonymity. “We suspect that North Korea, while looking for ways to ease the international financial restrictions imposed on them, decided to show their efforts in improving their global image [by joining the APG].

“But since the lists that they need to follow are long, we will probably have wait and see how sincere and determined they are with their decision.”

In other words, it could be a facade as a way for North Korea to ease the sanctions imposed on it, since the possibility that Pyongyang will give up its nuclear ambitions is low.

The action is particularly suspicious because up until last year’s APG meeting held in Shanghai, North Korea refused to join the organization because of the rule requiring members and observers to follow global standards. North Korea at the time argued that it would join the APG only after the agreement to follow UN resolutions was taken out.

The resolutions include prevention of money laundering, nuclear terrorism and development of nuclear weapons, which is the opposite of the North Korean government’s goal of securing both economic growth and nuclear weapons.

But now, North Korea has agreed to follow all regulations presented by APG.

The tide seemed to have turned as financial sanctions imposed by the international community and led by the U.S. have intensified.

Pyongyang suffered heavily last year after the U.S. and China closed the accounts of the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea, which was known as the money laundering window for Pyongyang. The money laundered through the trade bank is suspected of being used in funding the regime’s control over the country.

In May, the state-run Bank of China said it had notified the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea that it was closing all of its accounts and suspending all financial transactions. It did not specify the number of accounts in the bank.

The move came as a shock considering China and North Korea’s strong ties. China was previously the lifeline of North Korea, whose economy has been heavily dependent on its close ally.

Last year wasn’t the first time that North Korea’s accounts have been shut down. In 2005, the U.S. froze North Korea’s accounts at Macau’s Banco Delta Asia, which was a heavy blow to Pyongyang’s ability to secure foreign capital.

The recent change of heart seems to have been triggered by a report by the U.S. State Department in May designating North Korea as a country that is non-cooperative against terror, citing its decision not to join either the FATF or APG.

Although suspicious, the South Korean government isn’t disapproving of the move by the North, as there are positive aspects such as better transparency of Pyongyang’s finances if it conforms to the APG’s regulations.

And if Pyongyang doesn’t follow the rules and loses its license as an observer, the sanctions against North Korea will further tighten.

“North Korean representatives, after their acceptance was approved [in Macau], stressed that they will work on following the APG’s international standards and our [South Korean] government has emphasized the importance of following the resolutions set by the United Nations Security Council,” said a government official.

Read the full story here:
North Korea joins OECD anti-money laundering group
JoongAng Daily
Jung Won-yeop and Park Jin-seok
2014-7-19

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Mobilization of idle funds emphasized for fiscal expansion

Friday, June 20th, 2014

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2014-6-18

With the international sanctions against the DPRK and the country’s continual isolation, North Korean authorities are stressing the need to mobilize the “cash in the closet” being kept by more and more North Korean people and institutions.

According to an article published in the Kim Il Sung University Gazette (Vol. 1, 2014, January 20), “The Basic Direction of Financial Management and Measures to Resolve Funding Problems Based on Kimilsung-Kimjongilism,” one solution to finance the enormous defense and economic construction costs is to “mobilize idle funds.”

The article states the following: “Some of the funds that are being circulated in the market have strayed away from the normal production process and distribution passage and remain harbored in the hands of organizations, enterprises, and people. . . . Mobilization of idle funds shall meet the funding needs of the state and serve as a source of supplementary income to increase state revenue.”

The article adds that “The state should secure idle funds of institutions and enterprises through banks and mobilize idle cash kept by the people through savings and insurance,” and furthermore states that “Banks should concentrate to have control over idle funds.”

According to the article, “Dependence on foreign aid to resolve funding problems will lead to continuous financial subjugation.” Mobilization of idle funds is seen as a necessary policy to realize the national goal of “autonomous economy,” which takes precedence over attracting foreign investment.

Since the early 2000s, North Korea has emphasized the need to mobilize institutions’ and persons’ idle funds. But the North Korean people remain reluctant to save money in banks for the fear of revealing their income to authorities and anxiety over the possibility of losing their savings.

