North Korean Economy Watch

Pyongyang, November 18 (KCNA) — The governments of the DPRK and South Sudan established diplomatic ties at an ambassadorial level.

A joint communique on the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations was made public in Ethiopia on Nov. 16.

The communique was signed by Kim Hyok Chol and Arop Kuol Deng, ambassadors of the DPRK and South Sudan to Ethiopia, upon authorization of the governments of their countries.

The two countries agreed to open their diplomatic ties from the very day of their signature to the joint communique, on the basis of the principle of respect for sovereignty, equality, reciprocity and non-interference and in line with the April 18, 1961, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Since all North Korean embassies must self-finance their operations, it is not likely that they will open an embassy in South Sudan until there are sufficient business contracts to maintain the office overhead. In the meantime, many of their diplomatic and consular functions will probably be held out of the Ethiopian embassy.

What kind of business opportunities await the DPRK in South Sudan? South Sudan is the world’s newest oil-producing nation, so it is likely that the DPRK will try to pursue oil contracts there. As a new nation, South Sudan also has an interest in building up its military capabilities. The DPRK has long supplied military equipment to the African continent, so they will probably look for opportunities in this new nation as well.

To date, the DPRK maintains embassies in the following African countries: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

From the Choson Exchange web page (November 5):

In October 2011, John Kim, a board director of the Choson Exchange, visited the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone. The following is a summary of some of his findings based on site visits and talks with senior officials in the SEZ. An longer account of his travels and impressions will be available soon. This information helps elaborate on our report from August.

Rajin Port
The Rajin Port employs 1400 workers. The Chinese have conducted feasibility tests regarding two new piers, but currently the port houses three piers with 9-9.5 meters draft. A 30,000 metric ton coal storage warehouse was built at Pier 1 by the Chinese, who moved 80,000 metric tons through the facility in five shipments from January to September. Pier two, largely dedicated to container shipment, is currently dormant and a Swiss company is currently using Pier 3 to ship manganese and talc out of the region. The Russians also have a 49 year lease agreement signed in 2008.

Oongsang [Ungsang] Port
Oongsang Port exported Russian lumber until 1985, but remains largely quiet now except for the occasional fishing boat. The present draft of 7 meters constricts any major future activity, so the North Koreans hope to bring in over $100M to widen the draft to 9 meters. After Rajin Port activity surpasses capacity there, Oongsang Port will become the next regional hub for drybulk activity.

Sonbong Port
Originally opened in the early 70’s, the draft within the port is 7 meters, but a fully laden Very Large Crude Carrier containing 270,000 metric tons of oil can offload at an offshore facility further out at sea. Two pipes, 63 cm in diameter, run for 9km underground before reaching the storage facility at “Victory Petrochemical”, a simple refinery that was designed to refine crude and send oil products (gasoline, naphtha, jet fuel, diesel and fuel oil) back to the port for export. In addition to this two way flow, fuel oil also arrived sporadically at the port as part of aid packages from 1994 to 2008.

Sonbong Power
This power plant was originally designed to take fuel oil from Victory Petrochemical as feedstock and generate power to feed back to Victory. Since the refinery has been offline, Sonbong Power has at times provided electricity to the region, but with fuel oil prices close to $700/metric ton and current electricity prices at 6.5 eurocents/kwh, the economics of running the plant do not work leaving the 800 workers employed here largely idle.

Victory [Sungri] Oil Refinery
Literally translated as “Victory Chemical Plant”, this refinery was completed in 1973 with a 40,000bbl/day crude distillation unit that typically yields 40~50% residual fuel oil for an average crude feed. Investment into upgrading capacity in the international market has led to an eroding of margins for simple refineries like Victory. Currently the refinery is idle and would need over $500M in investment to become competitive.

Hye Song Trading Company
Mr Kim visited a Sewing Factory owned by Hye Song, which runs 8 such factories employing 2000 workers. Output is recorded for the entire year on a bulletin board at the front entrance of the company. All employees except the handyman were women.

Cell Phone use more prevalent
The number of cell phone users in the DPRK crossed 1 million earlier this year and one official commented that the overwhelming majority of urban households have at least one cell phone. This particular official had 4 phones for a household of 3. Foreigners are allowed to use cell phones on a different network, and users of the domestic and foreign network can not call each other. All usage is prepaid.

