North Korean Economy Watch

KCNA
12/26/2007

Efforts are being made to ardon this year with fine labor feats at collieries throughout the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The coal production is ever growing these days thanks to the enthusiasm of coal-miners who have turned out to implement the tasks set forth in the joint editorial for this year and joint slogans.

The Sunchon Area Youth Coal Complex has given precedence to tunneling to create reserve coal cutting faces, thus opening a bright prospect for coal production.

The February 8 Jikdong and Chonsong Youth Coal Mines, which take the Lion’s share in the complex, are making use of rational cutting and transporting methods to turn out more coal than before while saving materials.

All the coal mines of the Tokchon Area Coal Complex including the Tokchon, Sochang Youth and Toksong Coal Mines are carrying on the daily tunneling assignments at over 150 percent with the application of advanced tunneling method, creating reserve coal fields.

A collective innovation is taking place at coal mines of the Onsong and Kaechon Area Coal Complexes. They have introduced into production innovative mining and blasting methods to suit the conditions of coal fields and rock quality.

The Kujang Area Coal Complex is concentrating efforts on big coal mines with good cutting conditions and big production capacity while improving transport conditions.

The workers of the Anju and Pukchang Area Coal Complexes provide thermal-power generations and other fields of the national economy with a large amount of coal with high sense of responsibility and pride of being the pilot of the national economy.

Daily NK
Kang Jae Hyok
12/21/2006

Inside source from North Korea said each house in Musan, Onsung, Hoeryong in North Hamkyong Province, would receive electricity from the December 19th to 24th, commemorating Kim Jong Il’s mother, Kim Jong Suk’s birthday (Dec. 24).

In a telephone interview with the Daily NK, thirty-eight years old resident of Musan, North Hamkyong “K” said electricity supply was resumed on Tuesday. “Public service workers visited each house and asked them to use only one light bulb per household.”

K said with delightful voice “I’m so happy that I could eat in a bright house, and I could watch TV and VCR, too.”

In this year, North Korea’s electricity production has been worsened than ever that only army barracks, strategic facilities and rice mills were provided electricity.

Lack of electricity has been common since the mid-1990s economic collapse. And it becomes worse in winter, because hydro-electric power plants, which comprise most of North Korea’s electricity-production, cannot produce energy in arid season.

Therefore, North Korea in winter is once described as a “wilderness” by a Korean-Chinese visitor.

Some wealthy North Koreans are equipped with own electric generators, including Chinese solar-light collectors.

In North Korea, electricity is supplied on holidays such as Kim Il Sung’s birthday April 15, Kim Jong Il’s birthday February 16, or Party Foundation Day. Since 1997, Kim Jong Il’s mother, Kim Jong Suk’s birthday has become an official holiday.

Joong Ang Daily
12/22/2006
Ser Myo-ja

Amid the ongoing six-party talks and criticism that inter-Korean economic projects have helped North Korea finance its nuclear arms program, South Korea celebrated a cross-border power cable connection yesterday for the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

A ceremony to mark the connection took place yesterday inside the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. Also yesterday, the nation’s top North Korea policymaker said the economic cooperation programs are crucial to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.

(more…)

Yonhap
12/14/2006

KEDO closes final deal on liquidation of N. Korean nuclear reactor project

An international energy consortium this week signed its final agreement with a South Korean firm to liquidate its 10-year project to build two light-water reactors in communist North Korea, a South Korean official said Thursday.

“In a Dec. 8 meeting in New York, the executive board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) approved a deal with the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO),” Moon Dae-keun, an official from the Unification Ministry, told reporters.

The so-called Termination Agreement made official the tentative agreement between the two sides in June that the South Korean electric company would pay the cost of liquidating the US$4.6-billion project in return for all of KEDO’s tangible assets outside of the communist North, Moon said.

The agreement comes as probably the last official document to be signed by the international consortium, which includes South Korea, Japan, the European Union and the United States, ministry officials said.

About $1.65 billion has been spent on the now-defunct project, more than $1.14 billion of which came from South Korea, according to Moon.

The government earlier estimated the liquidation to cost between $150 million to $200 million, but officials said Thursday that it would take as long as three years to accurately determine how much it would cost.

A group of KEDO’s subcontractors have filed claims for 37 lost contracts, worth some $73 million, as of Tuesday, the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The international organization has a total of 101 outstanding contracts, according to Moon.

The organization’s assets to be taken over by the South Korean electric company cost some $830 million to acquire or build, according to the Unification Ministry. No estimates for their current value were available.