The recent increase in North Korean academia’s emphasis on the “fiscal expansion through the mobilization of idle funds” began from late last year, but it also appears to serve the purpose of attracting capital to fund economic development zone projects, which is currently suffering from fund shortages.

North Korea continues to seek opportunities to expand trade and exchanges with Russia and China but is also turning an eye toward the domestic market to fully maximize its objective of fiscal expansion.

In addition, the issue of introducing commercial banks (as a means to effectively mobilize idle funds of the private sector) is being raised again — a policy that remained inactive for a decade due to insignificant results.

North Korea instituted the Commercial Banking Act in 2006, but the actual operation of the bank has yet to be confirmed.  

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Russia and DPRK discuss economic opportunities

Saturday, March 29th, 2014

What are the opportunities? Rason port, Iron Silk Road (Rail), Kaesong Industrial Complex, gas pipeline.

According to RIA Novosti:

Russia and North Korea have signed a new protocol to transition to using the ruble for payments between the two countries as part of an effort to boost annual bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2020, Russia’s Far East Development Ministry said Friday.

The announcement came as Russian officials have expressed a desire to explore new markets for the country’s businesses, following the introduction of sanctions by the West in reaction to Moscow’s stance over Crimea. Russian leaders have simultaneously reassured international investors the country remains open for business, and there are no plans to restrict international commerce.

The protocol announced Friday came following a visit of a Russian delegation to the Asian country for a meeting of a standing bilateral commission, timed to mark the 65th anniversary of a cooperation agreement between the Soviet Union and North Korea.

The parties agreed to move towards settling payments in rubles as well as adopting further measures to boost bilateral trade, including easing visa procedures and providing for Russian access to proposed special economic zones in the country, the ministry’s statement said.

The ministry reaffirmed the countries’ mutual interest in joint projects with South Korea, including international connections for railways [Iron Silk Road], gas pipelines and power lines.

The Russian delegation also proposed the entry of Russian businesses into the Kaesong Industrial Park, a special economic zone in North Korea just north of Seoul where South Korean companies are allowed to employ northern workers.

The two sides identified areas for further cooperation, including a transshipment complex at the port of Rason and technical cooperation for the modernization of North Korea’s mining sector, automobile industry and electric power plants.

According to the statement, during the talks Russian Far East Development Minister Alexander Galushka emphasized that achieving such goals would only be possible if stability is maintained on the Korean peninsula.

The next meeting of the bilateral commission is scheduled for June in Russia’s far eastern Vladivostok.

Here is what Yonhap reports:

North Korea and Russia have agreed to boost economic ties by pushing for trilateral projects involving South Korea, including a plan to support Russian companies’ entry into an inter-Korean industrial complex, a media report said Saturday.

The agreement between the two was made earlier this week when Russia’s Far East Development Minister Alexander Galushka visited the North for a five-day run until Friday to explore ways to boost bilateral economic cooperation, according to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti.

“The Russian delegation proposed the entry of Russian businesses into the Kaesong Industrial Park, a special economic zone in North Korea just north of Seoul where South Korean companies are allowed to employ northern workers,” the RIA Novosti reported, citing the ministry.

Officials of Seoul’s unification ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, welcomed the agreement between the North and Russia, while stressing the importance of Russia’s prior consultation with the South.

“Russian companies’ making inroads into the Kaesong park is desirable in terms of the internationalization of the complex … It would also prevent the North from unilaterally reversing its agreement with Seoul over the Kaeesong operation,” the ministry official said, requesting anonymity.

Internationalization of the enclave, a symbol of inter-Korean detente, is one of the key topics for inter-Korean meetings aimed at ensuring its normal operations and further invigorating the complex. The Kaesong park resumed operations in September, more than five months after the North unilaterally closed it in anger over Seoul-Washington joint military exercises.

