North Korean Economy Watch

North Korea Today No. 119 Apr 2008
End of March, Price of Rice and Maize Reaches Highest Level in History

(click on image for more legible version)

The price of foodstuffs is increasing at an incredible pace. On March 30th, for the first time in the country, the price of rice went over the 2,000won per kilogram mark and was traded for 2,050won in the city of Nampo. In the case of maize, the situation is even more extreme. The rumors that the price of maize would go over 1,000won in April became a reality and was being sold for 1,000won in places like Pyongyang, Chungjin, and Hamheung, while in Nampo, it was being traded for 1,050won. In other outlying regions, maize was still being traded at high prices ranging from 900won-950won. Only in areas like Onsung, Hoeryung, and some border areas in North Hamgyong Province was rice being traded at the comparatively low price of 1,600won for rice and 650-750won for maize.

According to the Daily NK:

An inside North Korean source relayed that North Korean authorities have stepped up its regulations of  “home-brewed wine production and sales” with the purpose of eradicating the food waste by citizens.

Party Inspection Units are looking for all kinds of food waste (marriages, sixtieth-birthday anniversaries, sacrificial rites, and dinners among leaders), but liquor producers and distributors are on the list of targets.  Propaganda is being fed to local workers, extolling them not to waste food, and in order to minimize any bribery or favoritism, inspectors are being called from neighboring provinces.

Those prosecuted in the inspections have been levied fines and all of their liquor and materials confiscated (and I really doubt they are pouring it down drains).

Read the whole story here:
North Korea’s Inspection of Home-Brewed Wine by the Party
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
4/9/2008

News of the DPRK’s food shortages began to surface several weeks ago when Good Friends reported:

North Korea’s chronic food shortage has worsened to affect even some of the country’s elite citizens in the capital, a South Korean aid group said Thursday.

The communist nation has not given rice rations to medium- and lower-level officials living in Pyongyang this month after cutting the rations by 60 percent in February, the Good Friends aid agency said in its regular newsletter.

Pyongyang citizens are considered the most well-off in the isolated, impoverished country, where the government controls most means of production and operates a centralized ration system. Only those deemed most loyal to Kim Jong Il’s regime are allowed to live in the capital.

The food situation is more serious in rural areas, with residents in many regions in the country’s South Hwanghae province living without food rations since November, the aid group said. (AP)

Why was this the case?

Floods last August ruined part of the main yearly harvest, creating a 25 percent shortfall in the food supply and putting 6 million people in need, according to the U.N. World Food Program.

Over the winter, drought damaged the wheat and barley crop, according to a recent report in the official North Korean media. That crop normally tides people over during the summer “lean season” until the fall harvest.

North Korea’s ability to buy food, meanwhile, has plunged, as the cost of rice and wheat on the global market has jumped to record highs, up 50 percent in the past six months.

China also appears to have tightened its food squeeze on North Korea for domestic reasons. In order to meet local demand and control inflation, Beijing slapped a 22 percent tariff on grain exports to the North. (Washington Post)

So North Korea’s domestic agricultural production has fallen and so have commercial food imports (international inflation, OECD government subsidies for bio-fuels, and increasing fuel prices have combined to raise the prices of commodities such as rice and pork up to 70% in the course of a year). 

Compounding this problem, however, agricultural aid from North Korea’s two most reliable benefactors (China and South Korea) has dried up.

[China] has quietly slashed food aid to North Korea, according to figures compiled by the World Food Program. Deliveries plummeted from 440,000 metric tons in 2005 to 207,000 tons in 2006. Last year there was a slight increase in aid, but it remained far below the levels of the past decade. (Washington Post)

And strained relations with the new Lee government in South Korea have not helped:

The South typically sends about 500,000 tonnes of rice and 300,000 tonnes of fertiliser a year. None has been sent this year and without the fertiliser, North Korea is almost certain to see a fall of several tens of tonnes in its harvest (Reuters)

So what will be the mitigating factors that prevent another humanitarian emergency?