The light-water reactors were part of a 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea, in which the communist state agreed to freeze its nuclear activities in return for various economic incentives.

The 1994 agreement, known as the Agreed Framework, became a dead letter following North Korea’s withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in early 2003 and its subsequent unloading of spent fuel rods from a nuclear facility for reprocessing.

North Korea is believed to have created as much as 40 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium through reprocessing, enough to make six to eight atomic bombs.

Yonhap
12/6/2006

South Korea is set to announce its participation in a U.S.-led campaign to stop container-borne radioactive materials after refusing to help interdict North Korean ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

A Foreign Ministry official confirmed Wednesday that Seoul decided to join the International Container Scanning Network, or ICSN.

“The government plans to formally announce the decision later this week,” the official said, asking not to be identified.

The ICSN calls for its members to install state-of-the-art radioactivity detectors at their major ports so customs officials can screen the contents of containers without opening them.

International efforts to curb the flow of nuclear materials have gained more urgency since North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October.

Seoul’s decision to join the ICSN was widely interpreted as designed to offset its limited participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

South Korea said last month that it would stay away from any PSI-related activity in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula, citing its unique geopolitical situation. South Korea remains technically at war with the communist North and the two sides are vulnerable to military clashes especially in the poorly-demarcated West Sea.

South Korea described its position in the PSI as “special status,” as it kept the door open for PSI activities in remote areas.

Government officials, however, said the PSI was not considered when it made the decision to join the ICSN, a project still being tested.

Yonhap
11/23/2006

North Korea’s top energy policy is to develop wind energy in a three-stage project planned out to 2020, the country’s officials said in an Asian conference earlier this month.

They claimed they have turned to building hydraulic power stations after the construction of a light-water reactor promised by the international community was suspended.

North Korea is a participant in the Asian Energy Security Workshop sponsored by the San Francisco-based Nautilus Institute and Tsinghua University in China. This year’s meeting was in Beijing on Nov. 5-7, and papers from the conference were recently posted last week on the Nautilus Web site.

South Korea, Russia, China, Japan and Mongolia were also participants.

The paper submitted by the North Korean delegation said building up the wind energy sector is “considered a top priority for policymakers, technicians and managers” in Pyongyang.

North Korea would first construct a prototype wind farm with a 10-megawatt capacity by the year 2010, then build three main wind farms with a capacity of 100 megawatts by 2015, the paper said.

In the third stage ending in 2020, onshore and offshore wind farms would be built throughout the country, it said.

North Korea has already received outside assistance for its wind energy projects, including from Denmark, which provided wind turbines that were installed along the country’s west coast in 1986. The Nautilus Institute funded the installation of a standalone wind energy system in 1998.

The paper cited fund shortages and technological barriers in pursuing the policy, but said “these problems will be gradually solved through the correct policy of the DPRK” and cooperation with the international community.

Ri Yong-ho, an official at the Pyongyang International Information Center of New Technology and Economy, said his country turned to hydraulic power stations after work on the light-water reactor was suspended.

Under the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, the North was to receive two reactors financed by the international community in exchange for freezing its nuclear activities. The agreement fell through after Pyongyang was accused of hiding a secret nuclear weapons program.

“To cope with this situation, the DPRK began to increase government investment in the construction of hydraulic power stations,” Ri said in his presentation.

“Our future direction for securing energy is the technological upgrading of existing thermal power plants to increase energy conversion efficiency, further construction of hydraulic power stations to raise its proportion, and taking positive measures to develop and use renewable energy, including wind power,” he said.

But no new plants are being built for the time being, Ri said.

The official said Pyongyang was also trying organic matter energy, particularly methane gas.

“For this purpose, professional research institutions for producing methane gas were organized and set to work to continuously renew and develop the technology of gasification and introduce it to productive sites,” he said.

Joong Ang Daily
11/17/2006

China has not cut off oil supplies to North Korea, nor will it stop oil and food assistance to its ally as a means of exerting political pressure, Chinese officials were quoted as telling a group of U.S. scholars.

The Americans in the group also said Wednesday that Chinese officials seemed to have a different understanding from the North Koreans about how U.S. financial sanctions would be dealt with at the next round of six-nation talks.

The Chinese reportedly said they were “surprised” that Pyongyang had told the group it expected those sanctions to be lifted.

Siegfried Hecker, a visiting professor at Stanford University, said he asked Chinese foreign ministry officials if Beijing had cut off heavy fuel oil to North Korea as reported.