“But it is crucial for Russia to discuss the matter with our side first as it is basically operated by the South Korean authorities,” he added.

A handful of companies from China, Australia and Germany have so far expressed interests in making an investment in the Kaesong complex, prompting the Seoul government to review holding joint presentation sessions with the North to lure investors from overseas, according to another ministry official.

Here is additional information from Yonhap on recent shipments from Russia to the DPRK:

Russia exported US$21.16 million’s worth of jib cranes, machinery used mostly for cargo handling at ports, to North Korea last year, accounting for nearly 22 percent of its total exports to the North, according to the report by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). The amount surpasses that of Russia’s traditional export goods such as coal, petroleum and bituminous oil.

There were no records of the machines being exported to North Korea the year before, with the 2011 amount standing at $139,000.

North Korea and Russia maintain economic relations that include a project that would make North Korea’s northeastern port city of Rajin a logistics hub by connecting it to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway. North Korea is said to have agreed to a long-term lease of the No. 3 dock at Rajin port to Russia and that it is modernizing facilities there. The cranes may be for such modernization efforts, the KOTRA report said.

Also noteworthy is Russia’s exports of ambulances to the North, amounting to approximately 10.1 billion won ($9.45 million), the fourth largest in terms of value. Ambulances are a relatively new product on the trade list.

KCNA’s reporting of the meeting was much more muted:

DPRK Premier Meets Minister of Development of Far East of Russia

Pyongyang, March 26 (KCNA) — Pak Pong Ju, premier of the DPRK Cabinet, met Alexandr Galushka, minister of the Development of Far East of Russia who is chairman of the Russian side to the Inter-governmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology between the DPRK and Russia, and his party.

He had a friendly talk with them who paid a courtesy call on him at the Mansudae Assembly Hall on Wednesday.

Minutes of Talks between Governments of DPRK, Russia Signed

Pyongyang, March 26 (KCNA) — Minutes of talks on cooperation in trade, economy, science and technology between the governments of the DPRK and Russia were signed here Wednesday.

Present at the signing ceremony were Ri Ryong Nam, minister of Foreign Trade who is chairman of the DPRK side to the Inter-governmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology between the DPRK and Russia, and officials concerned, Alexandr Galushka, minister for the Development of Far East who is chairman of the Russian side to the Inter-governmental Committee, and his party and Alexandr Timonin, Russian ambassador to the DPRK.

Ri Ryong Nam and Alexandr Galushka signed the minutes of the talks.

Read the full story here:
Russia, North Korea Agree to Settle Payments in Rubles in Trade Pact
RIA Novosti
2014-3-28

N. Korea, Russia to discuss supporting Moscow firms’ advance into Kaesong park
Yonhap
2014-3-29

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Babson on post-Jang economic management

Monday, February 24th, 2014

Writing in 38 North, Bradley Babson comments on the effect Jang Song-thaek purge will have on North Korea’s economic management moving forward:

With Jang’s demise there is now a potential opportunity to make fundamental changes in the North Korean economic management and financial systems. Removing his influence over major foreign exchange earning enterprises operating outside any institutionalized supervision means that some other mechanisms must be put in place to manage these important national resources. Whether this will lead to a more rational system of cabinet-managed financial institutions serving an economic development strategy endorsed by Kim Jong Un is a basic question. Early indications are that the cabinet will be empowered to exercise more centralized control over the economy,[2] but how far this will extend into the fragmented financial system remains to be seen.

One indicator of possible significant change is whether the KPA will regain its former economic independence or become more closely integrated with national economic and financial management. This is important for improving efficiency in allocation of resources for economic development and having more control in balancing security expenditures with investments in the general economy.

Another indicator will be whether the existing system that provides funds for sustaining luxury goods patronage for the Pyongyang elite and for showcase projects like equipping the new Masik Pass ski resort, will be handed over to new more loyal technocrats to manage. Or will the Cabinet be given more latitude to shape the future political economy and distribution of wealth, given the reality that access to market power is becoming more valuable for the Pyongyang elite than receiving patronage? This would be a major change that could lead to new incentives for more rational economic management. Acknowledgment that markets are here to stay would open the possibility of addressing the need to build new financial institutional capabilities required for mobilizing and regulating private savings and economic activity. This would also help focus attention on ways to improve macroeconomic management of the mixed state-directed and market economy system.

