North Korean Economy Watch

Pictured Above: The DPRK’s two most famous waterways are the Paekma-Cholsan Waterway (see here and here) and the Kaechon-Lake Thaesong Waterway. A third waterway in the Miru Plain is too recent to appear on Google Earth.

 According to KCNA (2012-1-26):

Waterway to Be Built in South Hwanghae Province, DPRK

Pyongyang, January 26 (KCNA) — A gravity-fed waterway will be built in South Hwanghae Province.

It is another gigantic nature-remaking project in the era of Songun as part of the far-sighted nature-harnessing plan of leader Kim Jong Il and the dear respected Kim Jong Un.

The completion of the waterway will help sufficiently irrigate tens of thousands of hectares of farmland and tideland-turned rice fields including those in Ongjin, Kangryong, Pyoksong and other several counties to ensure a safe and high yield of grain.

It will also help save tens of thousands of kilowatt of electricity and make a great contribution to the economic development and improvement of people’s living standard by preventing the damage by flood in the area along Jaeryong River.

A ground-breaking ceremony took place in Haeju City on Thursday.

Present there were Choe Yong Rim, Kim Ki Nam and other senior officials and officials of ministries and national institutions, builders and working people.

As the DPRK’s “rice bowl”, South Hwanghae Province is home to at least three additional large-scale agricultural projects at the moment: Pujiman Tideland Reclamation (Ongjin), Ryongmae Island (룡매도) land reclamation project, and the Sohae-ri-Nunggum Island Tedeland Reclamation.

According to KCNA (2012-1-25):

The gross industrial output value grew 1.2 times for twenty days of January this year as against the same period last year.

This is the result of the high-pitched drive waged by all the workers of the country since the first day of this year after receiving with excitement the joint calls of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the joint New Year editorial for this year and the letter of the working people in South Hamgyong Province.

In the period, the Ministry of Light Industry increased the production 1.4 times and the Ministry of Food and Daily Necessities sharply boosted the production.

Thermal and hydropower stations have increased the ratio of operating the generating equipment.

Much effort is being concentrated on supplying coal to the thermal power plants and chemical and metal plants and developing more coal beds.

The Ministry of Coal Industry produced 12,000 more tons of coal than planned for the 20 days.

Iron mills and steelworks also increased the production.

The freight transport volume increased by 12 percent from the same period last year.

Innovations were made in the production of vinalon and fertilizer by the industrial establishments in the field of chemical industry and in the production of custom built equipment and mining machines by the industrial enterprises of the field of machine industry.

The forestry stations and pit wood stations increased the timber production.

Progress has been reported on a daily basis from the important projects including the building of apartments in Mansudae areas and the Paektusan Songun Youth Power Station.

For the uninitiated, this is about as close as the DPRK gets to releasing economic statistics. Note there are no base numbers–only [some] % increases. Also, despite the measure being officially named “output value”, it is really just a claim of increased physical production.  There is no value (prices) or mention of “services” included in these measures.

Unfortunately without more solid numbers, and the proclivity to ascribe productivity gains to effective propaganda, these reports cannot be taken seriously.

Although we all talk about the DPRK’s GDP and per capita income as if the numbers are solid, the reality is quite the opposite.  In addition to the general lack of information, there are all sorts of methodological problems with assessing the value of the DPRK’s economy.  Here are some helpful sources if you want to learn more:

1. DPRK Economic Statistics Report

2. G. Warren Nutter papers:

- (JSTOR) “Soviet Industrial Growth”, Source: Science, New Series, Vol. 130, No. 3370 (Jul. 31, 1959), pp. 252-255

-(JSTOR) “Industrial Growth in the Soviet Union”, The American Economic Review , Vol. 48, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1958), pp. 398-411

-(JSTOR) Some Observations on Soviet Industrial Growth”, The American Economic Review , Vol. 47, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1957), pp. 618-630

3. The North Korean Economy by Nicholas Eberstadt

4. Assessing the economic performance of North Korea, 1954–1989: Estimates and growth accounting analysis

5. Bank of Korea’s assessment fo the DPRK economy in 2010.

6. My North Korean Economic Statistics Page

Huichon Power Station on Google Earth
The Huichon Power Stations 1 & 2 (희천1호발전소, 희천2호발전소) are too new to appear on Google Earth satellite imagery. I have, however, mapped them out by hand on the old imagery to give a better idea of their locations. I have also tagged them on Wikimapia.

In the picture above you can see that the Huichon Power Station’s headwaters begin in Ryongrim County (룡림군) where the newly-built Ryongrim Dam holds back a large reservoir. This reservoir drains through a tunnel [in orange in the image above] approximately 30 km long (18.5 miles) and empties through the Huichon Power Station No. 1 in Tongsin County into the Chongchon River. The river flows south where it crosses into Huichon County and builds up behind a second reservoir.  From this second reservoir the water drains out directly through the Huichon Power Station No. 2.

