North Korean Economy Watch

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2013-5-20

High ranking North Korean officials have relayed that, since last year, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un has on several occasions provided direction on improvements for economic management methods and that some new measures are being implemented on an experimental basis.

In a May 10, 2013 interview with the Choson Sinbo, North Korean Cabinet secretariat Kim Ki Chol and National Planning Committee director Ri Yong Min relayed that “Kim Jung Un spoke on several occasions, both this year and last, about the time to fix economic management practices and delegated related responsibilities to students and laborers.” The officials added, “We are holding rounds of consultation and discussion together with research institutes and representatives of several economic sectors.”

The officials further stated that “Out of these consultations have emerged a number of promising economic proposals which we are putting into practice on an experimental basis. In the case that they show positive results, we plan to introduce them across the country. Most remain in the research stage.” These remarks indicate that North Korea is embarking on some kind of economic reform measures.

These statements seem to confirm that North Korea’s economic measures are being driven by the direct orders of Kim Jung Un, such as the ‘June 28 Measure’ (i.e., policy on agriculture). They also suggest that once measures clear the testing stage, they will be implemented on a national scale.

They also explained that while additional new economic control measures are being adopted, these measures at the same time deal with issues related to production planning, price adjustment, and currency circulation. They added that new laws would have to be created, and explained that measures were being expanded that allow for the expansion of authority in the interest of reinvigorating production at factories and industrial sites.

Mention of price adjustment and currency circulation suggests that North Korea’s new economic reforms may not be limited to farms, factories, and industrial sites; rather, it hints at the possibility that North Korea will embark on much larger scale reform extending to the financial sector.

They explained that some farms which carried out the national plan last year implemented land distribution, and contributed to the right of factories and industrial sites to sell and trade freely. They added that such steps reflected the demands of workers.

The officials were reserved in their comments in regard to the timing of any future announcements related to North Korean economic measures: “If successes are consistent we can advance the reforms on a wide scale; but, for now, we need to keep an eye on progress.”

The officials added that they were being retrained in management at the University of the People’s Economy and taking classes about farm management and management at Kim Bo Hyun College.

North Korea emphasized the construction of an economic powerhouse at the beginning of May, and it is currently heating up in the fields of industry and farming by encouraging an increase in production. In relation to this, the Korean Workers’ Party is mobilizing media sources including the Rodong Sinmun, the Korean Central News Agency, and Korean Central Broadcasting.

Particularly, these media sources are emphasizing that obtaining a nuclear deterrent is the greatest asset on the road to economic construction. They are also claiming that increase in production is one means for the achievement of the new economic line of pursuing simultaneously economic construction and building of a nuclear force.

Now that the annual US-ROK joint unit tactical military field training drills, i.e., ‘Foal Eagle’, have concluded (as of April 30) and tensions on the Korean peninsula have subsided somewhat, North Korea’s new economic line is being assessed as one which is aimed at enhancing the economic livelihoods of North Koreans.

The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, Victor Cha, 2012, p116-118.

The third bad decision took place in the 1970s. It related to foreign debt. The DPRK continued the same trends of previous decade as economic resources were diverted to the military. Despite having half the population, North Korean military spending exceeded that of the South every year from 1968 to 1979. The buildup of this decade included increasing the size of the armed forces from 485,000 to 680,000, which was twice that of the ROK. By 1980, troop number stood at 720,000 and continued to swell, with the majority deployed along the thirty-eighth parallel with their sights set on the South. Special forces grew from 15,000(1970) to 41,000(1978)The military began Scud missile development, boosted its submarine and surface flee, and the air force grew to over 200 attack plane. The army added 2,500 armed personnel carriers, about 1,000 heavy tanks, and 6,000 or so artillery tubes and rocket launchers. Military doctrine was revamped to increase the speed, power, and lethality of attacks in combat, focusing on rapid advance advance and infiltration tactics. In spite of its relatively limited technological base, by 1992 the North had twice the number of tanks and artillery that U.S-ROK defenses had in the South.