Read the full story here:
The Demise of Jang Song Thaek and the Future of North Korea’s Financial System
38 North
Bradley Babson
2014-2-24

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DPRK consolidates gold export revenues

Friday, December 27th, 2013

According to the Daily NK:

Approximately two months prior to the purge of Jang Sung Taek, the North Korean authorities halted exports of gold ore from the mines of Hwanghae Province in the southwest of the country, Daily NK has learned.

The step allegedly followed the discovery of improprieties in the operation of mining enterprises managed by persons linked with Jang, and formed part of measures designed to bring foreign currency-earning activities en masse under strict Central Party control.

“The order to halt exports was handed down in October, some months before the official news of the purge of Jang Sung Taek,” a source involved in the industry told Daily NK on the 27th. “It was even applied to foreign currency-earners affiliated with Central Party organs, as well as those from normal provincial-level agencies.”

“A directive ordering operations to cease from the second half of the year was issued to Holdong and Eunpa mines in Yeonsan County, North Hwanghae Province. These mines are shut now and their shafts are just filling up with water,” the source went on. “Mine officials have told me that this order came down stating that neither provincial nor Central Party managed-enterprises were allowed to mine for gold.”

“By doing this just a few months before the Jang Song Taek purge, the authorities moved to integrate foreign currency-earning activities and confiscate those enterprises and funds formerly managed by Jang prior to his purging,” he added. Explicating his view of the logic behind the step, he went on, “[The authorities] wish to greatly reinforce their control over these foreign-currency earning enterprises’ resources so as to bring together the management of Kim Jong Eun’s ruling funds.”

“I am told that they discovered that the enterprises Jang was managing had not been passing their profits to the state in the prescribed manner, so they halted the trade completely” the source alleged. “They controlled the mines, saying that the reason was because Jang was flogging off natural resources for a low price.”

“Previously, only ore with a purity of 20-30g of gold per ton could be exported, so any ore with a lower purity than this was not controlled. But now they are stopping all gold ore from exiting,” he went on to explain, adding that the ban is causing serious problems for the region’s miners, many of whom rely in large part on income from the mines for their survival.

“They used to share export licenses with other enterprises and export ore that way, too, but right now that is also totally prohibited,” he added.

Read the full story here:
Gold Mining Stopped to Unify Funds
Daily NK
Oh Se Hyeok
2013-12-27

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New info on the DPRK’s exchange rates and Economic Development Zones

Sunday, November 3rd, 2013

James Pearson writing in Reuters updates us on the state of the DPRK’s domestic currency:

In a dimly-lit Pyongyang toy shop packed with Mickey Mouse picture frames and plastic handguns, a basketball sells for 46,000 Korean People’s Won – close to $500 at North Korea’s centrally planned exchange rate.

Luckily, for young North Koreans looking to shoot hoops with Dennis Rodman, the new friend of leader Kim Jong Un, the Chinese-made ball actually costs a little less than $6 based on black market rates.

Once reserved for official exchange only in zones aimed at attracting foreign investment, and in illegal underground market deals elsewhere, black market rates are being used more frequently and openly in North Korean cities.

Publicly advertised prices at rates close to the market rate – around 8,000 won to the dollar versus the official rate of 96 – could signal Pyongyang is trying to marketise its centrally planned economy and allow a burgeoning “grey market” to thrive. This could boost growth and capture more of the dollars and Chinese yuan circulating widely so that North Korea can pay for imports of oil and food.

Unofficial market rates could become more widespread following an announcement last month of 14 new special economic zones (SEZs) aimed at kickstarting a moribund economy where output is just one fortieth of wealthier South Korea’s. A spokesperson for the Korea Economic Development Association, a local organization tasked with communicating policy in the new SEZs, told Reuters that exchange rates in the new zones are to be “fixed according to (local) market rates.”