The construction of the Ryongrim Dam has resulted in the destruction of at least two villages, Toyang-ri (도양리) and Sinchang-ri (신창리).  Toyang-ri was destroyed for the dam itself. Sinchang-ri was flooded by the reservoir.  A third village, Kuryong-ri (구룡리), was also likely flooded or relocated—although this cannot be confirmed with current satellite imagery. The destroyed villages were probably relocated to Ryongrim Town itself. On several recent occasions North Korean television has highlighted improvements in housing and leisure facilities within the town.

When Kim Jong-il gave guidance visits to this site he often stood on the eastern side of the dam which offers the view captured in the image above (R).

The Huichon Power Station No. 1 itself is located in Tongsin County aproximately 30km due south from the Ryongrim Dam (40.273568°, 126.526565°).

In the satellite image above I have drawn the physical location of the power plant.  Next to and below it I have posted images from KCTV dated 2011-3-10.

The Huichon Power Station No. 2 lies on the Chongchon River just south of the border with Tongsin.

This project might have resulted in the destruction of one village, Kyonghung-ri (경흥리), in Tongsin County, but this is impossible to confirm without better satellite imagery.

So where will the electricity produced at these new power stations be consumed? On January 21, 2012, Rodong Sinmun reported the answer:

Like the warm hands of leader Kim Jong Il, the transmission lines from the Huichon Power Station are now almost stretching out for the capital city of Pyongyang.

To meet the great expectations of Kim Jong Il who entrusted them to such a gigantic work, the builders of the power station have gained great successes.

They have erected big dams, cut waterway tunnels and carried out other bulky tasks that were said to take ten years and more; and in the wake of trial operation of generating equipment at the Huichon Power Station No. 1, they successfully assembled the hulks of generators at the Huichon Power Station No. 2.

These successes had an immediate chain reaction on the scaffold workers laying transmission cables from the power station to the capital city.

They have already laid transmission cables in scores of kilometer long section, while preceding the construction of pylons in two months.

By their heroic labor, the excavation work to lay the foundation for the pylons have been wound up, too.

Now, their job is concrete tamping of the pylons’ foundations. By introducing new work methods they are hastening their work of erecting pylons as firm as would stand for many hundred years.

Now that power lines have been lain in major sections, they have buckled down to laying the power lines in the remaining sections and erecting transformer substations to reach the capital city as early as possible.

It won’t be long before we can see the power lines reach Pyongyang amid the cheers of the citizens.

Since I have mapped out a significant portion of the North Korean electricity grid on Google Earth, I can point out an area where I believe these power cables are being constructed. In the image below, dated 2010-9-14, I have connected the power cable tower construction sites with a yellow line:

In the image above there are approximately 146 power cable towers under construction between Pakchon (North Pyongan-top of image) and Sunan (Pyongyang-bottom of image). Of course, to be certain that these are the specific lines connecting Huichon and Pyongyang,  I will need more imagery.

Ryesonggang Power Station 2 update

I previously wrote about the Ryesonggang Power Station No. 2 here. Since a newer satellite image has come to my attention that shows the project completed, however, I thought I would post an update.

Ryesonggang Power Station No. 3 

On June 25, 2011 North Korean television showed construction of the Ryesonggang Power Station No. 3 had begun.  The DPRK submitted this project to the UNFCC’s Carbon trading program. Using satellite imagery, we can see that construction is indeed well under way:

The satellite images above are dated 2007-10-4 (L) and 2011-3-23 (R). In the right-hand photo I have boxed in the construction site and the quarters and facilities of the construction workers.

UPDATE: This was picked up by Radio Free Asia.

Andray Abrahamin and John Kim worte a comprehensive summary of the current state of Rason. The article appears in The Diplomat:

In 1991, the North Korean government dubbed Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) a free trade zone to attract foreign capital. However, less than a decade later, the zone lost its free trade status. According to local businessmen, the party secretary of Rason, a relative of the late Kim Jong-il himself, was charged with corruption and eventually executed, a harbinger for the long period of isolation ahead. Since the end of 2009, signs of renewed commitment to Rason have sprouted. While it may be too early to say whether the region will succeed in drawing investment and reform, our recent trips to Rason lead us to believe that developments on the ground may eventually warrant a shift in foreign policy by governments around the globe.

China has long eyed Rason as a potential import/export center for the landlocked provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang. However, from Rason’s inception, the Middle Kingdom held little influence or interest in the region’s success. In 2002, North Korea establishedanother special economic zone in Shinuiju and instated businessman Yang Bin, then China’s second richest man, as the SEZ’s Chief Executive. The Chinese authorities promptly placed Yang Bin under house arrest. Perhaps as a lesson learned from this episode, the North Koreans have made the Chinese government a major stakeholder in Rason’s development.