“The answer was that China did not cut off heavy fuel oil to North Korea. That’s the direct answer that we received,” he said at a news conference.

Mr. Hecker was part of a four-member delegation that was in Pyongyang Oct. 31-Nov. 4. He is a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a U.S. nuclear weapons center, and has visited North Korea three times.

The other members of the team were Jack Pritchard, former U.S. point man on North Korea policy and now head of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C.; Robert Carlin, a former North Korea analyst now at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization; and John Lewis, a Stanford University professor.

There was speculation that Beijing had ended the fuel aid to the North in September, when Pyongyang showed signs of preparing for its first nuclear test. The aid suspension was believed to be China’s way of pressing its ally to forgo the test.

Mr. Hecker said Chinese officials were clear that Beijing did not and would not stop fuel and food donations, arguing that North Korea would only “grow stronger” if pressured.

The team arrived in North Korea on the day the communist regime, after a year’s boycott, agreed to return to the six-nation nuclear talks that also involve South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan.

Pyongyang left the table to protest punitive measures taken by the U.S. Treasury against Macao’s Banco Delta Asia for allegedly laundering money for the North.

North Korean officials told the American visitors that they expected discussions and a conclusion of the sanctions issue at the next six-party talks, according to Mr. Pritchard.

But Chinese officials, when told of Pyongyang’s position, “expressed some surprise,” Mr. Hecker said.

“They indicated, obviously, differences of opinion as to what was agreed on,” he said.

From Businessweek:
Joe McDonald
11/5/2006

In the midst of tensions over North Korea’s nuclear program, a Western company is there searching for oil. Another just bought a bank.

“North Korea is hungry for business,” said Roger Barrett, the British founder of Beijing-based Korea Business Consultants, who recently took 11 Asian and European clients to Pyongyang to play golf and make contacts.

A small group of Westerners are taking on the challenge of doing business in the isolated North, hoping to get in on the ground floor as its communist rulers experiment with economic reform.

The obstacles are daunting. A Stalinist dictatorship, bureaucracy and language barriers. Foreign sanctions that block most financial transfers, making it hard to get paid and to get supplies. And now worries that United Nations sanctions imposed after North Korea’s Oct. 9 nuclear test could be expanded to a general clampdown on trade.

But the Westerners talk positively about the North as a business environment, with skilled workers and leaders who they say welcome foreign investment.

“They are very skillful and hardworking,” said Felix Abt, a Swiss businessman who oversees two ventures in Pyongyang, one that makes business and game software for sale in Europe and another that makes antibiotics and painkillers for the domestic market. “It’s sometimes faster to get licenses and necessary approvals here than it is in China or Vietnam.”

Barrett said that even as the U.N. Security Council debated the latest sanctions on the North, he got inquiries from investors interested in its rich mineral resources and low-cost manufacturing work force.

“Investors are rushing into China, but labor costs there are escalating, and companies are looking for an alternative,” Barrett said. North Korea “has absolutely the capabilities to take off like South Korea.”

So far the largest foreign business community in North Korea is from China, its main source of trade and aid.

South Korea accounts for most of the North’s foreign investment, with stakes totaling $620 million in an export-manufacturing zone and a resort for foreigners. China’s investments total just $31 million, according to the Chinese Commerce Ministry.

U.S. regulations allow American companies to trade with North Korea under limited conditions, though tensions between the governments and lack of diplomatic relations raises the risk of doing business. Britain, Germany, Sweden and other Western governments, meanwhile, have official relations with Pyongyang.

North Korea’s foreign trade has risen sharply, though the total was less than $4 billion last year, according to South Korean and Chinese government figures. Trade with the South soared by more than 50 percent in 2005 to just over $1 billion.

Most trade is carried out by North Korean state companies, not private entrepreneurs. And some partners are shying away. Trade with Japan, once the North’s No. 1 trading partner, tumbled from $1.3 billion in 2001 to just $200 million last year amid tensions with Tokyo over North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and ’80s.

The Europeans’ chamber of commerce in Pyongyang had 12 members when it was launched last year. They include delivery company DHL Express, an Italian law firm and a German venture founded in 2003 to provide Internet access to foreign businesses in Pyongyang.

This tentative foothold follows the slow pace of economic reform in North Korea. Only in 2002 did North Korean leader Kim Jong Il allow limited free enterprise to revive a decrepit economy, which teetered in the 1990s following the loss of Soviet aid and then collapsed amid widespread food shortages. Still, foreign observers say officials are reluctant to give up control, despite prodding from Beijing, which wants faster reforms to reduce its ally’s dependence on aid.