“The reason for the mass starvation that occurred in late 90s is that North Korea faced natural disasters without expanding the market’s capability to substitute for the broken planned economy capability, and so the damage to North Korean citizens was inevitably large.”

“The market in North Korea has expanded in the last 10 years. The supply and demand structure of daily necessities, including food items, has been formed.”

“Because the market capacity has expanded, the possibility of a mass-scale starvation occurring is no longer high. In actuality, the change in food prices is being monitored at the market.”

-Dong Yong Seung, the Samsung Economic Research Institute’s Economic Security Team Chief, speaking at the 19th Expert Forum sponsored by the Peace Foundation (Daily NK)

Mr. Dong’s analysis addresses the improved efficiency of DRPK’s market supply chains but does not address the effects of an adverse supply shock. 

The UN seems ready to help, although it has not been asked:

Institutionally, mechanisms are in place in North Korea to ring the international alarm bell before hunger turns into mass starvation. The World Food Program monitors nutrition in 50 counties, and the Kim government has become expert in asking for help.

“The North Koreans know that they are facing a difficult situation and have made it increasingly clear in the past few weeks that they will need outside assistance to meet their growing needs,” the U.N. official said, asking not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

North Korea, which even with a good harvest still falls about 1 million tonnes, or around 20 percent, short of what it needs to feed its people, relies heavily on aid from China, South Korea and U.N. aid agencies to fill the gap.

The UN official said it was clear from a variety of sources that the food security situation was worsening in North Korea and that it needed to be addressed.

Last month Kwon Tae-jin, an expert on the North’s agriculture sector at the South’s Korea Rural Economic Institute told Reuters that if South Korea and other nations did not send food aid, the North would be faced with a food crisis worse than the one in the 90s.

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation said in late March it sees the North having a shortfall of about 1.66 million tonnes in cereals for the year ending in October 2008.

The North will start to feel the shortage the hardest in the coming months when its meagre stocks of food, already depleted by flooding that hit the country last year, dry up and before the start of its potato harvest in June and July. (Washington Post)

The UNWFP, however, will be under pressure from its donors to monitor food aid and make sure it is not diverted to non-emergency uses.  Under these conditions, it is not likely that they will be asked to provide much aid until a catastrophy is already underway.  So with the UN out of the picture, who is best positioned to prevent the reemergence of a humanitarian crisis in North Korea today? China.  

Despite China’s own food probelms, however, it is always likely to capitulate, at least in part, to North Korea’s emergency requests.  China does not want to deal with another North Korean famine, particularly during the Olympic season, and they certainly do not want to deal with any political instability that could result. 

Yonhap reports that the DPRK has asked the Chinese for 150,000 tons of corn this year.  Chinas says they will give 50,000 tons–and that is just initially. (Yonhap)

UPDATE 4/14/2008: I still have not seen any reports in the media of Noth Korea seeking suport from Russia.

UPDATE 6/9/2008: China increases grain export quota to North Korea to 150,000 tons

(more…)

Where do North Koreans get their alcohol?  The Daily NK has the scoop:

North Korean citizens started producing/distributing home-brewed liquor in 1987 after the prohibition of the production and sale of liquor in North Korea was lifted. 

Liquor made in the home of an average North Korean citizen consists of ingredients such as corn or rice and malt. The yeast cultivated from rice powder is combined with porridge prepared from the powder and fermented in a vat. After 12~14 days, the rice porridge and the yeast will produce a chemical reaction and will turn into a thick porridge, which is called “liquor porridge” in North Korea.

Refrigerating the steam from the cultivated liquor porridge and turning it into fluid produces liquor. North Korean citizens enjoy over 40% of alcohol content-liquor and approximately 800ml of liquor is produced from a kilogram of corn. A bottle of liquor (500 ml) is close to the price of a kilogram of corn, so selling liquor made from this produce can bring in a small profit.