The Chinese have moved 80,000 metric tons of coal this year through a pier they leased at the Rajin port.They are also reportedly sending regular delegations of senior officials, including the Chairman of the China Development Bank, and they have invested $30 million to repave the road from the border town of Wonjong to the Rajin Port. This road was 60 percent paved during a visit in October, and recent reports from businessmen inside the region confirm that the road is now 95 percent paved, allowing for large trucks to pass through. The Chinese have also constructed a new road on their side of the border, part of the support this area has received after the Chinese central government designated it “The Changjitu Development Region” in November of 2009.Officials from the North explained that the Chinese will have a say in everything from zoning of real estate to port customs and investment policies.

Though Russia’s involvement doesn’t run as deep, it also maintains a keen interest in Rason’s ice-free port and has pledged an investment of $200 million to refurbish a railway from the border town of Khasan and to upgrade pier three at the Rajin port, which it has leased for 49 years. Rason’s third port at Oongsang was once a major exporter of lumber from the Soviet Union, and though Oongsang looks far from reviving the Soviet involvement of its heyday, Russia clearly has an interest in Rason’s success as well.

In addition to neighboring countries’ newfound interest in the zone’s success, the North Korean leadership has also shown a renewed desire in luring investment into the region. In December 2009, Kim Jong-il made a visit to the area, sent his former trade minister to run the region as party secretary, and reinstated Rason’s status as a special city, wresting it out of provincial control. Any potential investor who visits the SEZ would experience the thirst of the local government to develop the region, as reflected by the words of an official with the Rason Economic Cooperation Bureau, Rhee Sung Hye: “The future of my career depends on how much investment I can bring.”

At the national level there are also signs that the regime is increasing its focus on economic development as a source of legitimacy. In 2009, the Joint Venture Investment Commission was formed as a one stop shop for foreign investors, while the Taepung Group and State Development Bank were created to attract foreign investment. In the first half of 2011, Kim Jong-il made more appearances related to the economy and less related to defense than in prior years, and a focus on improving lives through focus on light industry and agriculture was emphasized in joint editorials that signaled policy direction at the beginning of 2010 and 2011.

The alignment of simultaneous commitment from North Korea, China, and Russia sets the scene for a North Korean special economic zone with higher chances of success than perhaps ever before. However, interest and desire may not necessarily translate into results without knowledge of markets and how to create a stable investment environment. After a recent tour of his 200MW fuel oil powered generation facility, the President of Songbong Power, Rhee Kang Chul, expressed that the reason for his plant’s inactivity and the subsequent blackouts in the region was the rise in feedstock costs. When asked about mechanisms for electricity pricing, Rhee responded that the government had set power prices at 6.5 euro cents/kwh, but he couldn’t provide further details on how the number was arrived at and when it might change again. Though Rhee was clearly an expert on the technical aspects of power generation, he hadn’t had the chance to consider that potential investors, after getting comfortable with country risk, would have little clarity on the revenue side of their equation. When this was expressed to the Vice Mayor of Rason, he replied, “We can change the price of electricity here. Rason is not under the same restrictions as the rest of the country.”

North Korea could theoretically piggyback off the market knowledge that their Chinese partners have gained over the last 30 years, but Rason’s neighbors are only likely to share when it suits their interests. In the case of Sonbong Power, Kang told us that every Chinese official who has visited stated that the most effective solution would be to pipe in power from the Chinese grid. “We plan to have a power line installed from the border by the end of 2013.” As power is as strategic asset like food or water, dependence on Chinese power clearly leaves the North Koreans in a vulnerable position.

China is clearly North Korea’s closest ally, but their relationship has a thorny history and Pyongyang is acutely aware of its reliance on big brother Beijing. With China’s rise, many other countries in the region are increasingly dependent on trade but increasingly cautious of dependence, welcoming a stronger presence from the United States, which is in the midst of a strategic pivot towards Asia.

In December 2009, the Asia Society and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation published a report arguing that economic engagement of Pyongyang by the United States would result in creation of vested interests in continued reform, a changed perception of self-interest and a less confrontational foreign policy from North Korea. Against the backdrop of a more uncertain domestic environment after the death of Kim Jong-il, and the shifting dynamics in Asia generally, a North Korea that trades more and engages with the outside world may necessitate a change in foreign policy of governments around the world, most specifically the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

The Rajin-Sonbong SEZ has a checkered past and it would be naïve to say that North Korea is embarking on late 1970’s style Chinese economic reforms. However, we believe that the unprecedented alignment of interests in the region make it a likely starting point for any lasting directional change, which is why the world should watch Rason.

Read the full story here:
Why World Should Watch Rason
The Diplomat
John Kim & Andray Abrahamian
2011-12-22

Google Earth is offering some new imagery of the DPRK so I wanted to point out a few of the new locations we can identify.  The Pyongyang imagery is dated 2011-3-15. The east-coast imagery is dated 2011-5-14.

1. Solar Equipment Center (태양열설비쎈)

(Google Earth Coordinates: 39.014504°, 125.662840° , Google Maps, Wikimapia)

Kim Jong-il visited this facility on October 9, 2011.  It produces solar water heaters (KCNA).

2. Kumkop (gold cup) Combined Foodstuff Factory (금컵체육인종합식료공장)

(Google Earth Coordinates: 39.009592°, 125.671213°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

According to KCNA:

The factory produces rice cake, bread, confectionary, processed meat and drinks. It also has welfare facilities for its employees.