“The official rate for the won is like a placeholder,” said Matthew Reichel, director of the Pyongyang Project, a Canadian NGO that organizes academic exchanges with North Korea. “We all know that the value of the won is not this.”

UNDER STRAIN

An estimated 90 percent of economic transactions along North Korea’s border with China are in yuan, an embarrassment for a country whose policy stresses economic independence, and something that reduces the grip that authorities attempt to exercise over its people and economy.

Pyongyang does not publish economic data, but is believed to have run a sizeable current account deficit for years, straining its ability to pay for imports in hard currency.

An attempt in 2009 to revalue the won and confiscate private foreign currency savings prompted protests from market traders and forced a rare policy reversal and public apology from state officials.

“Due to its lack of foreign currency, the North Korean government will have to tolerate black market rates, even if it has difficulty in officially recognizing them,” said Cho Bong-hyun, a North Korea economics expert at the IBK Economic Research Institute in Seoul.

Read the full story here:
Insight: Won for the money: North Korea experiments with exchange rates
Reuters
2013-11-3

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DPRK debt will hamper development of Economic Development Zones

Wednesday, October 30th, 2013

According to the Daily NK:

North Korea’s unserviced external debt will make it difficult for the country and its partners to implement plans for special economic zones, it has been pointed out. North Korea, which defaulted on its external debt decades ago, needs to recover its sovereign credit rating through repayment or rescheduling, but has not shown any intention of doing so.

“North Korea’s outstanding foreign debt is between $120 billion and $150 billion; if the state cannot repay this, they cannot get access to international financial institutions,” Yoon Deok Ryong, a senior researcher with the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy explained to Daily NK. “The North Korean regime must take steps to restore trust. One of the ways this could be done would be to join the Paris Club of debtors, a structure within which developing nations can borrow money without incurring interest.”

“For a number of years, the Chinese government has been distributing investment guides to Chinese businessmen that outline the risks of investing in North Korea. These guides were previously shared privately, but have now been made public by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce,” Yoon went on. “We can see in this that China, too, is wary of investing in North Korea; it is therefore imperative for the North Korean government to adopt trustworthy measures such as servicing its debts. This is the only way that their development plans can work out.”

“North Korea has been pushing for foreign capital via investment symposiums and talks, as well as the enactment of appropriate trade legislation. But the truly vital concern they should deal with is the building of trust to improve their battered image, one that is often associated with massive outstanding sovereign debt,” a second economic expert, speaking on condition of anonymity, agreed.

All joint ventures require a North Korean business partner. However, many previous JV agreements have seen the North Korean side not service its financial obligations properly. This makes it harder every time Pyongyang makes a new attempt to attract foreign capital.

“During the peak of joint ventures with China in the mid-2000s, there was this hotel in Pyongyang designated solely for Chinese visitors, Kim Seong Ryong, a recent defector who worked on trade issues for a provincial people’s committee in Hwanghae Province, revealed to Daily NK. “Of the 1000 Chinese staying there, most had come to collect their debts. Eventually, however, most could not get their money back and had to close down their businesses.”

Kim went on, “No matter how the Chinese government goes about spurring investment in North Korea, it remains uncertain how much money Chinese businessmen will willingly give in light of the calculations involved. In particular, Chinese traders are fully aware that North Korea does not service its debts properly; thus, the likelihood that Chinese traders will refrain from participating in the development zones is very high.”

Read the full story here:
Debt Burden Set to Trip Up SEZ Plans
Daily NK
Oh Se Hyeok
2013-10-30

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DPRK Won exchange rate data

Friday, October 18th, 2013

DPRK-won-JA-Ilbo-2013-10

According to the JoongAng Ilbo:

The value of the North Korean won has plummeted against the Chinese yuan in the last three years, hit by a continual series of crises, a South Korean ruling party lawmaker said.