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s Inspection of Home-Brewed Wine by the Party
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
4/9/2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-3-22-1
3/22/2008

Recently, North Korea passed a measure prohibiting women younger then 49 from selling goods in markets, leading to clashes between police enforcing the rule and younger women wanting to work in markets.

The March 19th newsletter from ‘Good Friends’, an organization providing aid for North Korea, reported that on February 5th in Haeju, South Hwanghae Province, women who were not allowed to enter the local market and so were selling goods on a nearby corner physically clashed and police. This reportedly led to the arrest and detention of 9 people.

The newsletter reported, “The women held at the police station were subjected to harsh interrogation as to ‘who was the ringleader’, and after being subjected to four days of torture, one who could no longer hold out confessed to being the ringleader and was sent to a detention center, while the remaining women were all released.”

North Korean authorities announced the measure restricting women under 49 from selling goods in markets after December 1st last year, and that measure is being enforced not only in Pyongyang, but in rural areas as well.

According to Good Friends, “Just like other cities, Haeju City has received absolutely no food rations since March,” and “Women from households barely managing regular meals through market trading are being reduced to the weakest level by North Korean authorities’ prohibition on trading.”

It follows that in Haeju City, either authorities recognize that if these women can not sell in the markets their families will starve to death and so turn a blind eye to their activities, or these women, prevented from selling in markets, will continue to clash with authorities.

The newsletter also reported, “On March 3, in Chungjin City, North Hamkyung Province, organized protests by women prevented from market activities by the new regulations broke out, and Chungjin City authorities are now allowing all women, with no exception, to sell goods in markets.”

Immediately following organized protests by these women, Chungjin City officials reported the disturbances, but no policies to deal with the issue were forthcoming, and so it appears that all women, with no exception, are now allowed to conduct market activities.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Bfrief No. 08-3-13-1
3/13/2008

International fuel and food prices are skyrocketing, while the cost of Chinese goods continues to rise, so that this so-called ‘triple-threat’ is sending shockwaves through the North Korean economy. In this year’s New Year’s Joint Editorial, North Korea championed the banner of a ‘strong and prosperous nation’, and declared that this year would focus on the economy, however this ‘triple-threat’ will likely make it extremely difficult for the North to meet its policy goals.

With oil prices peaking at over 110 USD per barrel, if these high oil prices continue, North Korea, which imports crude and refined oil from China, Russia and other countries, will face a growing import burden. In accordance with the February 13th agreement reached through six-party talks, South Korea, the United States and others will provide some heavy fuel oil, and the agreement stipulated the amount of oil to be delivered, rather than the value, so this will not be affected by rising prices. However, this oil does not cover all of the North’s needs, and as for the remaining portion, either the amount imported will have to be reduced, or the North will have no choice but to invest considerably more in fuel. In addition, as a large portion of North Korea’s oil is imported from China, Pyongyang’s trade deficit with its neighbor will also grow.

According to the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), North Korea imported 523,000 tons of crude oil from China in 2005, 524,000 tons in 2006, and 523,000 tons last year, each year accounting for approximately 25 percent of total oil imports. North Korea’s trade deficit with China has shown a steadily growing trend, reaching 212,330,000 USD in 2004, 588,210,000 USD in 2005, and 764,170,000 USD in 2006. With grain prices also skyrocketing, and North Korea depending largely on China and Thailand for rice and other grain imports, the burden on the North’s economy is growing, and this is one factor in the instability of domestic prices in the DPRK.

According to the Chinese Customs Bureau, North Korea imported 81,041 tons of rice and 53,888 tons of corn last year, increases of 109.9 percent and 37.4 percent, respectively. North Korea’s corn, rice and oil imports from China are subject to market price controls, so that rising international prices directly affect the North’s cost burden. Last year, the price of Chinese goods rose 4.8 percent, recording the largest jump in ten years, and this trend extends to a wide variety of goods. 80 percent of disposable goods in North Korea are produced in China, and rising Chinese prices are directly reflected in North Korean import costs, which is passed on to DPRK citizens.