Academic Lee Hy-Sang, who has written one of the best scholarly treatment of the North Korean economy, has noted that this obsession with aggrandizing the military was driven by ideology as much as it was by external security threats. Self-reliance required the strongest military one could muster. The net effect, however, was an increasingly reckless and irresponsible approach to the economy. In order to offset the strain of the military budget on the economy, the DPRK should have directed efforts at excavating coal and other mineral resources to trade for hard currency, which mighty then have been used to finance heavy industry development, and to address energy shortages. Instead, the government decided to engage in massive borrowing from foreign markets. At the times, it seemed like the right decision. Sino-American rapprochement and U.S.-Soviet detente transformed relations between the East and West, and in this wider political context Western European countries were willing to extend credit to countries like North Korea. More important, the North began looking over its its shoulder as the 1970s saw the gradual acceleration of South Korean growth and development of major heavy industries like the Pohang Steel Complex.

So, in 1972, Pyongyang borrowed $80 million from France to build a fertilizer plant. The following year they borrowed another $160 million, from the United Kingdom to build a cement factory. In 1974, they borrowed $400 million from countries including Japan for large-scale plant equipment. In fact, between 1970 and 1975, the North borrowed approximately $1.2 billion before foreign governments realized that Pyongyang could not service the debt, These numbers do not account for whatever else might have been provided to the North from Eastern bloc countries and China.Thus, in 1976, the debt market dried up for the North as precipitously as it had opened to them six years earlier. Trapped by it own self-reliance ideology, the North could not do things normal nations would, such as issue bonds to finance its debt. Today, North Korea’s external debt is estimated $12.5 billion and no one expects them to pay it off. An attempt was made to pay back some of this in 1990 and 1991, but the DPRK has long since defaulted on its long-term debt. Pyongyang has occasionally asked Russia and former Soviet satellites like Czech Republic to forgive the majority of the debt. In response, these countries have asked for North Korea to repay part of the debt through barter. Pyongyang asked Russia in 2007 to make a “high-level political decision” to forgive $8.8 billion in unpaid debt. In August 2010, Prague asked for zinc ore as repayment for an outstanding $10 million in unpaid loans from the Cold War when it provided Kim Il-sung with machinery and equipment. Pyongyang responded that it would provide four hundred tons of “heavenly ginseng root” worth some $500,000. Since annual consumption of the root in the country was barely two tons, this would have kept Czechs well-stocked with ginseng—which, among its many reported benefits, boasts of enhancing sexual vitality—for two hundred years. As unusual secondary market has emerged for North Korean debt that a few courageous investors have dared to enter. It sells DPRK debt paper at about 6 cents on the dollar, based on the bet not that Pyongyang would ever repay but that under a future unification scenario, South Korea would want to reestablish North Korean creditworthiness as it worked to gradually reintegrate the two systems. If Seoul were to take on this debt, it could repay it all, speculators hope, with only one week’s addition to its foreign exchange reserves. Even if Seoul were to pay off only a portion of the debt, speculators could make six to seven times what they have paid for North Korean paper.

UPDATE 2 (2013-5-23): Many NGOs are now unable to transfer funds to the DPRK. According to Reuters:

Aid agencies helping millions of people in North Korea could be forced to pull out after a Chinese bank cut ties with main foreign exchange bank, a humanitarian group said on Wednesday.

…

Some aid workers are now resorting to bringing in cash in person, putting them at personal risk. It is thought some agencies have only enough reserves to last a couple of months.

“All agencies with offices in Pyongyang are affected and everyone is extremely concerned,” Mathias Mogge, director of programmes for German aid group Welthungerhilfe, told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

“This could eventually reduce our ability to carry out projects or even force a complete close down. If all the agencies had to pull out, it would affect millions of people,” said Mogge, who has just returned from the secretive country.

See here also.

UPDATE 1 (2013-5-10): Additional Chinese banks are cutting ties with the DPRK. According to the Asahi Shimbun:

China’s four largest state-owned commercial banks have suspended money transfers to North Korea as part of sanctions against Pyongyang’s missile launch and nuclear test.

The action was based on a direct instruction from a government agency, sources close to the banks said.

The Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank and the Agricultural Bank of China took the step following North Korea’s third nuclear test in February, the sources said.

“North Korea came under sanctions over issues including the launch of ballistic missiles,” said a senior official at a branch of the China Construction Bank.

A source close to the Bank of China, which trades heavily in foreign currency, said the bank received instructions from a government agency that manages foreign currency trade.