Abt, the Swiss businessman, moved to Pyongyang in 2002 after seven years working in Vietnam, another Asian communist economy in the throes of reform.

“I heard that some economic reforms were in the pipeline, and I was quite thrilled to experience the beginning,” said Abt.

Now his Vietnamese wife takes their 14-month-old daughter to play at an international school. After work, he goes out to sing karaoke with North Korean co-workers.

But Abt has felt the bite of efforts to pressure the North.

Foreign banks have been leery since Washington last year sanctioned Macau’s Banco Delta Asia, which the U.S. said helped the North launder money. China told its banks this month to curtail financial transfers to or from the North.

“It’s getting difficult to make bank transfers to suppliers or to get money from customers,” Abt said.

He worries that the factory might have to shut down if U.N. sanctions block imports of required chemicals on the grounds that they also could have military uses.

Barrett said his clients have lost access to $11 million in Banco Delta Asia accounts that were frozen by the U.S. sanctions.

Colin McAskill, a British businessman who has done business with the North since the 1970s, is lobbying Washington to fine-tune its sanctions so the bank’s customers can withdraw money that was made legally.

McAskill is chairman of Hong Kong-based Koryo Asia Ltd., which said in September it was buying a 70 percent controlling stake in Daedong Credit Bank, North Korea’s first foreign-owned financial institution. The bank, which is 30 percent owned by a North Korean bank, serves foreign companies and has accounts at Banco Delta Asia.

North Korea also has turned to Western investors in hopes of developing oil resources and reducing its near-total reliance on China for fuel. It awarded a 20-year exploration concession last year to Aminex plc, a London firm.

Aminex is helping the North Korean government deal with other foreign companies, and in exchange gets to pick where it will drill for oil, its chief executive, Brian Hall, said by phone from London.

Aminex hasn’t felt any effects from the nuclear tumult, Hall said.

“We have good relations and no problems with the agreements but are closely watching the political situation,” he said.

From the Donga
11/3/2006

It is being reported that North Korea has increased its oil imports from Primorsky, Russia every year and made its payment by sending labor abroad due to its payment incapability.

According to the government of Primorsky yesterday, North Korean oil imports increased from 62,000 dollars in 2001 to 4.4 million dollars last year. Considering that the export price for Russian Urals oil has increased 35% during the past four years, North Korean oil supplies imported from Primorsky have been more than a 42-fold increase.

“Primorsky, which does not have oil resources, exports oil to North Korea through the federal government and in compensation we get labor instead of money due to North Korean incapability of making its payment,” said Primorsky experts on North Korea.

Dong-A Ilbo special team confirmed in an interview with the government of Primorsky that North Korea has been increasing its labor exports from 3,320 workers at the end of last year to 5,000 workers until late of this year. The current number of abroad sending workers is the greatest ever since Statistics Committee of Primorsky analyzed statistics of North Korean labors in 1993.

The government of Primorsky allowed only some North Korean labor force imports. Recently, however, it is reported that they have increased the scale according to the increasing demand from local companies in Russia.

A government official of Primorsky stated over a phone call with reporters on October 30, “We have limited the number of labor permits since foreign workers are taking away employment from Russian workers.” The official did not specifically mention the reason of the recent growing North Korean labor forces because “the person in charge is away at the moment.”

However, Professor Larisha Jabrobskaja at the Far Eastern Research Center in Vladivostok, who has studied North Korean labor problems for 15 years, explained the reason as, “North Korea, suffering from a chronic trade deficit since the 1990s, is sending labor abroad in an attempt to make its payment.”

He added, “Considering the current trade structure of Primorsky, which its oil import to North Korea accounts 70% of the total exports, it seems Primorsky is swapping oil for North Korean labor.”

“North Korea is planning to expand its oil import through attracting Russian energy corporations in the Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone and the Primorsky’s project to expand its oil and coal export is taking shape these days,” according to the government of Primorsky.

Most of the workers who were forced to enter into Russia in the 1990s worked as woodcutters, but nowadays they work in various fields including construction, agricultural and marine industry.

Local Russians in Primorsky said, “North Korean workers usually get disadvantaged when they look for jobs after the entry and also when they exchange money through North Korean executives, even by offering bribes.”

Asian Survey
November/December 2006, Vol. 46, No. 6, Pages 898-916
Jae Cheol Kim
Professor of International Studies at the Catholic University of Korea, Seoul.