Handset Type: Local
Purchase Cost: 1570-2200 RMB
Usage Cost: 250 minutes and 20 text messages, while each additional minute is charged at 60 NKW (about .1 RMB/min)

Handset Type: Foreigner
Purchase Cost: 1800-2400 RMB
Usage Cost: Does not include any free minutes and are charged at 2RMB/min

Banking System has room for growth
There are two banks in Rason, the Central Bank, which is focused on domestic transactions, and the Golden Triangle Bank, which is focused on foreign currency transactions. Transactions for goods and services are conducted almost entirely in cash, usually in RMB or NKW. Mechanisms for savings are credit have room for development. As banks take a fee to deposit and withdraw cash, merchants prefer to hold money in cash (usually RMB). Credit is also available almost exclusively through friends or family.

Bottlenecks
A number of issues require solving if Rason is serious about attracting large scale foreign investment. Among these are reliable access to travel visas, reasonable communications costs with the outside world, a more mature banking system with savings and credit mechanisms and favorable tax treatment with a consistent legal framework. The mere fact that Rason is experimenting with market reform is encouraging, and Mr Kim is optimistic about economic development in the region and the nation as a whole.

UPDATE: On a flight today I was able to translate most of this map.  Interestingly, it shows the incomplete Kumho Light Water Reactor (금호원자력발전소: in yellow on the right) but none of the other nuclear facilities.

ORIGINAL POST: A recent visitor to the DPRK took this picture of a map of the North Korean electricity grid:

See larger version here

This is one of the best maps of the North Korean electricity grid that I have seen (abstract as it is). This will be immensely helpful for my own efforts to map the North Korean electricity grid on Google Earth:

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-8-24

Kim Jong Il’s visit to Moscow on August 20 is sparking interest for the future of economic cooperation between the two countries.

According to the KCNA, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressed interest to increase trilateral cooperation between the ROK-DPRK-Russia in the gas, energy, and railroad sectors. In the message sent from Medvedev to mark the 66th anniversary of independence from Japanese colonial rule, “plans to expand cooperation with the DPRK and the ROK in gas, energy, and railroad industry” were emphasized.

The cooperation projects are evaluated to have “great economic and political significance contributing to the stability in Northeast Asia and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”

In July 4, the KCNA reported that the delegates from the Russian energy giant Gazprom headed by Chairman Alekhsandr Ananenkov visited Pyongyang to discuss energy cooperation, although details of the visit was not elaborated. Ananenkov was reported to have met with North Korean officials in gas and oil industriesto discuss bilateral cooperation in these areas.

Russia has also expressed interest in linking gas pipelines to export natural gas to South Korea via inter-Korean railroad system.

A spokesperson of the foreign ministry of the DPRK reported on the recent visit from the vice-foreign minister and chief representative of Russia on Six-Party Talks, Aleksei Borodavkin, this past March. In the statement, the Russian government expressed concerns for improving inter-Korean relations and stressed prospects of the tripartite economic cooperation projects with North and South Korea including the construction of railways, gas pipeline, and a transmission line linking the three countries. The DPRK also expressed support for the upcoming economic cooperation projects.

In result, the main agenda in the bilateral economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea entails railway, gas pipeline, and transmission line construction.

President Lee Myung-bak has met with the Russian president Medvedev in September 2008 in Moscow. At the summit, the two presidents reached an agreement to pursue projects to export Russian PNG or pipeline natural gas to South Korea through a pipeline via North Korea from 2015.

Immediately following the summit, South Korea’s Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) and Russia’s Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to jointly study the possibilities of constructing a long-distance pipeline running from Vladivostok. Under the contract, Russia will send at least 7.5 million tons of natural gas annually for a period of 30 years through a pipeline to South Korea via North Korea.

This joint study between ROK-Russia is expected to serve as a momentum in bringing diverse economic cooperation between North and South Korea as well.

While it is still premature to judge the long-term outlook for such trilateral economic cooperation, its effects are anticipated to contribute to stability and peace in the Northeast Asian region.

Additional Information: here is a summary of the recent Kim Jong-il — Medvedev summit.

Imports from North Korea: Existing Rules,Implications of the KORUS FTA, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator, Jeanne J. Grimmett, Vivian C. Jones, Dick K. Nanto, Michaela D. Platzer, Dianne E. Rennack
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
June 2, 2011

Download the PDF here.  This publication has been added to the list of previous CRS reports on the DPRK here.