Representative Yoon Sang-hyun of the Saenuri Party, a member of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, said at a parliamentary hearing Wednesday, “Through some sources in North Korea and from the government, we have analyzed the fluctuation of the North Korean currency for the last three years.

“The value of the Chinese yuan has surged in North Korean territory amidst a series of crises: military provocations, power succession and natural disasters,” Yoon said.

According to Yoon, the exchange rate of North Korean currency on the black market was around 400 won ($0.38) to the Chinese yuan between January and September 2011. But it rose to 560 won against the yuan in October 2011, 640 won in November and 850 won in December. That was a precarious time, Yoon says, with rumors that leader Kim Jong-il was sick. On Dec. 17, 2011, Kim died and was succeeded by his youngest son, Kim Jong-un.

In July and August 2012, when heavy rainfall battered North Korea, the won weakened more, reaching 1,000 won against the yuan. In December 2012, when North Korea successfully launched a long-range missile, its currency dipped to 1,350 won to the yuan from 1,250 won in November.

Ahead of its third underground nuclear weapons test on Feb. 12 of this year, the won fell close to 1,450 won against the yuan, the lowest level ever.

The currency became stronger when Pyongyang went off its highest level of military readiness last May, and its value returned to 1,200 won to the yuan. The won is currently trading at around 1,250 won against the yuan, Yoon said. The yuan has appreciated 171.7 percent against the won from two years ago.

“In 2009, when North Korean botched its currency renomination, anxiety spread that the local currency would become ‘paper money,’?” Cheong Seong-chang, a senior fellow at the Sejong Institute in South Korea, said. “Officials in North Korea prefer to receive bribes in yuan, not in won.

“When tensions escalate in North Korea, demand for the more stable yuan increases,” Cheong said. “And whenever North Korea makes an attack or other kind of provocation, the Chinese government tightens up procedures for visas and customs regulations on North Korean products.

That makes trade with China more difficult, resulting in a shrinkage in the supply of yuan into the country.”

Representative Yoon said the popularity of the yuan in North Korea also suggests more capitalist activity going on. “In a society that strictly bans the circulation of foreign currency, a wide range of individual transactions using a foreign currency is happening,” Yoon said.

“In some border regions with China, commercial transactions are increasing. The so-called Yuanization phenomenon – in which the yuan replaces a local currency – is happening in North Korea.”

Analysts in Seoul say the influence of China on the North Korean economy is ever expanding. “A strong yuan in North Korea indicates the regime is heavily dependent on the Chinese currency,” Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean affairs at Dongguk University, said. “That means that if China imposes economic sanctions on the regime, it would be a big blow to its economy.”

“As North Korea has no credit policies or system for financial transaction, residents are dependent on foreign currency for commercial activities,” Yoon said.

“As provocations by North Korea are putting its economy at risk, North Korea should stop all provocations, restore the value of its weak currency and stabilize its market.”

The Daily NK tracks the exchange rate of the DPRK won here.

Read the full story here:
North’s won tumbled against yuan, says Rep
JoongAng Ilbo
Kim Kyung-jin
2013-10-18

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Report: Korean Workers’ Party sets up Economy Department

Friday, July 12th, 2013

According to Radio Free Asia:

The party has created a centralized department with branches throughout the nation to formulate and oversee policies ranging from appointment of top economic officials to approval of companies and implementation of foreign exchange controls, a source from Jagang province, near the border with China, told RFA’s Korean Service.

The Party’s Department of Economy was set up last month.

“From last June, each [Party] committee in the provinces and cities established a [a branch of the] Department of Economy,” the source said on condition of anonymity.

“It will further strengthen the control and management of the Party,” he said.

The move by the Workers’ Party Central Committee was part of a shakeup within the Party and led to several branches of existing departments being transferred to the Department of Economy, he said.

A source in Yanggang province, also along the Chinese border, told RFA that the newly-formed department would wield as much power as the Department of Organization Management, which oversees the entire Workers’ Party.