…

A Chinese trading company in Dandong, a city in Liaoning province bordering North Korea, has been unable to transfer money to North Korea, a source close to the company said.

North Korean workers in China are also believed to be having difficulties sending money home.

However, the effectiveness of these financial sanctions remains to be seen since the amount of money North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank has handled is unknown.

Much of the trade between China and North Korea is settled in cash or barter, a diplomatic source in Beijing explained.

An official at a Chinese trading company also said money can be brought into North Korea by human couriers.

The Financial Times offers additional information:

Nevertheless, the blockade is far from watertight. A smaller bank based in northeastern China across the border from North Korea said it was still handling large-scale cross-border transfers, an indication that Beijing is not willing to entirely cut off North Korea.

Here is additional coverage in the Hankyoreh.

ORIGINAL POST (2013-5-7): According to the New York Times, the Bank of China has cut ties with the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank:

The state-controlled Bank of China said on Tuesday that it had ended all dealings with a key North Korean bank in what appeared to be the strongest public Chinese response yet to North Korea’s willingness to brush aside warnings from Beijing and push ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

…

Ruan Zongze, a former Chinese diplomat in Washington who is now a vice president of the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing, said the Chinese government was responding to a recent United Nations resolution imposing further sanctions on North Korea after its nuclear and ballistic missile tests and was not responding to American pressure. He noted that the Chinese government had recently encouraged state-controlled enterprises to follow the resolution in their dealings with North Korea.

…

In a single-sentence statement on Tuesday afternoon, the Bank of China said it has “already issued a bank account closing notice to North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank, and has ceased accepting funds transfer business related to this bank account.”

A spokeswoman for the bank declined to say whether money in the account would be frozen or returned to North Korea. The spokeswoman, who insisted that her name not be used in keeping with bank policy, said the account had been closed by the end of April.

The Bank of China was the overseas banking arm of China’s central bank until the 1980s and is still majority-owned by the Chinese government, playing an important role in diplomatic and financial policy.

…

Mr. Cai said that the move by the Bank of China appeared to be “predominantly symbolic,” but later added, “It could have practical consequences, because North Korea is already under such heavy international sanctions, and China is such an important economic channel for it.

“If China narrows the door to North Korea, then its economic operations or financial flows could be affected,” he said. “But primarily this appears to be a way of China showing its views about their behavior, so that North Korea is more likely to rethink its actions.”

Here is additional coverage in the Washington Post.

Here is additional coverage in the Los Angeles Times.

Here is additional coverage in the Wall Street Journal.

Here is additional coverage in the Hankyoreh.

Read the full stories here:
China Cuts Ties With Key North Korean Bank
New York Times
Keith Bradsher and Nick Cumming-Bruce
2013-5-7

4 major Chinese banks halt money transfers to North Korea
Asahi Shimbun
2013-5-10

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2013-4-25

After North Korea’s currency revaluation in 2009, North Korean currency is still unstable and North Korean markets near the DPRK-China border are reportedly filled with Chinese merchandise, with transactions being conducted mainly in Chinese yuan.

An online newspaper, the Daily NK, reported that markets in the city of Hyesan (Ryanggang Province) and surrounding areas are using Chinese yuan as the primary currency for transactions rather than local North Korean won.  Rice prices are standard indicators of inflation in North Korea and even rice was reported to be exchanged in yuan.  As the monetary value of domestic currency continues to fall, North Korea is experiencing hyperinflation and North Koreans are showing a preference for the more stable Chinese yuan over won.

With an exception of rice, vegetables, and seafood, manufactured goods including confectioneries, the daily necessities for sale in these markets are mostly from China.  As well, some South Korean items such as instant noodles, Choco Pies, and butane gas are sold openly in the markets.

Border areas have a higher rate of Chinese yuan usage than inland areas, as for years traders have been buying Chinese goods with Chinese yuan to sell in the domestic markets.  However, with the unstable domestic currency, more and more North Koreans have been using Chinese yuan over the last three years.  Some report goods bought with North Korean won must be converted to the CNY exchange rate.

As of mid-April, the exchange rate of 100 CNY to KPW was 130,000. However, Pyongsong and Pyongyang cities used mainly US dollars and local won in equal rates.