As North Korea emphasizes the building of its economy, it appears unlikely that residents will feel any direct effects of Pyongyang’s promise to prioritize the stability of its citizens’ livelihoods.

At its height, North Korea’s socialist infrastructure was responsible for the vast majority of the people’s standard of living.  Ration coupons and large purchases (such as for a car or refrigerator) were all provided through one’s employer.  This is because society was vertically integrated, with state-owned companies and ministries providing a broad array of social services that are handled by a variety of agents in a capitalist society (food, housing, education, childcare, health care etc..). There was little room for markets, or even prices, in people’s lives.

Although this system only worked for North Koreans in large urban areas, and excluded those in smaller villages and the country side who were much more dependent on themselves, for the vast majority of North Koreans today that system (or social contract) is a distant memory.  Out of fiscal necessity it has been chiseled away over the years, and as a result the scope for individual entrepreneurship in both the public and private spheres is increasing.  I do not want to give the impression that capitalism is running wild, but when compared to the past, the control of the North Korean state over the lives of its people is diminished.

One practice which has been retained to some degree, however, is the distribution of gifts or special provisions on the birthdays of the two leaders, Kim il Sung and Kim Jong il.  The scale of one’s gift, however, allegedly depends on one’s rank in society.  A common farmer might get a new pair of socks.  A senior Worker’s Party official probably receives a good deal more.  One estimate puts the value of these special gifts at USD$20m. 

The origins of these gifts are mixed.  Some are donated by foreigners.  Some are imported by the leadership.  Others are made domestically by the people themselves.

According to a story in today’s Daily NK, creeping marketization – bringing with it an increase in price and quality discrimination,  has left many North Korean consumers less than impressed with this year’s gift offerings:

A North Korean source in Shinuiju said in a phone conversation on the 17th, “When looking at the goods provided this time around, the quality has gone up as a whole in contrast to the past. However, the citizens did not attach too much significance to the ‘Great General’s gift’ as in the past.”

The source relayed the public sentiment as “Goods more valuable than his gifts are all over the place in the jangmadang. A portion of the people has said, ‘Special provisions are not necessary. Just do not regulate the markets.'”

In Shinuiju, a bottle of luxury liquor, 2kg of tangerine, and two pheasants were provided to the party organization through the “special provision’ and a bottle of liquor and a modest amount of fruits such as apples and tangerines were given to regular organizations. The People’s Units received a bottle of liquor, a toothbrush, and a bar of soap and pre-school and elementary school students received five pieces of gum, two rice crackers, two packs of chips, and one pack of candy.

The source added, “Those receiving the ‘title of hero’ and the Secretaries in charge of the county parties were given boxes marked with the label ‘gift,’ but its contents are uncertain.”

Another source in Hoiryeong in a phone conversation on this day said, “A bottle of liquor, a bar of soap, and a bottle of toothpaste were provided through the February 16th holiday provision and the children received a pack of candy, two packs of chips, a pack of pea candy, two packs of rice crackers, and seven pieces of gum.”

He also expressed discontent, saying, “It is pitiful to have to wait in line in front of the stores through which provisions are handed out for a mere bottle of liquor and soap.”

In the Hyesan, Yangkang Province region, laborers working at state enterprises were given 3kg of Annam rice (wild rice) and a bottle of liquor and oil were given to average households.

North Korea, in time for Kim Jong Il’s birthday in 2007, provided around 10 food items and daily necessities, including liquor and beer, cider and rice tally, oil, chips, and gum, to civilians.

In 2007, 200g of chips, 200g of candy, 100g of rice snacks, and five pieces of gum were given to elementary school students. Due to the shortage in foreign currency, special provisions were not offered to average civilians.

A caveat to this story is that all of the data points are from the large cities on the Chinese border.  These cities have benefited the most from trade with China and in all likelihood are the most “ideologically contaminated” in the DPRK.  