The drinks, including carbonated water and nutritious water, are made with natural medicinal materials good for recovery from fatigue and promotion of health.

3. New Taekwando Center construction:

(Google Earth Coordinates:  39.016453°, 125.681939°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

This facility is due to be completed in July.  I am not sure what it offers that the other Taekwando Center located right next door doesn’t have.

4. Something new at the old baseball stadium:

(Google Earth Coordinates:  39.008113°, 125.679196°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

5. Wonsan – Hamhung Road (Partial map):

(Google Earth Coordinates:  39.421286°, 127.272296°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

Read more about this road here.

6. And not really new, but Kim Jong-il recently visited the wind power farm of KPA Air Force Unit 1016–so I thought I would post it:

This facility is located in Kwail County (과일군) at  38.442086°, 124.939944°.  I have also marked it on Wikimapia and Google Maps.  According to KCNA:

[Kim Jong-il] toured a wind power plant built by the unit. After being briefed on the plant, he went round its inside and outside to learn about its construction and output of electricity.

Very pleased to hear that servicepersons of the unit successfully completed the plant with high output capacity in cooperation with Kim Chaek University of Technology and scientific institutions, he gave a high appreciation of their merit.

I am relaxed to hear that pilots and servicepersons rejoice at the plant as they can freely use enough electricity for combat preparations while cooking and heating with it, he said.

Being told that the plant freed the unit from the shortage of electricity and some of excessive power is supplied even to a bathing resort in the unit’s stationary area, he said with high appreciation that the People’s Army has done good things for the people.

After his inspection, Kim Jong Il gave the accompanying commanding officials and staff members of the KPA Supreme Command precious teachings needed to further strengthen the KPA into an invincible revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu and thus defend the socialist motherland as firm as a rock.

Just east of this facility is an air force base, so it is reasonable to assume that this is the home of KPA Air Force Unit 1016:

This wind power farm is not the KPA Air Force’s only or even largest experiment with wind power. Below is a Google Earth image of a facility in Ongjin County:

This facility is located in Google Earth here: 37.941508°, 125.409778°. I have also tagged it on Wikimpaia and Google Maps. It contains four wind turbines on two different sites (as of 2010-7-4).

I have uploaded a short clip to You Tube that is taken from North Korean television.  It shows a romanticized account of the installation of these specific wind power turbines.  You can see the clip here.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-11-23

North Korea has reportedly stopped coal export temporarily to manage fuel shortage during the winter season.

According to Chinese traders from Shenyang, their North Korean trade counterparts informed them that they recently received official orders from the government to stop exporting coal. Except for those orders previously received, coal from North Korea will not be leaving the country for the time being.

The export volume of coal has continuously increased this year, consequently causing a domestic shortfall in the supply of coal. In fear of power and fuel shortages for the winter season, North Korea is believed to be taking precautionary measures to preserve energy supply, especially with hydroelectric power generators not in operation.

From this year, North Korea has drastically increased coal export to China. From January to July, China has imported about 816,700 tons of North Korean anthracites, nine times more than the previous year. Anthracites made up 46.3 percent of the all the exports to China.

The amount of North Korean anthracites that entered China via Donggang Port (located in Dandong City, Liaoning Province) reached over 77.7 million USD. The city of Dandong is located across from Sinuiju. Separated by the Amnok River (Yalu River), it is the trade hub between China and the DPRK, with over 70 percent of total bilateral trade taking place in the city, as anthracite coal as the main object of trade.

With the international price of coal on the rise and operation of hydroelectric power plants in decline, dependence on thermoelectricity is growing, which explains the recent climb in China’s anthracite import.

Toughened international sanctions and halted trade with South Korea has made North Korea turn to natural resource trading with China to bring in hard currency.

In August 2009, North Korea halted coal exports when it was faced with extreme power shortage. However, coal trade was resumed the following April.

Massive amounts of coal were exported to China to earn foreign currency, but this has created serious energy shortage affecting the operations of factories and other industrial facilities.

During the field guidance visit to the February 8 Vinalon Complex, Kim Jong Il emphasized that “Raw materials must be adequately supplied to normalize the production of factories.”

However, most North Korean traders agreed that such suspension would not be prolonged for a lengthy period, since North Korea, who is heavily dependent on mined resource exports including coal and steel, cannot afford to enforce a trade embargo for long. Many expect the trade to resume by next spring.

Pyongyang, November 18 (KCNA) — The governments of the DPRK and South Sudan established diplomatic ties at an ambassadorial level.

A joint communique on the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations was made public in Ethiopia on Nov. 16.

The communique was signed by Kim Hyok Chol and Arop Kuol Deng, ambassadors of the DPRK and South Sudan to Ethiopia, upon authorization of the governments of their countries.