PDF here: chinainDPRK.pdf

Conclusion:
China’s investment efforts suggest that it has begun to engage North Korea economically. By investing, the Chinese leadership has attempted to push the North to embrace economic reforms, which in turn could improve the North Korean economy and reduce the country’s potential for political instability. In order to lead the North to embark on reform policies, Beijing has tried to provide it with seed money and technology by encouraging Chinese companies to invest. This suggests that despite expectations and allegations from the West that China might abandon its long-time ally, China is committed to supporting North Korea.

The Chinese investment, however, has increasingly been influenced by commercial considerations. Officials in Beijing have stressed that economic exchanges with the North must be mutually beneficial. Chinese companies, which have become responsible for the majority of the investment, have paid increasing attention to market share and natural resources. That China has increasingly tried to gain economic advantage in the North suggests that Sino-North Korean relations are being transformed from being ideology-motivated to interestmotivated.

Despite a stiff increase over the past couple of years, it is hard to say that Chinese investment is either full-fledged or irreversible. Because the instability of North Korea prevents Chinese entrepreneurs from fully embracing the country, Chinese investment must be seen as a pilot project, with Chinese companies and entrepreneurs testing the water. Looking to the future, Chinese investment in North Korea is likely to increase. Despite problems, the Chinese leadership will probably continue to encourage further investment in an effort to exploit developmental opportunities while simultaneously curtailing the flow of direct aid to the North. In addition, China’s dynamic economic growth will propel its overseas investment. As China’s capital account is gradually liberalized, cash-rich Chinese companies will look for markets and resources abroad to fuel their development. The potential appreciation of the yuan will further force firms to relocate factories producing low-end products to countries where the labor cost is lower. Seen from this perspective, North Korea is a good candidate for future Chinese investment—if there is no major turbulence in bilateral relations.

Highlights:
North Korea has been reluctant to follow China’s path of reform and opening because it worried that the policy may create political problems. In an apparent response to China’s recommendation in the late 1990s for reform, for instance, Kim asked Beijing to respect “Korean-style socialism.” But China’s support for reform is not unconditional. Although Chinese leaders have repeatedly urged the DPRK to embrace market-driven reforms (even taking Kim Jong Il is on tours to see the results of China’s economic reforms), when North Korea decided to set up a special economic zone in Sinuiju, apparently without prior consultation with Beijing, China aborted the project by arresting Yang Bin, whom North Korea had designated head of the zone, in October 2002.

China, however, does not want to see turbulence on the Korean Peninsula, which could not only lead to the economic and political collapse of a socialist regime on China’s border but could also threaten regional stability. China thus has tried to sustain the Pyongyang regime by providing economic assistance–believing that reform and opening would not only revive the North Korean economy but also reduce the need for regular aid to prop up the regime, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the Chinese government would encourage more of its companies to invest and establish their businesses in North Korea.

For Chinese firms, the prime minister’s statement amounted to a government directive, with some entrepreneurs understanding that Wen’s statement was a signal for Chinese companies to invest.  Organizations were formed to smooth such investment, including the Shenyang Municipal Association of Entrepreneurs (Shenyangshi Qiyejia Xiehui), Dandong Municipal Economic Consultation Center for the Korean Peninsula (Dandongshi Chaoxianbandao Jingji Zixun Zhongxin), and Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company (Beijing Chaohua Youlian). They organized explanatory meetings on investment, drawing numerous applicants.

Beijing attempted to boost investors’ confidence by signing an “Investment Encouragement and Protection Agreement” with Pyongyang in March 2005 when Premier Park Bongju visited Beijing. The framework for economic and technological cooperation was made clearer through the signing of an “Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation” that October. Chinese officials have given financial incentives and guarantees to firms that invest in North Korea. China’s state-run banks have not only provided companies with investment capital but also have underwritten Chinese investment for joint ventures. Beijing granted preferential treatment to products processed in the North, allowing them better access to the Chinese market. Products that were processed in the Rajin area with Chinese materials and then imported to China, for instance, were labeled domestic trade and were thus exempted from customs inspection.

The deputy CEO of Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company, a Beijing company that helps Chinese companies invest in the North, has been quoted as saying that whether a company is able to invest in North Korea depended not on the company’s will but on whether the North would accept it or not. Foreign investors, he added, needed to meet the criterion of “political reliability.” In practice, concerns about political contamination limit North Korea’s economic cooperation with South Korea, whose government has eagerly pushed economic integration with the North. North Korea’s opening therefore means an opening toward China, and this in turn gives Chinese companies very rare advantages.