A video recording obtained by the Daily NK unveiled the landscape of the marketplace and nearby alley markets of  Hyesan and surrounding areas.  Items for sale include jackets, mufflers, gloves, coats and other winter clothing as well as cosmetics, perfumes, toothpaste, toothbrushes and other daily goods. Transactions were being made in Chinese yuan.

North Korean authorities are waging a crackdown against the use of the yuan in the markets but merchants continue to use yuan in secret.

The high number of Chinese goods in North Korean markets can be attributed to the failed production system of the people’s economy of North Korea, which began to tumble in the late 1990s. As the regime began to invest excessively in its military sector, production in the manufacturing sector declined.

Although North Korean products appear in the markets, most people prefer Chinese goods due to their better quality.

A recent article in the official state economics journal of North Korea, Kyongje Yongu (Journal of Economic Research), criticized the “trade companies for focusing on only one or two countries,” expressing concerns that, “the whole nation may experience political and economic pressure from trade companies that restrict foreign trade to only one country.”

Kim Jong Un has also expressed official disapproval against “import syndrome” of the people and regarded it as an obstacle hindering the development of North Korea’s light industry.

Although no specific country was named, it is believed that China makes up over 80 percent of North Korea’s total foreign trade. North Korea continues to show vigilance against its rising dependence on China.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2013-3-21

North Korea announced that it has instituted a new law to begin levying tax in the Mount Kumgang Tourist Zone which has been — until now — a tax-free zone. In addition, a personal protection regulation for tourists was also added to its tourism regulations. North Korea has been modifying laws pertaining to the Mt. Kumgang area in order to develop it as a special tourism zone.

Last week, Yonhap News reported that it had obtained from North Korea a book that was released last November on North Korea’s laws and regulations on international economic policy. According to the book, North Korea adopted in June 2012 a new tax regulation for the Special Zone for International Tour of Mount Kumgang. The law was passed by the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly.

The new tax regulation stipulated that any companies or individuals (foreigners and oversees Koreans) who conduct business transactions or make profit from the Special Zone for International Tour of Mount Kumgang are subjected to tax.

The business income tax applied in the Mount Kumgang zone are on average about 14 percent of one’s yearly profit (infrastructure projects including airport, railways, roads, and port construction only pay 10 percent) and individual income tax ranges from 5 to 30 percent when monthly income is 300 euros (approximately 430,000 KRW).

The tax regulation also covers property, inheritance, transaction, business, and local tax. This comes as a subordinate law under the Special Law for International Tourism in Mount Kumgang, which was enacted in May 2011 and subsequently revoked the monopoly rights of Hyundai Asan.

As such, this law likely will impact South Korean investment in the Mount Kumgang tourism industry.

In the past, working closely with Hyundai Asan, North Korea designated the tourist area as a tax-free zone. There were also no separate laws regarding the levying of taxes on foreigners except for South Korean tourists, who were required to pay 50 USD per person.

In the ‘Tourism Regulations of Mount Kumgang International Tourism Zone,’ a clause was added that specified the special travel bureau for international tourism was responsible for the protection of personal safety and property of tourists in Mount Kumgang. The special travel bureau for international tourism is under the jurisdiction of the Guidance Bureau of the Special Zone of Mount Kumgang International Tourism.

North Korea’s decision to insert a clause ensuring the safety of tourists is likely due to the fact that this issue has continually been raised as a main concern since the death of a South Korean tourist in the zone in July 2008 and subsequent halt of inter-Korean cooperation in the Mount Kumgang project.

In addition to the new tax and tourism regulations, North Korea also made new regulations pertaining to the foundation and management of enterprises; customs; access, visitation, and housing; insurance, and environmental protection, among others.

According to RFA:

North Korea’s regime is distributing special monthly payments in U.S. currency via a cash card system to high-ranking military officers in a bid to maintain loyalty, according to a source inside the country.

The payments can be spent at stores and restaurants equipped with card readers which accept foreign currency, the source told RFA’s Korean Service Wednesday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“Since last year, North Korean generals in the military have been receiving a U.S. dollar cash cards every month,” said the source, who claims to have wide knowledge of the North Korean military.

“This is Kim Jong Un’s new instruction to guarantee a good lifestyle for the generals,” he said, referring to the country’s young “Supreme Leader” who took power after his father Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011.