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Trade with China 1995-2009
Nathaniel Aden
Nautilus Institute
June 7, 2011

View the paper here.  A link to this paper has been added to the DPRK Economic Statistics Page. The Nautilus Insitute has also posted links to some very interesting presentations from the 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals Working Group.

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[Book] The Contemporary North Korean Politics: History, Ideology, and Power System (현대 북한의 정치: 역사, 이념, 권력체계)
Jong Song-Jang (정성장)
More information TBA, but see here and here (Korean).

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[Book] Architekturführer Pjöngjang (German: Pyongyang Architecture Guide)
Philipp Meuser
Order here at Amazon. More here and here.

According to the Korea Herald (h/t L.P.):

A number of economic cooperation projects appear ready to take shape between North Korea and China.

A businessman here claimed the North and China have signed a more concrete agreement last year following up on a 2005 preliminary deal to jointly develop an offshore oil field.

“The North has agreed with China to jointly develop an offshore oil field in the waters off Nampo,” a western coastal town, said Kim Young-il, chief executive of a South Korean trading firm and inter-Korean trade adviser to the Korea International Trade Association.

“The North Korea-China agreement on joint development of the oil field seems to have taken place last year.”

It is estimated that some 20 billion tons of crude oil is buried under the Bohai Gulf continental shelf which stretches across the Korea Bay between the North Pyongan Province and China’s Liaoning Province, Kim said during a policy debate session hosted by a legislator.

“The joint exploration would be economically viable because, once about a third of the oil reserve can be extracted, they can extract between 7 and 8 billion tons, enough to meet China’s entire demand for nearly 30 years,” Kim said.

Read the full story here:
Communist allies seek strategic interests
Korea Herald
Kim So-hyun
2011-6-1

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.10-12-3-2
12/3/2010

North Korean trade with China has jumped 26.7 percent during the first eight months of the year, with the bulk of its imports made up of crude oil, and its largest export being coal. Despite the increasingly severe food shortages in the North, food imports from China were actually down 7.5 percent, while on the other hand, fertilizer imports shot up by 162 percent.

The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) looked into the Chinese government’s import and export figures and determined that North Korean exports to China during the first eight months of the year were worth 650,000 USD, 20.6% more than during the same period last year, while DPRK imported 1.345 billion USD-worth of goods (30% increase), for trade worth a total of 1.995 billion USD, 26.7 percent more than 2009.

“Mineral fuel and mineral oil” topped the list of North Korean imports (321,000 USD), with crude oil (229,000 USD) and oil (63,000 USD) making up 90.7 percent of imported goods. However, while crude imports were 53 percent more expensive, the amount of oil imported only rose by 2.3 percent; the sharp increase in expenditure was due to climbing international oil prices. The second- and third-largest imports were listed as “nuclear reactor, boiler, and machinery” (127,000 USD) and “electromagnetic machinery, sound and video equipment” (106,000 USD). Other imports included cars and car parts, steel and steel goods, plastic and plastic goods, artificial filament, fertilizer, and grain. A KOTRA official stated that while “nuclear reactor” was listed among the goods imported by the North, there is no way to verify the Chinese statistics.

North Korea’s grain import expenditures increased by five percent, to 34,000 USD, but overall grain imports fell 7.5 percent, to 102,000 tons, due to increased costs. More specifically, rice import expenditures were up 8.4 percent to 16.6 million USD, but the amount of rice imported fell by six percent, to 38,400 tons. Corn expenditures dropped by one percent to 16.3 million USD while the amount imported fell by ten percent, to 62,000 tons. The cost of barley imports grew 190 percent, to 353,000 USD, with the amount of barley brought into the country up 89 percent to 1,011 tons. 277,000 tons of fertilizer were imported, 162 percent more than last year, at a cost of 40 million USD, 85 percent more than 2009. Almost all of the fertilizer was nitrogenous.

North Korea’s exports to China were made up largely of mining and fisheries. Coal topped the list (191,000 USD), although the amount sent across the border was 31 percent less than last year. Iron ore was second, and was not only down by 34 percent, it brought in 134 percent less than 2009, as it was worth only 111 million USD. Textiles and accessories worth 81 million USD, steel worth 64 million USD, and mollusks worth 32 million USD were also sent to China.