Labor costs in the DPRK are low [compared to China], running only 70–80 yuan (about US$10) per month.  Building a factory is very cheap, up to one million yuan (about $120,000).  Chinese entrepreneurs see that what North Korea needs is largely light industrial products. Because brand consciousness there is weak, these investors believe that many Chinese companies, even small- and medium-sized ones, can compete in the North Korean market.  The scope for making profits is bigger in North Korea than in China because manufacturers can charge more for similar products in the North. For example, the price of a cigarette lighter is three to five yuan ($0.36 to $0.60) in Pyongyang but only 0.5 yuan ($0.06) in Wenzhou, China.

Although big state-owned companies account for the majority of Chinese outward investments, they rarely invest in North Korea, leaving this to small- to medium-sized companies. In the past, most Chinese investors were Korean-Chinese merchants from two areas in China: Liaoning Province and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. They do not expect that they can make profits in the North Korean market right away; rather, they plan to be ready for when the North opens to the world, by moving into the market early.

Chinese investment projects in North Korea are not only small in number but also weak in scale. There are no detailed data available on their average size, but they likely are no exception to the fact that China’s outward investment is generally characterized by its small scale and low level of technology.

Although North Korea wants capital in such sectors as home appliances, construction materials, electronic communications products, and machine building, Chinese investment is heavily concentrated in the sectors where China’s needs lie, such as resource extraction, or where its companies can make a profit, such as service sectors. The official Chinese guideline for outbound investment, noted above, recommended investment only in such manufacturing sectors as textiles, clothing, and food products, leaving aside other sectors for which North Korea wants investment.

The North lacks basic frameworks needed for drawing in foreign investment. Policies, laws, and regulations about tax, for instance, are not in place. There is no well established market mechanism for running the economy. The government is still heavily involved in economic management; therefore, potential investors need to have personal networks to open doors, a point that worries potential Chinese investors.  North Korea lacks a sound political environment for enticing foreign investment. The country’s economic policies, especially those related to reform, shift continuously, raising questions about the official commitment to reform.

Pyongyang Department Store No. 1
Zeng Changbiao, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Zhongxu Group, in a much publicized deal in 2004, signed a contract to run Pyongyang’s Department Store No.1 for 10 years. He said his main motive for investing was to take over the North Korean market. He wants to be dominant in the North Korean retail business by securing and expanding market share. But it is not clear whether the contract was put into practice.  An article in a journal published by the National Development and Reform Commission, a ministry-level organization of the Chinese government, suggested that little had changed at the department store by the middle of 2005. South Korean officials also say that the store is still run by North Korea. Zhongxu Group’s Zeng received the lowest tax rate—5% income and 5% import—in the North Korean tax system.

This is one of three big department stores that were being run either by the Chinese alone or jointly.  Shenyang Municipal Association for Trade Promotion opened Daesong Market in Pyongyang, the first wholly foreign-owned company in a non-science sector.

Musan
China has shown an interest in joint resources development projects. The best known case is the project to develop the Musan iron mines. It is not easy to draw an exact picture of Chinese investment in the mines because many press reports suggest different stories. According to a Korean report, a Chinese company from Jilin Province planned to invest about $500 million in the mines. Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper, reported that three companies from Jilin—Tonghua Iron & Steel Group (Tonggang), Yanbian Tianchi Company, and Sinosteel Corporation (Zhonggang)—contracted rights to exploit the Musan iron mines for 50 years. According to the report, the Chinese companies were going to invest 7 billion yuan (about $865 million) and planned to produce 10 million tons of iron ore each year.  In the case of the Musan mines, 2 billion yuan (about $240 million) out of the 7 billion China committed to invest was allocated to building roads and railways from Musan to Tonghua in China. Sizable investment levels might help Jilin secure access to seaports in North Korea.

Similarly, the Chinese press has reported that the Musan iron mines development project was canceled by officials in North Korea, embarrassed by publicity over the deal because it highlighted the degree of foreign investment, a subject that Pyongyang would prefer to handle quietly.

Raijin
Rason International Logistics Joint Company-Rason International secured the exclusive rights to run the No. 3 and No. 4 piers of Rajin port for 50 years. In order to secure the rights, China committed to investing 30 million euros ($36 million) to build an industrial park, tourism facilities, and a road from the trade district of Rason city to Rajin Port. North Korea in turn committed to providing China with 5 to 10 square kilometers of land to build the industrial park.