Source:
Jangmadang Goods Are More Valuable Than the General’s Gifts
Daily NK
Choi Choel Hee
2/21/2008

When looking at North Korea’s cities on Google Earth one can’t help but notice the number of monuments to the Great Leader.  But if you are looking for the true heart of the cities, in other words where all the people are, you need to look closely for North Korea’s markets.  They do have them–in all of the major cities visible on Google Earth:

 
 
(Clockwise from upper left) Markets in Pyongyang, Kaesong, Sinuiju, and Wonsan

This week, the Daily NK reported that the new regulations and crackdowns on market activity are meeting with resentment in Pyongyang. 

What happened?  Supposedly Pyongyang’s new Party Chief Secretary suggested to Kim Jong Il the idea of converting the jangmadang into farmers markets (in other words only selling agricultural goods from the countryside as in the past), and Mr. Kim approved it.

As of January 15, public announcements were placed on the entrances of marketplaces detailing what could/could not be sold in the market.  Violators are subject to having their goods confiscated by inspection units (these sorts of policies are ripe for promoting corruption).

Ever entrepreneurial, North Korean sellers simply adapted, shifting location from inside the marketplaces to back-alleys.  Seemingly, they are still subject to inspection and confiscation in these local neighborhoods, but apparently the risk is lower.  Several of these street markets are also visible on Google Earth:

But others have decided to stay put in the markets and simply hide their goods:

A portion of the people still secretly trade in the jangmadang. Simultaneously avoiding the inspection units, they refrain from putting out the goods and bargain with customers by holding up signposts. When they tell the passing-by customers, “This is what I have,” a bargain is reached. Of course, the goods are temporarily stored at a nearby residence and taken out after the bargain. (Daily NK)

Lankov also discussed the regulations and games people play to avoid the market inspection units here. 

The full article can be found below:
Jangmadang Will Be Converted to Farmers Markets
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/13/2008

The Chosun-Shinbo reports (via the Daily NK) “North Korea can produce instant noodles again” because construction has been completed on Pyongyang’s newest (and largest) noodle factory, the Pyongyang Wheat Flour Factory.

“Starting this year, domestically produced instant noodles will likely be supplied to people on a large scale.”(Daily NK)

…signaling that the DPRK government still seems intent on re-launcing the collapsed Public Distribution System (which has floundered many times).

[The] Pyongyang Wheat Flour Factory is located in Samheong-dong of Mankyungdae District, in Pyongyang, and mainly produces wheat flour, cookie, noodle, and yeast. North Korea built its first noodle factory, Daedong River Instant Noodle Factory, with foreign capital in August 2000 along the Daedong River in Pyongyang.(Daily NK)

Last October Yonhap, reported that Hyundai’s 44,000-strong union donated US$553,800,  appx. $13 per worker, to help finance a corn noodle factory in Pyongyang.  This is likely the “older” Daedong River Instant Noodle Factory.  If this is the case, then Pyongyang has two noodle factories coming on line at about the same time.

The rest of the story:
Although the DPRK government is a newcomer to the noodle business, noodle production and consumption have been burgeoning in North Korea’s private economy, and there is supportive journalistic evidence that the business now suports those on the lower rungs of the  economic ladder (see here, here, here, and here).  Small scale noodle production requires little capital, so it is a natural fit for those who have nothing but have taken to supporting themselves. 

The opening of new government-operated food processing plants is tantamount to a “re-nationalization” of a “privatized” industry in the DPRK.  Past reports claim that noodle sales earned private vendors between 900 to 1,600 won.  Now these vendors, who operate at the fringes of North Korea’s semi-legal private economy, will at a minimum, be forced to compete with “free” or heavily subsidized government operators. 

What will be the result?  On the pessimistic side, we could claim that the DPRK government is attempting to monopolize the food supply to control the population (as it has in the past).  On the other hand, their ambitions might be more modest and they are only looking to establish some form of carrot they can point to as legitimization of the government’s leadership.

From an economic reform perspective, however, North Korea needs fewer government-run noodle factories and a better business environment for noodle entrepreneurs. 