According to Forbes:

Last year India exported roughly $1 billion to North Korea, up from an average of barely $100 million in the middle of the past decade, reports the Confederation of Indian Industry, a trade organization–most of that in refined petroleum products. The trade group says that North Korea’s exports to India were a minuscule $57 million, including silver and auto parts. (South Korean trade figures suggest India’s exports are much lower.)

The commercial tie has no deep historical roots and is curious, to say the least, given Pyongyang’s closeness with China, India’s commercial rival, and its connection to the A.Q. Khan nuclear network in Pakistan, India’s enemy.

North Korea needs oil to maintain power plants and to keep its outsize military on the move. It apparently has enough hard- currency reserve from its murky export trade to buy on the spot market. India, for its part, has ramped up refining but gotten ahead of domestic demand. Further, by keeping an artificial lid on pump prices until recently, Indian policy encouraged these oil sector producers to look for clients overseas. “India is the largest exporter of refined products east of the Suez [meaning the Middle East and Asia],” says Fereidun Fesharaki, chairman of Facts Global Energy in Singapore. A lot of enhanced supply came online in 2009, mostly from Reliance Industries, which has the world’s largest refinery, and the Essar Group, the Mumbai steel and energy giant. At current usage and demand “India needs 15 years of demand to absorb this current supply,” he adds.

Until June the New Delhi government kept a cap on domestic gasoline prices, running up a $10 billion subsidy bill, or roughly 7% of its budget. While state-owned companies were compensated for their losses, those in the private sector were on their own, causing them to look for other markets, especially since the price for crude has doubled, to $78 per barrel since 2004. “Their incentive is [to find] who in the world is desperate enough to take the products, and it’s usually Iran or North Korea,” says Fesharaki.

Some North Korea watchers are caught off guard. “I was flabbergasted by the increase in trade,” says Stephan Haggard, director of the Korea-Pacific Program at UC, San Diego. “North Korea is basically engaged in close to barter trade.” No one seems more surprised than Pratap Singh, India’s ambassador to Pyongyang, who says he has no idea of trade volume because the North Koreans won’t supply credible data, much less working phone lines. “How did you manage to get through?” he asks a reporter.

Like other oil refiners, neither Reliance nor Essar exports fuel to North Korea directly. That’s too much of a risk politically (even though this trade isn’t barred under current UN sanctions) and economically, as Pyongyang has been known to slip on its payments. Instead, the fuel is sold through a network of traders and banks in Dubai and elsewhere. Trade data nevertheless record the origin of the refined petro goods.

Curiously, both New Delhi and the U.S. State Department, which have bumped along in relations complicated by India’s own nuclear development, show no alarm. A spokesman for India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs says all international strictures are observed and nothing sinister is at hand. Washington won’t comment without verifying the data.

Perhaps a little more attention is in order since India is selling more than mere oil to North Korea. Last year, according to Indian trade data, India also exported $2 million in goods in a category called “nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances”–most likely water pumps, computer data storage units, ball bearings and machine tools. Could they be used to maintain a nuke plant in some way? Maybe.

“North Korea, over the years, has attained skills to disguise their trade activities and also to utilize materials they have for other purposes,” says Jennifer Lee, a research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “Countries need to be especially careful in what they export to North Korea.”

Read the full story here:
Look Who’s Helping North Korea
Forbes
Megha Bahree
7/22/2010
(Magazine date: 8/9/2010)

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.10-07-08-2
7-8-2010

As inter-Korean commerce has all but dried up in the wake of the Cheonan incident, trade between North Korea and China appears to have continued to grow. According to Chinese customs statistics released on July 6, trade with North Korea from January to May amounted to 983.63 million USD; 18.1 percent more than the 833.07 million USD reported for the same period last year.

North Korea imported 727.192 million USD-worth of Chinese goods (29 percent increase over the same period last year), but exports dropped by 4.9 percent, amounting to only 256.438 million USD. This indicates a 60 percent increase in North Korea’s trade deficit with China, which was 470.757 million USD in the first part of 2009. With South Korean sanctions against the North halting all inter-Korean trade outside of the Kaesong Industrial Complex following the sinking of the Cheonan, it is expected that Pyongyang will become even more economically dependent on Beijing.

During this period, crude oil accounted for most of North Korea’s imports from China, as Pyongyang bought 254,000 tons (slightly more than the 247,000 tons in early 2009). However, due to rising international fuel prices, this oil cost the North 157.097 million USD, a 76 percent increase over what Pyongyang spent during this period last year.