According to the source, four-star generals in the North Korean military receive around U.S. $1,200 each month on their cards, while three-star generals get U.S. $1,000 and two-star generals make U.S. $700. These payments are on top of their monthly salaries.

The special payments drawn by the generals dwarf the average government worker’s monthly salary of about 2,000 to 6,000 won (U.S. $0.70 to $2 based on prevailing market rates).

“The amount of cash on the card depends on the person’s level in the military,” the source said.

“When you have spent all of the cash, the card gets recharged again the following month. I’m not sure whether the provider is ‘Office 39’ of the Workers’ Party or the General Logistics Bureau.”

Office 39 of the ruling Workers Party is believed to maintain a foreign currency slush fund, while the General Logistics Bureau controls logistics, support, and procurement activities for the massive North Korean military.

The source said that recipients of the cash card are not limited to generals, but also include other high-level officers from a unit that directs infiltration activities by North Korean military agents in South Korea and another unit that is in charge of “electronic combat” in the General Reconnaissance Bureau.

“A colonel in the General Reconnaissance Bureau is able to spend up to U.S. $400 a month on the card,” the source said.

“A high-ranking military officer who is not a general can receive U.S. currency on a card if he is in charge of an important duty.”

There are a number of stores and restaurants where recipients can spend their cash in the capital Pyongyang, the source said.

Generals can also use their cards at guesthouses in seaside resort cities like Cheongjin in North Hamgyong province and Hamheung in South Hamgyong province, which only cater to officers of their rank.

For their convenience, card readers have been set up at places where foreign currency is traded, he said.

I have previously posted on the DPRK’s debit card system here, here, and here.

There are a number of reasons why this makes a particularly effective control tool.  To begin with, the military senior staff are dependent on the party to receive their elite consumer goods.  Additionally, these money balances cannot be directly spent in the markets or easily transferred to third parties.  Finally, in theory, all purchases can be audited. FECs (FOreign Excahnge Certificates) on speed.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Generals Get Cash Cards for Loyalty
RFA
2013-2-21

Pictured Above (Google Earth): The Hyesan Market (L) and a street market (R).

According to the Daily NK:

The authorities in Hyesan have embarked on an experiment that permits multiple traders to utilize each stall in the city jangmadang (market).

A source from the Yankang Province city told Daily NK on the 30th, “Hyesan Municipal People’s Committee has been struggling for a while to decide what to do with all these traders in the streets outside the market. So, they’ve decided to try and co-opt them by restarting stall-sharing arrangements. Any trader, even ones who used to trade in the streets, can now operate inside the market as long as they are ready to pay.”

“The traders rotate six days a week, and on Sundays the original stallholder gets to decide who trades there,” the source went on.

However, many of the original stallholders are reportedly angry at the move, according to the source, with many asking why they are being stopped from trading for almost half the week.

“But,” she said, “the Market Management Office is having none of it, so they have little choice but to oblige.”

The idea of stall-sharing has been tried before in Hyesan, but with little success. “Just last year they ordered the same thing to happen,” the source recalled, “but it wasn’t long before things went back to normal.”

That being said, she went on, “Now because the order has come from the Upper (Central Party), they are really trying to do it.”

Defectors from the city and others with experience of trading directly in the market say the measure has far more to do with controlling traders working illegally on the city streets than improving the efficiency of the market itself. In fact, they say the measure is likely to have a deleterious effect on market operations.

Seo Ok Ran, a 42-year old defector now living in the Dongdaemun area of Seoul pointed out, “Last year when they did this I had a hard time finding the right stallholders for the items I needed. At the end of the day, it just reduces trade.”

It is unclear whether the new rules are being applied nationwide, or are restricted to the area under the remit of Hyesan Municipal People’s Committee.

Read the full story here:
Stall-Sharing Returns to Hyesan
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
2012-12-1

Stephan Haggard posts some economic data from the Kaesong Industrial Zone. I repost most of it here for archival purposes:

According to the MOU, the average monthly wage at KIC has reached $128.3 as of the first half of 2012. This marks a steady increase from $68.1 in 2006, $71.0 in 2007, $74.1 in 2008, $80.3 in 2009, $93.7 in 2010, $109.3 in 2011. One source of the increase is a built-in escalator clause on the minimum wage payment, which started at $50 and has increased 5% a year over the last six years. But that only gets you to about $67 for this year.