“From now on, all officials in charge of economic matters have to be approved by the Department of Economy, while all companies also require approval from the department when they are established, shut down, or merged,” the Yanggang source said.

The Department of Economy also has the power to punish and appoint officials in charge of economic matters, he said, adding that he expects it to become “the strongest department in the Party.”

Even if the North Korean military, judicial agencies, and the Cabinet—or executive branch of the government—seek to establish new units for earning foreign currency or production, they are required to obtain permission in advance from the department, he said.

“Establishing the Department of Economy is related to the so-called ‘reformed economic management system,” the source in Yanggang province said, referring to a new policy announced in June last year which grants individuals greater authority in the distribution of goods.

“It means the Party never wants to lose its control over the economy, even though the ‘reformed system’ takes place everywhere,” he added.

The source said that the lack of central control had led to situations in which bogus companies and organizations were running businesses and generating foreign currency revenue without reporting them, creating a need for the Party to more efficiently oversee these groups.

For example, he said, several companies and restaurants which were established under the guise of being welfare organizations to feed and clothe the poor are really generating foreign currency for the North Korean Cabinet.

But he noted that even as the Department of Economy sought to rein in these businesses, it would inevitably generate conflict within the Party as it grew in power, leading different factions to jockey for control.

“[Some of] the functions of [the Party’s] Department of the Executives and Department of Organization Management were already taken away by the Department of Economy, and also the Department of Administration has seen interference from the department as well,” the source said.

“In the future, the scope of Department of Economy’s activity will surely conflict with other departments of the Workers’ Party.”

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s Workers’ Party Takes Economic Control
Radio Free Asia
Sung Hui Moon
2013-7-12

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US sanctions DPRK Daedong Credit Bank

Thursday, June 27th, 2013

Here is the press release from the Treasury Department:

Treasury Sanctions Bank, Front Company, and Official Linked to North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

6/27/2013
Action Targets North Korea’s Use of Deceptive Financial Practices
to Support its Weapons Programs

WASHINGTON – Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury took another step in our ongoing efforts to disrupt North Korean financial networks supporting the regime’s illicit ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and proliferation activities. Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), together with DCB Finance Limited—a DCB front company—and DCB’s representative Kim Chol Sam were designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of WMD and their supporters. The financial operations carried out by DCB, DCB Finance Limited, and Kim Chol Sam are responsible for managing millions of dollars of transactions in support of the North Korean regime’s destabilizing activities.

The Treasury Department also designated Son Mun San, the External Affairs Bureau Chief of North Korea’s General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE) under E.O. 13882 for his work directing North Korea’s nuclear-related research efforts. The GBAE, which was previously designated by the U.S. and the UN, is responsible for North Korea’s nuclear program, which includes the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and its five megawatt plutonium production research reactor, as well as its fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities.

“Although the recent spate of provocations has waned, North Korea’s dangerous and destabilizing illicit nuclear and ballistic missile program continues apace, supported by North Korean financial institutions like Daedong Credit Bank. We are committed to increasing the sanctions pressure on North Korea until it complies with its international obligations,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We urge financial institutions around the world to be wary of dealing with Daedong Credit Bank and the other designated entities in order to maintain the transparency and legitimacy of the international financial system.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and proliferation activities violate UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and 2094 (2013); destabilize the region; and undermine the global nonproliferation regime. Today’s designations build upon other recent U.S. efforts to target DPRK proliferation activities, including the March 2013 designation of North Korea’s main foreign exchange bank, the Foreign Trade Bank (FTB).

Daedong Credit Bank has engaged in the same type of activity that was at issue in the FTB designation, most notably providing financial services to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer as well as KOMID’s main financial arm, the Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB), both of which have been previously designated by the U.S. for the central role they play supporting North Korea’s illicit nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. KOMID and TCB were also designated by the United Nations. UNSCR 2094 requires the imposition of targeted financial sanctions on entities that work for or on behalf of, or at the direction of, UN-designated North Korean entities. Since at least 2007, Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) has facilitated hundreds of financial transactions worth millions of dollars on behalf of KOMID and TCB. In some cases, DCB has knowingly facilitated transactions by using deceptive financial practices.