The two countries agreed to open their diplomatic ties from the very day of their signature to the joint communique, on the basis of the principle of respect for sovereignty, equality, reciprocity and non-interference and in line with the April 18, 1961, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Since all North Korean embassies must self-finance their operations, it is not likely that they will open an embassy in South Sudan until there are sufficient business contracts to maintain the office overhead. In the meantime, many of their diplomatic and consular functions will probably be held out of the Ethiopian embassy.

What kind of business opportunities await the DPRK in South Sudan? South Sudan is the world’s newest oil-producing nation, so it is likely that the DPRK will try to pursue oil contracts there. As a new nation, South Sudan also has an interest in building up its military capabilities. The DPRK has long supplied military equipment to the African continent, so they will probably look for opportunities in this new nation as well.

To date, the DPRK maintains embassies in the following African countries: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Post 36 (2012-1-27): Yonahp reports from anonymous sources that despite the death of Kim Jong-il, the DPRK leadership is still interested in pursuing the pipeline. According to the article:

Top North Korean officials have vowed to move ahead with an ambitious project to build a pipeline through their isolated country to ship Siberian gas to South Korea.

The North Korean officials reaffirmed their commitment to Russia following the death last month of their former leader Kim Jong-il, according to a diplomatic source in Moscow, without identifying the North Korean officials.

Post 35 (2011-11-17): According to RIA Novosti, the DPRK looks to reap $100 million per year in transit fees:

North Korea will get $100 million annually if it becomes a transit country for Russian gas supplies to South Korea, the Russian president’s envoy to the Far East said on Thursday.

In August, President Dmitry Medvedev said after talks with his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-il that the parties had reached an agreement to draw up a project to build a gas pipeline to South Korea. The pipeline will cost an estimated $6 billion.

“It [$100 million] would be a huge sum for a country with annual gross product of $10 billion. Moreover, the country would have to make no big effort to get it,” Presidential plenipotentiary envoy to the Russian Far East Victor Ishayev said.

Alexander Medvedev, Gazprom deputy board chairman, said the expected volume of Russian gas exports to South Korea was raised to 12 billion cubic meters from 10 bcm.

Supplies of Russian gas to South Korea are expected to be started in 2017. Gazprom currently supplies up to 1.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas to South Korea annually.

Post 34 (2011-11-16): According to the Daily NK, Russia has agreed to guarantee deliveries of gas via the pipeline:

Responding to fears over the possible risks that may come with the proposed three-way gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea via the North, Russian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Konstantin Vnukov reaffirmed again on Tuesday that Moscow is ready to shoulder that burden.

Delivering the keynote address at a forum held by the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation in central Seoul, Ambassador Vnukov asserted that Russia is in a position to “guarantee the risks arising from the North Korea pipeline.”

The ambassador’s words mirror an earlier pledge given by President Dimitry Medvedev during a summit meeting with President Lee Myung Bak in St. Petersburg on November 2nd, in which the Russian president revealed that his country would be willing to assume responsibility for the security risks associated with the project.

Vnukov also reaffirmed the benefits of the project for South Korea, saying, “Russian natural gas is coming into South Korea at the moment, but if imports were to be brought in via a pipeline, the cost would fall by 20-30%.”

He further noted that there is already a gas pipeline network in Russia stretching as far as the Russia-North Korea border region, meaning that “practical discussion about this can be had,” although he noted that it would require greater tripartite cooperation.

“Russia is pushing forward with joint projects including not only the gas pipeline but also the railways project,” he concluded, “These projects offer benefits to all of the North, the South and Russia, and help with the security of the Korean Peninsula and the normalization of inter-Korean dialogue.”

Post 33 (2011-11-4): According to the Donga Ilbo, the ROK is planning to offer the DPRK a natural gas power plant (rather than cash) in return for pipeline transit rights. The article reports:

South Korea plans to build a natural gas power plant in North Korea in return for the latter letting a gas pipeline linking the South and Russia pass through North Korean territory, a source said Thursday.

According to the source from the ruling Grand National Party of South Korea, if the pipeline goes through the North, the South is considering building a power plant rather than offering cash that Pyongyang could misuse.

“North Korea has no reason to reject this offer considering its dire power shortages,” the source said.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak agreed with Russian leader Dmitry Medvedev to closely cooperate to ensure success of the pipeline, so debate has risen in Seoul on how to compensate Pyongyang. Certain voices warn that if Seoul pays between 100 million U.S. dollars and 200 million dollars in cash, Pyongyang might use the money to expand its nuclear and military facilities.

Without transparency in the North`s use of the funds, others say, South Korea and the U.S. could even argue over the pipeline project in addition to conservatives in Seoul.

“The key issues in the pipeline project are safety and the passage fee,” told Won Hee-ryong, a member of the ruling party`s supreme council, at a party meeting. “Public consensus is necessary since public opinion will be divided if Russia gives the money paid by the South to the North in cash.”

Therefore, Seoul and Moscow will likely include specific details on the proposed power plant in the North when they sign a contract for the pipeline and gas supply. Seoul`s plan is to pay cash to Moscow for the pipeline, while the latter will use part of the money to build a natural gas plant in the North.