In addition, rice (24,400 tons), corn (31,400 tons), beans (20,500 tons), flour (34,000 tons) and other necessary food imports totaling 11,300 tons reflected a 41 percent increase over the same period in 2009. The cost of fertilizer imports also jumped sharply, amounting to 81,943 tons, or 115.6 percent more than the 38,004 tons imported from January to May 2009. Increasing imports of food and fertilizer are a result of the growing agricultural difficulties being faced in the North. Based on current prices, aviation fuel imports also grew by 46.8 percent, freight trucks by 98.7 percent, automobile fuel by 47.4 percent, and bituminous coal by 137 percent.

The top ten official imports of Chinese goods by North Korea were as follows: crude oil (21.6 percent); aviation fuel (3.1 percent); freight trucks (2.9 percent); automobile fuel (2 percent); bituminous coal (1.9 percent); fertilizer (1.8 percent); beans (1.6 percent); flour (1.6 percent); rice (1.5 percent); and corn (1.1 percent).

North Korea’s exports to China were mainly underground natural resources. The top ten exported goods were: iron ore (17.1 percent); anthracite (16 percent); pig iron (9.6 percent); zinc (5 percent); Magnesite (3.6 percent); lead (2.4 percent); silicon (2.3 percent); men’s clothing (2.2 percent); frozen squid (2.1 percent); and aluminum (1.9 percent).

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-06-07-1
6/7/2010

In 2009, North Korea’s foreign trade (not including inter-Korean trade) amounted to 3.41 billion dollars, 10.5 percent less than 2008, which saw the largest amount of DPRK overseas commerce since 1991. Exports were down 5.97 percent (1.06 billion USD), while imports were down 12.45 percent (2.35 billion USD), recording a 1.29 billion USD trade deficit.

These figures come from a KOTRA analysis of the Korea Business Center (KBC)’s statistics of trade with North Korea by foreign countries. Because North Korea does not reveal trade statistics, this ‘mirror analysis’ method of analyzing the statistics of its trading partners is the only method available.

Looking at each country’s trade figures individually reveals that China is the North’s largest trade partner. DPRK-PRC trade amounted to 2.68 billion USD last year, 78.5 percent of all the North’s foreign trade. The North exported 790 million USD worth of goods to China, while its imports from China amounted to 1.89 billion USD. As North Korea’s trade with China continues to grow relative to that with other countries, so too, does its economic dependence on Beijing. In 2003, DPRK-PRC trade amounted to 42.8 percent of its overall foreign trade. This grew to 48.5 percent in 2004, accounted for more than half (52.6 percent) in2005, hit 56.7 percent in 2006, 67.1 percent in 2007, and 73 percent in 2008.

North Korea’s main imports from China were crude oil and petroleum (330 million USD, down 44.2 percent from 2008), boiler and machinery parts (160 million USD, up 10 percent), and electrical components (130 million USD, up 31 percent). Top exports to China included coal (260 million USD, up 26 percent), minerals (140 million USD, down 34.1 percent), and textiles (90 million USD, up 20.7 percent).

Germany, Russia, India, and Singapore were the North’s 2nd thru 5th largest trade partners. Trade with Germany was up 33.7 percent, amounting to 70 million USD, while trade with Russia, India, and Singapore dropped off. After these countries, Hong Kong, Brazil, Thailand, Bangladesh, and the Netherlands made up the rest of the top 10 trade partners, which account for 92 percent of all the North’s overseas trade.

In addition, with continuing sanctions against the North by the United States and Japan, there were no exports to these countries, and imports from these countries amounted to a mere 2.7 million USD and 900,000 USD, respectively.

Inter-Korean trade for 2009 amounted to 1.68 billion USD. This was down 7.8 percent from the previous year. North Korean imports from the South were down 16.1 percent, recording 740 million USD. This was largely impacted by the closing of the Keumgang Mountain tourism project.

Combined, North Korea’s total foreign trade was down 9.7 percent, to 5.09 billion USD. 53 percent of this was with China, while 33 percent was with South Korea.

Continued international sanctions against the North and the possibility of additional unilateral sanctions from several countries means DPRK foreign trade will likely shrink more in 2010. It is also expected that the North’s economic dependency on China will continue to grow.