The full stories can be found here:
North Korea Can Produce Instant Noodles Again
Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
2/12/2008

Hyundai Motor union leaders visit N. Korea for noodle project
Yonhap
10/31/2007

This should not be a surprise to anyone who is familiar with how socialist and highly regulated economies actually function.  If there is a profit opportunity to be had by breaking a regulation, there will generally be a bureaucrat there willing to pocket some of the earnings to look the other way.

The fact that ordinary North Koreans are willing to pay to get access to Kaesong jobs should send a powerful signal to those who call for the zone’s abolition. Wages and working conditions at the complex, though not popular with Western activists, are relatively better than those on the local collective farm.  When the average Kaesong resident figures out that working there will lead to a better life, baksheesh is inevitable. 

Claudia Rosette covered a similar phenomenon with North Korean loggers in Russia.

The Daily NK covers the Kaesong phenomenon specifically:

Known as a “dream place of employment” among North Koreans, citizens of the North are paying hundreds of thousands of won in the form of bribes to gain employment in the facility.

“They say that one can find a job in the Kaesong Industrial Complex by giving 700,000 North Korean won in bribes for males and 200,000 won for females. If I had used the 200 USD (approximately 700,000 won) spent in obtaining a passport as a bribe, I could have entered the Complex.”

As for the why the Kaesong Complex is so popular, Kim explained, “Commodity provision tickets, equivalent to a worker’s salary, are given to laborers in Kaesong and if one uses these tickets well, he or she can make a huge profit.”

Currently, the official salary for laborers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex is around 60 USD, a small amount of which is distributed as cash and the rest in the form of “commodity provision tickets.”

In the Kaesong Industrial Complex, there are several shops that can only be frequented by Kaesong laborers and the prices at these stores are at inexpensive compared to prices in the jangmadang.

Laborers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex use their “commodity tickets” to purchase products at a cheap price and can make a huge profit by selling the goods, giving the difference to middlemen (currency traders who mediate deals).

Recently, there have even been cases where the middlemen had specific orders for certain items from the Kaesong laborers, asking them to procure a certain amount of rice, oil, and so on. The middlemen can easily make an exorbitant amount of money by selling these goods at the jangmadang.

ADDENDUM REVISITED (The Daily NK is transalted into English and as a result is even less clear than my writing somethimes, so I have revised this post several times to clarify the text):

Opinions of the complex seemingly hinge on one’s policy goals.  If the primary goal is to raise living standards in the North and open the people up to outside influences, then Kaesong seems like progress (although maybe not the most cost effective).  If the primary goal is to minimize the income of the DPRK government, then the Kaesong zone probably is not a good idea…. 

Taking the latter point of view, Joshua at OneFree Korea emphasises the point that  the North Korean government keeps most of the cash wages paid to the workers, and that zone employees survive on the supplemental “commodity tickets”–either consuming the goods they purchase in the company store or selling them to local markets for cash.

Theoretically, though, if the thousands of workers employed in Kaesong were re-selling subsidized goods to the Kaesong public markets, this would have the (short run) effect of lowering or stabilizing food prices for the general public (since Zone employees do not need to purchase food at local markets and their clandestine re-selling of commodities to the markets increases the supply of cheaper goods).  This also means that  in general re-selling to the market is not terribly profitable to any zone employee, except when there is a temporary mismatch beteen supply and demand (which might be common depending on the reliability of the DPRK’s market supply chains).  How the price decrease would affect domestic food producers (and the long term price) is probably a bit more complicated since we are not sure how much North Korean farmers respond to price changes. 

Additionally, even though the North Korean government keeps most of the cash wages, the commodity coupons still give the worker approximately $60 in purchasing power –a decent income in North Korea. 

However, given that the South Koreans pay all cash wages go to the North Korean government and the workers themselves receive an additional $60 in script to use at the company stores, means that the average economic cost of a North Korean worker in  Kaesong is closer to $120/month! 

The whole article can be found here:
Bribery Required to Work at the Kaesong Complex
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/4/2008