The South would then provide part of the natural gas from Russia to the North, which would use the gas to generate power.

The source said it was in the same vein that Medvedev promised that Russia will take complete responsibility for the risks of the pipeline going through North Korea.

Two points: First, this plan seems to be taking the proposal to route gas to the DPRK through South Korea seriously. See the map below for more details, but the bottom line of the proposal is that if Pyongyang carries through with a course of action that leads to the disruption of gas supplies, Pyongyang itself would pay a direct economic price for their behavior.  The offer to build a gas power plant, in this sense, can be seen as an effort to coax North Korea into an economic game in which it faces a strong economic incentive to control its future behavior.

Secondly, every country’s budget is fungible. Offering to build a power plant instead of cash might reduce the quantity of funds the DPRK devotes to activities the international community considers undesirable, however, it will not zero them out.  If the South Koreans and Russians build and maintain a power plant int he DPRK, this will free up significant resources in the DPRK budget for other activities, some of which may be considered unacceptable by its neighbors.

Post 32 (2011-11-3): The Korea Herald also reports on the Medvedev-Lee talks in St. Petersburg:

The two leaders agreed that once the security problem was dealt with, they could consider supplying surplus electricity as well as gas from the Russian Far East to South Korea via the North, Choe said.

A tentative agreement reached between Korea Gas Corp. and Russia’s Gazprom calls for starting the construction of a pipeline through North Korea in 2013 in order to begin gas supply in 2017.

The two state-funded companies agreed on the roadmap in September, Nikolai Dubik, head of Gazprom’s legal department, said at the Korea-Russia Dialogue forum in St. Petersburg Wednesday.

The roadmap calls for the completion of commercial negotiations on the basic conditions related to the pipeline gas project by January and the signing of a deal between January and April.

The two sides will then draft the gas pipeline route between March next year and September 2013, start the construction right away and complete it by December 2016 to begin supply in January 2017, Dubik said.

Chief executives Choo Kang-soo of KOGAS and Alexey Miller of Gazprom signed on to the plan in September during Choo’s visit to Moscow.

Alexander Medvedev, head of Gazprom’s export, said in an international management forum in Tokyo late last month that his staff were in talks with their Korean counterpart on the main conditions related to the gas supply.

He said they plan to complete the discussions by January and sign a basic agreement in mid-2012.

Lee said intensifying Korea-Russia cooperation in Siberia and the Russian Far East region was highly encouraging for the future of the two countries as well as Northeast Asia in a speech at the closing ceremony of the Korea-Russia Dialogue forum earlier Wednesday.

“I visited Siberia and the Russian Far East a number of times when I was a businessman, confirmed the infinite potential of the region with my own eyes and have sought bilateral economic cooperation since,” Lee said at the second annual KRD forum in St. Petersburg.

Post 31 (2011-11-2): The Korea Times reports on the Medvedev-Lee summit in St. Petersburg:

President Lee Myung-bak and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed Wednesday to work closely together to push a pipeline project to send Russian gas to South Korea via North Korea.

During a summit here, Lee and Medvedev shared the view that the three sides involved will benefit if the project goes ahead.

Russia could send as much as 10 billion cubic meters of gas to South Korea a year if the trans-Korea pipeline is built.

South Korea could purchase quality Russian gas at a reasonable price — at nearly a 30 percent discount compared to current prices — while North Korea can earn an estimated $100 million a year in transit fees.

The gas pipeline was on top of the agenda for the Lee-Medvedev summit.

Although they agreed on the benefits, Lee addressed the political risks of the project. He said he was concerned with the possibility of North Korea, which was responsible for two attacks last year, “playing games” with the pipeline.

If that problem is resolved, Lee said Seoul could consider cooperating with Moscow on sending electricity from the Russian Far East to South Korea through North Korea as well.

Although the two leaders shared the need for cooperation on the project, no concrete agreement signaling a development in the matter was announced after the talks.

The state-run Korea Gas Corporation signed an exploratory blueprint with its Russian counterpart Gazprom in September.

Russia has been talking with North Korea over the pipeline project after Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il agreed to construct the gas pipeline during a summit held in Sakhalin in August.

In an interview with French daily Le Figaro, Lee said the three sides involved may be able to sit down together some time in the future to discuss the trilateral project.

“But there are several conditions that need to be met before this happens,” he said.

Post 30 (2011-11-2): The Korea Times reports that South Korean officials are downplaying the importance of the roadmap:

South Korean officials on Wednesday downplayed the significance of a roadmap it had agreed with Russia to build a massive gas pipeline linking the two countries via North Korea, saying the project still has a long way to go.

On Tuesday, a senior Russian official said the two countries hope to start construction of the transnational gas pipeline in 2013 and transport Siberian gas through the connection in 2017.

The timeline was part of a memorandum of understanding South Korea’s state-run gas firm Korea Gas Corp. signed in September with its Russian counterpart Gazprom on the project, said Nikolai Dubik, chief of Gazprom’s legal department.