The remainder of the observed increase is apparently the result of additional payments for overtime, which has been rising dramatically. Average weekly working hours were already 55.2 hours in 2006 but now stand at 61.6 in 2012 (up to July). If we knew that these additional hours were the result of the free choices of hard-working, upwardly mobile workers we would still probably find it a little excessive. But of course, the advantages of working in Kaesong are such that North Korean authorities have absolute power to hire and fire at will. There is no way of knowing whether workers would choose this regimen if they were organized or not.

But the story is much worse, of course, because we don’t ultimately know what share of these wage payments actually end up in the hands of the workers in the complex. Wages are paid in U.S. dollars to the North Korean authorities by the South Korean companies operating in the complex. 45% of the wage bill–15% for “social security” and 30% for “socio-cultural policy entitlements”–flows into the regime’s coffer, while the remaining 55% is supposedly given to the workers in either DPRK won or coupons.

But not so fast. A crucial question is the exchange rate at which workers are paid and the value of the “coupons” they receive. We hardly need to state the obvious: North Korean workers are not getting paid the won equivalent of their dollar salaries at anything resembling the shadow-market exchange rate that reflects actual scarcities. At least in the Yonhap report, the MOU makes no mention of what the real dollar equivalent of won payments are using a realistic exchange rate. But given the country’s high inflation and rapid depreciation of the exchange rate—see my colleague Marc Noland on this—the dollar value of what North Korean workers actually receive could be only a small fraction—even a very small fraction—of the stated dollar wage .

Why has Kaesong stayed open? The answer lies in a pretty straightforward political economy calculus on both sides. For the South, Kaesong is industrial policy for labor-intensive firms. For North Korea, it is a cash cow that even hardliners have been loath to push the way of the Mt. Kumgang project. Since 2004, total wage payments for North Korean workers in the KIC has totaled $245.7 million, rising from $380,000 in 2004 (the first year of operation) to $61.76 million in 2011 and $45.93 million in the first half of 2012. For Pyongyang, even hardliners can see that this is a no-brainer.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
2012-10-25

Recently, eight companies in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) informed that they received tax collection notices, a unilateral decision made by the North Koreans.

The Ministry of Unification and KIC reported that out of the 123 companies, 8 companies were informed by the North Korean authorities to pay about 160,000 USD in total in taxes.

Two companies out of the eight notified companies already paid close to 20,000 USD to the North Korean tax authorities.

On top of taxation, 21 companies were notified to submit additional tax documents. This may be to collect additional information for future tax collection purposes.

The tax authorities are also requiring companies to submit documents related to show proof of purchase of raw materials, and submit cost analysis documents and a copy of bank statements showing the history transactions.

Last August, the Central Special Direct General Bureau (CSDGB) notified the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee of new tax bylaws, which enforces a fine up to 200 times the amount of accounting manipulation and abolish the retroactive taxation system while increasing the number of documents for submission. Furthermore, the North is threatening to restrict access to the KIC, if companies fail to pay owed taxes or do not submit requested documents.

In addition to imposing fines for tax frauds, new tax bylaws demanded by the CSDGB included enforcement of additional taxes in the name of corporate income tax, sales tax, and other taxes.

The unilateral decision by the CSDGB to amend bylaws is a violation of Kaesong Industrial District Law, which requires any revision of the laws must be negotiated between the North and the South. Another problematic issue is that tax imposed on the companies is based on North Korea’s own estimation rather than tax reports submitted by the companies of the KIC.

For the first time last year, tenant companies in the KIC recorded an average operating profit of 56 million KRW, finally operating in the black after years in deficit.

The DPRK has registered its second Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project: The Kumya Hydro Power Plant.

Here is the official UN web page containing all of the technical information.

Here is an older Google Earth satellite image featuring the approximate location of the dam and power station (39.554552°, 127.164363°):

The Hanns Seidel Foundation (Facebook page here) visited the site and took this photo:

The dam was also featured on the North Korean evening news on 2012-9-28, however, it appears to be known domestically as the “Kumya-gang Power Station No. 2 (금야강2호발전소)”. You can see it here at the 3:36 mark:

Additional Information:
1. The DPRK’s first CDM project: Hamhung Hydro Power Plant No. 1

2. I have collected lots of information on the DPRK’s CDM efforts. You can read about them here.