DCB Finance Limited and Kim Chol Sam

Since at least 2006, Daedong Credit Bank has used its front company, DCB Finance Limited, to carry out international financial transactions as a means to avoid scrutiny by financial institutions avoiding business with North Korea. DCB Finance Limited is registered in the British Virgin Islands and also operates out of China.

Kim Chol Sam is a representative for Daedong Credit Bank who has also been involved in managing transactions on behalf of DCB Finance Limited. As a Dalian, China-based representative of DCB, it is suspected Kim Chol Sam has facilitated transactions worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and likely managed millions of dollars in North-Korean related accounts.

Son Mun San

Since at least 2010, Son Mun San has served as the External Affairs Bureau Chief of North Korea’s General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE).

GBAE is responsible for North Korea’s nuclear program, which includes the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and its five megawatt plutonium production research reactor, as well as its fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities. GBAE was designated by the United Nations Security Council in July 2009 and was also designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in September 2009.

U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the entities and individuals listed today, and any assets they may have subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Identifying information:

Entity Name: Daedong Credit Bank
AKA: DCB
AKA: Taedong Credit Bank
Address: Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK
Alt. Address: Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, DPRK
SWIFT: DCBK KPPY

Entity: DCB Finance Limited
Address: Akara Building, 24 de Castro Street, Wickhams Cay I, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands
Alt. Address: Dalian, China

Name:Kim Chol Sam
Date of Birth: March 11, 1971
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea
Role: Treasurer, Daedong Credit Bank

Name: Son Mun San
Date of Birth: January 23, 1951
Role: External Affairs Bureau Chief, General Bureau of Atomic Energy

According to Reuters:

The U.S. Treasury said Daedong Credit Bank has been providing financial services to the Korea Mining Developing Trading Corp, or KOMID, which it said was Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer, and the Tanchon Commercial Bank, or TCB, its main financial arm.

“Since at least 2007, Daedong Credit Bank has facilitated hundreds of financial transactions worth millions of dollars on behalf of KOMID and TCB,” the Treasury said. “In some cases, (it) had knowingly facilitated transactions by using deceptive financial practices.”

The Treasury said it was also sanctioning a Daedong front company called DCB Financial Limited, that company’s representative, Kim Chol Sam, and Son Mun San, the external affairs bureau chief of North Korea’s Bureau of Atomic Energy.

It said the front company had carried out international financial transactions as a way to avoid scrutiny by institutions trying to avoid doing business with North Korea.

The action generally prohibits U.S. citizens from engaging in any transactions with the entities or persons targeted, and freezes any assets they might have in the United States.

The fresh set of sanctions follows a decision by the United States in March to target North Korean’s Foreign Trade Bank, its main foreign exchange institution, to try to choke off cash to the government in Pyongyang.

Banks in the European Union have been reluctant to do business with FTB in the wake of the U.S. sanctions, and China’s biggest foreign exchange bank, the Bank of China, closed FTB’s account.

Treasury Under Secretary David Cohen told reporters on a conference call that he expects banks outside the United States to continue to limit or terminate their dealings with the sanctioned banks. “Being exposed to a financial institution like Daedong Credit Bank exposes those financial institutions to real risk, in particular reputational risk,” he said.

Cohen said previous sanctions had increased the North Korean regime’s financial isolation and that these latest designations would ratchet the pressure up further.

Here is the Wall Street Journal’s coverage.

Additional information:

1. Previous posts on Daedong Credit Bank here.

2. The US recently sanctioned the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank. Previous posts on the Foreign Trade Bank here.

3. Previous posts on KOMID here.

Read the full story here:
U.S. sanctions North Korea bank as it targets weapons program
Reuters
Paige Gance
2013-6-27

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