On Wednesday, South Korean officials downplayed the plan’s significance, saying it is not legally binding and little more than wishful hopes for now. They stressed the two sides have not made any progress since September, and that any meaningful progress can come only after Russia and North Korea agree on pipeline transit fees.

“There has been no progress since the MOU in September,” a government official said on condition of anonymity. “Russia has not yet made any commercial proposals to us, such as gas prices or terms of construction. Once proposals are made, we have to hold negotiations.”

The ambitious project, which has been discussed for about 20 years but never materialized due in part to security tensions, gained momentum after North Korean leader Kim Jong-il expressed his willingness to permit the envisioned pipeline to go through the nation during summit talks with Medvedev in August.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev were expected to discuss the project during summit talks in Russia’s second-largest city of Saint Petersburg Wednesday, along with efforts to end Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.

“I doubt today’s summit will produce any specific results (about the pipeline),” the government official said.

The project has drawn keen media attention because it could help reduce tensions on the divided peninsula. Lee has also said that the project is workable as it would benefit all parties involved.

But in an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro published Tuesday, Lee also said there is a long way to go before the project comes to fruition.

“There will be a point in time where the South, the North and Russia hold three-way discussions,” Lee said in the interview. “But before reaching that stage, a lot of conditions must be fulfilled. Discussions on the gas pipeline project could proceed swiftly, or not. It is difficult to predict for now.”

Post 29 (2011-10-24): The Korea Economic Institute and the National Committee on North Korea co-hosted a presentation with Georgy Toloraya on the current dynamics of North Korea – Russia relations and how their diplomatic efforts affect approaches to solving important issues involving North Korea. You can watch the presentation here.

Post 28 (2011-10-24): Russia, South Korea discuss gas pipeline. According to RIA Novosti:

A Russian delegation has left for Seoul for a meeting of the intergovernmental commission on gas supplies to South Korea and construction of a pipeline via North Korea, a source in the Russian Energy Ministry said on Monday.

“A meeting of the intergovernmental commission will be held tomorrow. A large Gazprom delegation has set off there and I hope they will reach an agreement,” the source said.

The source said that three-party negotiations would start only after all necessary agreements with South Korea were concluded. “We are looking forward to holding tripartite talks,” the source said.

In August, President Dmitry Medvedev said after talks with his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-il that the parties had reached an agreement to draw up a project to build a gas pipeline to South Korea. The pipeline will cost an estimated $6 billion.

Alexander Medvedev, Gazprom deputy board chairman, said the expected volume of Russian gas exports to South Korea was raised to 12 billion cubic meters from 10 bcm.

Supplies of Russian gas to South Korea are expected to be started n 2017. Gazprom currently supplies up to 1.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas to South Korea annually.

Post 27 (2011-10-5): Stephan Haggard links to a fantastic report (in the Korean Yonhap) which offers an economic solution to the DPRK’s credible commitment problem with regards to pipeline contract enforcement: build the pipeline to Pyongyang via South Korea.

In this scheme (above left), if Pyongyang cuts off the gas in the pipeline, Pyongyang can be cut off as well. This is basically a form of bonding (insuring) the investment in the absence of a credible third party contract enforcer.

Haggard offers the following information from the Korean report:

South Korean demand will always be larger than North Korean demand, creating asymmetries in bargaining power. But this scheme requies that North Korea have some skin in the game beyond simply collecting transit fees. This idea creates a classic—and beneficial–mutual hostage situation: “you hold me up, I hold you up.”

Kwon’s cost estimate for the project–$2.2 billion—is slightly lower than what Kogas’ Russian subsidiary (Kogas Vostok) has estimated ($2.5 billion). But the project would increase Russia’s share of the South Korean market from 6 to nearly 30 percent. While the Kogas Vostok official stated that the pipeline option is more efficient than either compressed or liquefied natural gas (CNG or LNG), he also admitted that the pipeline involved “unavoidable” political risks.

(more…)

Pictured above (Google Earth): The KEDO light water reactor construction site in Sinpho County, South Hamgyong Province.  See in Google Maps here.

 According to Yonhap:

An international consortium once tasked with building two power-generating nuclear reactors in North Korea will soon demand that the communist country provide US$1.89 billion in compensation for the project’s failure, a Seoul official said Monday.

The demand comes after North Korea filed its own compensation claim worth some $5.8 billion in September, saying it suffered heavy financial losses and other troubles from the failed project.

In a 1994 deal linked to North Korea’s promise to denuclearize, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which includes South Korea, Japan and the United States, agreed to build two 1,000-megawatt light-water reactors in the communist country within several years.

After years of delays due to poor funding and other problems, the project fell through in 2006 after the U.S. caught North Korea pushing a second nuclear weapons program based on enriched uranium in addition to its widely known plutonium-based one.

The $4.2 billion project was about 35 percent complete when the KEDO called it off.

“Ever since the project fell through in 2006, the KEDO has sent a request to North Korea each year, demanding compensation for its breach of the agreement,” the government official said, requesting anonymity. “North Korea gave no response, and its sudden claim for compensation is completely unacceptable. The KEDO plans to send an official reply in the coming days.”

The latest development comes as diplomatic efforts are under way to revive the stalled six-party talks on ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang is pushing for an unconditional reopening of the multilateral negotiations it walked away from in April 2009, while Seoul and Washington insist that the communist country first demonstrate its sincerity toward denuclearization through such pre-steps as a monitored shutdown of its uranium enrichment program.

The forum, which offers economic and political aid to North Korea in exchange for its denuclearization, also involves Japan, China and Russia.

The Korea Times also reported on this story.

Read the full story here:
Power consortium to demand $1.89 bln from N. Korea over failed energy project
Yonhap
2011-11-14

From the Choson Exchange web page (November 5):

In October 2011, John Kim, a board director of the Choson Exchange, visited the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone. The following is a summary of some of his findings based on site visits and talks with senior officials in the SEZ. An longer account of his travels and impressions will be available soon. This information helps elaborate on our report from August.

Rajin Port
The Rajin Port employs 1400 workers. The Chinese have conducted feasibility tests regarding two new piers, but currently the port houses three piers with 9-9.5 meters draft. A 30,000 metric ton coal storage warehouse was built at Pier 1 by the Chinese, who moved 80,000 metric tons through the facility in five shipments from January to September. Pier two, largely dedicated to container shipment, is currently dormant and a Swiss company is currently using Pier 3 to ship manganese and talc out of the region. The Russians also have a 49 year lease agreement signed in 2008.

Oongsang [Ungsang] Port
Oongsang Port exported Russian lumber until 1985, but remains largely quiet now except for the occasional fishing boat. The present draft of 7 meters constricts any major future activity, so the North Koreans hope to bring in over $100M to widen the draft to 9 meters. After Rajin Port activity surpasses capacity there, Oongsang Port will become the next regional hub for drybulk activity.

Sonbong Port
Originally opened in the early 70’s, the draft within the port is 7 meters, but a fully laden Very Large Crude Carrier containing 270,000 metric tons of oil can offload at an offshore facility further out at sea. Two pipes, 63 cm in diameter, run for 9km underground before reaching the storage facility at “Victory Petrochemical”, a simple refinery that was designed to refine crude and send oil products (gasoline, naphtha, jet fuel, diesel and fuel oil) back to the port for export. In addition to this two way flow, fuel oil also arrived sporadically at the port as part of aid packages from 1994 to 2008.

Sonbong Power
This power plant was originally designed to take fuel oil from Victory Petrochemical as feedstock and generate power to feed back to Victory. Since the refinery has been offline, Sonbong Power has at times provided electricity to the region, but with fuel oil prices close to $700/metric ton and current electricity prices at 6.5 eurocents/kwh, the economics of running the plant do not work leaving the 800 workers employed here largely idle.

Victory [Sungri] Oil Refinery
Literally translated as “Victory Chemical Plant”, this refinery was completed in 1973 with a 40,000bbl/day crude distillation unit that typically yields 40~50% residual fuel oil for an average crude feed. Investment into upgrading capacity in the international market has led to an eroding of margins for simple refineries like Victory. Currently the refinery is idle and would need over $500M in investment to become competitive.

Hye Song Trading Company
Mr Kim visited a Sewing Factory owned by Hye Song, which runs 8 such factories employing 2000 workers. Output is recorded for the entire year on a bulletin board at the front entrance of the company. All employees except the handyman were women.

Cell Phone use more prevalent
The number of cell phone users in the DPRK crossed 1 million earlier this year and one official commented that the overwhelming majority of urban households have at least one cell phone. This particular official had 4 phones for a household of 3. Foreigners are allowed to use cell phones on a different network, and users of the domestic and foreign network can not call each other. All usage is prepaid.

Handset Type: Local
Purchase Cost: 1570-2200 RMB
Usage Cost: 250 minutes and 20 text messages, while each additional minute is charged at 60 NKW (about .1 RMB/min)

Handset Type: Foreigner
Purchase Cost: 1800-2400 RMB
Usage Cost: Does not include any free minutes and are charged at 2RMB/min

Banking System has room for growth
There are two banks in Rason, the Central Bank, which is focused on domestic transactions, and the Golden Triangle Bank, which is focused on foreign currency transactions. Transactions for goods and services are conducted almost entirely in cash, usually in RMB or NKW. Mechanisms for savings are credit have room for development. As banks take a fee to deposit and withdraw cash, merchants prefer to hold money in cash (usually RMB). Credit is also available almost exclusively through friends or family.

Bottlenecks
A number of issues require solving if Rason is serious about attracting large scale foreign investment. Among these are reliable access to travel visas, reasonable communications costs with the outside world, a more mature banking system with savings and credit mechanisms and favorable tax treatment with a consistent legal framework. The mere fact that Rason is experimenting with market reform is encouraging, and Mr Kim is optimistic about economic development in the region and the nation as a whole.